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AIRSS)
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COPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
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Satellite-Aided Tracking
COSTIND Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (China)
COTS Commercial Orbital Transportation System
CSA Canadian Space Agency
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
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MDA Missile Defense Agency (US)
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Space Security 2008 is the fifth annual report on trends and developments in space, covering the
period January to December 2007. It is part of a wider Space Security Index (SSI) project that
facilitates dialog among space experts on space security challenges.
In keeping with the intent expressed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that space is a global
commons to be used for peaceful purposes, the definition of space security guiding this report is:
The secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom
from space-based threats.
The primary consideration is not the interests or the security of specific actors operating in
space, but the security of space as an environment that can be sustained for use by all actors.
The Space Security Index aims to improve transparency with respect to space activities and
provide a common, comprehensive knowledge base to support the development of national
and international policies that ensure secure space access for all nations. This is critical because
outer space is an environment distinctly different from the terrestrial environment, but
intimately connected. Human activities such as debris creation require special caution and
attention because their impact on space and on Earth can be extreme and far-reaching. Military
security on Earth has become intertwined with the security of space assets. Conflicts in space
between states can reflect but also aggravate existing tensions. While space activities are a
strategic focus for national security, the pervasive dual military and civilian uses of space assets
also contribute to global human security by, for example, tracking weather patterns to support
agriculture, assisting responses to natural calamities, and interdicting criminal activities and
human rights violations. And yet technologies that better enable the use of space for some
purposes and actors may deny the secure use of space for other legitimate purposes and actors
as technological developments outstrip the existing governance framework for outer space.
Space security is assessed here according to the following eight indicators:
• The space environment
• Space laws, policies and doctrines
• Civil space programs and global utilities
• Commercial space
• Space support for terrestrial military operations
• Space systems protection
• Space systems negation
• Space-based strike systems
Each chapter provides a description of a specific indicator and its impact on space security. A
discussion of the prevailing trends associated with each indicator is followed by an overview of
key developments throughout the year, and an assessment of their short-term effects on
established trends and the broader security of outer space. Longer-term changes can also be
observed and noted. For example, a prolonged decline in the annual production of new space
debris, described in Trend 1.1 under the Space Environment, has reversed and rates are once
again increasing.
Several developments in 2007, captured under different indicators in this volume highlight the
contradictions and complexities intrinsic to outer space activity. As described under the space
environment indicator in chapter 1, the year 2007 marked the greatest annual increase in space
debris, largely attributed to the intercept and destruction of a redundant weather satellite in low
Earth orbit by China and the explosion of a failed Russian Briz-M rocket body. Yet 2007 also
witnessed the adoption of debris mitigation guidelines by the United Nations, described in
chapter 2 on laws, policies and doctrines. Chapter 7 on space support for terrestrial military
5
6operations describes the use of missile and anti-missile technologies to threaten space assets and
collective security in outer space. Such use sparked renewed efforts to regulate deployments and
activities in outer space, as indicated in chapter 2. Despite what may be viewed as growing
military tensions in space, 2007 also marked the creation of a “Global Exploration Strategy,”
described in chapter 3 on civil space programs — a vision produced by the 14 largest national
civil space agencies to coordinate future space exploration activities.
Space Security 2008 does not seek to provide an absolutely positive or negative assessment of all
outer space activities conducted in 2007. The contradictions and complexities do not allow it.
Instead, this volume aims to assess the range of implications that developments could have on
the security of space across the various indicators. Such an assessment reflects the real-life
challenge faced by policymakers in determining the multiple effects of their potential and actual
decisions across the range of indicators.
Expert participation in the Space Security Index is a key component of the project. The primary
research is reviewed prior to publication through three processes. The annual Space Security
E-Consultation is done online, with comments provided by participants representing all sectors
(commercial, military, civil, etc.). This consultation provides invaluable insights into the
perceptions, concerns, and priorities of space stakeholders around the world, as well as critical
feedback on the research. The Space Security Working Group consultation is held each spring
for 2 days and the text is reviewed chapter by chapter for corrections and gaps. The participants
are listed in Annex 1. The Working Group meeting also provides an important forum for
dialog. Finally, the Advisory Group to the Space Security Index provides its comments in the
penultimate step before publication.
Space Security 2008 is based solely on open source information. Great effort is made to ensure a
complete and factually accurate description of events, based on a critical appraisal of the available
information and consultation with international experts. Strategic and commercial secrecy with
respect to space activities inevitably poses a challenge to the comprehensive nature of this report,
particularly when reporting on proposed research or future activities. It should be noted,
however, that space assets and activities by their very nature are generally in plain view to those
with the technology to observe them. Such technology is increasingly available at low cost.
For further information about the Space Security Index, its methodology, project partners, and
sponsors, please visit the website www.spacesecurity.org. Comments and suggestions to improve
the publication are welcome.
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The Space Environment
Trend 1.1: Growing debris threats to spacecraft as rate of debris production
increases — Traveling at speeds of up to 7.8 kilometers per second, space debris poses a
significant threat to spacecraft. The number of objects in Earth orbit has increased steadily;
today the US Department of Defense (DOD) is using the Space Surveillance Network to
track more than 17,300 objects approximately 10 cm or larger. It is estimated that there are
over 300,000 objects measuring between 1 and 10 cm in diameter, and billions smaller. The
annual growth rate of tracked debris began to decrease in the 1990s, largely due to national
debris mitigation efforts, but has been growing again since 2004.
2007 Developments
• Chinese kinetic satellite intercept creates largest manmade debris field in history
• Trackable space debris population increases by 20.12 percent
Space security impact
The deliberate destruction of a satellite and creation of such a massive debris field at a
relatively high altitude in a crowded orbit has a negative impact on space security, increasing
the threat of debris collision for operational satellites in low Earth orbit and those launched in
the future. Additional unintentional breakups demonstrate that even normal launch activity
can further degrade the space environment, even if best practices are applied. Efforts must be
made by all space actors to mitigate the threat to space security posed by debris.
Trend 1.2: Increasing awareness of space debris threats and continued
efforts to develop guidelines for debris mitigation — Significant on-orbit collisions
such as the collision of the French military satellite Cerise with a portion of an Ariane rocket
in 1996, and improved tracking abilities have encouraged the cognition of space debris as a
growing threat. Since the mid-1990s, many spacefaring states, including China, Japan, Russia,
and the US, and the European Space Agency have developed debris mitigation standards.
2007 Developments
• International debris mitigation guidelines adopted
• Better implementation of mitigation guidelines by commercial actors
Space security impact
The approval of voluntary debris mitigation guidelines is a positive step for ensuring the
sustainability of the space environment, but the number of breakup events in 2007 (see Trend
1.1) demonstrated that the challenge of space debris will require solutions on multiple fronts.
If implemented by all space actors, the debris mitigation guidelines will reduce the chances
that future space launches and missions will create additional debris but will not reduce the
debris creation from objects already on orbit. The record of implementation was mixed in
2007, with China worsening the problem of debris but commercial operators better managing
end-of-life procedures for satellites in GEO. Solutions that help prevent collisions between
operational satellites and other objects are still needed, as well as research into potential
methods of removing debris from orbit.
Trend 1.3: Space surveillance capabilities to support collision avoidance
slowly improving— Efforts to create an international space surveillance system to support
collision avoidance and debris re-entry have been unsuccessful, but several states have pursued
national systems. The US Space Surveillance Network uses 30 sensors worldwide to monitor
over 17,000 space objects in all orbits, but has moderated access to its data since 2004 out of
9
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concern for national security. Russia maintains a Space Surveillance System using its
early-warning radars and monitors some 5,000 objects (mostly in LEO), but does not widely
disseminate data. The EU, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Japan are all developing
independent space surveillance capabilities.
2007 Developments
• US focus on improving space situational awareness capabilities continues, but actions are modest
• Worldwide actors continue to develop independent space surveillance capabilities
Space security impact
The international improvement of space surveillance and space situational awareness
capabilities in 2007 may have a positive effect on space security by providing improved and
redundant tracking of space objects for collision avoidance, as well as greater transparency of
space activities. However, the trend toward secretive development of space situational
awareness and the continued drive for independent space tracking systems indicate a broader
mistrust that could reduce space security, particularly as many aspects of these capabilities are
enablers for space system negation. In this context, greater transparency may not make actors
feel more secure in space, as the growing focus on the space protection/negation elements of
space situational awareness demonstrated (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1).
Trend 1.4: Growing demand for radio frequency spectrum and orbital slots
— Expanding satellite applications are driving demand for limited resources in space,
including radio frequencies and orbital slots. More satellites are operating in the frequency
bands that are commonly used by GEO satellites and are causing increasing frequency
interference. Satellite operators spend about five percent of their time addressing frequency
interference issues, including conflicts such as the disagreement over frequency allocation
between the US Global Positioning System and the EU Galileo navigational system. The
growth in military bandwidth consumption has also been dramatic: the US military used
some 700 megabytes per second of bandwidth during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2003,
compared to 99 megabytes per second during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. There are
more than 800 operational satellites in orbit today: Increased competition for orbital slot
assignments, particularly in GEO where most communications satellites operate, has caused
occasional disputes between satellite operators. The International Telecommunication Union
has been pursuing reforms to address slot allocation backlogs and related financial challenges.
2007 Developments
• Cooperation and conflict over satellite navigation signals
• US efforts to increase military communications bandwidth
• Global efforts to solve spectrum demand issues
• Unintentional radio frequency interference continues
Space security impact
Radio frequency competition, coordination, and interference posed a challenge to space
security in 2007, particularly for strategic uses. While international institutions such as the
ITU continue to manage competition for space resources, the fact that military operators are
outside this arrangement complicates the process, which will only become more difficult as
demand from all users increases in the future. Nonetheless, recognition of the issue and
progress toward solutions demonstrate the willingness of all space actors to work together on
this issue.
10
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Trend 1.5: Increased recognition of the threat from NEO collisions with Earth
and progress toward possible solutions— Near Earth objects (NEOs) are asteroids
and comets whose orbits bring them in close proximity to the Earth or intersect the Earth’s
orbit. Over the past decade a growing amount of research started to identify the types of
objects that pose threats to Earth and potential mitigation strategies. Mitigation is a difficult
challenge due to the extreme mass, velocity, and distance of any impacting NEO, and depends
on the amount of warning time. Types of kinetic mitigation methods may include ramming
the NEO with a series of kinetic projectiles, and some have advocated the use of nearby
explosions of nuclear weapons, which could create additional threats to the environment and
stability of outer space.
2007 Developments
• Ongoing debate on mitigation strategies for NEOs
Space security impact
Efforts to address potential threats from NEOs are positive insofar as they make the link
between space and the security of Earth. However, some options to mitigate threats, such as
the use of nuclear weapons, may have negative repercussions for space security by contributing
to environmental hazards and instability. There is a need to further explore this issue with the
aim of balancing protection of the Earth from space-based threats with long-term
sustainability of the space environment.
Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
Trend 2.1: Gradual development of legal framework for outer space
activities — The international legal framework for outer space establishes the principle that
space should be used for “peaceful purposes.” Since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty
(OST) in 1967, this framework has grown to include the Astronaut Rescue Agreement
(1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1979), and the Moon
Agreement (1979), as well as a range of other international and bilateral agreements and
relevant rules of customary international law. The OST prohibits the stationing of nuclear
weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction anywhere in space. The termination of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 eliminated a longstanding US/USSR-Russia prohibition
on space-based conventional weapons, stimulating renewed concerns about the potential for
space weaponization.
Since 1981 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has each year adopted a resolution requesting
that states refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calling for
negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a multilateral agreement on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Voting patterns have demonstrated
near-unanimous support for the PAROS resolution; however, the US and Israel cast the first
negative votes in 2005.
2007 Developments
• Chinese satellite destruction raises concerns about the peaceful uses of outer space
• Divisions remain on key space security Resolutions at the UN General Assembly
• Some governments and civil society call for regulatory approaches to space security
Space security impact
Although the Chinese satellite intercept and destruction raised concerns about the peaceful
uses of outer space, including secure and sustainable access, it also focused the attention of the
Space Security 2008
international community on the gaps in the current space security legal and regulatory
framework. High-level support from government, military, and commercial officials for the
increased use of regulatory approaches such as guidelines, rules of the road, and codes of
conduct suggest that this might be a viable avenue to enhance the security of outer space in
the future. Although significant political divisions remain, efforts in this direction are already
being implemented with the adoption of space debris mitigation guidelines in 2007 (see trend
2.2). However, these alternative approaches rely on good-will implementation by states.
Moreover, the division on implementation of UN-SPIDER demonstrates that secure and
sustainable access to, and use of, space for all requires significant technical and financial
support in addition to an enabling legal framework. Overall, developments in 2007 indicate
the fragility of space security. Although international commitment to ensure space security
now seems stronger, obstacles to meaningful action remain.
Trend 2.2: Progress in COPUOS but the Conference on Disarmament has
been unable to agree on an agenda since 1998 — A range of international
institutions, such as the UNGA, COPUOS, ITU, and the CD, have been mandated to
address issues related to space security. The CD has been deadlocked without an agreed plan
of work since 1998, however, and there has been no progress on space issues in 30 years despite
efforts to move forward on the PAROS mandate to develop an instrument relating to space
security and the weaponization of space.
2007 Developments
• COPUOS addresses the Registration Convention and Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and charts
future role and activities aimed at peaceful uses and sustainability
• Renewed efforts toward resumption of substantive work in the CD
Space security impact
Developments in 2007 demonstrated both the expediency and flexibility of technical,
regulatory guidelines to address key threats to the security of outer space, as well as the
potential weakness of such an approach to enforce behavior. Moreover, events in COPUOS
and the CD suggest that a growing division between states that advocate such technical tools
and states that insist on a treaty-based approach to space security could result in blocked
progress on all fronts. More generally, however, indications of greater cooperation and support
for discussions on space security issues were a positive development for 2007.
Trend 2.3: Spacefaring states’ national space policies consistently
emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space
— All spacefaring states emphasize the importance of cooperation and the peaceful uses of
space, but with caveats based on national security concerns. The US has recently announced
plans for peaceful space exploration of the Moon and Mars, while there is growing interest in
manned space programs. The national space policies of many developing countries, such as
Brazil and India, tend to focus on the utility of space cooperation for social and economic
development.
2007 Developments
• European Space Policy highlights European independence and civil-military synergies within a
context of peaceful uses of outer space
• China’s five-year Space Development Plan reaffirms the importance of commercial development and
national strength within a context of peaceful uses of outer space
12
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• 14 national space agencies jointly develop framework for coordination of outer space exploration
efforts
Space security impact
States continued to express commitment to international cooperation and the peaceful use of
outer space in their civil space policies in 2007, demonstrated most strongly by the Global
Exploration Strategy. Yet independence in space is also emphasized. The peaceful use of space
is increasingly viewed as strategic, which could limit opportunities for cooperation. The
impact on space security will depend on whether or not states pursue independent or
collective measures to achieve the strategic goals set out in their space policies.
Trend 2.4: Growing focus within national military doctrines on the security
uses of outer space — Fueled by the technological revolution in military affairs, the
military doctrine of a growing number of actors (led by China, Russia, the US, and key
European states) increasingly emphasizes the use of space systems to support national security.
Dependence on these systems has led several states to view space assets as critical national
security infrastructure. US military space doctrine has focused on the need to ensure US
freedom of action in space, through the use, when necessary, of “counterspace operations” that
prevent adversaries from accessing space to threaten US interests.
2007 Developments
• Japan considers new space law to permit military use of space
• India continues to consider an Aerospace Command and greater military use of space
• Greater use of space for security purposes considered in Europe
Space security impact
In 2007 states continued to emphasize the use of space for national security purposes through
military doctrines and some new programs. A positive impact of this development is an
increase in transparency, allowing states to better predict the behavior of others in space,
although this is limited to broad goals and objectives. On the other hand, these policies and
doctrines also demonstrate a growing concern for the need to protect space assets and
capabilities, which may have a positive or negative impact on space security, depending on
whether such protection is pursued through passive or aggressive means, collectively or
independently.
Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities
Trend 3.1: Growth in the number of actors gaining access to space— The rate
at which new states gain access to space increased dramatically in the 1990s. By 2007 10 actors
had demonstrated independent orbital launch capacity and 47 states had launched civil
satellites, either independently or in collaboration with others. In 2003 China joined Russia
and the US as the only space powers with demonstrated manned spaceflight capabilities.
2007 Developments
• Global efforts to increase access to and use of space through development of launch capabilities and
institutions
• Microsatellites contribute to increased accessibility of space
Space security impact
Although no new space civil space actors emerged in 2007, nations expanded their civil space
capabilities, particularly regarding launch and microsatellite technologies. This is an indicator
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that space remains accessible for use and exploitation for peaceful purposes. On the other
hand, the proliferation of civil space technologies such as launch capabilities also provides
more actors with abilities that could potentially be used to threaten access to and use of space
by other states. The growing number and diversity of space actors also place increased demand
on available space resources and on efforts to coordinate space traffic and implement
international legal obligations. In the long term, an increased number of satellites launched
into outer space will also add pressure to the problem of space debris.
Trend 3.2: Changing priorities and funding levels within civil space programs
— Civil expenditures on space have continued to increase in India and China in recent years,
while past decreases in the US, the EU countries, and Russia have begun to rebound.
Increasingly, civil space programs include security and development applications. Algeria,
Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Thailand are all placing a
priority on satellites to support social and economic development. Dual-use applications such
as satellite navigation and Earth observation are a growing focus of US, European, and
Chinese civil space programs.
2007 Developments
• Space budgets grow in India and Russia as focus shifts to large-scale projects
• Use of remote sensing to support sustainable development
• Strong interest in Europe, Russia, US, and India with respect to developing human spacecraft, but
efforts progress slowly
• Space agencies continue to focus on the Moon, Mars
Space security impact
Activities in 2007 demonstrated the continuation of a recently renewed interest in large-scale
space projects, particularly lunar exploration and human spaceflight. Although developments
in 2007 indicate some cooperation on these projects, competition may increase if such
capabilities become strategic in the future, as indicated by historical trends. Nonetheless, it
remains to be seen if these large-scale projects will gain the necessary investment to come to
fruition; only in India, Russia, and possibly China are resources growing significantly. Outer
space continues to be dominated by a few states. Delays in construction of new human
spacecraft in the US, may adversely influence space security in the future by limiting human
access to space, in particular the International Space Station (ISS). Finally, the growing use of
remote sensing satellites for sustainable development is drawing more stakeholders into space,
and strengthening the relationship between security in space and security on Earth. However,
what is essentially the proliferation of dual-use spacecraft may contribute to the expression of
regional tensions in space (see Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.2).
Trend 3.3: Steady growth in international cooperation in civil space
programs — International civil space cooperation efforts over the past decades have
included the US-USSR Apollo-Soyuz docking of manned modules, Soviet flights to the MIR
space station with foreign representatives, the Hubble Space Telescope, and such joint
NASA-ESA projects as Skylab. The most prominent example of international cooperation is
the ISS, involving 16 states, 56 launches, and an estimated cost of over $100-billion to date.
International civil space cooperation has played a key role in the proliferation of technical
capabilities for states to access space.
2007 Developments
• International cooperation emerging for Moon/Mars exploration
14
Executive Summary
15
• International cooperation on the ISS, space science, and launch technology
• US-Chinese cooperation falters
Space security impact
Growing cooperation and collaboration between major and less developed space powers
enhance space security by providing partner countries with greater access to space through
shared resources and technology. Larger networks of cooperation such as the “Global
Exploration Strategy” could also result in greater transparency of space activities, mitigating
uncertainties or mistrust that may arise as more countries gain access to space. There is a risk,
however, that sensitive military technologies may proliferate. Moreover, as regional
cooperation becomes stronger there may be negative geopolitical tensions and rivalries in space
— as the tensions between China and the US demonstrate, civil space cooperation is often
influenced by strategic concerns. Yet cooperation efforts on the Moon and Mars in 2007
suggest that what is often characterized as a new space race may not in fact become a reality.
Trend 3.4: Continued growth in global utilities as states seek to expand
applications and accessibility — The use of space-based global utilities, including
navigation, weather, and search-and-rescue systems, has grown substantially over the last
decade. These systems have spawned space applications that are almost indispensable to the
civil, commercial, and military sectors. Advanced and developing economies alike are heavily
dependent on these space-based systems. Currently Russia, the US, the EU, Japan, and India
are developing satellite-based navigation capabilities. The strategic value of satellite navigation
was underscored by the conflict over frequencies for Galileo and GPS, resolved in 2004.
2007 Developments
• A difficult year for space navigation utilities
• Civil space applications for global monitoring focus on climate change
Space security impact
On the one hand, the growth in global utilities, particularly navigation systems, should have
a positive impact on space security by providing redundancy of capabilities and increasing
access to space through collaborative efforts, particularly if they are interoperable. Yet ongoing
disputes over the use of signals and the development of independent capabilities indicate that
cooperation is difficult and that this utility remains an important military application subject
to potential interference. The growing use of civil space capabilities for climate change
monitoring could enhance international commitments to maintain space security by further
linking the security of Earth to the security of space.
Commercial Space
Trend 4.1: Continued overall growth in the global commercial space industry
— Growth in the commercial space industry is dominated by satellite services, which have
tripled in size since 1996, generating revenues estimated between $62.6-billion and
$111.14-billion in 2006, or up to 60 percent of the commercial satellite sector’s total.
Individual consumers are a growing source of demand for these services. Key commercial
satellite telecommunications companies include Intelsat, SES Global, Eutelsat, and Telesat
Canada. In recent years Russia has dominated the space launch industry with respect to the
number of commercial launches, while US companies have led in the satellite manufacturing
sector.
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2007 Developments
• Commercial space industry continues to grow, with individual users becoming more important
stakeholders
• India and China influence the commercial space industry
Space security impact
Continued growth in the commercial space sector is reflected largely by higher revenues and
not necessarily an increase in space activity. However, individual users are becoming more
important stakeholders in space as they demand not only more communication services, but
also satellite navigation/positioning and remote sensing products. Ongoing growth of the
industry suggests that there is overall confidence in the security of space and the ability of both
companies and consumers to continue to rely on space resources. Growing competition in the
commercial launch market may also contribute to space security by providing greater access
to outer space, although tensions may arise if future demand for space resources exceeds
supply.
Trend 4.2: Commercial sector supporting increased access to space —
Commercial space launches have contributed to cheaper space access. The costs to launch a
satellite into GEO have declined from an average of about $40,000/kilogram in 1990 to
$26,000/kilogram in 2000, with prices beginning to consolidate. In 2000 payloads could be
placed in LEO for as little as $5,000/kilogram. In recent years European and Russian space
agencies have been the most active space launch providers. Today’s commercial launch
providers include Arianespace in Europe, Energiya in Russia, LockheedMartin in the US, and
two international consortia — Sea Launch and International Launch Service. Virgin Galactic
and Space Adventures provide private, suborbital human spaceflight.
2007 Developments
• Launch costs remain high in a tight market following launch failures
• Lower insurance rates and new entrants to the launch market may reduce cost of access to space
• Private human suborbital spaceflight expanding, but capabilities limited
• Commercial spaceflight aims for the Moon
• Greater commercial access to high-resolution space imagery
Space security impact
Sustained competition in commercial space launch may slightly reduce the cost of access to
space in the near future, but in the absence of revolutionized technologies, there is not likely
to be a significant impact on space access. Although the commercial human space flight
industry continues to develop, it has yet to deliver sustainable, low-cost launchers. Moreover,
while some regulatory efforts are being made to support the prospect of private human access
to space, this may cause potential challenges to space security, both in terms of the
sustainability of the space environment as well as the applicability of international laws, such
as the Outer Space Treaty, which have yet to be revisited by the international community.
Finally, while the space industry is facilitating greater use of space applications, in particular
remote sensing, there are legitimate fears about the implications for security on Earth (see
Trend 4.3 below).
Trend 4.3: Governments both support and regulate the commercial space
sector as subsidies and national security concerns continue to play an
important role — The commercial space sector is significantly shaped by national
governments and security concerns. The 1998 US Space Launch Cost Reduction Act and the
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2003 European Guaranteed Access to Space program provide for significant government
subsidization of the space launch and manufacturing markets. The US and European space
industry also receive important space contracts from government programs. In 1999 the US
placed satellite export licensing on the State Department’s US Munitions List, bringing
satellite product export licensing under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
regime and significantly complicating the way US companies participate in international
collaborative satellite launch and manufacturing ventures.
2007 Developments
• Governments and militaries partner with the commercial industry for satellite imaging,
communications, and launch services
• Galileo demonstrates the limits to public-private partnerships
• Ongoing efforts to regulate access to commercial satellite imagery
• Private industry joins government in space safety efforts
• Export controls try to balance commercial interests with security concerns
Space security impact
The strong relationship between military and commercial uses of space and the security
dimensions of many commercial services has a complex impact on space security. On the one
hand, multiple-use spacecraft could become military targets in the future, resulting in an
overall decrease in security. Alternatively, the proliferation of dual-use assets in space could
make a military attack less useful and, therefore, less likely. Arguably, this could increase overall
space security. There are also pros and cons for government users of commercial systems,
including greater flexibility and options for using space, but fewer security features to protect
this use. The failure of the Galileo partnership, however, demonstrates that the costs and risks
of space access and use remain high, and governments must play a key role in ensuring that
access. Efforts to regulate access to both commercial space technology and data in 2007
reflected ongoing attempts to balance the benefits of secure access to and use of space against
the potential threats it may pose to space security. This balance was better addressed regarding
access to commercial imagery in 2007, but striking a balance between these two components
of space security will become more complicated if commercial capabilities continue to
increase. Finally, the growing interest in the commercial space industry to advance and
participate in space governance initiatives is a positive development for space security, since all
actors share the same interest in the secure and sustainable access to space.
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations
Trend 5.1: US and Russia continue to lead in deploying military space
systems—By the end of the ColdWar, the US and USSR had developed extensive military
space systems designed to provide military attack warning, communications, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and intelligence, as well as navigation and weapons guidance applications. By the
end of 2007 the US and USSR/Russia had launched more than 3,000 military satellites, while
the rest of the world had launched under 100.
The US has dominated the military space arena since the end of the Cold War and currently
spends close to $28-billion on military space programs and has approximately 136 operational
dedicated military satellites — over half of all military satellites in orbit. Russia is believed to
have some 67 dedicated military satellites in orbit. The US is, by all major indicators, the actor
most dependent on its space capabilities. As early as 2001 the Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization warned that US
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dependence on space systems made it uniquely vulnerable to a “space Pearl Harbor” and
recommended that the US develop enhanced space control (protection and negation)
capabilities.
2007 Developments
• US focus on major upgrades to critical systems, but some progress more than others
• US continues to face setbacks on remote sensing programs
• Russia continues to invest in military programs to maintain its space-based capabilities, with focus
on revitalizing GLONASS
Space security impact
The US is slowly progressing with modernization of its space systems. The focus is on meeting
the bandwidth and secure communications needs of today’s military and preventing gaps in
next-generation capabilities, both of which are elements of secure and sustainable use of space.
Troubles faced by the National Reconnaissance Office, however, demonstrate weaknesses in
its abilities to manage complex projects, research and development, and acquisitions, which
may continue to hinder major system upgrades. Continued dependence on space assets
increases US vulnerability in space, and it is not yet clear if efforts to protect those assets in
the future will contribute to or detract from the security of outer space. The Russian focus on
revitalizing GLONASS and its aging satellite fleet could also be positive for space security by
providing redundancy for the US GPS, more reliable and secure early warning capabilities,
and more secure satellite communications.
Trend 5.2: More actors developing military space capabilities — Regional
tensions are a significant driver of military space acquisitions. Declining costs for space access
and the proliferation of space technology are enabling more states to develop and deploy their
own military satellites via the launch capabilities and manufacturing services of others,
including the commercial sector.
China provides military communications through its DFH series satellite, and has deployed a
pair of Beidou navigation satellites to ensure access to navigational capability. China also
maintains three ZY series satellites in LEO for tactical reconnaissance and surveillance
functions, has deployed three military reconnaissance satellites, and is believed to be
purchasing additional commercial satellite imagery from Russia to meet its intelligence needs.
EU states have developed a range of military space systems. France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, and Greece jointly use the Helios-1 military optical observation satellite system in
LEO, which provides images with a one-meter resolution. France, Germany, and Spain have
also developed a range of radar reconnaissance and communications capabilities and France is
developing a missile early-warning system. The UK maintains a constellation of three dual-use
Skynet 4 communications satellites in GEO. The joint EU-European Space Agency Galileo
satellite navigation program, initiated in 1999, is intended to operate for civil and commercial
purposes, but will have an inherent dual-use capability.
Israel operates a dual-use Eros A imagery system as well as the military reconnaissance and
surveillance Ofeq-5 system. India’s civil space agency maintains its Technology Experimental
Satellite for remote sensing, but it also provides military reconnaissance capabilities. Japan
operates the commercial Superbird satellite for military communications and has four
“information gathering” remote sensing satellites — two optical and two radar. Thailand operates
a military communications satellite and is developing its first intelligence and defense satellite.
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2007 Developments
• Europe developing a range of integrated military capabilities, both dedicated and dual-use
• China investing to achieve self-reliance in space
• Focus on remote sensing capabilities in the Middle East and Asia
• Canada to use dual-use satellite to monitor the Arctic, develop military support capabilities
• Potential use of space for military purposes in Nigeria
Space security impact
The continued drive for more states to develop and deploy both dedicated military and
dual-use space systems was reflected in 2007 along with a growing emergence of strategic
partnerships. While an increase in the use of space for military purposes demonstrates the
continued accessibility of the space environment and greater access to space technologies,
states continue to operate and develop their space programs with considerable secrecy,
reducing transparency of space operations. There are indications that these developments are
affecting perceptions of security on Earth; how this in turns affects the security of space will
depend on how states react to perceived threats from and in space. As more states become
dependent on space systems for military operations and national security, mutual vulnerability
may provide incentives to enhance the security of outer space or to develop capabilities to
quickly negate space systems. The growing diversity of space systems for global navigation and
positioning and communications may enhance the security of space operations by providing
redundancy, particularly if they are interoperational.
Space Systems Protection
Trend 6.1: US and Russia lead in general capability to detect rocket
launches, while US leads in the development of advanced technologies to
detect direct attacks on satellites — The ability to distinguish space negation attacks
from technical failures or environmental disruptions is critical to maintaining international
stability in space. Early warning also enables defensive responses, but the type of protection
available may be limited. Only the US and Russia can reliably detect rocket launches. US
Defense Support Program satellites provide early warning of conventional and nuclear ballistic
missile attacks; Russia began rebuilding its aging system in 2001 by upgrading its Oko series
satellites. France is developing two missile-launch early-warning satellites — Spirale-1 and -2.
Most actors have a basic capability to detect a ground-based electronic attack, such as
jamming, by sensing an interference signal or by noticing a loss of communications. It is very
difficult to obtain advance warning of directed energy attacks that move at the speed of light.
2007 Developments
• Russia upgrades its early-warning systems, but results are limited
• US early-warning upgrade efforts continue to face challenges, but also some success
• US focus on space situational awareness
• Global development of space surveillance capabilities
Space security impact
As space actors seek to improve their launch detection and space surveillance capabilities, space
security could be enhanced through greater transparency of space activities, more accurate
threat detection, and greater redundancy, which can support protective responses and overall
confidence. The benefits of space surveillance could be increased with data sharing among
different actors. Yet the continued drive for independent space tracking systems indicate
broader mistrust that could reduce space security, particularly as many aspects of these
capabilities are enablers for space system negation. In this context, as demonstrated by the US
focus on the space protection/negation elements of space situational awareness, greater
transparency may not make actors feel more secure in space.
Trend 6.2: The protection of satellite ground stations is a concern, while the
protection of satellite communications links is poor but improving — Many
space systems lack protection from attacks on ground stations and communications links. The
vast majority of commercial space systems have only one operations center and one ground
station, leaving them vulnerable to negation efforts. While many actors employ passive
electronic protection capabilities, such as shielding and directional antennas, more advanced
measures, such as burst transmissions, are generally unique to military systems and the
capabilities of more technically advanced states. China and the US have been aggressively
pursuing a variety of anti-jamming capabilities.
2007 Developments
• Slow but steady progress on laser satellite communication links but technological challenges remain
• US RADIRS Unit becomes operational
• Renewed focus on protecting commercial satellites
Space security impact
Developments in 2007 had a mixed impact on space security. While some progress has been
made toward securing ground to satellites communications through the use of laser links,
progress remains slow due to major technological challenges and communication links remain
vulnerable. In the meantime, a greater ability by the US to identify and respond to sources of
interference might enhance the security of some systems, but efforts to better protect
commercial satellites will only be effective if market incentives are in place.
Trend 6.3 Protection of satellites against some direct threats is improving
but remains limited — The primary source of protection for satellites comes from the
difficulties associated with launching an attack into space. Satellite protection measures also
include system redundancy and interoperability, which has become characteristic of satellite
navigation systems. Most key US, European, and Russian military satellites are hardened
against the effects of a high-altitude nuclear detonation. Nonetheless, if an actor has the ability
to overcome these natural defenses, there are few options available for physically protecting a
satellite against a direct attack. Consequently, initiatives to prevent the proliferation and use
of negation capabilities covered in the chapters on Laws, Policies and Doctrines and
Commercial Space are also critical for protection, as is the achievement of collective space
security as defined by the Space Security Index.
2007 Developments
• US continues to pursue space-based satellite protection
Space security impact
The development of autonomous on-orbit servicing satellites and nanosatellites for local space
surveillance has the potential to improve space security for the actors employing those
technologies by providing better on-orbit threat identification and response options to protect
the space-based components of satellite systems. However, the basic technologies involved are
also applicable for spacecraft negation and raise questions about the implications of more
active space-based protection systems for the security of other actors in space. The overall
impact on space security will depend greatly on how the relevant technologies are used and
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how transparent the usage is. Moreover, space-based protection capabilities themselves could
be defeated by a determined attacker.
Trend 6.4: US leads in developing of capabilities to rapidly rebuild space
systems following direct attacks on satellites— The ability to rapidly rebuild space
systems after an attack could reduce vulnerabilities in space and increase the ability to recover
from an attack. Although the US and Russia are developing various elements of responsive
space systems, no state currently has this capability. The key US responsive launch initiative is
the Falcon program, which seeks to develop a rocket capable of placing 100-1,000 kilograms
into LEO within 24 hours. It includes the AirLaunch LLC QuickReach air-launch rocket and
the SpaceX Falcon-1.
2007 Developments
• US increases efforts for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
• Canada considers responsive space
• Small and nanosatellite research may contribute to passive protection
Space security impact
Whether efforts on more responsive space launch and flexible deployment of microsatellites
will enhance the secure use of space systems remains unclear. The formal definition of the US
ORS concept and the continued development of small satellites and launch vehicles are steps
toward a rapid replacement capability, but an operational ORS capacity remains fairly distant.
Further studies are also needed to determine the survivability of small satellites against
potential threats. Nonetheless, the use of small and relatively low-cost satellites for a greater
range of applications potentially allows actors to replace outdated, malfunctioned, or attacked
satellites more often and quickly. Constellations of smaller satellites can also provide enhanced
protection through redundancy, but because they are difficult to detect and track,
transparency of and confidence in space activities could be reduced.
Space Systems Negation
Trend 7.1 Proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations and
communications links — Ground segments and communications links remain the most
vulnerable components of space systems, susceptible to attack by conventional military means,
computer hacking, and electronic jamming. A number of incidents of intentional jamming of
communications satellites have been reported in recent years. Iraq’s acquisition of
GPS-jamming equipment for use against US GPS-guided munitions during Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003 suggested that jamming capabilities are proliferating. The US leads in
developing doctrines and advanced technologies to temporarily negate space systems by
disrupting or denying access to satellite communications, and has deployed a mobile system
to disrupt satellite communications without inflicting permanent damage to the satellite.
2007 Developments
• Tamil Tigers illegally broadcast radio and television on Intelsat signals
• Mysterious jamming incidents demonstrate continued ease of jamming satellite communications
• Intrusion of secure computer networks in China, UK, Germany, France, and the US
• US and China upgrade capabilities for cyber attacks, jamming
Space security impact
Incidents of both deliberate and unintentional satellite interference in 2007 demonstrate the
vulnerability of satellite communications and computer networks to external attacks.
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Moreover, the significant security and financial costs that result from interference show the
debilitating effect that relatively low-cost, low-technology threats can have on the security of
space operations. Facilitating and dispersing authorization for attacks could also create greater
instability. It should be noted, however, that interference with satellite communications and
ground stations is generally temporary and reversible and is less provocative and escalatory
than other types of space system negation.
Trend 7.2 US leads in the development of space situational awareness
capabilities to support space negation — Space surveillance capabilities for debris
monitoring and transparency can also support satellite tracking for space negation purposes.
The US and Russia maintain the most extensive space surveillance capabilities and the US has
explicitly linked its development of enhanced space surveillance systems to efforts to enable
offensive counterspace operations. China and India also have satellite tracking, telemetry, and
control assets essential to their civil space programs. Canada, France, Germany, and Japan are
actively expanding their ground-based space surveillance capabilities.
2007 Developments
• Space surveillance capabilities highlight vulnerability of satellites to detection
• Orbital Express satellite demonstrates automated approach using Space Situational Awareness data
Space security impact
Space surveillance can support both protection and negation activities. Efforts to develop and
enhance space surveillance systems can have a positive impact on space security by increasing
the ability of actors to safely operate in space, enhancing transparency of outer space activities,
and providing a redundancy of capabilities. But the potential for such capabilities to support
deliberate attacks against satellites and other space objects is demonstrated through the
centrality of space surveillance in identifying foreign satellites, space control efforts, and close
proximity operations, depending on the extent to which the capability were integrated into
military command systems. Transparency in the collection and use of space surveillance data
would enhance its positive contribution to the security of outer space.
Trend 7.3 Ongoing proliferation of ground-based capabilities to attack
satellites — The development of ground-based ASAT weapons employing conventional,
nuclear, and directed energy capabilities dates back to the Cold War when a variety of US and
USSR programs were initiated. Since then technologies have proliferated. The capability to
launch a payload into space to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is a basic
requirement for conventional satellite negation systems. Some 28 states have demonstrated
suborbital launch capability and, of those, 10 have orbital launch capability. As many as 30
states may have low-power lasers to degrade unhardened satellite sensors. The US and China
lead in the development of more advanced ground-based kinetic-kill systems with the
capability to directly attack satellites. Both have deployed advanced missile and laser programs,
which have inherent satellite negation capabilities in LEO.
2007 Developments
• China tests direct ascent missile against own satellite, triggers protective response
• US continues development of ballistic missile defense systems and considers use against a
de-orbiting satellite
• Ballistic missile defense efforts in Japan, India may lay the foundation for potential ground-based
ASAT capabilities
• Ongoing development of high energy lasers
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Space security impact
The Chinese satellite intercept in January 2007 ended a 20-year pause in known ASAT testing
and demonstrated a current capability to destroy LEO satellites. The successful destruction of
FY-1C and the debris cloud created are both negative developments in space security,
compounded by a potential spiral of capabilities and tests — indicated by US anti-ballistic
missile activities — as well as other protective responses. The continued development of high
energy lasers combined with adaptive optics could have a negative impact on space security as
it has the potential to cause permanent damage to a satellite. The same technologies could also
be applied to satellite tracking and identification. The development of theater-level ABM
capabilities by the various actors, although not a direct threat to space objects, is cause for
concern, because most of the necessary technologies, such as target detection, tracking,
homing, command and control networks, and boosters, are also applicable to ASAT roles.
Trend 7.4: Increasing access to space-based negation-enabling capabilities
— Space-based negation efforts require sophisticated capabilities, such as precision on-orbit
maneuverability and space tracking. Many of these capabilities have dual-use potential. For
example, microsatellites provide an inexpensive option for many space applications, but could
be modified to serve as kinetic-kill vehicles. The US leads in the development of most of these
enabling capabilities, although none appear to be integrated into dedicated space-based
negation systems.
2007 Developments
• US and European states testing space-based technologies with potential negation capabilities
Space security impact
The emergence of advanced space-based capabilities is likely to complicate space security
because of the range of passive protection and more active negation functions that they can
serve, with the line between these types of activities unclear. These technologies could be used
to enhance knowledge of local space and gather information on other, potentially hostile,
satellites or to support on-orbit servicing of satellites to extend their lifespans or recover from
negation efforts. But all of the capabilities described have clear space negation applications.
Currently, however, these programs are still experimental and their funding levels are relatively
low. The more immediate consequence is the challenge posed by not knowing what the threats
are, largely because of the secrecy of many technology programs.
Space-Based Strike Systems
Trend 8.1: While no space-based strike systems have been tested or
deployed, the US continues to consider a space-based interceptor for its
missile defense system — Although the US and USSR developed and tested
ground-based and airborne ASAT systems between the 1960s and 1980s, there has not yet
been any deployment of space-to-Earth or space-to-missile strike systems. Under the Strategic
Defense Initiative in the 1980s, the US invested several billion dollars in the development of
a space-based interceptor concept called Brilliant Pebbles, and tested targeting and propulsion
components required for such a system. The US and USSR were both developing directed
energy strike systems in the 1980s, although today these programs have largely been halted.
2007 Developments
• NFIRE successfully tests sensor system in space for missile defense
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• Multiple Kill Vehicle received boost in FY08 budget allocation
• Congress cuts funding for Space Test Bed
Space security impact
The ongoing absence of space-based strike systems and infrastructure continued to support
the security of outer space in 2007. While precursor technology development continued
through the NFIRE test and MKV program, restraint exercised by US policymakers is positive
and indicates concern for space security and the challenge of balancing terrestrial missile
defense requirements with the need to maintain freedom from space-based threats.
Trend 8.2: A growing number of countries are developing more advanced
space-based strike-enabling technologies through other civil, commercial,
and military programs — The majority of advanced, space-based strike enabling
technologies are dual-use and are developed through other civil, commercial, or military space
programs. While there is no evidence to suggest that states pursuing these enabling
technologies intend to use them for space-based strike purposes, such development does bring
these actors technologically closer to this capability. For example, China, India, and Israel are
developing precision attitude control and large deployable optics for civil space telescope
missions. There are also five states in addition to the European Union that are developing
independent, high-precision satellite navigation capabilities. China, India, and the EU are
developing Earth reentry capabilities that provide a basis for the more advanced technologies
required for the delivery of mass-to-target weapons from space to the Earth.
2007 Developments
• Prompt Global Strike program authorized by the US Congress
• Report outlines the potential costs to deploy space-based weapons
• Upgrades in US global missile tracking and warning
• The US, Europe, China, and Russia continue research and development of global positioning systems
• Continued progress in air-based laser technology
Space security impact
Space-based weapons designed to strike terrestrial targets will require sophisticated
technological developments that, at present, few spacefaring states seem able to exploit. The
development of dual-use capabilities that also provide enabling technologies for space-based
strike systems continued in 2007, although there is no evidence that states are developing such
capabilities for strike purposes. Nonetheless, the potential for space-to-Earth strike systems
will continue to pose a challenge to the international community as advanced space-based
technologies continue to be developed. While some enabling technologies for space-based
strike are specific to that purpose and include significant technology barriers, many are
advanced technologies associated with other space applications and have been developed for a
variety of purposes by several different actors; this means that if one actor were to pursue a
space-based strike capability, others could follow.
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The Space Environment
1. The Space Environment
This chapter assesses trends and developments related to human activity in the space
environment, with an emphasis on space debris and space resource issues such as the
registration of orbital slots and the allocation of radio frequencies.
Space debris, which is predominantly caused by manmade objects, represents a growing threat
to spacecraft. The impact of space debris upon space security is related to a number of key
issues examined by this chapter, including the amount of space debris in various orbits, space
surveillance capabilities that track space debris to enable collision avoidance, and efforts to
reduce new debris and to potentially remove existing space debris in the future.
All space missions inevitably create space debris — rocket booster stages are expended and
released to drift in space and exhaust products are created. The testing of anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons has also created thousands of long-lasting pieces of space debris, some 300 of which
are reportedly still in orbit from USSR ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s.1
A growing awareness of the impact of space debris on the security of space assets has
encouraged space actors to take steps to mitigate the production of new debris through the
development and implementation of national and international debris mitigation guidelines,
also examined here. This chapter does not address natural phenomena such as solar flares and
near-Earth asteroids, except in cases where technologies and techniques are developed to
mitigate their impact.
Actors who wish to place a satellite in geostationary orbit must obtain an appropriate orbital
slot in which to do so and secure a portion of the radio spectrum to carry their satellite
communications. Both radio frequencies and orbital slots are indispensable tools for all space
operations and their national assignments are coordinated through the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and recognized by the ITU Constitution as “limited
natural resources,” given their finite number.
According to the Outer Space Treaty, space is considered open to everyone and not subject to
sovereign claims, so the distribution and use of these two scarce resources have to be
negotiated among states. This chapter assesses the trends and developments related to the
demand for orbital slots and radio frequencies, as well as the conflict and cooperation
associated with the distribution and use of these key space environment resources. This
includes compliance with existing norms and procedures developed by the ITU to manage the
use and distribution of orbital slots and radio frequencies.
Space Security Impact
Space is a harsh environment and orbital debris represents a growing threat to the secure access
to and use of space due to the potential for collisions with spacecraft. Due to very high orbital
velocities of 7.8 kilometers per second (~30,000 kilometers per hour) in Low Earth Orbit
(LEO), debris as small as 10 centimeters in diameter carries the kinetic energy of a
35,000-kilogram truck traveling at up to 190 kilometers per hour. While objects have lower
relative velocities in Geostationary Orbit (GEO), debris at this altitude is still moving as fast
as a bullet — about 1,800 kilometers per hour. No satellite can be reliably protected against
this kind of destructive force. See Figure 1.1 for types of Earth orbits.
The total amount of space debris in orbit is growing each year. LEO is the most highly
congested orbit. Some debris in LEO will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrate in a
relatively short period of time due to atmospheric drag, but debris in orbits above 600
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kilometers will remain a threat for decades and even centuries. There have already been
a number of space debris collisions with civil, commercial, and military spacecraft. Although
a rare occurrence, the reentry of very large debris can also pose a threat to humans and the
Earth environment.
The development of surveillance capabilities to track space debris and avoid collisions clearly
provides significant space security advantages. Efforts to mitigate the production of new debris
through compliance with national and international rules, guidelines, standards, and practices
can also have a positive impact on space security. Technical measures to efficiently remove
debris could have a positive impact in the future.
Resource distribution, including the assignment of orbital slots and radio frequencies to space
actors, has a direct impact on the abilities of actors to access and use space. Growing numbers
of space actors, particularly in the communications sector, have led to more competition and
sometimes friction over the use of orbital slots and frequencies.
New measures to increase the number of available orbital slots and frequency bands, such as
technology to reduce interference between radio signals, can reduce competition and increase
the availability of these scarce resources. There is a strong incentive for space actors to
cooperate in the registration and use of radio frequencies and orbital slots — namely,
confidence in the sustainability of their use. Cooperation in this area can also strengthen
support for the application of the rule of law to broader space security issues.
Other space environment threats include radiation surges caused by solar flares, which damage
on-board satellite microchips, interrupt shortwave radio transmissions, and cause errors in
navigation systems. Near Earth objects (NEOs) are space-based objects that pose a threat to
the Earth if the two collide. Research is ongoing into ways to mitigate the risk of impact with
larger NEOs.
Figure 1.1: Types of Earth orbits
LEO = Low Earth Orbit (100-1,500 km)
MEO = Medium Earth Orbit (5,000-10,000 km)
GEO = Geostationary Orbit (36,000 km)
HEO = Highly Elliptical Orbit
Space Security 2008
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Trend 1.1: Growing debris threats to spacecraft as rate of debris
production increases
The US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is the system that most comprehensively tracks
and catalogs space debris, although technological factors limit it to spot checking rather than
continuous surveillance, and limit the size of tracked objects to those greater than 10 cm in
LEO and much larger in GEO. According to the latest reports, the US Department of
Defense (DOD) is using the SSN to track more than 17,300 objects approximately 10 cm or
larger, of which fewer than 10 percent are operational satellites.2 It is estimated that there are
over 300,000 objects measuring between one and 10 cm in diameter, and billions smaller.3
Those objects which can be tracked repeatedly and whose source has been identified are placed
in the satellite catalog, currently numbering almost 13,000 objects. This catalog is publicly
available at http://www.space-track.org. The total number of cataloged objects increased
significantly in 2003 when the Cobra Dane radar was reinstated as part of the SSN after being
taken offline in 1994 due to budgetary constraints.4
Two key factors affecting the amount of space debris are the number of objects in orbit and
the number of debris-creating launches each year. Growth in the debris population increases
the probability of inter-debris collisions that have the potential to create even more debris. A
recent study by NASA has shown that, in LEO, debris-debris collisions will become the
dominant source of debris production within the next 50 years.5 As debris collides and
multiplies, it will eventually create a “cascade of collisions” that will spread debris to levels
threatening sustainable space access.6 As of 2003 it was estimated that 43 per cent of tracked
debris resulted mostly from explosions and collisions.7 Additional space debris in LEO could
be created by ground- and space-based midcourse missile defense systems currently under
development, or other weapons testing in space.8
Between 1961 and 1996 an average of approximately 240 new pieces of debris were cataloged
each year; these new pieces were the result, in large part, of fragmentation and the presence of
new satellites. Between 8 October 1997 and 30 June 2004 only 603 new pieces of debris were
cataloged — a noteworthy decrease — particularly given the increased resolution of the
system. This decline can be related in large part to international debris mitigation efforts,
which increased significantly in the 1990s, combined with a lower number of launches per
year. Since 2004 an increase in the annual rate of debris production has again been observed.
The highest concentration of space debris is found in LEO, where more debris-producing
activities take place. The overwhelming majority of debris in LEO is smaller than 10
centimeters — too small to be reliably tracked and cataloged. Space scientists estimate that
there are tens of millions of objects smaller than 10 centimeters in size and approximately
100,000 between one and 10 centimeters (i.e., larger than a marble). Particles as small as two
millimeters pose a serious hazard to the security of spacecraft, threatening unprotected fuel
lines and other sensitive components.9 Protection against particles one to 10 millimeters in
size can be achieved by shielding spacecraft bodies, while protection against larger debris can
only really be achieved through collision avoidance procedures. Debris fragments between one
and 10 centimeters “will penetrate and damage most spacecraft,” according to the Center for
Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies. Moreover, “if the spacecraft bus is impacted, satellite
function will be terminated and, at the same time, a significant amount of additional small
debris will be created.”10
28
The French military satellite Cerise had its stabilization arm severed in 1996 by a briefcase-sized portion of
an Ariane rocket, and was temporarily put out of commission.
The Space Shuttle has been hit several times by particles bigger than one millimeter, and the first 33 Shuttle
flights sustained debris damage to some of the tiles on the Shuttle’s undersides. Several thermal windows
must be replaced after each Shuttle mission because of space debris damage.
The 10-year-old Hubble Space Telescope, which orbits in LEO, had a 3/4-inch hole in its antenna that was
created by debris.
The Russian Kosmos 1275 military navigation satellite experienced an unexpected breakup in July 1981,
generally thought to have been a result of space debris, though officially assessed by Russian authority to
have been caused by battery failure.
In 1985 a US kinetic energy ASAT test produced over 250 pieces of cataloged debris, some of which later
came within 1.3 kilometers of the International Space Station. The last piece of debris generated from this
test de-orbited in 2002.
The Long Duration Exposure Facility, a school bus-sized satellite in LEO, recorded more than 30,000 hits by
debris or meteoroids during six years in orbit.
Figure 1.2: Number of cataloged objects in Earth orbit11
Today, collisions between space assets like the International Space Station and very small pieces
of debris are a daily but manageable problem.12 A 1995 US National Research Council study
found that within the orbital altitude most congested with debris (900-1,000 kilometers), the
chance of a typical spacecraft colliding with a large fragment was only about one in 1,000 over
the spacecraft’s 10-year functional lifetime, with even larger odds against impact in higher
orbits.13
However, the same study noted that, “although the current hazard to most space activities
from debris is low, growth in the amount of debris threatens to make some valuable orbital
regions increasingly inhospitable to space operations over the next few decades.”14 Indeed,
some experts at NASA believe that collisions between space assets and larger pieces of debris
will remain rare only for the next decade, although there is ongoing discussion about this
assessment.15 While major collisions have so far been rare, there have been several incidents of
varying severity as noted in Figure 1.3 below.
Figure 1.3: Space debris incidents16
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2007 Development
Chinese kinetic satellite intercept creates largest manmade debris field in history
On 11 January 2007 China launched a missile carrying a kinetic intercept vehicle, which
impacted the defunct Fengyun-1C Chinese weather satellite at a closing speed of nearly 9
kilometers per second and an orbital altitude of 864 kilometers, creating a large debris cloud.17
As of 1 February 2008 the US SSN had identified and cataloged 2,317 pieces from the
event.18 Figure 1.6 shows the spread of pieces across a wide range of altitudes as well as how
the debris field has changed over time.19 It is spread over a narrower range of inclinations,
ranging from 95.14° to 105.57° from the original inclination of 98.7°.20 It is estimated that
the total number of pieces of the trackable debris population is close to 2,600. An estimate of
the number of pieces of the untrackable population down to 1 cm, based on new tracking data
from the Haystack X-band radar, is 150,000.21
The significance of the large increase in debris in LEO is heightened by the fact that the FY-1C
was in one of the most crowded areas of orbit when it was destroyed. According to the US Air
Force (USAF) the number of close approaches to the approximately 400 operational US
satellites has doubled to almost 200 per week.22 Additionally, Iridium has reported an increase
in close approaches of 15 per cent for its 66 satellites in LEO after the test.23 The definition
of “close approach” differs greatly between satellite operators and so the above numbers should
be seen as only a rough indicator of the increased danger to operational satellites. It has been
confirmed, however, that NASA maneuvered its Terra satellite on 22 June 2007 to avoid a
close approach with a piece of Fengyun-1C debris.24
The largest trackable debris field prior to the Chinese intercept of Fengyun-1C was generated
by the breakup of a Pegasus launch vehicle on 3 June 1996.25 The upper stage of the launch
vehicle, known as the Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System (HAPS), shut down
prematurely and was stranded in orbit with fuel in its tanks. The HAPS was in an orbit 585
kilometers by 820 kilometers and at 82° inclination when it exploded,26 creating 713
trackable pieces of debris.27 As of 1 February 2008 63 pieces were still in orbit.28
Figure 1.4: Debris from the Chinese ASAT test29
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Previous ASAT tests have been conducted by both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Between 1963 and 198230 the Soviet Union tested a co-orbital ASAT system 23 times,
including seven interceptions.31 While these interceptions were of a less energetic nature than
the Chinese and American ASAT tests, the nine tests generated more than 700 cataloged
pieces of debris.32 On 13 September 1985 the United States launched an ASAT missile from
an F-15 flight aircraft and destroyed the Solwind satellite.33 The Solwind was in an orbit 545
kilometers by 515 kilometers at an inclination of 97.8° and the impact created a debris field
of 285 trackable pieces, the last of which reentered Earth’s atmosphere in February 2004.34
However, the space surveillance capability, primarily in the US, has since increased
dramatically, resulting in a much greater ability to detect, track, and characterize satellite
breakup events. It is not known how many additional pieces from the Solwind and Soviet tests
would have been detected had they been observed with the current capability. However, the
altitude of the Fengyun-1C is a major contributor to the severity of the Chinese test. Debris
from the Solwind explosion at an altitude of approximately 300 kilometers de-orbited within
25 years. While most of the Fengyun-1C pieces should reenter within a few decades, the final
pieces are likely to remain in orbit for centuries.
On 21 February 2008 the United States destroyed their USA 193 satellite with a Standard
Missile 3 (SM-3) fired from the USS Lake Erie Aegis cruiser.35 While this event used a kinetic
impact kill very similar to the one used by the Chinese to destroy the Fengyun-1C, it occurred
at a much lower altitude and produced only short-lived debris. A complete discussion of this
event will be presented in Space Security 2009.
2007 Development
Trackable space debris population increases by 20.12 per cent
By the end of 2007 the total number of large and medium-sized objects (>10cm) in orbit
cataloged by the US SSN stood at 12,456.36 This number represents an increase of 2,507
objects or 20.12 percent over yearend data for 2006.37 The locations of the space debris are
correlated to the regions of space with the most activity.
Figure 1.5: Growth in on-orbit population by category38
This chart displays a summary of all objects in Earth orbit officially catalogued by the US Space Surveillance
Network. “Fragmentation debris” includes satellite breakup debris and anomalous event debris, while
“mission-related debris” includes all objects dispenses, separated, or released as part of the planned mission.
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In addition to the Chinese satellite intercept, several other breakups during 2007 contributed
to the worst year for new debris creation. The most serious breakup occurred on 19 February
when a Russian Briz-M rocket body exploded.39 The Briz-M upper stage is commonly used
on the Proton booster to place commercial payloads into geostationary orbit. This particular
booster had failed to place in orbit the Arabsat 4A and was left almost fully fueled in an orbit
495 kilometers by 14,750 kilometers at 51.5° inclination.40 Multiple observers recorded the
event that is estimated to have produced at least 1,000 pieces of trackable debris. However, as
of 1 February 2008 only 25 pieces had been placed in the satellite catalog.41
Other breakups in 2007 are summarized in Figure 1.6 below. While some types of breakup
can be mitigated through use of best practices, others are more worrisome. Three out of the
eight times the Delta-4 has been launched it has released debris, and the cause remains
unknown.42 Similarly, the Briz-M failed half-way to orbit and exploded; it is not clear how to
mitigate such an event.
Figure 1.6: Summary of 2007 debris events43
* As initially estimated by the US SSN
** As of 1 February 2008
2007 Space Secuity Impact
The deliberate destruction of a satellite and creation of such a massive debris field at a
relatively high altitude in a crowded orbit has a negative impact on space security, increasing
the threat of debris collision for operational satellites in low Earth orbit and those launched in
the future. Additional unintentional breakups demonstrate that even normal launch activity
can further degrade the space environment, even if best practices are applied. Efforts must be
made by all space actors to mitigate the threat to space security posed by debris.
Trend 1.2: Increasing awareness of space debris threats
and continued efforts to develop guidelines for
debris mitigation
Growing awareness of space debris threats has led to the development of a number of
international and national debris mitigation guidelines. The Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Parent Country Date Location Estimated Catalogued Lifespan
Object Pieces* Pieces**
FY-1C PRC 11 Jan 846 km; 98.7° 2,600 2,300 Long
Beidou PRC 2 Feb 195 km x 41,775 km; 25° 70-100 0 Long
CBERS-1 PRC/Brazil 18 Feb 775 km; 98.2° 100 66 Short
Aux Motor CIS 14 Feb 260 km x 14,160 km; 46.6° 60+ 0 Long
Briz-M CIS 19 Feb 495 km x 14,750 km; 51.5° 1,000+ 0 Long
H-2A Japan 28 Jul 430 km; 98.2° 4 14 Short
UARS USA 10 Nov 353 km x 468 km; 56.9° 4 4 Short
Delta IV USA 11 Nov Classified 25+ 0 Short
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(COPUOS) began discussions of space debris issues in 1994 and published its Technical
Report on Space Debris in 1999. In 2001 COPUOS asked the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC) to develop a set of international debris mitigation
guidelines, on which it based its own draft guidelines in 2005.44 The IADC includes
representatives of the space agencies of China, Europe (ESA), France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the UK, and the US.
At the national level, NASA issued guidelines on limiting orbital debris in the August 1995
NASA Safety Standard 1740. In December 2000 the US government issued formal orbital
debris mitigation standards for space operators. These standards were developed by DOD and
NASA. In 2004 the US Federal Communications Commission imposed requirements for
satellite operators to move geostationary satellites at the end of their operating life into
“graveyard orbits” some 200 to 300 kilometers above GEO, and in 2005 new rules went into
effect requiring satellite system operators to submit orbital debris mitigation plans.45 The ESA
initiated a space debris mitigation effort in 1998.
Figure 1.7: Density of space objects by altitude46
The ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook was published in 1999 and revised in 2002.47
Also in 2002 ESA issued the European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard48 and
issued new debris mitigation guidelines in 2003. Japan and Russia also appear to strongly
support the mitigation of space debris production. China, although a member of the IADC,
has been slow to adopt debris mitigation measures.49 At the 2003 COPUOS annual meeting,
China committed to “undertake the study and development of Chinese design norms to
mitigate space debris, in conformity with the principles reflected in the space debris mitigation
guidelines developed by the Coordination Committee.”50
While there are differences among national debris mitigation guidelines, they are broadly
consistent. For example, all national guidelines address issues related to the minimization of
debris released during normal operations. Most states require residual propellants, batteries,
flywheels, pressure vessels, and other instruments to be depleted or made passive at the end of
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their operational lifetime.51 All major national debris mitigation guidelines address the
disposal of GEO satellites, typically in graveyard orbits some 235 kilometers above the GEO
orbit, and most seek the removal of dead spacecraft from LEO within 25 years.52
In April 2004, the IADC released a revised debris “Protection Manual” describing design
measures for spacecraft survivability against debris,53 as well, a subcommittee of the International
Organization for Standardization started drafting a set of standards that incorporate elements
of the IADC guidelines.54
The progressive development of international and national debris mitigation guidelines has
been complemented by research into debris mitigation technologies, such as electromagnetic
“tethers” that could help safely de-orbit non-operational satellites.55 However, a 2006 IADC
report concluded that, while “electrodynamic tethers have strong potential to become effective
mitigation measures,…various problems are still to be solved before this technique can be
practically adopted.”56 Currently natural decay due to atmospheric drag remains the only
technologically and economically feasible way to remove debris.
2007 Development
International debris mitigation guidelines adopted
At the 44th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the UN
COPUOS in February 2007 the member states adopted the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC) guidelines for debris mitigation.57 These guidelines are
summarized in Figure 1.8.
Figure 1.8: UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines58
These guidelines are the end result of three years of work by the IADC and are intended to
provide debris mitigation through all phases of space activity. The member states pledged to
implement these guidelines within their national licensing or other applicable mechanisms “to
the greatest extent feasible.”59 They were subsequently adopted by the UN COPUOS in June
200760 and the UN General Assembly in December 2007.61
On 15 August 2007 NASA implemented the latest version of its Procedural Requirements and
Safety Standards.62 These documents outline the debris mitigation standards to which all
NASA spacecraft and missions will adhere for future missions. In addition NASA added
explicit debris mitigation duties to four additional organizations, bringing to 14 the number
of organizations with debris responsibilities within NASA.
1. Limit debris released during normal operations.
2. Minimize the potential for breakups during operational phases.
3. Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit.
4. Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities.
5. Minimize potential for post-mission breakups resulting from stored energy.
6. Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO)
region after the end of their mission.
7. Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous
Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.
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Officials from China have also indicated that they are implementing similar wide-ranging
debris mitigation standards throughout their space program. Several facilities in China have
been identified as working on several key areas, including space debris surveillance, collision
avoidance, satellite debris protection, and debris mitigation.63
2007 Development
Better implementation of mitigation guidelines by commercial actors
Despite the drastic increase in space debris caused by the Chinese satellite intercept, 2007 also
saw better implementation of debris mitigation guidelines by commercial operators. In
particular, they did better in disposing of old satellites in geostationary orbit. Of the 12
satellites that reached the end of their operational life, 11 were moved to a graveyard orbit 300
kilometers beyond GEO, although one was re-orbited too close to GEO. This compares to
2006, when “nine satellites were correctly reorbited, seven were reorbited too close and three
were abandoned.”64
2007 Space Security Impact
The approval of voluntary debris mitigation guidelines is a positive step for ensuring the
sustainability of the space environment, but the number of breakup events in 2007 (see Trend
1.1) demonstrated that the challenge of space debris will require solutions on multiple fronts.
If implemented by all space actors, the debris mitigation guidelines will reduce the chances of
future space launches and missions from creating additional debris but will not reduce the
debris creation from objects already on orbit. The record of implementation was mixed in
2007, with China worsening the problem of debris but commercial operators better managing
end-of-life procedures for satellites in GEO. Solutions that help prevent collisions between
operational satellites and other objects are still needed, as well as research into potential
methods of removing debris from orbit.
Trend 1.3: Space surveillance capabilities to support collision
avoidance slowly improving
Space surveillance capabilities are vital to the mitigation of environmental hazards. There is no
international space surveillance mechanism, but several efforts to create one date to the 1980s.
In 1986 Canada presented the so-called PAXSAT study, which proposed a space-to-space
remote sensing system (PAXSAT A) based on non-superpower technology available at the
time. In 1989 France proposed the creation of an Earth-based space surveillance system
consisting of radar and optical sensors to allow the international community to track the
trajectory of space objects. This proposal was presented in the Conference on Disarmament
and evolved into a proposal to establish a UN International Trajectography Centre
(UNITRACE). It was suggested that, in the context of rapid technological advances and easier
access to high-quality information, the UNITRACE proposal could be revisited and updated.
Such an initiative could complement the US-Russian agreement to establish the Joint Center
for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches
and would be consistent with that agreement’s anticipated multilateralization.65 In the absence
of an international system, countries are establishing independent space surveillance
capabilities, with some degree of information exchange.
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The US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is the network that most systematically tracks and
catalogs orbital debris. The system is comprised of approximately 30 radar and optical sensors
at 16 sites worldwide.66 The SSN can reliably track objects in LEO with a radar cross-section
of ten centimeters in diameter or greater. It uses a tasked sensor approach, which means that
not all orbital space is searched at all times; thus objects may be observed and then lost again.
The system takes up to 500,000 observations daily. Although objects from one to five
centimeters in size are not reliably tracked by the system, they can still damage or destroy a
satellite. The Air Force Space Surveillance System or Space Fence is the oldest US space
surveillance system and consists of three transmitters and six receivers. It provides the greatest
number of observations of any sensor and is capable of making some five million detections
each month of objects larger than a basketball.67 Since 2004 the US has implemented stricter
regulations on external access to its SSN data according to national security interests.68
The broader category of space situational awareness, within which space surveillance is a
primary capability, remains one of the “most urgent space security shortcomings” of the US,
according to leading experts.69 The US has programs to bolster such capabilities, but they are
generally under-funded and behind schedule. The US Deep View program plans to develop
a high-resolution radar-imaging capability to characterize smaller objects in Earth orbit by
2010.70 The US Space Surveillance Telescope program intends to “demonstrate an advanced
ground-based optical system to enable detection and tracking of faint objects in space, while
providing rapid, wide-area search capability” by 2009.71 The Space Based Space Surveillance
System (SBSS) is being developed to enhance capabilities for identifying and tracking debris
in GEO, however the Orbital Deep Space Imager program was cancelled in 2006. This
capability is also relevant for the broader US space control mission (see Space Systems
Negation Trend 7.2).72
Russia is the only other state with a dedicated Space Surveillance System (SSS), which
functions using Russia’s early warning radars in space and more than 20 optical and
electro-optical facilities at 14 locations on Earth.73 The main optical observation system,
Okno (tr. Window), located at an altitude of 2,200 meters in the mountains near the Tajik
eastern city of Nurek, aims principally at objects from 2,000 to 40,000 kilometers in
altitude.74 The system cannot track satellites at very low inclinations and the operation of
Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic.75 The network as a whole is estimated to
carry out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalog of approximately 5,000
objects, mostly in LEO.76 While information from the system is not classified, Russia does not
have a formal structure to widely disseminate information about observations.77
France and Germany also emphasize space surveillance for debris monitoring. France’s Air
Force operates the Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale (GRAVES) space surveillance
system, which has been fully operational since 22 December 2005. The system is capable of
monitoring approximately 2,000 space objects, including orbital debris, in LEO up to 1,000
kilometers in altitude, and follows more than a quarter of all satellites, particularly those that
France considers threatening and those for which the US does not publish orbital
information.78 France has cited the necessity of developing this system to decrease reliance on
US surveillance information, and to ensure the availability of data in the event of a data
distribution blackout.79 The German Defense Research Organization operates the FGAN
Tracking and Imaging Radar. The 34-meter-diameter antenna carries out observations in the
L- and Ku-bands and can see objects as small as two centimeters in diameter at altitudes of
1,000 kilometers.80 Also, the British National Space Centre (BNSC) is developing a new space
surveillance system to map large areas of the sky quickly.81
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The EU maintains information from the SSN in its own Database and Information System
Characterising Objects in Space (DISCOS), which also takes inputs from Germany’s FGAN
Radar and ESA’s Space Debris Telescope in Tenerife, Spain. The Space Debris Telescope, a
one-meter Zeiss optical telescope, focuses on observations in GEO and can detect objects as
small as approximately 15 centimeters in diameter in that orbit.82 Other optical sensors,
including three Passive Imaging Metric Sensor Telescopes operated by the UK Ministry of
Defence, the Zimmerwald one-meter telescope at the Astronomical Institute of the University
of Berne in Switzerland, and the French SPOC system and ROSACE telescope, contribute to
debris surveillance in GEO.83 ESA’s Space Operations Centre in Germany has begun to
provide a Space Debris Avoidance Service using data from DISCOS for satellite operators.84
The ESA has defined space surveillance as one of three main security priorities.85 Although
there is still not an integrated European network, option studies are ongoing and a formal
proposal is expected in 2008.86
Since joining the IADC in 1995 China has also maintained its own catalog of space objects,
using data from the SSN to perform avoidance maneuver calculations and debris modeling.87
Space surveillance is an area of growth for China, which announced new investments in
optical telescopes for debris monitoring in 2003. Prior to the launch of the Shenzhou V in
2003, it was revealed that the spacecraft had a debris “alarm system” to warn of potential
collisions.88 In 2005 the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a Space Object and Debris
Monitoring and Research Center at Purple Mountain Observatory that employs researchers
to develop a debris warning system for China’s space assets.89 To support its growing space
program, China has established a tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) system
consisting of six ground stations in China and one each in Namibia and Pakistan, as well as a
fleet of four Yuan Wang satellite-tracking ships.90 These assets provide the foundation for
space surveillance, but are believed to have limited capacity to track unfriendly space objects.
Since 2004 Japan has operated a radar station in Okayama prefecture dedicated to the
observation of space debris to support manned space missions. The Kamisaibara Spaceguard
Center radar can detect objects as small as one meter in diameter to a distance of 600
kilometers, and track up to 10 objects at once.91 Two optical telescopes at the Bisei
Astronomical Observatory — a 0.5-meter tracking telescope and a 1.01-meter reflecting
telescope capable of viewing objects to 30 cm92 — are dedicated to space debris surveillance
in GEO.
Canada’s Microvariability and Oscillations of Stars (MOST) microsatellite hosts a space
telescope and was a technology demonstrator for future space surveillance efforts.93 Canada is
also developing the SAPPHIRE system, which will feature a space-based sensor that will
provide observations of objects to high Earth orbits (6,000 to 40,000 kilometers). It is
anticipated that the data will be included in the US space catalog, maintained by the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).94 Canada’s planned Near Earth Object
Surveillance Satellite (NEOSsat) asteroid discovery and tracking mission, being developed by
Defence Research and Development Canada and the Canadian Space Agency, will also have
space surveillance capabilities at high altitudes between 15,000 and 40,000 km.95
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Figure 1.9: Worldwide space situational awareness capability96
2007 Development
US focus on improving space situational awareness capabilities continues,
but actions are modest
The Chinese satellite intercept and other space security concerns have increased awareness in
the US military of the need for better space situational awareness (SSA), which includes
surveillance capabilities for debris mitigation as well as for potential space protection and
negation capabilities (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1). In 2007 US military leaders
highlighted four major shortfalls in the current US SSA capability: the ability to track foreign
satellites, predicting the effects of space weather, tracking orbital debris, and building a cadre
of space experts.97 Efforts to correct these shortcomings are proceeding on multiple fronts; the
US Congress authorized an additional $100-million for SSA programs above the President’s
request in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, including $42-million for the
Maui Space Surveillance System, up from $5-million in FY2007. The Rapid Attack
Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) received an $11-million increase
to $64-million. An initial cut in funding for the Space Fence was reversed and overall SSA
operations spending has increased from $187-million to $197-million.98 However, the focus
was largely on counter-ASAT capabilities (see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.2).99
Meanwhile the USAF continued work on its “clean sheet” proposal, which examines options
for bolstering SSA capabilities through the addition of special purpose sensors. Sensors
Country Optical Radar Orbital Global Centralized Public
Sensors Sensors Sensors Coverage Tasking Catalog Data
Amateur observers n M M M n
Bolivia* n
Canada n
China n n
European Union n n (M) (M) (M)
France n n
Georgia* n
Germany n
Great Britain n n
Japan n n
India n
Norway n
Russia n n M
South Africa n
Spain* n
Switzerland n
Tajikistan* n
Ukraine n
United States n n M M n n M
Uzbekistan* n
Key: ■ = Full capability □ = Some capability (□) = Under development *Part of the ISON scientific network
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currently in use were mostly built for other purposes such as missile early-warning.100 This
proposal would also set the USAF’s long-term acquisition road map for SSA. However
completion of the clean sheet analysis caused further delay to the SBSS program, which would
enhance the capabilities of the Space Fence and the SSN by providing surveillance of objects
in GEO. Launch of the initial pathfinder satellite is not expected before 2009 and costs have
increased by $35-million over the FY2008 budget request, while the status of a follow-on
system is in limbo.101
Despite growing concern for better space surveillance capabilities, funding for the Space Fence
was scaled back significantly in 2007 and the timeline pushed back further. Approved in 1997,
the Space Fence upgrade would switch from VHF radar to S-band radar, allowing it to track
objects as small as 5 centimeters in diameter. The FY2008 request for the Space Fence was only
$4-million — almost $10-million less than the amount anticipated the previous year — and
figures for subsequent years of funding were also heavily reduced. Although the House
approved up to $9.8-million in additional resources, the Space Fence upgrade appears to be
continually under-funded and delayed.102
In a measure to improve SSA command and control, US Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) revamped the primary military satellite space surveillance center.
USSTRATCOM took over the space surveillance mission from United States Space
Command (USSPACECOM) following its merger into USSTRATCOM and dissolution in
2002.103 Formerly known as the Space Control Center (SCC) and located inside Cheyenne
Mountain in Colorado Springs, the facility was renamed the Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) and completed its move to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California in August
2007.104 The unit’s mission is to collate the data from the SSN and provide both SSA and
command and control for the US. Military leaders hope the move will provide more coherent
command and control of US space assets and better integration with joint warfighters located
in theaters worldwide.
2007 Development
Worldwide actors continue to develop independent space surveillance capabilities
Demonstrating the capacity of the French GRAVES system, officials announced that the radar
had detected at least two dozen satellites that were not found in the official satellite catalog
published by the US military (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1).105 Ukraine is also
reportedly launching a system to monitor debris and satellites in space.106 Meanwhile the
contract to develop and build the Canadian space-based surveillance satellite Sapphire was
awarded to the Canadian defense contractor MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd.
(MDA).107 The satellite will provide optical tracking from low Earth orbit and is planned to
contribute to the US SSN.108
Chinese officials also announced the initiation of a major space surveillance project in late
2007. The network will consist of two lines of observatories, one north-south along 120th east
longitude and one east-west along the 30th parallel with completion planned for 2010.109
2007 Space Security Impact
The international improvement of space surveillance and space situational awareness
capabilities in 2007 may have a positive effect on space security by providing improved and
redundant tracking of space objects for collision avoidance, as well as greater transparency of
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space activities. However, the trend toward secretive development of space situational
awareness and the continued drive for independent space tracking systems indicate a broader
mistrust that could reduce space security, particularly as many aspects of these capabilities are
enablers for space system negation. In this context, greater transparency may not make actors
feel more secure in space, as the growing focus on the space protection/negation elements of
space situational awareness demonstrated (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1).
Trend 1.4: Growing demand for radio frequency spectrum and
orbital slots
Radio frequencies
The radio frequency spectrum — the part of the electromagnetic spectrum that allows the
transmission of radio signals — is divided into portions known as frequency bands. Frequency
is generally measured in hertz, defined as cycles per second. Higher frequencies are capable of
transmitting more information but require more power to travel longer distances compared to
lower frequencies. Communications satellites tend to use the L-band (1-2 gigahertz) and
S-band (2-4 gigahertz) for mobile phones, ship communications, and messaging. The C-band
(4-8 gigahertz) is widely used by commercial satellite operators to provide services such as
roving telephone services, and the Ku-band (12-18 gigahertz) is used to provide connections
between satellite users. The Ka-band (27-40 gigahertz) is now being used for broadband
communications. It is US policy to reserve the Ultra-High Frequency, X-, and K-bands
(240-340 megahertz, 8-12 gigahertz, and 18-27 gigahertz, respectively) for the US military.110
For technical reasons, most satellite communication falls below 60 gigahertz, thus actors are
competing for a relatively small portion of the radio spectrum, with competition particularly
intense for the segment of the spectrum below 3 gigahertz.111 Additionally, the number of
satellites operating in the 7-8 gigahertz band, commonly used by GEO satellites, has grown
rapidly over the past two decades.112 Since many satellites vie for this advantageous frequency
and ever closer orbit slots, there is an increased risk of accidental signal jamming.
Increased military demand for communications bandwidth was apparent during the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when the US military used some 700 megabytes per second
of bandwidth, compared to about 99 megabytes per second during the 1991 US operations
in Iraq.113 It is reported that during Operation Desert Storm certain air tasking orders and
time-sensitive intelligence information were delivered by hand, due to a lack of available
bandwidth.114 To address this challenge, the Wideband Global SATCOM system is designed
to provide transmission capacity of up to 2.4 gigabits per second per satellite, more than 10
times the capacity of the most advanced Defense Satellite Communications System satellite
currently used.115
While crowded orbits can result in signal interference, new technologies are being developed
to manage the need for greater frequency usage, allowing more satellites to operate in closer
proximity without interference (see Trend 1.5). Frequency hopping, lower power output,
digital signal processing, frequency-agile transceivers, and software-managed spectrum have
the potential to significantly improve bandwidth use and alleviate conflicts over bandwidth
allocation. Current receivers are also being produced with higher tolerance for interference
than those created decades ago, reflecting the need for increased frequency usage and
sharing.116
There is also significant research being conducted on the use of lasers for communications,
particularly by the US military. Lasers transmit information on much higher frequencies and
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have very tight beams. These features allow very high bit rates and tighter placement of
satellites to alleviate some of the current congestion and concern about interference. The US
military Transformational Satellite Communications System proposes to use this technology,
but not before 2014. The planned US NeXt Generation Communications Program also aims
to alleviate frequency demand by allowing several users to share one band of frequency, with
their respective devices intelligently searching through the allocated band for unused portions
for transmission117 (see Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.1).
Today issues of interference arise primarily when two spacecraft require the same frequencies,
or when their fields of view overlap. While interference is not epidemic, it is a growing concern
for satellite operators, particularly in “crowded space segments” in Asia.118 For example, a
general manager of engineering at AsiaSat has noted that “frequency coordination is a
full-time occupation for about five percent of our staff, and that’s about right for most other
satellite companies.”119
An official at New Skies Satellites noted, however, that while interference is common, “satellite
operators monitor their systems around the clock and can pinpoint interference and its source
fairly easily in most cases.”120 The simplest way to reduce such interference is to ensure that
all actors have access to reasonable and sufficient bandwidth. To this end the US DOD is
releasing a portion of the military-reserved spectrum from 1,710-1,755 megahertz to the
commercial sector for third-generation (3G) wireless communications.121 India, however, has
the world’s fastest growing telecoms market, and there is an ongoing struggle between the
commercial sector and the Department of Defence over spectrum use.122
Originally adopted in 1994, the current version of the ITU Constitution123 governs
international sharing of the finite radio spectrum and orbital slots used to communicate with
and house satellites in GEO. Article 45 of the Constitution stipulates that “all stations…must
be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio
services or communications of other members.”124 Military communications are exempt from
the ITU Constitution. Though they must observe measures to prevent harmful interference,
“interferences from the military communication and tracking systems into satellite
communications is on the increase.”125
International negotiations over radio frequency allocations have become politicized, involving
bargaining over systems and capabilities that can take years.126 There is growing concern
within the US that the open discussion of certain system characteristics and positioning
information necessary to identify and resolve frequency and interference disputes among
systems could compromise the security of the systems in question. The Aerospace Corporation
noted in 2002 that “the spectrum-management community is moving toward more
confidentiality, including the use of generic or non-identifying names instead of actual
program names for registration submissions.”127
Regional efforts are also underway to harmonize radio frequency utilization. In 2004 the US
and EU agreed to major principles over frequency allocation and interoperability between the
US GPS and the EU’s Galileo navigational system; details were finalized in 2007 (see
below).128 ASEAN and the EU are also seeking to harmonize regulations in Asia and Europe
respectively.129
Orbital slots
Today’s satellites operate in three basic orbital bands: LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and
GEO. There are approximately 850 operational spacecraft, approximately 36 per cent of
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which are in LEO, six per cent in MEO, 48 per cent in GEO, and about 10 per cent in either
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) or planetary trajectories.130 HEO is increasingly being used for
specific applications, such as early warning satellites and polar communications coverage. LEO
is often used for remote sensing and earth observation, and MEO is home to critical
navigation systems such as the GPS and Galileo system. Most communications and weather
satellites are in GEO, as orbital movement at this altitude is synchronized with the Earth’s
24-hour rotation, meaning that it is always in the same position over the Earth.
Prime GEO slots are located above or close to the equator over regions with high populations
and socioeconomic status. Low inclinations are also desired to maximize the reliability of the
satellite footprint. The orbital arc of interest to the United States lies between 60 and 135
degrees west longitude because satellites in this area can serve the entire continental US;131
these desirable slots are also optimal for the rest of the Americas. Similar desirable spots exist
over Africa for Europe and the Philippines for Asia.
To avoid radio frequency interference, GEO satellites are required to maintain a minimum of
two and up to nine degrees of orbital separation, depending on the band they are using to
transmit and receive signals and the field of view of their ground antennas.132 This is because
GEO satellites must generate high-power transmissions to deliver a strong signal to Earth, due
to distance and the use of high bandwidth signals for television or broadband applications.133
This means that only a limited number of satellites can occupy the prime equator (0 degree
inclination) orbital path. In the equatorial arc around the continental US, there is room for
only an extremely limited number of satellites. To deal with the limited availability of orbital
slots, the ITU Constitution states that radio frequencies and associate orbits, including those
in GEO, “must be used rationally, efficiently and economically…so that countries or groups
of countries may have equitable access” to both.134 However in practice, the ITU has
distributed orbital slots in GEO on a first-come, first-served basis.
Compounding these issues has been a rush of early registrations with the ITU, often for
so-called “paper satellites,” combined with ITU revenue shortfalls and disputes over satellite
network filing fees. “At one time there were about 1300 filings (applications) for satellite
networks before the ITU and about 1200 of them were for paper satellites.”135 Filing fees for
ITU cost recovery grew from about $1,126 in 2000 to $31,277 in 2003, resulting in patterns
of non-payment and tensions between satellite operators and the ITU. A new fee schedule
implemented in January 2006 links charges to the complexity and size of a filing. While most
incur a flat fee of $500, they can reach almost $60,000 for more complex requests requiring
extensive coordination.136 Additional measures to reduce unnecessary registrations include a
requirement for satellites to be brought online within seven years of a request, a requirement
for the provision of advanced publication information at the time of filing to verify the
seriousness of intention, and payment of filing fees within six months.137 Still, by May 2007
157 satellite network filings had been cancelled for non-payment of cost recovery fees.138
2007 Development
Cooperation and conflict over satellite navigation signals
The US and EU have been engaged in ongoing negotiations to make GPS and Galileo
compatible, with key disagreements involving signal frequencies. The US in particular has
been concerned that Galileo’s open signal would be too close to the upgraded GPS military
signal (M code), preventing the US from locally jamming open signals during a conflict
without interfering with its own military use.139 In July 2007, however, the two agreed to a
common GPS-Galileo civilian signal to allow for interoperability of the two systems, while
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also maintaining the integrity of the US military signal.140 But, added conflict has arisen from
China’s announcement that it too will build a global satellite navigation system; it has filled
with the ITU to transmit on signals that would overlay both Galileo and the US M code.141
An ITU working group is evaluating the threat of interference. Chinese sources indicate that
it is willing to cooperate with the other systems, but there is no sign of efforts to reach an
agreement.142
2007 Development
US efforts to increase military communications bandwidth
After another short delay, the first of five planned satellites for the US Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) was launched on 11 October 2007 and successfully handed over to the
USAF.143 The full WGS constellation is expected to dramatically increase bandwidth
availability for the US military and alleviate demands for commercial satellite bandwidth.144
Other programs intended to contribute to greater bandwidth availability, including the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Transformational Satellite
Communications (TSAT) System, remain behind schedule and significantly over budget (see
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.1).145
Another possible solution to the bandwidth crunch is the April 2007 announcement by Cisco
Systems, Inc. on the development of packet-routing switches for satellites. Cisco’s router
technology already powers much of the ground-based Internet; Cisco is currently partnering
with the USAF to develop similar systems for space.146 These systems would allow space to be
an extension of ground Internet links and digital packets could be routed through both
systems with greatly reduced overhead, automatically bypassing bottlenecks.
2007 Development
Global efforts to solve spectrum demand issues
In October 2007 the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) of the ITU addressed
the recent spread of broadband wireless capability, called International Mobile
Telecommunications (IMT), and the resulting increase in demand for already sparse
spectrum.147 In the past such issues generally affected only a few countries and could be
managed individually by states. The global spread of new wireless communications
technologies means that this issue now needs to be tackled by many countries and requires
international cooperation. Specifically, the Broadband Wireless Access technology, such as
WiMax in the US, operates very close to the upper limit of the C-band frequency used by
many communications satellites. The WRC voted to safeguard satellite C-band services by not
giving IMT technologies global certification to operate within the C-band.148
Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman’s announcement that it has developed the world’s fastest
transistor may indicate a technology development that could ease the spectrum crunch.149 By
enabling communication devices to operate at frequencies of over one terahertz, this
technology would open up new areas of usable spectrum.
2007 Development
Unintentional radio frequency interference continues
In September 2007 reports of satellite TV interruptions spread across Israel and Lebanon.150
The source of the interference was not positively identified, but started at the same time as an
Israeli air strike on a facility in Syria.151 Originally it was thought to be caused by the jamming
tactics used by the Israeli force to disrupt air defense radars, but an official Israeli investigation
into the issue pointed to a different source of the interference: a Dutch ship operating as part
of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Mediterranean.152 The
Dutch government has since denied the claim and the investigation continues, with Russian
and German vessels seen as possible sources.153 The interference has disrupted the
transmissions of the Israeli Yes satellite television company, resulting in the cancellation of
thousands of viewer contracts and a class-action lawsuit against the company.154 Eutelsat also
investigated an unidentified source of interference in January 2007.155 The Satellite Users
Interference Reduction Group identified almost half of all reported interference incidents in
2007 as having an unknown source,156 most likely accidental. There were only 36 reported
cases, compared with 306 in 2006 and 1,282 in 2005.
2007 Space Security Impact
Radio frequency competition, coordination, and interference posed a challenge to space
security in 2007, particularly for strategic uses. While international institutions such as the
ITU continue to manage competition for space resources, the fact that military operators are
outside this arrangement complicates the process, which will only become more difficult as
demand from all users increases in the future. Nonetheless, recognition of the issue and
progress toward solutions demonstrate the willingness of all space actors to work together on
this issue.
Trend 1.5: Increased recognition of the threat from NEO collisions
with Earth and progress toward possible solutions
Since the discovery of the Chicxulub crater and its likely associating with the extinction of the
dinosaurs, scientists have been uncovering more and more evidence that celestial objects have
a history of impacting the Earth and affecting its inhabitants. Over the past decade a growing
amount of research started to identify the types of objects that pose threats to Earth and
potential mitigation strategies.
Near Earth objects (NEOs) are asteroids and comets whose orbits bring them in close
proximity to the Earth or intersect the Earth’s orbit. NEOs are subdivided into Near Earth
Asteroids (NEAs) and Near Earth Comets (NECs). Within both groupings are Potentially
Hazardous Objects (PHOs), those NEOs whose orbits intersect that of Earth’s and have a
relatively high potential of impacting the Earth itself. As comets represent a very small portion
of the overall collision threat in terms of probability, most NEO researchers commonly focus
on PHA instead. A PHA is defined as an asteroid with an orbit that comes with 0.05
astronomical units of the Earth’s orbit and has a brightness magnitude greater than 22
(approximately 150 meters in diameter).157
Original efforts to find threatening NEOs focused on the so-called ‘civilization-killer’ class
which are NEOs 1 km in diameter or larger. In 1998 NASA undertook a survey to discover
90 percent of these objects by 2008. Of the estimated 1,100 objects in this class, NASA is
currently tracking 746, or just under 80 percent.158 In 2003, a NASA Science Definition
Team published a report that recommended the search be extended to include all NEOs down
to 140 m in diameter.159 Impacts of this class of objects would have the potential to destroy
regions of the Earth’s surface. Discovery of these objects, along with the 1 km and larger
objects would identify 90 percent of the risk the Earth faces from NEO collisions.160 Other
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efforts to identify NEOs include Canada’s Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite, which will
be the first space-based telescope to find and track NEOs. It is planned for launch in 2009.161
However, there is now a growing consensus that the greatest threat is not from asteroids that
can destroy the entire Earth or large regions, but rather those that have the potential to destroy
cities. These are objects approximately 45 m in diameter, one of which caused the Tunguska
explosion in Siberia in 1908. Researchers estimate that there are over 700,000 NEOs of this
size, of which approximately three percent are estimated to pose a threat of impact with the
Earth.162
Technical research and discussion is ongoing into ways of mitigating a NEO collision with the
Earth. This is proving to be a difficult challenge due to the extreme mass, velocity and distance
of any impacting NEO. Mitigation methods can be divided into two categories depending on
how much warning time there is for the impact event. If the warning times are on the order
of years, there are several mitigation methods that could be used consisting of constant thrust
applications to gradually change the NEO’s orbit over time. The most promising of these is
the gravitational tractor idea conceived by ex-astronaut Ed Lu, but it could also pose a risk to
space security if used against uncooperative satellites.163 If warning times are relatively short,
then only certain kinetic methods can be applied. Types of kinetic mitigation methods may
include ramming the NEO with a series of kinetic projectiles. NASA has advocated the use of
nearby explosions of nuclear weapons to try and change the trajectory of the largest NEOs,
but others have refuted this argument.164 The use of nuclear weapons in space could damage
satellites and other space assets, and have long-term consequences for the space environment
(see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.3).
Out of the approximately 5,500 known NEOs there are currently 962 known PHAs.165 206
of these present a non-zero impact risk to the Earth.166 This number is expected to jump to
over 10,000 in the next 15 years, requiring international decision-making on those objects
which present a threat. As a result, focus is now shifting towards discussion of governance
issues for NEO detection and mitigation. The Association of Space Explorers (ASE) is
currently leading this effort with a series of workshops and will be presenting its report to the
United Nations in February 2009.167 COPUOS also has an Action Team on Near Earth
Objects under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee that is developing
recommendations for action at the international level.168
2007 Development
Ongoing debate on mitigation strategies for NEOs
At the second quadrennial Planetary Defense Conference held March 2007 in Washington,
DC, global experts from a wide range of disciplines discussed the threat to Earth from Near
Earth Objects (NEO) and potential mitigation strategies.169 Attendees recommended that
further steps be taken to identify and characterize the NEO threat and that conceptualization
of mitigation techniques be continued. More analysis must be done on potentially serious
legal, political, policy, and societal issues associated with an impact and after effects.170
Further, on 10 November 2007 the US House Committee on Science and Technology’s
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics held a hearing to discuss NEO discovery and
characterization strategies. A NASA report published in March analyzed the status of its survey
program and outlined the feasibility of various mitigation techniques, including nuclear
standoff explosions.171
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2007 Space Security Impact
Efforts to address potential threats from NEOs are positive in so far as they make the link
between space and the security of Earth. However, some options to mitigate such threats such
as the use of nuclear weapons, may have negative repercussions for space security by
contributing to environmental hazards and instability. There is a need to further explore this
issue with the aim of balancing protection of the Earth from space-based threats with
long-term sustainability of the space environment.
The Space Environment
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2. Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
This chapter assesses trends and developments related to space security-relevant national and
international laws, multilateral institutions, national space security policies, and military space
doctrines.
Space security-relevant international law has progressively expanded to include, among others,
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Astronaut Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability
Convention, the 1975 Registration Convention, and the 1979 Moon Agreement. These
treaties establish the fundamental right of access to space, as well as state responsibility to use
space for peaceful purposes. They also restrict space from national appropriation and prohibit
certain military space activities, such as placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction in outer space.
This chapter also assesses trends and developments related to space security-relevant
multilateral institutions mandated to address uses of space, such as the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the
UN General Assembly (UNGA). While COPUOS tends to focus on commercial and civil
space issues, the CD primarily addresses military space challenges through its work on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) also
address space issues regarding radio frequency spectrum, orbital slots, and space debris. These
institutions are examined in the Space Environment chapter.
National space policies include authoritative national policy statements regarding the
principles and objectives of space actors with respect to the access to and use of space. Such
policies provide the context within which national civil, commercial, and military space actors
operate. For the most part, states continue to emphasize international cooperation and the
peaceful uses of space in their national space policies.
This chapter also examines the interplay between national space policies and military space
programs. Reflecting the fact that space is increasingly being used to support military
operations, some space actors also have designated national military space doctrines that
support the development of military space applications such as navigation, communications,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or meteorological capabilities.
Space Security Impact
National and international laws have a direct impact on space security since they establish key
space security parameters such as the common access to space, prohibitions against the
national appropriation of space and the placement of certain weapons in space, and the
obligation to ensure that space is used for peaceful (i.e., non-aggressive) purposes.
International law can improve space security by restricting activities that infringe upon actors’
secure and sustainable access to and use of space, or that result in space-based threats.
International law, when applied, promotes predictability and transparency among space actors
and helps overcome collective action problems. National legislation and international space
law also play an important role in establishing the framework necessary for the sustainable
commercial use of space.
Multilateral institutions play an essential role in space security, providing a venue to discuss
issues of collective concern, negotiate potential disagreements over the allocation of scarce
space resources in a peaceful manner, and develop new international law as necessary. Ongoing
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discussion and negotiation within these institutions also help to build a degree of transparency
and therefore confidence among spacefaring states. Multilateral institutions also help to
provide the technical support that is needed to ensure access to and use of space for all nations.
National space policies and doctrines both reflect and inform space actors’ use of space, as well
as their broad civil, commercial, and military priorities. Thus the relationship between policy
and space security varies, depending on whether or not a specific policy or doctrine promotes
the secure and sustainable use of space by all space actors. Some space actors maintain explicit
policies on international cooperation in space with the potential to enhance transparency and
exert a related positive influence upon space security considerations. Such international
cooperation frequently supports the diffusion of space capabilities, not only increasing the
number of space actors with space assets, but also creating a greater interest in maintaining the
peaceful and equitable use of space.
National space policies and military doctrines may have adverse effects on space security if
they promote policies and practices designed to constrain the secure use of space by other
actors or advocate space-based weapons. States that remain ambiguous on these points could
also stimulate the development of policies, doctrines, and capabilities to counterbalance what
a peer may, with a lack of evidence to the contrary, perceive as a threat. Furthermore, military
doctrines that rely heavily on space can push other states to develop protection and negation
capabilities to protect valuable space systems. At the same time, making these doctrines and
policies public also promotes transparency and can help to make behavior more predictable.
Trend 2.1: Gradual development of legal framework for outer
space activities
The web of national and international laws and regulations and international treaties that
govern the use of space has become gradually more extensive. The international legal
framework that governs the use of outer space includes space-specific UN treaties, customary
international law, bilateral treaties, and other space-related international agreements.
The UN Charter establishes the fundamental objective of peaceful relations among states,
including their interactions in space. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of
force in international relations, while Article 51 codifies the right of self-defense in cases of
aggression involving the illegal use of force by another state(s).1
Outer Space Treaty (OST)
Often referred to as the Magna Carta of outer space, the OST represents the primary basis for
legal order in the space environment, establishing outer space as a domain to be used by all
humankind for peaceful purposes (see Figure 2.1).
Lack of definitional clarity in the OST presents several challenges for space security. The OST
does not specify where airspace ends and outer space begins. This issue has been on the agenda
of both the Legal and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittees of COPUOS since 1959
and remains unresolved.2 One view is that space begins at 100 kilometers above the Earth, but
some states disclaim the need for such a boundary to be established.3
There has also been debate regarding the expression “peaceful purposes.” The position
maintained by the US is that the OST’s references to “peaceful purposes” mean
“non-aggressive” purposes.4 The interpretation initially favored by Soviet officials equated
peaceful purposes with wholly non-military ones.5 State practice over the past 40 years has
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generally supported the view that “peaceful” does mean “non-aggressive.” Thus while space
assets have been used extensively to support terrestrial military operations, actors have stopped
short of actually deploying weapons in space. However, ground-based weapons have been
tested against satellites in orbit — most recently by China in 2007 and previously by the US
and Russia (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.3). Article IV of the OST has been cited by
some to argue that all military activities in outer space are permissible, unless specifically
prohibited by another treaty or customary international law.6
There is no widely accepted definition of the term “space weapon.” Various definitions have
been advanced around the nature, place of deployment, location of targets, and scientific
principle of weapons, as well as debates about whether ASATs and anti-ballistic missile
weapons constitute space weapons.7
Figure 2.1: Key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty8
Article Key provisions
Preamble Mankind has an interest in maintaining the exploration of space for peaceful purposes.
Article I Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is “the province of all
mankind” and “shall be free for the exploration and use by all states without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality.”
Article II Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means.
Article III The UN Charter and general principles of terrestrial international law are applicable to
outer space.
Article IV It is prohibited to place in outer space objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction.
The Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Military fortifications and the testing of any other kind of weapons on the Moon are
prohibited. However, the use of military personnel and hardware are permitted, but for
scientific purposes only.
Article VI States are internationally responsible for national activities in outer space, including
activities carried on by nongovernmental entities.
Article VII States Parties who launch, procure a launch, or from whose territory an object is launched
are internationally liable for damage to another State Party
Article IX In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided by the principles of
cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space with
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States.
States Parties are to undertake international consultations before proceeding with any
activity that would cause potentially harmful interference with the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space.
Article XI States Parties are to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public, and the international
scientific community of the nature, conduct, location, and results of outer space activities.
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Liability Convention
This Convention establishes a liability system for activities in outer space, which is
instrumental in addressing threats from space debris and other spacecraft. The Convention
specifies that a launching state “is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by
its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”9 If a launching state causes
damage to another space object, it is liable only if it is at fault for causing the damage. The
Convention has partly been applied in practice only once. Canada received $3-million in
compensation from the Soviet Union for cleanup following the 1978 crash of Cosmos 954,
which scattered radioactive debris over a remote part of the country, it was settled only
partially within the channels of the Convention.10 Liability for damage caused in space is
more difficult to establish. Moreover, the Convention reiterates that states parties remain
responsible for the activities of their national and nongovernmental entities. The
commercialization and growing military uses of space are challenging the structure of the
Liability Convention. For example, the growing number of private and international actors
undertaking space launches is confusing the current definition of the term “launching state.”
Registration Convention
This Convention requires states to maintain national registries of objects launched into space.
Reporting to the Secretary-General of the UN on several data points is also mandatory, such
as the date and location of the launch, changes in orbital parameters after the launch, and the
recovery date of the spacecraft. This data is maintained in a public “Convention Register,” the
benefits of which include effective management of space traffic, enforcement of safety
standards, and attribution of liability for damage. Furthermore, it acts as a space security
confidence-building measure by promoting transparency. The UN also maintains a separate
register with information provided by states not party to the Convention (the Resolution
Register), based on UNGA Resolution 1721 B of 20 December 1961.11 As of 2006, only 21
of 51 parties had submitted notice to the UN of a national registry.12
A lack of timelines for UN registration remains a shortcoming of the Registration
Convention. While information is to be provided “as soon as practicable,” it might not be
provided for weeks or months, if at all. Part of the challenge is the growing number of private
and international actors. For example, from 1980 to 1991 registration of space objects at both
the national and international levels slipped from 99 percent to 91 percent, but between 2001
and 2003 it was only 75 percent.13 Moreover, not one of the satellites registered has ever been
described as having a military function.14 Nor does the Convention require a launching state
to provide appropriate identification markings for its spacecraft and its component parts.
Various proposals have been advanced at the CD to resolve the enumerated shortcomings of
the Registration Convention and the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS has been deliberating
the issue since 2004.
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Figure 2.2: Registered and unregistered satellites launched since 195715
Launching state Number of payloads
1957–1979 1980 – June 30 1957 – June 30
2006 2006
Registered Not Registered Registered Not Registered Total
Soviet Union 1,415 18 1,317 0 2,750
United States of America 934 33 779 105 1,851
Russian Federation 0 0 473 3 476
Japan 18 0 89 8 115
The People’s Republic of China 5 3 84 10 102
France 26 0 55 0 81
United Kingdom 6 1 27 20 54
European Space Agency 1 0 39 3 43
India 2 0 36 0 38
Federal Republic of Germany 3 1 25 4 33
Canada 3 0 19 1 21
Italy 4 0 7 7 18
Luxembourg 0 0 14 1 15
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 13 13
Australia 1 0 8 1 10
Brazil 0 0 6 4 10
Indonesia 0 0 0 10 10
Sweden 0 0 9 0 9
Spain 1 0 5 3 9
Israel 0 0 2 7 9
Korea 0 0 8 0 8
Argentina 0 0 5 3 8
The United Mexican States 0 0 2 5 7
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic 1 0 5 0 6
Thailand 0 0 0 6 6
Turkey 0 0 4 0 4
Malaysia 0 0 3 0 3
Ukraine 0 0 3 0 3
Eumetsat 0 0 3 0 3
The Netherlands 0 1 0 2 3
Denmark 0 0 0 3 3
Norway 0 0 0 3 3
United Arab Emirates 0 0 2 0 2
Pakistan 0 0 1 1 2
Egypt 0 0 0 2 2
Philippines 0 0 1 0 1
Chile 0 0 1 0 1
Algeria 0 0 1 0 1
Greece 0 0 1 0 1
Nigeria 0 0 1 0 1
Portugal 0 0 0 1 1
Singapore 0 0 0 1 1
South Africa 0 0 0 1 1
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1
Iran 0 0 0 1 1
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 1 1
Total 2420 57 3034 225 5734
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Treaty Date Ratifications Signatures
Outer Space Treaty 1967 98 27
Rescue Agreement 1968 91 25
Liability Convention 1972 87 25
Registration Convention 1975 48 4
Moon Agreement 1979 12 4
Moon Agreement
This Agreement generally echoes the space security language and spirit of the OST in terms
of the prohibitions on aggressive behavior on and around the Moon, including the installation
of weapons and military bases, as well as other non-peaceful activities.16 However, the Moon
Agreement is not widely ratified and reflects contentious issues surrounding lunar
exploration.17 States continue to object to its provisions regarding an international regime to
govern the exploitation of the Moon’s natural resources and differences exist over the
interpretation of the Moon’s natural resources as the “common heritage of mankind” and the
right to inspect all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations belonging to
any other party.
Astronaut Rescue Agreement
This Agreement requires that assistance be rendered to astronauts in distress, whether on
sovereign or foreign territory. The Agreement also requires that astronauts and their spacecraft
are to be returned promptly to the responsible launching authority should they land within
the jurisdiction of another state party.
Figure 2.3: Signature and ratification of major space treaties
UN space principles
In addition to treaties, five UN resolutions known as UN principles have been adopted by the
General Assembly for the regulation of special categories of space activities (see Figure 2.4).
Though these principles are not legally binding instruments, they retain a certain legal
significance by establishing a code of conduct recommended by the members of the UNGA,
reflecting the conviction of the international community on these issues.
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Figure 2.4: Key UN space principles
PAROS resolution
Since 1981 the UNGA has passed an annual resolution asking all states to refrain from actions
contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calling for negotiations in the CD on a
multilateral agreement to support PAROS.18 PAROS resolutions have generally passed
unanimously in the UNGA, with only four abstentions on average, demonstrating a
widespread desire on the part of the international community to expand international law to
include prohibitions against weapons in space.19 Starting in 1995 the US and Israel
consistently abstained from voting on the resolution, and they cast the first negative votes in
2005.20 Israel has since reverted to abstaining.
Multilateral and bilateral arms control and outer space agreements
Since space issues have long been a topic of concern, there are a range of other legal space
security-relevant agreements that have attempted to provide predictability and transparency in
the peacetime deployment or testing of weapons that either travel through space or can be
used in space. For example, one of the key provisions of some arms control treaties, beginning
with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, has been a recognition of the legitimacy of
space-based reconnaissance, or National Technical Means (NTMs), as a mechanism of treaty
verification, and agreement not to interfere with them.21 A claim can be made, therefore, that
a norm of non-interference with NTMs, early warning satellites, and certain military
communications satellites has been accepted as conforming to the OST’s spirit of populating
space with systems “in the interest of maintaining peace and international security.”22 A
summary of the key space security-relevant provisions of these agreements is provided in
Figure 2.5.
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963)
• Space exploration should be carried out for the benefit of all countries.
• Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states and are not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty.
• States are liable for damage caused by spacecraft and bear international responsibility for national and nongovernmental
activities in outer space.
Principles on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite (1982)
• All states have the right to carry out direct television broadcasting and to access its technology, but states must take
responsibility for the signals broadcasted by them or actors under their jurisdiction.
Principles on Remote Sensing (1986)
• Remote sensing should be carried out for the benefit of all states, and remote sensing data should not be used against the
legitimate rights and interests of the sensed state.
Principles on Nuclear Power Sources (1992)
• Nuclear power may be necessary for certain space missions, but safety and liability guidelines apply to its use.
Declaration on Outer Space Benefits (1996)
• International cooperation in space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all states, with particular attention
to the needs of developing states.
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Figure 2.5: Multilateral and bilateral arms control and outer space agreements
Other laws and regimes
Coordination among participating states in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
adds another layer to the international regulatory framework.34 The MTCR is not a treaty but
rather a voluntary arrangement among 34 states to apply common export control policy on
an agreed list of technologies, such as launch vehicles that could also be used for missile
deployment (see Commercial Space Trend 4.3).35 Another related effort is the International
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (also referred to as the Hague Code of
Conduct), which calls for greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and proliferating
ballistic missiles.36 To increase transparency and reduce mistrust among subscribing states, it
introduces confidence-building measures such as the obligation to announce missile launches
in advance.
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Agreement Space security provisions
Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) Prohibition of nuclear weapons tests or any other
nuclear explosion in outer space23
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (1972)* Acceptance of, and prohibition of interference with,
national technical means of verification
Freezes the number of intercontinental ballistic
missile launchers24
Hotline Modernization Agreement (1973)* Sets up direct satellite communication between the
US/USSR25
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)*† Prohibition of space-based anti-ballistic missile
systems and interference with national technical
means of verification26
Environmental Modification Convention (1977) Bans for use as a weapon modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects
on space27
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (1979)* Acceptance of, and prohibition of interference with,
national technical means of verification
Prohibits fractional orbital bombardment systems
(FOBS)28
Launch Notification Agreement (1988)* Notification and sharing of parameters in advance of
any launch of a strategic ballistic missile29
Conventional Armed Forces in ) Acceptance of, and prohibition of interference with,
Europe Treaty (1990 national and multinational technical means of
verification30
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (1991)* Acceptance of, and prohibition of interference with,
national technical means of verification31
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1997) Acceptance of, and prohibition of interference with,
national technical means of verification32
Memorandum of Understanding establishing Exchange of information obtained from respective
a Joint Data Exchange Center (2000)* early warning systems33
Memorandum of Understanding establishing a Exchange of information on missile launches
Pre- and Post-Missile Launch Notification
System (2000)*
* Indicates a bilateral treaty between US and USSR/Russia
† US withdrew according to the terms of the treaty in 2002
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Finally, the treaties that have an impact on space security during times of armed conflict
include the body of international humanitarian law composed primarily of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions — also known as the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Through the
concepts of proportionality and distinction, they restrict the application of military force to
legitimate military targets and establish that the harm to civilian populations and objects
resulting from specific weapons and means of warfare should not be greater than that required
to achieve legitimate military objectives.37 Therefore, attacks on satellites, it could be argued,
may violate LOAC through direct or collateral damage on civilian satellites and/or the
satellites of neutral parties.
The emergence of space commerce and the potential for space tourism has led at least 20 states
to develop national laws to regulate these space activities in accordance with the OST, which
establishes state responsibility for the activities of national and nongovernmental entities.38
While the proliferation of national legislation may increase compliance with international
obligations and reinforce responsible use of space, in practice it has occasionally led to
divergent interpretations of treaties.39
Lastly, the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNISPACE III), held in 1999, adopted the Vienna Declaration on Space and Human
Development. It established an action plan calling for the use of space applications for
environmental protection, resource management, human security, and development and
welfare. The Vienna Declaration also called for increasing space access for developing
countries and the promotion of international space cooperation.40 A concrete outcome of
UNISPACE III is the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), passed by UNGA Resolution 61/110
on 14 December 2006. It is the first program aimed specifically at ensuring access to and use
of space-based information for all countries and organizations during all phases of a disaster.
Space Security Proposals
The last 25 years have seen a number of proposals to address gaps in the space security regime,
primarily within the context of the CD. At the 1981 UN General Assembly the USSR first
proposed a “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in
Outer Space.” The proposed treaty would have banned the orbiting of objects carrying
weapons of any kind and the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or in outer space.
States would also undertake not to destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning of
unarmed space objects of other states. A revised text, the “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of
the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth,” introduced to the CD in
1983, had a broader mandate and included a ban on ASAT testing or deployment as well as
verification measures.41
During the 1980s several states tabled working papers in the CD proposing arms control
frameworks for outer space, including the 1985 Chinese proposal to ban all military uses of
space. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka made proposals to restrict the testing and deployment of
ASATs. Canada, France, and Germany contributed to the space security debate in the CD by
exploring definitional issues and verification measures.42 In 1989 France proposed the
creation of a shared space surveillance system consisting of radar and optical sensors for the
international community to track the trajectory of space objects. The proposal presented in
the CD became known as the International Trajectography Centre (UNITRACE).
After the CD agenda crisis led to the collapse of the PAROS ad hoc committee in the late
1990s, Canada, China, and Russia contributed several working papers on options to prohibit
space weapons. In 2002, in conjunction with Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and
55
Syria, Russia and China submitted to the CD a joint working paper called “Possible Elements
for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in
Outer Space.”43 The paper proposed that states parties to such an agreement undertake not to
place in orbit any object carrying any kind of weapon and not to resort to the threat or use of
force against outer space objects. Parties would also declare the locations and scopes of
launching sites, the properties and parameters of objects being launched into outer space, and
notify others of launching activities. Since then, China and Russia have presented several
Non-Papers on verification measures for such a treaty and on existing international legal
instruments on the topic of space weapons.
In 2005 the UNGA adopted a resolution sponsored by Russia entitled “Transparency and
confidence-building in outer space activities,” inviting states to inform the UN
Secretary-General on transparency and confidence-building measures, and reaffirming that
“the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international
peace and security.”44 The United States registered the only vote against the resolution and
Israel the only abstention.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also contributed to this dialogue on gaps in the
international legal framework. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists drafted a
model treaty banning ASATs (1983).45 In 2003 the Henry L. Stimson Center proposed a code
of conduct on dangerous military practices in space.46 Since 2002 the UN Institute for
Disarmament Research has periodically convened expert meetings to examine space security
issues and options to address them.47
2007 Development
Chinese satellite destruction raises concerns about the peaceful uses of outer space
On 11 January 2007 China successfully destroyed its own aging weather satellite in low Earth
orbit with a ballistic missile, generating international concern about the peaceful uses of outer
space. The US termed the test “inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries
aspire to in the civil space area.”48 The UK stated that it did not believe that the test was
inconsistent with international law, but was concerned at the lack of prior international
consultation. The EU expressed deep concern about the event, stating that it was inconsistent
with international efforts to avert an arms race in outer space and calling on all signatories to
the OST to carry out their space activities in accordance with international law and in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security.49 Japan, on the other hand, expressed
the opinion that the event was in contravention of international law.50 Chinese authorities
maintain that the test was “not targeted at any country and will not threaten any country.”51
Nonetheless, the action appears to be in contrast to China’s longstanding advocacy of PAROS.
Despite demarche attempts by several states, many questions remain unanswered.
Some reactions raised the question of the future of peaceful uses of outer space. The Israeli
Minister of Defence and Air Force Chief warned that “emerging ASAT capabilities in the hands
of regional adversaries would require Israel to deploy its own defenses against anti-satellite
threats.”52 In India concern over the test led to calls supporting the establishment of an
Aerospace Command to protect the nation’s space-based assets.53 Nonetheless, India remains
committed to a “weapons free outer space.”54 Subsequently several states and civil society
groups called for a review of the Outer Space Treaty to prevent similar activities in the future.
The non-armament provisions of the OST are limited to the prohibition of the placement of
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space (Article III) and the testing of
weapons or military maneuvers on the Moon and other celestial bodies (Article IV).
Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
Space Security 2008
56
2007 Development
Divisions remain on key space security Resolutions at the UN General Assembly
During the 62nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) held in
2007 the US maintained opposition to the adoption of the annual Resolution on Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space both in the First Committee and in the Plenary Session on
the basis that there is no arms race in outer space.55 Israel continued to abstain from the vote,
while Côte d’Ivoire cast a positive vote after abstaining in 2006, quelling speculation of a
growing trend of abstentions.
In accordance with UNGA Resolution 61/75 introduced by the Russian Federation and
passed in 2006, replies on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) in outer
space were submitted by several states and considered by the UNGA in 2007.56 Most states
indicated general support for such measures; Cuba and the Russian Federation included
specific measures that could be explored by the UNGA, ranging from informal measures
based on exchanging information to more formal multilateral agreements. While stressing its
opposition to the weaponization of space China expressed the view that TCBMs are only
intermediate measures complementary to a negotiated international legal instrument.57 On
behalf of the EU Portugal suggested the adoption of a comprehensive code of conduct on
space objects and space activities as a means of filling gaps in the existing legal framework,
strengthening existing agreements, and codifying best practices.58 The UNGA passed a
Resolution on TCBMs by a vote of 179 with one against (United States) and one abstention
(Israel).59 The US cast a negative vote because it disagreed with the linkage between TCBMs
and a negotiated treaty, not with the aim of TCBMs themselves.
2007 Development
Some governments and civil society call for regulatory approaches to space security
The concept of a Code of Conduct or rules of the road for space operations was supported by
multiple stakeholders in 2007, including government and military officials, commercial
representatives, and nongovernmental organizations.60 For example, the Portuguese
submission on Resolution 61/75 on transparency and confidence-building measures (see
above) formed the basis of an EU “Draft Code of Conduct” to be submitted for international
consultations in 2008. Key activities would include “the avoidance of collisions and deliberate
explosions, the development of safer traffic-management practices, the provision of assurances
through improved information exchanges, transparency and notification measures, and the
adoption of more stringent space debris mitigation measures.”61
In other examples, General Chilton, Commander of the US Strategic Command, indicated
that the US “should examine the potential utility of a code of conduct or ‘rules of the road’
for the space domain, thus providing a common understanding of acceptable or unacceptable
behavior within a medium shared by all nations” as a means of advancing space situational
awareness.62 Similarly David McGlade, CEO of Intelsat Corp. urged the US to begin an
international dialogue on ‘Rules of the Road’ for space following the Chinese anti-satellite
demonstration. Commenting on the utility of nonbinding guidelines and protocols, he stated
that, “although there may be disagreement as to the value of additional laws or space treaties,
there seems to be general acceptance that certain guidelines or norms developed by consensus
may play a useful role in ordering our activities in space.”63
Several civil society initiatives in 2007 aimed to provide a starting point for such regulatory
initiatives. Following the 2006 Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management,64 prepared by the
International Academy of Astronautics, students at the summer session of the International
Space University worked on developing a space traffic management system.65 The study
proposed, among several alternatives, a set of 11 technical traffic rules and two environmental
rules as a basis for a long-term solution to the problem of space traffic management.66 The
Henry L. Stimson Center concluded a project with civil society partners from the US, Russia,
France, Canada, Japan, and China to develop a Code of Conduct for space operations in the
form of an executive-level agreement between states titled “Model Code of Conduct for
Responsible Space-faring Nations.”67 Although a civil society delegation from China actively
participated in the process leading up to the development of the Code, it did not sign off on
the final product. While there seems to be broad support for the concept of a code of conduct
as a regulatory approach to space security, there is no indication of consensus on the content
of such an agreement.68 For example, in contrast to the Stimson proposal that would ban all
satellite interference, the US military currently emphasizes tactics of space denial based on
localized, temporary, and reversible effects (see Trend 2.4).
2007 Space Security Impact
Although the Chinese satellite intercept and destruction raised concerns about the peaceful
uses of outer space, including secure and sustainable access, it also focused the attention of the
international community on the gaps in the current space security legal and regulatory
framework. High-level support from government, military, and commercial officials for the
increased use of regulatory approaches such as guidelines, rules of the road, and codes of
conduct suggest that this might be a viable avenue to enhance the security of outer space in
the future. Although significant political divisions remain, efforts in this direction are already
being implemented with the adoption of space debris mitigation guidelines in 2007 (see trend
2.2). However, these alternative approaches rely on good-will implementation by states.
Moreover, the division on implementation of UN-SPIDER demonstrates that secure and
sustainable access to, and use of, space for all requires significant technical and financial
support in addition to an enabling legal framework. Overall, developments in 2007 indicate
the fragility of space security. Although international commitment to ensure space security
now seems stronger, obstacles to meaningful action remain.
Trend 2.2: Progress in COPUOS but the Conference on
Disarmament has been unable to agree on an
agenda since 1998
An overview of the relationships among key space security-relevant institutions is provided in
Figure 2.6. The UNGA is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations and issues of
space security are often debated within the UNGA First Committee (Disarmament and
International Security). While the decisions of the Assembly are not legally binding, they are
considered to carry the weight of world opinion. The UNGA has long held that the
prevention of an arms race in outer space would make a significant contribution to
international peace and security.
The UNGA created COPUOS in 1958 to review the scope of international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of outer space, develop UN programs in this area, encourage research and
information exchanges on outer space matters, and study legal problems arising from the
exploration of outer space.69 There are currently 67 Member States of COPUOS, which
works by consensus. The IADC was established in 1993 as a standalone agency composed of
the space agencies of major space actors, and has played a key role in developing and
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promoting space debris mitigation guidelines, which provided the basis for those drafted by
the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in 2005.70 Debate on revisiting the
mandate of COPUOS to include all issues affecting the peaceful uses of outer space, namely
those pertaining to militarization, has not reached consensus. The United States in particular
emphasizes a strong distinction between peaceful uses and non-armament.71
Figure 2.6: International space security-relevant institutions
The CD was established in 1979 as the primary multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.
The CD presently has 66 Member States plus observers that meet in three sessions on an
annual basis and conduct work by consensus under the chair of a rotating Presidency. The CD
has repeatedly attempted to address the issue of the weaponization of space, driven by
perceived gaps in the OST that include its lack of verification or enforcement provision and
failure to expressly prohibit conventional weapons in outer space or ground-based ASATs. In
1982 The Mongolian People’s Republic put forward a proposal to create a committee to
negotiate a treaty to that effect.72 After three years of deliberation, the CD Committee on
PAROS was created and given a mandate “to examine, as a first step … the prevention of an
arms race in outer space.”73 From 1985 to 1994 the PAROS committee met, despite wide
disparity among the views of key states, and in that time made several recommendations for
space-related confidence-building measures.74
Extension of the PAROS committee mandate faltered in 1995 over an agenda dispute that
linked PAROS with other agenda items. Since 1998 the CD agenda negotiations have been
stalled and the CD has remained without a formal plan of work. The US has prioritized the
negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) over action on PAROS, while China
has reverse priorities, with a resulting stalemate on both issues. In 2000 then President of the
CD Ambassador Amorim of Brazil attempted to break the deadlock by proposing the creation
of four subcommittees, including one to “deal with” PAROS and another to “negotiate” the
FMCT.75 The 2002 “Five Ambassadors’ Initiative” again attempted to resolve the blockage,
proposing an agenda that decoupled the establishment of an ad hoc PAROS committee from
any eventual treaty on the non-weaponization of space, which received support from China
in 2003, leaving only the US in disagreement. In 2004 several states called for the
establishment of a CD expert group to discuss the broader technical questions surrounding
space weapons, but there was still no consensus on a program of work. Since 2005 the CD
has been advancing discussions on space security themes through informal sessions hosted by
delegates.
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2007 Development
COPUOS addresses the Registration Convention and Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
and charts future role and activities aimed at peaceful uses and sustainability
The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee endorsed a Working Paper on the practice of states and
international organizations in registering space objects.76 The Working Paper is the
culmination of efforts initiated in 2003 when the registration of space objects was adopted as
an agenda item based on a four-year work period.77 It recommends specific actions to improve
state practice in registering space objects and adherence to the Registration Convention,
including wider ratification of the Convention by states and international organizations,
efforts to attain uniformity of information submitted to the UN registry, and efforts to address
gaps caused by the ambiguity of the term ‘launching state.’78 The Working Paper subsequently
provided the basis of a draft resolution submitted by France to the UNGA, passed on 17
December 2007.79
On 21 February 2007 the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS adopted
voluntary, technical guidelines on space debris mitigation based on those previously adopted
by the IADC.80 The guidelines were subsequently endorsed by COPUOS and the UNGA.81
Yet China’s intentional destruction of a satellite in low Earth orbit on 11 January 2007 created
one of the worst manmade debris-creating events to date, demonstrating a potential weakness
in the ability of voluntary guidelines to regulate behavior in outer space (see Space
Environment, Trend 1.1 and 1.2).
Informal consultations held by the Chairman of COPUOS from July 2006 to April 2007
resulted in a working paper submitted on the future role and activities of the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The objective is for the Committee to take a “deeper look
at the longer-term issues facing the future peaceful uses of outer space and identify where the
Committee can best contribute to the sustainability of space activities.”82 An initial list
includes supporting the use of space systems to understand the monitor the Earth; supporting
increased benefits of satellite navigation systems to the global community; contributing to the
work of the Commission on Sustainable Development; developing ‘rules of the road’ to
support long-term sustainability of space activities; support participation by developing
countries in space exploration initiatives; consider conservation of designated areas of the
Moon and other parts of the solar system; consider the non-technical aspects of future
commercial space transportation; and continue to work on recommendations pertaining to
near-Earth objects.
2007 Development
Renewed efforts toward resumption of substantive work in the CD
In January 2007 the six presidents (P6) of the 2006 session of the CD presented a vision paper
to facilitate the resumption of substantive work in the CD.83 The paper summarized lessons
learned from the structured debates and informal consultations held in 2006 and identified
elements for substantive discussions, including the establishment of subsidiary bodies (as
opposed to Ad Hoc Committees) to address the core issues of the CD agenda and the
adoption of a schedule of activities to provide an efficient framework for substantive
discussions, pending agreement on the program of work.84 Coordinators were appointed to
arrange and chair deliberations on seven identified agenda items under the auspices of the
P6.85 Canada served as Coordinator for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and held
two rounds of informal discussions, which largely focused on the issue of the Treaty on the
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Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects (PPWT) being developed by Russia and China.86
The work of the seven coordinators culminated in a Presidential Draft Decision L.1, which
proposed the appointment of four coordinators to preside over substantive discussions on four
agenda items without prejudice to future work and negotiations.87 The four items selected
were: (1) nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war; (2) a non-discriminatory
and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; (3) issues related to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; and
(4) appropriate international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons.88 Support for the Presidential Proposal was mixed and
reservations were expressed by China, Pakistan, and Iran.89 L.1 was not adopted but remains
on the table for the 2008 session.
2007 Space Security Impact
Developments in 2007 demonstrated both the expediency and flexibility of technical,
regulatory guidelines to address key threats to the security of outer space, as well as the
potential weakness of such an approach to enforce behavior. Moreover, events in COPUOS
and the CD suggest that a growing division between states that advocate such technical tools
and states that insist on a treaty-based approach to space security could result in blocked
progress on all fronts. More generally, however, indications of greater cooperation and support
for discussions on space security issues were a positive development for 2007.
Trend 2.3: Spacefaring states’ national space policies consistently
emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful
uses of outer space
The national space policies of all spacefaring states explicitly support the principles of peaceful
and equitable use of space. Similarly almost all emphasize the goals of using space to promote
national commercial, scientific, and technological progress, with countries such as China,
Brazil, and India also emphasizing economic development. Virtually all space actors
underscore the importance of international cooperation in their space policies; however, it is
often delineated by national security concerns.
The US has the most to offer to international cooperative space efforts. While the US is
perhaps the least dependent upon such efforts to achieve its national space policy objectives,
the 2006 US National Space Policy nonetheless sets a goal to “encourage international
cooperation with foreign nations and/or consortia on space activities that are of mutual benefit
and that further the peaceful exploration and use of space,” as well as to “advance national
security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives.”90 Such cooperation is particularly
linked to space exploration, space surveillance, and Earth-observation. The US also aims to
build an understanding of, and support for, US national space policies and programs and to
encourage the use of US space capabilities and systems by friends and allies.”91
Russia is deeply engaged in cooperative international space activities, asserting that
international cooperation in space exploration is more efficient than breakthroughs by
individual states.92 The International Space Station (ISS) and the Russian-American
Observation Satellite Program (RAMOS) for detection of missile launches are examples of this
strategy, although RAMOS was cancelled in 2004.93 Russia is also a major partner of the
European Space Agency.94 Russia’s other key partners on space cooperation are China and
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India (see Civil Space and Global Utilities Trend 3.3 and 3.4).95 Russia has also undertaken
cooperative space ventures with Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel,
Pakistan, and Portugal on various occasions.96 Similar to those of the US, Russian space
cooperation activities have tended to support broader access and use of space. But Russian
policy also aims to maintain Russia’s status as a leading space power, as indicated in the Federal
Space Program for 2006–2015, which significantly increased the resources of the Russian
Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos).97
China’s 2006 White Paper on space declares a commitment to the peaceful use of outer space
in the interests of all mankind, linking this commitment to national development and security
goals, including protecting China’s national interest and building the state’s “comprehensive
and national strength.”98 While China actively promotes international exchanges and
cooperation, it has stated that such efforts must encourage independence and self-reliance in
space capabilities.99 The White Paper also emphasizes that, while due attention will be given
to international cooperation and exchanges in the field of space technology, these exchanges
must operate on the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity.100 In the spirit of these
principles, China has emphasized Asia-Pacific regional space cooperation, which in 1998 led
to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Small Multi-Mission
Satellite and Related Activities with Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, South Korea, and Thailand,
thus supporting broader access to space.101 China has pursued space cooperation with 13
states and is collaborating with Brazil on a series of Earth resources satellites.102
India is a growing space power that has pursued international cooperation from the inception
of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), although its mandate remains focused on
national priorities. India has signed MOUs with Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, China,
Darussalam, the European Space Agency (ESA), France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Norway, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Syria, the
Netherlands, Thailand, the UK, Ukraine, the US, and Venezuela. India also provides
international training on civil space applications through the Indian Institute of Remote
Sensing (IIRS) and the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in the Asia Pacific
Region to support broader use of space data.103
The ESA facilitates European space cooperation by providing a platform for discussion and
policymaking for the European scientific and industrial community.104 Many see this
cooperation as one of the most visible achievements of European cooperation in science and
technology. Historically Europe lacked the resources to meet its stated space policy, leading it
to establish strong links of cooperation with the larger space powers, specifically the US and
Russia. In addition France, Germany, Italy, and the UK all have extensive cooperative ventures
with the US, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Japan and others. The principles of space activity
advanced by France have emphasized free access for all peaceful applications, maintenance of
the security and integrity of orbital satellites, and consideration for the legitimate defense
interests of states. Autonomy is also a goal of European national space policies, as exemplified
by the Ariane launch and Galileo navigation programs.
2007 Development
European Space Policy highlights European independence and civil-military synergies
within a context of peaceful uses of outer space
On 22 May 2007 a new European Space Policy was adopted by a resolution of the Fourth
Space Council, a joint meeting of the Council of the EU, and the Council of the European
Space Agency.105 The policy’s strategic mission is based on the “peaceful exploitation of Outer
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Space by all states,” through which it seeks to: serve the public in key fields, including the
“environment, development, and global climate change,” “meet Europe’s security and defence
needs,” “ensure a strong and competitive space industry,” “contribute to the knowledge-based
society,” and “ensure independent European space applications.”106 To achieve this strategic
mission the policy calls on member states to take new steps to increase synergies between
defence and civil space programs and technologies, taking into account institutional
competencies.107 While stressing the peaceful use of outer space, the policy notes that “[t]he
economy and security of Europe and its citizens are increasingly dependent on space-based
capabilities which must be protected against disruption” and emphasizes the need for
European states to maintain independent access to space108 A number of specific short-term
actions are identified to implement the policy, with a strong focus on independent space access
and applications such as launch vehicles, navigation, and environmental monitoring.109
2007 Development
China’s five-year Space Development Plan reaffirms the importance of commercial
development and national strength within a context of peaceful uses of outer space
On 10 May 2007 China’s State Council released the country’s 11th five-year Space
Development Plan for 2006–2010, which follows a blueprint developed by the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).110 Program
priorities include manned space flight, lunar exploration, launch vehicle development, and
high-resolution Earth observation. The plan also emphasizes China’s determination to
promote the commercial development of space, particularly in the areas of
telecommunications, navigation, and remote sensing.111 While stressing the peaceful nature
of China’s exploration of space, the Chinese President called on space exploration efforts to
help to build China’s social, economic, and technological strength.112 This is in keeping with
the 2006 White Paper on Space Activities, which suggests that China intends to be a major
competitor in the space industry and links space activities to its national interests and
“comprehensive national strengths.”113 While focused on civil space efforts, the technologies
are dual-use and the policy resonates with the White Paper China’s National Defense in 2006,
which stresses “informationization” as a key strategy in the modernization of the People’s
Liberation Army. 114
2007 Development
14 national space agencies develop framework for coordination of outer space
exploration efforts
On 31 May 2007 14 national space agencies jointly released the document The Global
Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination.115 The document marked the
culmination of efforts toward international collaboration in outer space exploration initiated
by NASA in 2006. It asserts that “[s]ustainable space exploration is a challenge that no one
nation can do on its own,” and “elaborates an action plan to share the strategies and efforts of
individual nations so that all can achieve their exploration goals more effectively and safely.”116
The action plan would allow for the establishment of a voluntary, non-binding international
Coordination Mechanism for space agencies to exchange information on their respective space
exploration plans.117 This mechanism is intended to help identify gaps, overlaps, and synergies
in the space exploration plans of participating agencies.118 According to the document, “this
new era of space exploration is intended to strengthen international partnerships through the
sharing of challenging and peaceful goals.”119
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2007 Space Security Impact
States continued to express commitment to international cooperation and the peaceful use of
outer space in their civil space policies in 2007, demonstrated most strongly by the Global
Exploration Strategy. Yet independence in space is also emphasized. The peaceful use of space
is increasingly viewed as strategic, which could limit opportunities for cooperation. The
impact on space security will depend on whether or not states pursue independent or
collective measures to achieve the strategic goals set out in their space policies.
Trend 2.4: Growing focus within national military doctrines on the
security uses of outer space
Fueled by the revolution in military affairs, the military doctrine of a number of states
increasingly reflects a growing focus on space-based applications to support military force
enhancement functions (see Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations). Related to this
trend is a tendency among major space powers and several emerging space powers to view their
space assets as an integral element of their national critical infrastructure.
While there is a specific hierarchy in US military space doctrine documents, some emphaize
space control, defined as the “freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when
directed, denying it to an adversary.”120 It is US policy, under Joint Publication 3-14 and
Department of Defense (DOD) Space Control Policy, to emphasize tactical denial, meaning
that denial should have localized, reversible, and temporary effects.121 There is currently an
active debate within the US on how best to assure the security of vulnerable national space
assets. Some advocate the development of space control capabilities, including enhanced
protection, active defense systems, and space-based counterspace weapons. The 2003 US Air
Force (USAF) Transformation Flight Plan in particular calls for onboard protection capabilities
for space assets, coupled with offensive counterspace systems to ensure space control for US
forces.122 The 2004 USAF document on Counterspace Operations doctrine makes explicit
mention of military operations conceived “to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
adversary space capabilities.”123
Others in this debate advocate enhanced protection measures, but oppose the deployment of
weapons in space.124 Much official US military space doctrine has remained focused primarily
on force enhancement, as reflected in the US DOD 1999 Space Policy.125 The authoritative
US joint doctrine on such matters, Joint Publication 3-14, as well as the 2004 USAF Posture
Statement reflect a continuing emphasis on using space assets for traditional force
enhancement or combat support operations, as well as other passive measures such as space
systems protection and responsive space access.126
Interest in developing an antiballistic missile system in the US has fuelled discussion and plans
for space-based interceptors and space-based lasers. Most notable was President Reagan’s
Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 makes it the
policy of the US to “deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile
Defense…against limited ballistic missile attack.”127 While not explicitly mentioning
particular space-based systems, the 2006 National Space Policy calls on the Secretary of Defense
to provide space capabilities to support “multi-layered and integrated missile defenses.”128
In all military doctrine documents since 1992, Russia has expressed concern that attacks on
its early warning and space surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its
security.129 Therefore a basic Russian national security objective is the protection of Russian
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space systems, including ground stations on its territory.130 These concerns derive from
Russia’s assessment that modern warfare is becoming increasingly dependent on space-based
force enhancement capabilities.131 In 2001 Anatoliy Perminov, then Commander-in-Chief of
the space corps, stated that the international trend of armed force modernization demonstrates
“the continuously rising role of national space means in ensuring the high combat readiness
of troops and naval forces.”132 In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have
two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment
capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems.133
Russia’s second priority is upgrading its nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these
recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia’s secure access to
space.134 Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the
extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile
defense systems.135 Thus Russia has actively argued for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of
weapons in space. In the interim Russia has pledged not to be the first to deploy any weapons
in outer space and has encouraged other spacefaring nations to do the same. However, various
Russian officials have also threatened retaliatory measures against any country that attempts
to deploy weapons in space.136
China’s military space doctrine, should it exist, is not made public. China’s 2006 White Paper
on Space Activities identifies national security as a principle of China’s space program.137As
part of the modernization of its armed forces, the 2004 National Defense White Paper
describes China’s plans to develop technologies, including “dual purpose technology” in space,
for civil and military use.138 A subsequent White Paper in 2006 describes
“informationization” as a key strategy of its military modernization, although there is no
express mention of the use of outer space for national defense purposes, and asserts an
international security strategy based on developing cooperative, non-confrontational, and
non-aligned military relations with other states.139 Nonetheless, in contemporary Chinese
military science, the military use of space is inextricably linked to attaining comprehensive
national military power.140 China demonstrated significant counterspace capabilities via
missile intercept of an orbiting satellite on 11 January 2007, but maintains that the test was
“not targeted at any country and will not threaten any country,” and has remained publicly
committed to the non-weaponization of space.141
Space is important for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The space policies
of EU member states recognize that efforts to assume a larger role in international affairs will
require the development of space assets such as global communications, positioning, and
observation systems.142 The European Space Policy “ESDP and Space” paper approved by the
European Council in 2004 was the first council strategy paper on the use of space for ESDP
purposes, and was followed by a roadmap for implementation in 2005.143 While most
European space capabilities have focused on civil applications, there is an increasing awareness
of the need to strengthen dual-use and dedicated military capabilities. In the 2005 Report of
the Panel of Experts on Space and Security EU experts concluded that “Europe must establish a
new balance between civil and military uses of space” to effectively protect its borders in a
changing security environment, although political support for this recommendation is
unclear.144 The panel also recommended that the EU develop a security-related space strategy
to protect civil and military satellite systems, including defensive and anti-jamming
countermeasures. The report notes that since EU member states possess the industrial capacity
needed to develop space systems, member states should coordinate efforts to establish a well
developed space security program.145 In addition, at the third EC Space Council Meeting in
November 2005 elements of the space policy, including the Global Monitoring for
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Environment and Security (GMES) initiative, were confirmed as priorities. The EU European
Space Policy Green Paper and the subsequent European Space Policy White Paper also suggest
that the EU will work to strengthen and enforce international space law.146 In 2005 the
European Commission (EC) dedicated more than $5-billion to “Security and Space”
programs for 2006–2013 and doubled its budget for space-related research programs.147
At the national level, French military space doctrine recognizes the primordial role of space
support for terrestrial military operations and the Ministry of Defense has emphasized the role
of space power in maintaining sovereignty.148 UK military space doctrine calls for greater
satellite use for communications and intelligence. For its part, the ESA has traditionally
focused on civil uses of space, a role mandated by the reference in its statute to “exclusively
peaceful purposes.”149
Emerging spacefaring powers have also begun to emphasize the security dimension of outer
space. Israel’s space program is based on national security needs and tightly linked to its
military: In 2006 the Air Force was renamed the Air and Space Force and was given sole
responsibility for all military activities in space as well as for designing and operating the
nation’s future satellites. Its mission is to operate in the air and space arena for purposes of
defense and deterrence.150 India’s army doctrine, released in 2004, noted plans to make
extensive use of space-based sensors for what it predicts will be short and intense military
operations of the future.151 The Indian Air Force is also working toward the creation of an
Aerospace Command, intended to make “effective use of space-based assets for military
needs.”152 Japan is considering a bill to allow the government to carry out space activities for
non-aggressive military and/or defense purposes.153 Recent Canadian Air Force doctrine
documents have highlighted the importance of space systems in support of terrestrial military
operations, space situational awareness, and space systems protection.154
2007 Development
Japan considers new space law to permit military use of space
In June 2007 the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito in
Japan submitted a bill to the legislature for a new basic space law, literally translated as Japan’s
Fundamental Act of Outer Space. However, passage of the bill was delayed due to domestic
political changes.155 Presently, under a strict interpretation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
contained in the 1969 Parliamentary (Diet) Resolution adopting the Law on the
Establishment of the National Space Development Agency (NASDAct), Japan’s use of space
is limited to non-military purposes. If passed, the new bill would relax existing regulations and
allow the Japanese government to carry out space activities for non-aggressive military and/or
defense purposes, such as the development, launching, and operation of remote sensing
satellites by the Ministry of Defense.156 It would also create a space strategy headquarters and
upgrade the JAXA into an executive agency.157 Meanwhile, on 6 July 2007 Japan issued its
Annual Defense White Paper, citing concerns about North Korea and China and their
continued efforts to extend their military capabilities into space.158
2007 Development
India continues to consider an Aerospace Command and greater military use of space
In January 2007 the Indian Air Chief Marshall again announced plans for the establishment
of the long-anticipated Indian Aerospace Command, originally envisioned as part of the
Indian Air Force.159 This would substantially increase the role of India’s military forces in
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space. However, instead of a fully fledged aerospace command, a space cell has been
established under the Air Vice Marshal,160 and a dialogue on the shape of the eventual
Command is expected to take place among the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces to
establish a tri-services Aerospace Command. Training was also started for a core group of
people to staff the Command in the future. In 2007 India also reportedly took steps to revise
its defense doctrine to exploit the use of space to enhance the functional effectiveness of its
armed forces. Indian Army Commanders ratified Space Vision 2020 — the philosophy of
using space in future warfare — at an Army Commander’s conference in October 2007.161
The document, drawn up by a special space cell at the Indian Army Headquarters, reportedly
emphasizes aspects of force modernization, including battlefield transparency, long-range
precision engagement, and integral air mobility. This follows a space policy reportedly
developed by the Indian Air Force in 2007, as well as a new Air Force defense doctrine.162
Media reports indicate that the revised doctrine, which stresses the primacy of air power, also
features the utilization of “space for real-time military communications and reconnaissance
missions, ballistic missile defence and delivery of precision guided munitions through satellite
signals.”163
2007 Development
Greater use of space for security purposes considered in Europe
The primary focus and competency of the EU in relation to space is on civil space
applications, with military and defense issues the exclusive reserve of national governments.
Nonetheless, the European Space Policy adopted in 2007 highlights implementation of the
space dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since 2003 when the
European Commission adopted the White Paper titled “Space: a new European frontier for
an expanding Union,” the EU has consistently stressed the strategic importance of space in
implementing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. Along
this line, the European space policy seeks to develop synergies between defense and civil space
programs and also to guarantee EU independent access to space.164 While military space
capabilities remain within the exclusive purview of member states, the new policy urges them
to increase coordination to achieve the highest levels of interoperability between military and
civilian space systems. The policy envisages that “sharing and pooling of the resources of
European civilian and military space programmes, drawing on multiple use technology and
common standards, would allow more cost-effective solutions.”165
In France a working group on the strategic directions of defense space policy (GOSPS) was
established by the Minister of Defense to assess and advise on which security and defense space
capabilities will enable France to guarantee its strategic autonomy and meet its key
requirements. The GOSPS presented a classified report to the Minister in 2004 and a public
version containing key issues was released in 2007. In the report, the GOSPS acknowledged
that space control will be important in the future and therefore should be included in France’s
future defense strategy.166 Accordingly, it was recommended that national efforts should be
increased by 50 percent to reach an annual budget of $954-million, besides efforts at the
European level, while resorting to European cooperation and dual-use as much as possible. It
is expected that the recommendations of the GOSPS will be taken into consideration during
deliberations for the next military program law.167
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2007 Space Security Impact
In 2007 states continued to emphasize the use of space for national security purposes through
military doctrines and some new programs. A positive impact of this development is an
increase in transparency, allowing states to better predict the behavior of others in space,
although this is limited to broad goals and objectives. On the other hand, these policies and
doctrines also demonstrate a growing concern for the need to protect space assets and
capabilities, which may have a positive or negative impact on space security, depending on
whether such protection is pursued through passive or aggressive means, collectively or
independently.
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3. Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities
This chapter assesses trends and developments associated with civil space programs and
global space-based utilities. The civil space sector comprises those organizations engaged in
the exploration of space, or scientific research in or related to space, for non-commercial and
non-military purposes. This sector includes national space agencies such as the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Russian Federal Space Agency
(Roscosmos), and the European Space Agency (ESA); and missions such as Soyuz, Apollo,
MIR, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the International Space Station (ISS). Key
capabilities associated with launch vehicles related to civil programs that enable actors to
access space are also addressed. Finally, the sector includes international collaborations that
facilitate space access for countries without launch or other technical capabilities.
The chapter examines trends and developments among civil space actors. It also reviews the
number of actors with either independent access to space or access via the launch
capabilities of other actors; the number, scope, and priorities of civil programs, including
the number of human and civil satellite launches made by each actor; and the funding
trends of civil programs. It also assesses the degree and scope of international civil space
collaboration, often seen as the hallmark of civil space programs.
Global utilities are space-based applications provided by civil, military, or commercial
providers, which can be freely used by any actor equipped to receive the data they provide,
either directly or indirectly. Some global utilities include remote sensing satellites that
monitor the Earth’s changing environment using various sensors, such as weather satellites,
search and rescue satellites, and some telecommunications satellites with global utility
services, such as amateur radio satellites. Finally, the chapter includes satellite navigation
systems that provide geographic position (latitude, longitude, altitude) and velocity
information to users on the ground, at sea, or in the air. An example of a global utility is
the US Global Positioning System (GPS).
This chapter examines trends and developments in global utilities of all space actors,
including the number and types of such programs, their funding, and the number of users.
It also assesses trends in conflict and cooperation between actors in the development and
use of global utilities.
Space Security Impact
Civil space programs can affect space security in several positive ways. First, they are one of
the primary drivers behind the development of capabilities to access and use space, in
particular space launch capabilities, increasing the number of actors with secure access to
space. Second, civil space programs and their technological spin-offs on Earth underscore
the vast scientific, commercial, and social benefits of secure and sustainable uses of space,
thereby increasing global interest in the maintenance of space security. Third, civil space
programs develop and shape public interest and awareness of the peaceful uses of space.
Conversely, civil space programs can have a negative impact on space security by enabling
the development of dual-use technologies for space systems negation or space-based strike
capabilities, and by contributing to the overcrowding of scarce space resources such as
orbital slots and radio frequencies. Civil-military cooperation can have a mixed impact on
space security. On the one hand, it helps to advance the capabilities of civil space programs
to access and use space. On the other hand, it may encourage adversaries to target dual-use
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civil-military satellites, or make such targeting too costly, depending on how other space
actors react.
Millions of individuals rely on global utilities on a daily basis for weather, navigation,
communications, and search-and-rescue functions. Consequently, global utilities are
important for space security because they broaden the community of actors who have an
investment in space security and the peaceful uses of space. However, global utilities can also
be used for dual-use functions, providing data that can support terrestrial and space military
operations (see Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations, Space Systems Negation
Trend 7.2 and Space-Based Strike Systems Trend 8.2).
International cooperation remains a key aspect of both civil space programs and global
utilities. Such international cooperation can benefit space security by enhancing
transparency regarding the nature and purpose of certain civil programs that can have
military purposes. Furthermore, international cooperation in civil space programs can assist
in the transfer of skills, material, and technology for the access to, and use of, space by
emerging space actors. Finally, international cooperation in civil space programs can serve
to highlight areas of mutual benefit in achieving space security and reinforce the practice of
using space for peaceful purposes. On the other hand, competition for access to and use of
space resources in the longer term, particularly on the moon, could generate tensions
between space powers.
Trend 3.1: Growth in the number of actors gaining access to space
Civil space programs, in collaboration with military space programs, contribute to an
increase in the number of space actors. The number of actors that have demonstrated an
independent orbital launch capability continues to grow and now includes nine states in
addition to the European Space Agency (see Figure 3.1). This total does not include
non-state actors such as Sea Launch1 and International Launch Services (ILS)2 — two
consortia that provide commercial orbital launch services using rockets developed by state
actors. Ukraine has not yet conducted an independent launch but has demonstrated a
capability by building the Zenit launch vehicle used by Sea Launch. Kazakhstan, Brazil,
South Korea, and Iran are also developing launch vehicles.
There are a further 18 actors that have suborbital capability, which is required for a rocket
to enter space in its trajectory, but not achieve an orbit around the Earth. These actors are
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Libya, North Korea,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Syria.4
In addition, Iran and North Korea maintain long-range missile programs that could enable
them to develop an orbital launch capability.
By the end of 2007 a total of 47 civil actors had accessed space, either with their own
launchers or those of others. This number is expected to continue to grow, largely through
the efforts of non-state actors such as the UK’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd., and
countries like China, which are helping states to develop affordable small satellites. Since
the early 1990s Surrey Satellite has assisted seven states (Algeria, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Portugal, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey) in efforts to build their first civil satellites.5
A notable shift in this trend is the growing significance of African states as space actors in
an effort to capture the socioeconomic gains that access to space provides. Leaders of this
effort include South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, and Algeria.6
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Figure 3.1: Independent orbital launch capability and launch sites of states3
* France and the UK no longer conduct independent launches, but France’s CNES manufactures the Ariane
launcher used by Arianespace/ESA.
** Ukraine manufactures the Zenit rocket used by Sea Launch. Ukraine attempted its own commercial launch
of the Zenit in 1998, but failed.
Figure 3.2: Growth in the number of civil actors accessing space7
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State/actor Year of first orbital launch Launch vehicle
USSR/Russia 1957 R-7 rocket
USA 1958 Juniper-C
France* 1965 Diamant
Japan 1970 Lambda
China 1970 Long March
UK* 1971 Black Arrow
ESA 1979 Ariane
India 1980 SLV
Israel 1988 Shavit
Ukraine** 1999 Zenit
• Independent launches • Deployment of satellites
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Microsatellites
The trend in the 1990s toward miniaturization in electronics helped to reduce the size and
weight of civil satellites, which can now perform the same functions as their bulkier
predecessors but at a decreased cost. One of the first satellites to implement this technology
was the US Clementine lunar mission in 1994. Thus, despite decreasing funding levels, the
number of US missions has held relatively constant as this technology enabled ‘smaller,
faster, cheaper’ space missions.
Microsatellites are now increasingly used for civil missions, including, for example, the
multinational Disaster Monitoring Constellation and France’s joint military-civil Myriade
series of microsatellites.8 These developments have enabled European actors, China, and
Japan to expand their civil programs to the point where they now together equal the US or
Russia’s civil efforts. In 2004 China established the world’s largest microsatellite industry
park.9 As well, microsatellite technologies and civil-commercial partnerships have allowed
an increasing number of states to afford satellites.
2007 Development
Global efforts to increase access to and use of space through development of launch
capabilities and institutions
In 2007 39 civil space objects were launched, down from 47 in 2006 but still significantly
higher than 2005 launches. It was a significant year for the launch of civilian remote sensing
spacecraft, with both optical and radar capabilities launched, as well as lunar objects (Trend
3.2). Figure 3.3 provides an overview of 2007 launches.
Figure 3.3: Number of civil space missions in 2007
Although no new actors gained access to space in 2007, Iran and South Korea continued
efforts to develop independent launch capabilities. On 25 February 2007 Iranian state
television reported that the country had launched a suborbital sounding rocket that officials
at the Aerospace Research Center said carried a research payload and reached an altitude of
151 kilometers.10 The payload was jointly produced by the Aerospace Research Center and
the Ministry of Defence. Iran has previously stated that it intends to improve its Shahab-3
ballistic missile by developing a satellite launch capability. Another test launch is set for
2008.11 South Korea plans to launch its first Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV) in 2008.
Development of the rocket is said to cost $3.9-billion.12 The launch is scheduled to take
place from South Korea’s new Naro space center.13
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A growing interest in space activities was demonstrated in 2007 through the creation of new
national space bodies, particularly in developing countries. These are aimed at taking
advantage of the technology, economic, and social development benefits that outer space
offers. Vietnam inaugurated the Space Technology Institute, which will focus on
“researching into designing and assembling small satellites, applying space technologies in
life, and constructing space facilities, including laboratories and earth stations.”14 The
National Space Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan was instituted in 2007.15 It has been
tasked with drafting a law on space activities for Kazakhstan and developing the country’s
space industry.16 South Africa announced that its Space Agency, approved on 5 December
2007, will open in March 2008 and will report to the Minister of Science and Technology.17
Poland, which became the fourth cooperating state with the ESA in 2007, also announced
plans to create a National Space Agency, with a budget of $10.6-million for research in
2008.18
2007 Development
Microsatellites contribute to increased accessibility of space
The ongoing enhancement of microsatellite capabilities is also driving increased access to
space at reduced cost because these satellites are cheaper to produce and to launch. In 2007
India’s ISRO announced plans to launch satellites weighing less than 100-kilograms to meet
the needs of developing countries and the domestic scientific community.19 The Romanian
Space Agency signed a contract with the company BITNET-CCSS to build and operate its
first microsatellite.20 In cooperation with China, Nigeria launched its first communications
microsatellite, NigcomSat-1, which will operate over Africa, parts of the Middle East, and
Southern Europe.21 Although microsatellites are generally less capable than larger
spacecraft, they are increasingly used for more traditional functions, such as
communications and remote sensing.
The ability of microsatellite technology to perform more advanced capabilities was
demonstrated in 2007. The Russian NPO Lavochkin is developing the unified
micro-platform “Karat” for the creation of small satellites of different types. Microsatellites
will be launched with the heavy rockets as an extra payload. NPO Lavochkin already has 25
projects for both Russian and international space programs, with the first launch
announced for 2008.22 The ESA contracted with Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. to build
a geostationary small satellite platform (200-kilograms) within the Micro Satellite
Applications in Collaboration (Mosaic) program for $3.35-million.23 Finally, NPO
Lavochkin will construct small space vehicles for Russia that will be used to explore the
Moon and Mars and will weigh no more than 100 kilograms.24
2007 Space Security Impact
Although no new space civil space actors emerged in 2007, nations expanded their civil
space capabilities, particularly regarding launch and microsatellite technologies. This is an
indicator that space remains accessible for use and exploitation for peaceful purposes. On
the other hand, the proliferation of civil space technologies such as launch capabilities also
provides more actors with abilities that could potentially be used to threaten access to and
use of space by other states. The growing number and diversity of space actors also places
increased demand on available space resources and on efforts to coordinate space traffic and
implement international legal obligations. In the long term, an increased number of
satellites launched into outer space will also add pressure to the problem of space debris.
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Trend 3.2: Changing priorities and funding levels within civil space
programs25
Space agencies
Different states and regions have varying types of civil space institutions. The US maintains
two main civil agencies — NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). While much work is fielded out to major contractors such as the
Boeing Company and the Lockheed-Martin Corporation, mission design, integration,
launch, and operations are undertaken by the space agencies themselves. During the Cold
War Soviet civil space efforts were largely decentralized and led by “design bureaus” —
state-owned companies headed by top scientists. Russian launch capabilities were developed
by Strategic Rocket Forces, and cosmonaut training was managed by the Russian Air Force.
Formal coordination of efforts came through the Ministry for General Machine Building.26
A Russian space agency (Rossyskoe Kosmicheskoe Agenstvo) was established in 1992, and
has since been reshaped into Roscosmos. While this new agency has more centralized
powers than previous organizations, most work is still completed by design bureaus, now
integrated into “Science and Production Associations” (NPOs) such as NPO Energia, NPO
Energomash, and NPO Lavochkin. This continued decentralization of civil activities makes
obtaining accurate comprehensive budget figures for Russian civil space programs difficult.27
In 1961 France established its national space agency, the Centre National d’Études Spatiales
(CNES), which remains the largest of the EU national-level agencies. Italy established a
national space agency in 1989 (ASI), followed by Germany in 1990 (DLR). The European
Space Research Organisation and the European Launch Development Organisation, both
formed in 1962, were merged in 1975 into ESA, which is the principal space agency of the
region today. Although 17 states are members of ESA, most funding is provided by a few
states with active national space programs. Germany and France regularly provide between
40 and 50 percent of the ESA budget.28
In China, civil space activities began to grow when they were allocated to the China Great
Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. The China Aerospace Corporation was established in
1993, followed by the development of the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA).
The CNSA remains the central civil space agency in China and reports through the
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense to the State
Council.
In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council
formed in 1960. The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of
Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space
Development Agency undertook most of the work over the years. These efforts were merged
into the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2003.29 India’s civil space
agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), was founded in 1969. Israel’s space
agency was formed in 1982, Canada’s in 1989, and the Brazilian Agência Espacial Brasileira
was formed in 1994. South Africa’s cabinet approved plans for a space agency in 2006.30
For a complete list of civil space agencies please visit www.spacesecurity.org.
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Expenditures
Civil expenditures on space continue to increase considerably in India and China, due in
large part to growth in civil program activities, including large satellites and human
spaceflight programs. India’s space budget increased by 24 percent in 2005 and an
additional 35 percent in 2006, when it reached $815-million.31 The Chinese space budget
is complex and figures are not public. Officials have been quoted as saying that the Chinese
civil space budget is as low as $500-million. Media sources place the budget closer to
$2-billion. While it is safe to speculate that it falls somewhere between these two figures,
there is no reliable evidence.32 Nonetheless, China now has the “fourth largest satellite space
program” and the “fastest growing launch rate of any space-faring power,” launching 39
satellites (eight of which were military) between 1996 and 2006, 75 percent in the latter five
years.33
Decreases in civil space budgets in the US, the EU, and Russia have begun to rebound.
Although still dwarfing the civil space budgets of other actors, the NASA budget dropped
25 percent in real terms between 1992 and 2001.34 The ESA budget dropped nine percent
in the same period. This follows a long period of growth for both NASA and ESA from
1970 to 1991, in which the NASA budget grew 60 percent in real terms and the ESA
budget grew 165 percent in real terms.35 Both budgets have begun to increase modestly
since 2001. The NASA budget has increased annually at a rate of three to four percent since
2004 when President George W. Bush released the Vision for Space Exploration, which
contains a renewed focus on human space flight.36 In 2006 it remained at $16.62-billion.37
The ESA budget was increased by 10 percent in 2005.38 It is now steady at approximately
$3.5-billion per year.
The USSR/Russia was the most active civil space actor from 1970 to the early 1990s, when
sharp funding decreases led to a reduction in the number of civil missions. By 2001 the
number of Russian military, civil, and commercial satellites had fallen from over 180 during
the Soviet era to approximately 90. The budget had been reduced to $309-million — about
20 percent of the 1989 expenditure and less than the cost of a single launch of the US Space
Shuttle.39 This steady decline was reversed in 2005, however, when Russia approved a
10-year program with a budget of approximately $11-billion.40 Under this plan the Federal
Space Agency’s annual budget grew by approximately 30 percent in 2006 to roughly
$873-million.41 This budget may not provide an entirely accurate reflection of the status of
Russian civil space capabilities, since Russia also raises funds externally through industry
investments and commercial space launches and continues to launch more civil satellites
than any other state.
Expenditures are not the sole indicator of capabilities, however, because of the differences
in production cost from one country to another, as well as local standards of living and
purchasing power.42 For example, Russia, which has a significantly lower budget than
NASA, has historically launched more satellites than any other state.
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Figure 3.4: Historic annual civil space agency budgets of major space agencies (billion 2001 dollars)43
Human spaceflight
On 12 April 1961 Yuri Gagarin became the first human to travel into space onboard a
Soviet Vostok 1 spacecraft. Human spaceflight was dominated in the early years by the
USSR, which succeeded in fielding the first woman in space, the first human spacewalk, the
first multiple-person space flights, and the longest-duration space flight. Following the
Vostok series rockets, the Soyuz became the workhorse of the Soviet and then Russian
human spaceflight program, and has since carried out about 100 missions with a capacity
of three humans on each flight. The 2006-2015 Federal Space Program maintains an
emphasis on human space flight, featuring ongoing development of a reusable spacecraft,
the Kliper, to replace the Soyuz vehicle, and completion of the Russian segment of the ISS.44
The first US human mission was completed on 5 May 1961, with the suborbital flight of
the Mercury capsule launched on an Atlas-Mercury rocket. This was followed by the
Gemini flight series and then the Apollo flight series, which ultimately took humans to the
Moon. The US went on to develop the Skylab human space laboratories in 1973, and the
USSR developed the MIR space station, which operated from 1986 to 2001. In the 1970s,
the US initiated the Space Shuttle, which is capable of launching up to seven people to Low
Earth Orbit (LEO). The Shuttle was first launched in 1981, has completed about 100
launches, and is currently the only human spaceflight capability for the US. In 2004 the US
announced a new NASA plan that includes returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and a
human mission to Mars thereafter.45 On 4 December 2006 NASA announced its new
strategy for lunar exploration.46 Future plans include human return to the moon, and a
permanent human presence on the lunar surface.47 This announcement followed a report
in March 2006 that $3-billion will be cut from NASA’s space science budget over the course
of three years, reflecting a shifting priority toward human space flight.48
China began developing the Shenzhou human spaceflight system in the late 1990s and
completed a successful human mission in 2003, becoming the third state to develop an
independent human spaceflight capability.49 A second mission was successfully completed
in 2005, and a third is planned for 2008. Although there have been unofficial reports that
China intends to develop a human space station, there are currently no plans in place.50 The
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2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the subsequent grounding of US Space Shuttle
missions reduced the total annual number of US human missions. Russia was temporarily
the only actor performing regular human missions, with its Soyuz spacecraft providing the
only lifeline to the International Space Station (see Figure 3.5). This may once again be the
case, with the Space Shuttle scheduled for retirement in 2010.51
Other civil programs are also turning to human spaceflight. In 2005 JAXA released its
20-year vision statement, which includes expanding its knowledge of human space activities
aboard the ISS as well as developing a human space shuttle by 2025.52 The ESA also has a
long-term view to send humans to the Moon and Mars through the Aurora program and
India approved a human spaceflight program in 2006.53
Figure 3.5: Number of human launches54
New directions for civil programs
A growing number of civil space projects are now also explicitly focused on social and
economic development objectives. ISRO was established on this basis in 1969 and has since
developed a series of communications satellites that provide tele-education and telehealth
applications and remote sensing satellites to enhance agriculture, land, and water resource
management and disaster monitoring.55 In 2000 Malaysia launched Tiungsat-1, a
microsatellite that included several remote sensing instruments for environmental
monitoring. In 1998 Thailand and Chile together launched TMSat, the world’s first
50-kilogram microsatellite to produce high-resolution, full-color, multispectral images for
monitoring the Earth, and FASat-Bravo, a microsatellite to study depletion of the ozone
layer.56 African states such as Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa have built or are in
the process of building satellites to support socioeconomic development. A part of the 2007
EU/ESA Space Policy’s mission is to serve the public in the area of “environment,
development, and global climate change.”57
Civil space programs are increasingly being used for national security missions, particularly
in the field of meteorology and Earth observation science. For example the objective of the
EU/ESA Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program is to “support
Europe’s goals regarding sustainable development and global governance, in support of
environmental and security policies, by facilitating and fostering the timely provision of
quality data, information, and knowledge.”58
Civil programs also continue to generate significant economic and technological spin-offs.
It is estimated that for every dollar the US spends on research and development in its civil
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space program, it receives seven back in the form of corporate and personal income taxes
from increased employment and economic growth.59 Recent examples of these spin-offs
from NASA’s programs include scratch resistant lenses, virtual reality equipment, more
efficient solar cells, microlasers, advanced lubricants, and programmable pacemakers.60
Figure 3.6: Number of satellites by actor, December 200661
2007 Development
Space budgets grow in India and Russia as focus shifts to large-scale projects
India and Russia posted significant civil space budget gains in 2007 as both countries focus
on enhancing capabilities, launching human missions, and exploring the Moon. In 2007
ISRO’s budget increased by up to 30 percent after a 35 percent jump in 2006, bringing its
2007-2008 budget to just under $1-billion. The recent increase is intended to fund India’s
human space program, while earlier hikes supported significant new satellite applications.62
The budget for Russia’s Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) also grew substantially in 2007
to $1.347-billion compared to about $832-million in 2006.63 According to the Federal
2008 Budget Law, Roscosmos will receive more than $1.5-billion in 2008.64 These
budgetary figures do not include financing for the GLONASS system, which has a separate
budget of roughly $4.19-million plus $3.49-million for system maintenance.
Elsewhere civil space budgets remained fairly steady, and some apparent gains in Figure 3.2
reflect the lower value for the US dollar rather than new investments, particularly in
Europe. France was the only major contributor to ESA to increase budgetary resources,
adding approximately $15-million to the budget for the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales
(CNES). This brought the CNES budget to a total of $1.038-billion, in addition to
$1.013-billion paid to ESA.65
NASA continued to dominate the world in civil space spending in 2007, with a budget
approval of $17.3-billion for FY2008, a modest increase over the previous year.66 Spending
is focused on human space programs rather than science:67 The Constellations Systems
program received $3-billion; the International Space Station (ISS) $2.2-billion (an increase
of 26 percent); and the Space Shuttle program $4-billion.
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Chinese officials have been quoted as saying that the Chinese space budget is as low as
$500-million while media sources place the budget closer to $2-billion, although there is
no reliable evidence.68 However, ongoing plans for space exploration, new launchers, and
human missions suggest that the budget may be increasing. No notable new investments
were observed in South Korea, despite its ambitious vision for a space launcher and lunar
and human missions.
Figure 3.7: Civil space budgets in 2007 (in USD millions)69
* includes contribution to European Space Agency
2007 Development
Use of remote sensing to support sustainable development
The launch of remote sensing satellites was significant in 2007 and coincided with a
growing effort to use space applications to support economic and social development. In
China the Yaogan-2 and Yaogan-3 (Remote Sensing Satellite-2 and -3) were launched on
25 May 2007 and 12 November 2007 respectively. Yaogan-2 is an optical imaging satellite
while Yaogan-3 uses advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) for all-day/
all-weather/all-terrain imaging. According to Chinese media, both satellites were built by
the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) and will be used for “scientific research,
land resources surveying, crop yield estimate and disaster forecast.”70 Moreover, China and
Brazil agreed to provide land images from their joint optical imaging CBERS-2B
(China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite-2B) launched in September 2007 freely to African
and Asian countries.71 They will also provide the software needed to read the data, which
is intended to help respond to threats such as deforestation, desertification, and drought.72
India also declared that it will share remote sensing data for disaster management in the
Asia-Pacific region and provide data analysis and training to countries without independent
access. India has also instituted a Disaster Management Support System in Hyderabad.73 In
2007 it launched Cartosat-2, its 12th remote sensing satellite, which will be used for, among
other applications, urban and rural infrastructure development and management.74
Egypt had its first remote sensing satellite launched in 2007, jointly built by Egypt’s
National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences and the Ukrainian Yuzhnoye
Design Bureau.75 According to Egyptian officials, it will be used “to support development
in the fields of construction, cultivation and fighting desertification.76
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Like most civil space technologies, remote sensing capabilities are dual-use. Many of the
civilian spacecraft described above are also suspected of providing data for military use (see
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations, Trend 5.2).
2007 Development
Strong interest in Europe, Russia, US, and India with respect to developing human
spacecraft, but efforts progress slowly
While China’s Shenzhou-7 underwent extensive testing in preparation for an announced
spacewalk in 2008,77 efforts to develop next-generation human spacecraft in Russia,
Europe, and the US also progressed, albeit slowly. The Russian-ESA plan to produce the
Kliper, a winged, human spacecraft designed by RKK Energiya to replace the Russian Soyuz
capsule, was cancelled in 2006, but the Kliper concept resurfaced in 2007.78 Although
Kliper was being described by Roscosmos as the final stage of Russia’s human spacecraft
overhaul, RKK Energiya decided to market it to international investors as a profit-making
venture.79 In December 2007 the chief of Roscosmos indicated that India may be interested
in developing with Russia a new reusable spaceship, presumably the Kliper.80 The projected
timeframe for Kliper operations to begin is 2013-2015. In the meantime Russia is
continuing to work with the ESA on a study for an Advanced Crew Transportation System
(ACTS) for Low Earth Orbit and potentially the Moon. The study, which is expected to be
completed in 2008, is focused on a simpler, Soyuz-like design rather than the more
advanced Kliper model.81
In the US, a six months-late Preliminary Design Review of the Ares-1 may cause a delay of
over a year for the first launch of humans aboard the spacecraft. Initial plans forecasted a
first launch in 2015.82 Ares is part of NASA’s Constellation Program, which also includes
the Orion spacecraft and various support systems designed to replace the US Space Shuttle.
The Program was reviewed by NASA in 2007. A preliminary design review is planned for
2008 and a critical design review in early 2010.83 To address the gap between the retirement
of the Space Shuttle and the completion of the Constellation Program, NASA has signed
several funding and information-sharing agreements with the private sector to develop
interim transportation to the International Space Station (see Commercial Space Trend
4.3).84
India made progress in developing an indigenous human spacecraft with the successful
recovery of the Space Capsule Recovery Experiment on 22 January 2007.85 In December
2007 Europe’s first human-rated spacecraft, the Jules Verne Automated Transfer Vehicle,
was being prepared for launch in 2008.86
2007 Development
Space agencies continue to focus on the Moon, Mars
The Moon, and to a lesser extent Mars, were a focus of civil space programs in 2007. On
14 September 2007 Japan launched its Kaguya lunar probe into orbit. At a cost of
$478-million, it is considered to be the most extensive mission to investigate the Moon
since the US Apollo program in the 1960s and 1970s.87 It consists of a three-ton main
orbiter and two 50-kilogram subsatellites and is equipped with 14 scientific instruments
and a high-definition television camera.88 This is Japan’s second lunar orbiter; the first was
launched in 1990. Kaguya is intended to study the Moon’s origin and evolution and to
assess it for future use.89
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Japan’s lunar mission was followed on 24 October 2007 by the launch of Chang’e-1 by the
Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA), with cooperation from the ESA. The first
step of China’s lunar program aimed at robotic exploration of the Moon’s surface for
mapping and to analyze its chemical composition.90 Its cost is estimated at $187-million.
Although reports emerged in 2007 that China intends to have a human presence on the
Moon,91 Chinese officials have indicated that no official plans exist.92
Other announcements for new lunar exploration programs came from Europe, India, and
South Korea. Germany announced potential plans to send a robotic spacecraft to orbit the
Moon for scientific research as early as 2012.93 Meanwhile India was preparing for its first
lunar mission, the Chandrayaan-1, scheduled for launch in 2008.94 ISRO’s Moon mission
is estimated to cost $14-million per year over five years, or approximately two percent of its
total budget.95 South Korea also announced its plans to send a probe into lunar orbit by
2020 and another to the surface of the Moon by 2025 as part of its indigenous rocket
program. However, the rocket alone is estimated to cost $3.9-billion over the next decade
and to date South Korea’s space budget has not increased to reflect such ambitions.96 Russia
and China added a focus on Mars with the announced 2009 launch of Russia’s Phobos
Explorer satellite along with a small Chinese satellite intended to probe the Martian surface;
preparation was ongoing in 2007.97
2007 Space Security Impact
Activities in 2007 demonstrated the continuation of a recently renewed interest in
large-scale space projects, particularly lunar exploration and human spaceflight. Although
developments in 2007 indicate some cooperation on these projects, competition may
increase if such capabilities become strategic in the future, as indicated by historical trends.
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if these large-scale projects will gain the necessary
investment to come to fruition; only in India, Russia, and possibly China are resources
growing significantly. Outer space continues to be dominated by a few states. Delays in
construction of new human spacecraft in the US, may adversely influence space security in
the future by limiting human access to space, in particular the ISS. Finally, the growing use
of remote sensing satellites for sustainable development is drawing more stakeholders into
space, and strengthening the relationship between security in space and security on Earth.
However, what is essentially the proliferation of dual-use spacecraft may contribute to the
expression of regional tensions in space (see Space Support for Terrestrial Military
Operations Trend 5.2).
Trend 3.3: Steady growth in international cooperation in civil
space programs
Due to the huge costs and technical challenges associated with access to and use of space,
international cooperation has been a defining feature of civil space programs throughout the
space age. Scientific satellites in particular have been a driver of cooperation.98 One of the
first scientific satellites, Ariel-1, was launched in 1962 and was the world’s first international
satellite, built by NASA to carry UK experiments. The earliest large international
cooperation program was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which saw two Cold War rivals
working collaboratively on programs that culminated in a joint docking in space of
US/USSR human modules in July 1975. However, “collaboration has worked most
smoothly when the science or technology concerned is not of direct strategic (used here to
mean commercial or military) importance” and when projects have “no practical
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application in at least the short to medium term.”99 Moreover, if government support for
space science decreases, such cooperative efforts may also decline. A March 2006 report
indicates that $3-billion will be cut from NASA’s space science budget over the course of
three years as priority shifts toward human space flight.100
The 1980s saw a myriad of international collaborative projects involving the USSR and
other countries, including the US, Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Slovenia, Syria, and the UK, to enable those states to send astronauts to
conduct experiments onboard the MIR space station.101 From 1995 to 1998 there were
nine dockings of the US Space Shuttle to the MIR space station, with various crew
exchanges.102 ESA and NASA have collaborated on many scientific missions, including the
Hubble Space Telescope, the Galileo Jupiter probe, and the Cassini-Huygens Saturn probe.
The most prominent example of international civil space cooperation is the ISS, the largest
international engineering project ever undertaken. The project partners are NASA, the
Russian Aviation and Space Agency, ESA, JAXA, and the Canadian Space Agency. Brazil
participates through a separate agreement with NASA. The first module was launched in
1998; the station is still under construction. By 2006, 58 launches had carried components,
equipment, and astronauts to the station.103 The ISS is projected to cost $129-billion.104
Space-based global utilities, discussed in more detail in Trend 3.4, represent another area of
international cooperation. The EU Galileo satellite navigation system is a partnership
between the EU and the ESA and includes several international partners.105 Algeria, China,
Nigeria, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, and the UK are collaborating on the Disaster
Monitoring Constellation. The project, initiated by China, foresees the deployment of 10
dedicated microsatellites, five of which have been deployed to date. International
cooperation on Earth observation is also discussed below.
The nature of international space cooperation has changed since the end of the Cold War,
as many barriers to partnership have been overcome. Examples include the EU-Russia
collaboration on launcher development and uses, and EU-China cooperation on Galileo.
There are also increasing levels of cooperation among developed and developing countries,
and new and unprecedented partnerships such as the Sino-Brazilian Earth observation
satellite effort.106 A 2006 Chinese white paper indicated that China had signed 16
international space cooperation agreements with 13 different countries, space agencies, and
international organizations over the course of five years.107 Pakistan, Nigeria, and Venezuela
were identified as future partners in efforts to develop and launch satellites.
However, export controls remain a hindrance to increased cooperation, particularly in the
US (see Commercial Space Trend 4.3).
2007 Development
International cooperation emerging for Moon/Mars exploration
Despite claims of a new space race to the Moon, significant international cooperation is
developing for Moon and Mars missions. In 2007 the 14 largest space agencies agreed to
coordinate future space missions in a document titled “The Global Exploration Strategy:
The Framework for Coordination,” which highlights a shared vision of space exploration,
focused on solar system destinations such as the Moon and Mars. It calls for a voluntary
forum to assist coordination and collaboration for sustainable space exploration, although
it does not establish a global space program.108 Chinese authorities have also indicated that
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a mechanism for cooperation is being developed in Asia among countries pursuing lunar
exploration programs.109
Significant bilateral cooperation on Moon and Mars missions also took place in 2007.
Russia and India signed an agreement to cooperate on lunar research and exploration,
according to which the two countries will build and launch a Moon rover in 2011.110 The
agreement is valid until 2017 and establishes the technical, organizational, and legal aspects
of the proposed Moon exploration. Russia and the ESA agreed in 2007 to cooperate on a
next-generation human spacecraft aimed at taking humans to the Moon.111 Russia and
NASA also took steps to continue Russian-US cooperation in space exploration through an
agreement on two new scientific projects, LEND and DAN. The Russian LEND (Lunar
Exploration Neutron Detector) instrument to find water near the lunar poles is designed to
be carried aboard the American Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO). Russia’s DAN
(Dynamic Albedo of Neutrons) instrument will take part in the American Mars Science
Laboratory mission, which is scheduled for 2009 and is aimed at measuring water content
of soil on Mars.112 NASA is also considering support for the UK’s robotic lunar mission
Moonlite.113 Finally, in 2007 ESA provided technical support and knowledge-sharing for
both China’s Chang’e-1 lunar orbiter and India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter.
2007 Development
International cooperation on the ISS, space science, and launch technology
The ISS continued to be a focus of international space cooperation in 2007, with the US
and Russia coordinating plans for the development and use of the ISS until 2011.114
Within this framework, Roscosmos signed a contract with NASA for nearly $1-billion to
supply cargo shuttles for the US section of the ISS.115 Science also drove international
cooperation, one of the major examples being an agreement signed by NASA, the Canadian
Space Agency, and the ESA to build and launch a powerful orbital telescope to replace the
Hubble telescope. The new James Webb telescope is to be launched in 2013 at an estimated
cost of $3.5-billion.116
Launch efforts were also a source of cooperation in 2007, with construction of a Soyuz
launch base in French Guiana to increase the launcher’s lift capability.117 Russia also reached
an agreement with Indonesia to begin implementation of the Air Start project, which will
allow Russia to develop and use a new launch facility on the island of Biak, with launching
activities planned to start in 2009-2010.118 This project is part of a $1.2-billion agreement
by Indonesia to purchase Russian military hardware.119 Rocketry is also part of a newly
ratified agreement between Russia and South Korea on measures to cooperate on space
exploration and other peaceful uses of outer space.120 The two countries agreed to expand
cooperation in space science, including rocket building and astronaut training, and may
establish a joint company to make aerospace-related electronic parts and a working-level
committee to explore the development of liquid-fuel rockets.
2007 Development
US-Chinese cooperation falters
There were some indications of future cooperation between the civil space activities of
China and the US when NASA Chief Administrator Michael Griffin visited China in
September 2006,121 but this faltered following the Chinese intercept and destruction of one
of its own satellites on 11 January 2008. Although substantial cooperation on major
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projects such as the ISS and lunar/Martian exploration missions was not evident in the short
term, NASA officials claimed that the action undermined an agreement between the two
leaders to cooperate on civil space projects reached in April 2006.122 The US is
consequently reevaluating cooperation with China.
2007 Space Security Impact
Growing cooperation and collaboration between major and less developed space powers
enhance space security by providing partner countries with greater access to space through
shared resources and technology. Larger networks of cooperation such as the “Global
Exploration Strategy” could also result in greater transparency of space activities, mitigating
uncertainties or mistrust that may arise as more countries gain access to space. There is a
risk, however, that sensitive military technologies may proliferate. Moreover, as regional
cooperation becomes stronger there may be negative geopolitical tensions and rivalries in
space — as the tensions between China and the US demonstrate, civil space cooperation is
often influenced by strategic concerns. Yet cooperation efforts on the Moon and Mars in
2007 suggest that what is often characterized as a new space race may not in fact become a
reality.
Trend 3.4: Continued growth in global utilities as states seek to
expand applications and accessibility
The use of space-based global utilities, including navigation, weather, and search-and-rescue
systems, has grown dramatically over the last decade. For example GPS unit consumption
grew by approximately 25 percent per year between 1996 and 1999; sales revenue increased
from $6.2-billion in 1999123 to $21.8-billion in 2005.124 Key global utilities such as GPS
and weather satellites were initially developed by military actors. Today these systems have
grown into space applications that are almost indispensable to the civil and commercial
sectors as well.
Satellite navigation systems
There are currently two large-scale operational satellite navigation systems: the US GPS and
the Russian GLONASS system. Work on GPS began in 1978 and it was declared
operational in 1993, with a minimum of 24 satellites that orbit in six different planes at an
altitude of approximately 20,000 kilometers in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). A GPS
receiver must receive signals from four satellites to determine its location, accurate within
20 meters depending on the precision of available signals. GPS operates a Standard
Positioning Service for civilian use and a Precise Positioning Service that is intended for use
by the US Department of Defense and military allies
Begun as a military system, GPS diversified and grew to the point that, in 2001, military
uses of the GPS accounted for only about two percent of its total market. The commercial
air transportation industry, which carries over 2 billion passengers a year, relies heavily on
GPS.125 US companies receive about half of GPS product revenues, but US customers
account for only about one-third of the revenue base. The growth rate of GPS units in use
continues to increase, particularly outside of the US.126
The Russian GLONASS system uses principles that are similar to those used in the GPS. It
is designed to be composed of a minimum of 24 satellites in three orbital planes, with eight
satellites equally spaced in each plane, in a circular orbit with an altitude of 19,100
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kilometers.127 The first GLONASS satellite was orbited in 1982 and the system became
operational in 1996. Satellites soon malfunctioned, however, and the system remains below
operational levels, retaining only some capability, although efforts are underway to complete
the system once again.128 GLONASS operates a Standard Precision service available to all
civilian users on a continuous, worldwide basis and a High Precision service available to all
commercial users as of 2007.129 Russia has extended cooperation on GLONASS to China
and India.
China, Japan, the EU, and India are all engaged in the research and development of
additional satellite navigation systems.130 The Chinese Beidou system, designed for regional
use in and around China, has been under development since the late 1990s. It uses a
different principle than that of the GPS or GLONASS, operating four satellites in
geostationary orbit.131 In 2006 China announced that it will develop a global system called
Compass or Beidou-2 for military, civilian, and commercial use.132 The global system is
planned to include five satellites in GEO and 30 in MEO. The initial regional system is
expected to provide service in 2008.
India announced plans to develop an independent regional satellite navigation system.
Called the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), it will consist of a
seven-satellite constellation independent of India’s current involvement in the ESA’s Galileo
project and Russia’s GLONASS.133 Japan has begun developing the Quazi-Zenith Satellite
System (QZSS), which is to consist of a few satellites interoperable with GPS in Highly
Elliptical Orbit to enhance regional navigation over Japan.134 In 2004 an internal
programmatic dispute caused a deadlock in development.135
Perhaps most significantly, the EU and ESA are jointly developing the Galileo navigation
system, which is to consist of 30 satellites in a constellation similar to that of the GPS.
Significant effort on Galileo began in 2002, with the allocation of $577-million in
development funds by the European Council of Transport Ministers.136 The Galileo project
has been opened to international partners to support the development of the system; by
2006 these included Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.
Russia has agreed to launch Galileo satellites. China’s partnership status was clarified in
2004, when it was announced that China would not be granted access to the secure Public
Regulated Service government channel.137 Galileo will offer Open Service, commercial
service, safety-of-life service, search-and-rescue service, and an encrypted, jam-resistant,
publicly regulated service reserved for public authorities that are responsible for civil
protection, national security, and law enforcement.138 The project is currently in its testing
phase, but is already over budget; the completion date has been extended from 2008 to
2013.139
The development of competing independent satellite navigation systems, although
conceivably interoperable and able to extend the reliability of this global utility, has incurred
several conflicts. The US and EU are engaged in ongoing negotiations to make GPS and
Galileo compatible, with key disagreements involving signal frequencies. The US in
particular is concerned that Galileo’s open signal will be too close to the upgraded GPS
military signal (M code), preventing the US from locally jamming open signals during a
conflict without interfering with its own military use.140 As well, in 2006 it was announced
that China’s global Compass system may use the same frequency for its military signal as
that used for the EU encrypted service and the GPS military signal,141 making it difficult
to jam during a potential conflict and hindering the possibility of cooperating systems.
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Earth observation
Remote sensing satellites are used extensively for a variety of Earth observation functions,
including weather forecasting; surveillance of borders and coastal waters; monitoring crops,
fisheries, and forests; as well as monitoring natural disasters such as hurricanes, droughts,
floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and avalanches.
The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT) has launched eight satellites into GEO since 1972 to provide meteorological
data for Europeans. Similarly, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), founded in 1970, has launched over 34 satellites to provide US meteorological
services.142 Satellite operators from China, Europe, India, Japan, Russia, and the US,
together with the World Meteorological Organization, make up the Co-ordination Group
for Meteorological Satellites.143 In a significant shift of policy regarding weather satellites,
distribution of the data collected by EUMETSAT’s constellation of MetOp meteorological
satellites will be restricted by security concerns. A 2006 agreement between EUMETSAT
and the US NOAA will create a ‘data denial list’ that stipulates agencies that are restricted
from accessing data from the MetOp satellites. This agreement comes as the US DOD and
NOAA merge their weather satellites, giving the DOD a vested interest in any agreements
made with EUMETSAT. The satellites will be under EUMETSAT control but subject to
US third party restrictions.144
Another recent global space-based utilities initiative is the Global Earth Observation System
of Systems (GEOSS), which has the goal of “establishing an international, comprehensive,
coordinated and sustained Earth Observation System.”145 It is being coordinated by the
Group on Earth Observation, whose members currently include 75 states and the European
Commission. GEOSS will be constructed on the basis of a 10-year implementation plan
from 2005-2015. Benefits will include disaster reduction, resource monitoring and
management, sustainable land use and management, better development of energy
resources, and adaptation to climate variability and change.146
Space has also become critical for measuring climate change. Several countries, including
Algeria, China, Nigeria, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and Vietnam, are collaborating
on the Disaster Monitoring Constellation to deploy 10 microsatellites dedicated to this
use.147 Four are currently in operation.
Search and rescue
In 1979 COSPAS-SARSAT, the International Satellite System for Search and Rescue
Satellites, was founded by Canada, France, the USSR, and the US to coordinate the
satellite-based search-and-rescue system. Since 2001 SAR has provided emergency
communications for people in distress and has been credited with saving the lives of
approximately 1,500 people per year (see Figure 3.8).148 This figure is double that of 1996.
Currently COSPAS-SARSAT operates 12 satellites.149
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Figure 3.8: Lives saved annually by COSPAS-SARSAT150
2007 Development
A difficult year for space navigation utilities
The year 2007 was marked by challenges in the establishment of space-based navigation
systems in Europe and Russia. After a delay of five years, European governments have agreed
to provide the necessary $5-billion to continue work on Galileo — a proposed 30-satellite
space navigation system intended to provide Europe with independent capabilities. The EU
planned to formally adopt the program in March 2008 and the ESA anticipated opening
contracts by the end of that year.151 EU budget ministers agreed to provide the funding
entirely from the EU 2007 and 2008 budgets following the public-private partnership
scheme failure.152 By the end of 2007 only one experimental satellite, built by Surrey
Satellite Technology Systems, was in orbit and the system is not set to be deployed by 2013.
Galileo is highlighted as a priority in the 2007 European Space Policy.153
In Russia a presidential decree on the use of the global navigation satellite system
GLONASS was signed, aimed at addressing the socioeconomic development needs of
Russia. Accordingly, unrestricted access to civil navigation signals will be freely provided to
users.154 Demonstrating renewed investment to complete the system, three GLONASS
satellites were launched at the end of 2007, bringing the current constellation to 18, of
which only 14 are believed operational. According to Russian media sources, 20 GLONASS
satellites are needed to provide complete coverage of Russia, and 24 for global coverage.155
The budget for GLONASS has been increased significantly to complete the project that was
initiated during the Cold War: In 2007 $380-million was allocated and in 2006
$181-million.156 Nonetheless, fears were expressed that the system will not be completed
before 2010-2011 and that ongoing problems with the ground segment may hamper its
success.157 The inadequacies of the GLONASS system are becoming more apparent. Not
only is it inaccurate, providing at best positional accuracy of 10-17 meters, but it is unstable,
sometimes providing no reading at all.158 Russia and India signed an agreement to jointly
use the GLONASS system, which supports both civil and military users.159
Demonstrating the growing importance of satellite navigation for civilian uses, US
President George W. Bush announced that next-generation GPS Block III satellites will not
have the Selective Availability capability to degrade the civilian signal. (The US pledged to
stop intentional degradation in 2000.) The “decision reflects the United States strong
Space Security 2008
commitment to users of GPS that this free global utility can be counted on to support
peaceful civil activities around the world.”160 The US launched two GPS-2RM satellites on
20 December 2007 as part of an ongoing modernization process that provides a second
civilian signal in addition to two new military signals.161 The GPS Block III upgrade, which
is a response to anticipated European capabilities, will not be ready until 2013.162 In
another positive development, the US and EU agreed in July 2007 on a common
GPS-Galileo civilian signal to allow for interoperability of the two systems, while also
maintaining the integrity of the US military signal.163
China launched two navigation satellites in 2007: an experimental Beidou navigation
satellite into GEO on 2 February 2007 and the first next-generation Compass satellite into
MEO on 13 April 2007.164 The Beidou system, currently composed of four satellites, is
providing regional navigation data to China. The Compass system is intended to build on
Beidou and gradually become a global system, with initial services available in 2008 (see
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.2). The system is dual-use,
providing military support as well as services for economic development, such as
monitoring transportation.165 Fears were expressed in 2007 that the Compass system could
pose a threat to the success of the European Galileo system and potentially GPS if China
opts to use the same signal as their encrypted codes. Chinese sources indicate that it is
willing to cooperate with the other systems, but no agreements have emerged.166
2007 Development
Civil space applications for global monitoring focus on climate change
Europe’s Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program received a
boost in 2007 with the allocation from the EU Commission to the ESA of $52.5-million,
which is intended to ensure the coordination and timely supply of satellite-based remote
sensing data for the initiative’s preoperational phase in 2008-2010. The funding will also
support initial GMES services, which include three fast-track services focusing on land, sea,
and emergency; and two pilot service projects focusing on security and atmospheric
composition.167 GMES is an EU-led initiative in partnership with the ESA to combine
ground- and space-based Earth observations to develop an integrated environmental and
security monitoring capability. ESA and Thales Alenia Space signed a $346-million contract
to design and develop Sentinel-1, the first remote sensing satellite to be built for the
initiative.168 It will weigh around 2,200 kilograms and image the Earth in swaths 250
kilometers in diameter, with a ground resolution of five meters; launch is planned for 2011.
Also in 2007 the US NOAA environmental satellite operations center was officially opened.
The center provides 24-hour data for weather and climate prediction.169 In a separate
development, NOAA and NASA agreed to restore a planned climate sensor to the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project.
The sensor is designed to provide climate researchers with a more precise depiction of the
structure of the ozone layer. The NPOESS is a tri-agency environmental monitoring
program directed by the Department of Commerce (NOAA’s parent agency), the
Department of Defense, and NASA. With the launch of the first spacecraft planned for
2013, NPOESS will bring improved data and imagery that will allow better weather
forecasts, severe weather monitoring, and detection of climate change.170 An internal report
in 2007 to the White House about an impending crisis in the US satellite-based global
climate observing system followed an earlier decision to remove the sensor.171
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COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-063A 12/21/07 Ariane 5GS Rascom-QAF 1 France Africa Communication Thales/
Canne GEO
2007-001D 1/10/07 PSLV Pehuensat-1 India Argentina Technology AMSAT SSO
2007-010A 4/11/07 Chang Zheng 2C Hai Yang 1B China China Oceanography SISE/
Shanghai SSO
2007-019 5/24/07 Chang Zheng 2D Zheda Pixing China China Technology Zhejiang SSO
2007-019A 5/25/07 Chang Zheng 2D Yaogan 2 China China Remote sensing
(Optical) SAST SSO
2007-051A 10/24/07 Chang Zheng 3A Chang’e-1 China China Lunar CAST *
2007-042A 9/19/07 Chang Zheng 4B Zi Yuan 1-2B China China, Remote sensing
Brazil (Optical) INPE/CAST SSO
2007-012N 4/17/07 Dnepr Libertad Russia Columbia Technology USergioArb SSO
2007-012A 4/17/07 Dnepr Egyptsat 1 Russia Egypt Technology Yuzhone SSO
2007-040 9/14/07 Soyuz-U YES-2 Russia ESA Technology Delta-Utec LEO
2007-001B 1/10/07 PSLV Cartosat-2 India India Remote sensing
(Optical) ISRO SSO
2007-001C 1/10/07 PSLV SRE-1 India India Space recovery VSSC SSO
experiment
2007-013B 4/23/07 PSLV AAM India India Experimental VSSC/LPSC LEO
2007-001A 1/10/07 PSLV LAPAN-TUBsat India Indonesia Remote sensing LAPAN/TUB SSO
(Optical)
2007-013A 4/23/07 PSLV AGILE India Italy Astronomy CGS/MILANO LEO
2007-039A 9/14/07 H-IIA 2022 Kaguya Japan Japan Lunar Orbiter NEC Toshiba *
2007-039B 9/14/07 H-IIA 2022 Okina Japan Japan Lunar Orbiter relay NEC *
2007-039C 9/14/07 H-IIA 2022 Ouna Japan Japan Lunar Orbiter relay NEC *
2007-002A 1/18/07 Soyuz-U Progress M-59 Russia Russia Human Progress LEO
2007-008A 4/7/07 Soyuz-FG Soyuz TMA-10 Russia Russia Human Energiya LEO
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On the one hand, the growth in global utilities, particularly navigation systems, should have
a positive impact on space security by providing redundancy of capabilities and increasing
access to space through collaborative efforts, particularly if they are interoperable. Yet
ongoing disputes over the use of signals and the development of independent capabilities
indicate that cooperation is difficult and that this utility remains an important military
application subject to potential interference. The growing use of civil space capabilities for
climate change monitoring could enhance international commitments to maintain space
security by further linking the security of Earth to the security of space.
Figure 3.9: Civil payloads launched in 2007
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COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-017A 5/12/07 Soyuz-U Progress M-60 Russia Russia Human Progress LEO
2007-033A 8/2/07 Soyuz-U Progress M-61 Russia Russia Human Progress LEO
2007-040A 9/14/07 Soyuz-U Foton-M No. 3 Russia Russia Micro-gravity TsSKB LEO
2007-045A 10/10/07 Soyuz-FG Soyuz TMA-11 Russia Russia Human Energiya LEO
2007-064A 12/23/07 Soyuz-U Progress M-62 Russia Russia Human Progress LEO
2007-012B 4/17/07 Dnepr Saudisat 3 Russia Saudi Technology Saudisat SSO
Arabia
2007-004A 2/17/07 Delta 7925-10C THEMIS 1 US US Research Swales HEO
2007-004B 2/17/07 Delta 7925-10C THEMIS 2 US US Research Swales HEO
2007-004C 2/17/07 Delta 7925-10C THEMIS 3 US US Research Swales HEO
2007-004D 2/17/07 Delta 7925-10C THEMIS 4 US US Research Swales HEO
2007-004E 2/17/07 Delta 7925-10C THEMIS 5 US US Research Swales HEO
2007-012P 4/17/07 Dnepr CAPE 1 Russia US Technology UL-Lafayette SSO
2007-015A 4/25/07 Pegasus XL AIM US US Scientific OSC SSO
2007-024A 6/8/07 Space Shuttle Atlantis US US Human BNA/Palmdale LEO
2007-034A 8/7/07 Delta 7925-9.5 Phoenix US US Exploration LMA/Denver *
2007-035A 8/8/07 Space Shuttle Endeavour US US Human BNA/ LEO
(STS-118) Palmdale
2007-043A 9/27/07 Delta 7925H Dawn US US Exploration OSC/Dulles *
2007-050A 10/23/07 Space Shuttle Discovery US US Human BNA/ LEO
(STS-120) Palmdale
2007-055A 11/11/07 Chang Zheng 4C Yaogan 3 China China Remote sensing SAST SSO
(Radar)
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4. Commercial Space
This chapter assesses trends and developments in the commercial space sector, including the
builders and users of space hardware such as rockets and satellite components, and space
information technologies such as telecommunications, data relay, remote sensing, and
imaging. It also examines the relationships between governments and the commercial space
sector, including the government as partner and the government as regulator. Much work on
civil and military programs is contracted out to the commercial sector, which today has the
same capabilities as any other space actor.1
The commercial space sector has experienced dramatic growth over the past decade, largely
related to rapidly increasing revenues associated with satellite services. These services are
provided by organizations that operate satellites, as well as the ground support centers that
control them, process their data, and sell that data to others. The bulk of the revenue in the
satellite services sector is generated by telecommunications.2
The second largest contribution to the growth of the commercial space sector has been made
by satellite and ground equipment manufacturing. This includes both direct contractors that
design and build large systems and vehicles, smaller subcontractors responsible for system
components, and software providers.
This chapter also assesses trends and developments associated with launch vehicles and launch
services developed by commercial sector programs. The companies that operate launch
facilities, design and manufacture vehicles intended to place payloads in space, and
manufacture launch components and subsystems are examined. In the early 2000s,
overcapacity in the launch market and a reduction in commercial demand combined to
depress the cost of commercial space launches. More recently, an energized satellite
communication market and launch industry consolidation have resulted in a stabilization and
increase in launch pricing.
Governments play a central role in commercial space activities as users of certain services, by
supporting research and development, by subsidizing certain space industries, by underwriting
insurance costs, and by adopting enabling policies and regulations. Indeed the space launch
and manufacturing sectors survive largely on government funding. Conversely, because space
technology is often dual-use, governments have sometimes taken actions, such as the
imposition of export controls, which have constrained the growth of the commercial market.
Several states have begun to consider commercial space as a critical infrastructure for national
security. In addition, the military sector, which has been unable to meet its communication
and imagery needs with its own assets, has taken advantage of commercial capacity, thereby
creating a dependence on commercial systems for military applications.
Space Security Impact
The pervasive role that the commercial space sector plays in launch, communications,
imagery, and manufacturing, in addition to its role of supporting government civil and
military programs, means that the commercial space sector both affects and is effected by
changes in space security. A healthy space industry will tend to increase commercial
competition and can lead to decreasing costs for space access and use. This could have a
positive impact on space security by increasing the number of actors who can access and use
space or space products, thereby increasing the number of stakeholders in the maintenance of
space security. Increased competition can also lead to the further diversification of capabilities
to access and use space.
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Commercial space efforts have the potential to increase the level of transnational cooperation
and interdependence in the space sector, building transparency and trust through international
collaboration. Additionally, the development of the space industry could influence
international space governance. To thrive, sustainable commercial markets must have the
freedom to innovate, but they also require a framework of laws and regulations on issues of
property, standards, and liabilities.
Some commercial space actors also note that issues of ownership and property pose an
increasing challenge to the growth of the industry. For example, while the non-appropriation
clause of the Outer Space Treaty is generally understood to prohibit states from making
sovereignty claims in space, this clause also raises questions about the allocation and use of
space resources. There is concern that the clause could stifle entrepreneurship and growth in
the commercial space industry. As well, future conflicts over the issue could decrease space
security if not addressed in a timely manner.
Growth in space commerce has already led to greater competition for scarce space resources
such as orbital slots and radio frequencies. To date, national regulators and the International
Telecommunication Union have been able to manage inter- and intraindustry tensions.
However, strong terrestrial demand for additional frequency allocations and demands of
emerging nations for new orbital slots will provide new challenges for domestic and
international regulators The dependence of the commercial space sector on military clients or,
conversely, the reliance of militaries on commercial space assets could also have an adverse
impact on space security by making the industry overly dependent on one client, or by making
commercial space assets the potential target of military attacks.
Trend 4.1: Continued overall growth in the global commercial
space industry
The commercial space sector continues to grow, but at an uneven rate. The years 2003 and
2004 saw the slowest annual growth rates since the mid-1990s, followed by a rebound in
2005. Global space revenues have been estimated as totaling $143.31-billion in 2006 — a
growth of almost 23 percent over 2005, overwhelmingly led by satellite services.3 The satellite
services sector more than tripled in size between 1996 and 2006, generating revenues
estimated at between $62.6-billion and $111.14-billion in 2006, or up to 60 percent of the
commercial satellite sector’s total revenues (see Figure 4.1).4
Figure 4.1: World satellite industry revenues by sector (billion)5
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The telecommunications industry has long been a driver of commercial uses of space. The first
commercial satellite was the Telstar-1, launched by NASA in July 1962 for the
telecommunications giant AT&T.6 Satellite industry revenues were first reported in 1978,
when US Industrial Outlook reported 1976 Communication Satellite Corporation operating
revenues of almost $154-million.7 By 1980 it is estimated that the worldwide commercial
space sector already accounted for $2.1-billion in revenues,8 and in 2006, the sector collected
revenues estimated at between $106.1-billion and $143.31-billion.9 A significant portion of
this growth can be assigned to individual users, particularly for Direct Broadcasting Services
but also use of satellite navigation services and commercial satellite imaging.
A number of new companies were founded in the 1980s to take advantage of anticipated
growth in the space telecommunications services sector. This sector was deregulated in many
countries during the 1990s; the previously government-operated bodies International
Maritime Satellite Organisation (Inmarsat) and International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (Intelsat) were privatized in 1999 and 2001 respectively.10 PanAmSat, New
Skies, GE Americom, Loral Skynet, Eutelsat, Iridium, EchoStar, and Globalstar were some of
the prominent companies to emerge during the 1990s. Hughes also entered the market with
DirecTV, a new satellite television broadcast system.
More recently, increased demand from individual users has driven significant growth in
satellite services such as direct broadcast services. Other factors fueling sector growth include
the decreasing costs of both communications equipment and launches. Current major satellite
telecommunications companies include SES Global, Intelsat, Eutelsat, and Telesat Canada.11
The 2000 downturn in the technology and communications sectors affected the commercial
space sector, reducing market take-up of satellite telephony, thus creating a related launcher
overcapacity problem. Commercial satellite launches dropped from a peak of 38 in 1999 to
16 in 2001, but are beginning to recover.12 Revenue from commercial satellite launches
peaked at $5.3-billion in 2000, but has since leveled at around $3-billion annually.13 Despite
the persistent overcapacity of the space-launch market, there has been a consolidation of space
launch prices since 200414 (see Trend 4.2). In 2006 commercial launch revenues hit their
highest point since 2002 with an increase of 20 percent over 2005, reflecting the joint trends
of higher demand for launches to GEO and higher launch costs. These figures are only
beginning to reflect the rising costs to access space, however, as most launches in 2006 were
ordered prior to price increases.15 The commercial launch market has shifted away from the
trend of low demand and high capacity, which had kept prices low. While government
payloads still account for the majority of launch revenues, the proportion of commercial
customers and revenues is increasing.16 Of the 21 commercial launches in 2006, 16 went to
GEO — the highest number since 2002, reflecting the growing demand for
telecommunications services.17 Moreover, revenues for commercial launches in 2006 reached
their highest point since 2002, increasing 20 percent over those for 2005.
Satellite manufacturers worldwide collected an estimated $12.0-billion in 2006, close to the
record high of $12.4-billion in revenue set in 1998; 2006 revenues grew by almost 54 percent
over those for 2005.18 Revenue is unevenly divided between government and commercial
launches. The estimated value of government payloads was 75 percent of total revenues in
2006.19 The five major manufacturers of commercial communications satellites are Alcatel
Alenia Space, Boeing Satellite Systems, EADS Astrium, Lockheed Martin, and Space
Systems/Loral. Newcomers NPO Prikladnoy Mekhaniki (Russia) and the Indian Space
Research Organization (ISRO) are expected to make an impact in the future.20
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2007 Development
Commercial space industry continues to grow, with individual users becoming more
important stakeholders and new market entrants
The commercial space industry continues to rebound from a previous low with increasing
revenues in the launch, services, and manufacturing sectors. The Space Foundation Index,
which tracks the industry’s growth based on 31 publicly traded companies, reported growth
of 29 percent from June 2005 to December 2007. Although growth was only 8.4 percent in
2007, it outperformed the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index.21 Worldwide industry revenue
growth is estimated at 16 percent from 2006 to 2007.22
Figure 4.2: Commercial spacecraft launched in 2007
Demand for commercial space transportation services, which are directly linked to activities
in the global satellite market, continued to increase in 2007.23 Of the 68 successful orbital
launches in 2007, 23 were commercial launches,24 marking the third consecutive annual
increase since 2004.25 These 23 launches carried 49 payloads, of which 27 were commercial
spacecraft. Russia continued to lead the industry with 12 successful launches (Figure 4.6).26
Revenue for commercial launches also increased modestly by $125-million to reach
$1.55-billion. Although Russia dominated the industry in terms of the number of launches,
Europe received the largest revenue, an estimated $840-million compared to Russia’s
$477-million.27 The year 2007 was a record year for non-geostationary (GEO) launches, with
15 of 23 commercial launches executed largely to replace existing spacecraft. In contrast, since
2003 72 percent of all commercial launches have been to GEO; such launches generate the
majority of revenue and are likely to continue to drive the market.
Satellite services continued to account for approximately 60 percent of total satellite industry
revenues, growing by 18 percent in 2007.28 Individual users are a significant driver of this
growth, particularly through demand for satellite television, direct broadcasting, and
navigation/positioning services. Satellite television and direct broadcasting posted an
estimated 18 percent revenue increase in 2007; another estimate puts revenue from GPS
equipment at 56.2-billion in 2007, a growth of 20 percent.29 Satellite radio also continues to
grow significantly, with profits doubling from 2005 to 2006 and increasing by another 33
percent in 2007 to $2.1-billion,30 but as a new entrant it retains a small market share. Fixed
Satellite Services and Mobile Satellite Services have grown by 20 percent and 18 percent
respectively.
This steady growth of consumer services is also driving the ground equipment market, which
holds the second largest share of market revenues and grew by 19 percent in 2007.31 End-user
products for services such as HD TV, satellite radio, and navigation are key drivers.
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More satellite launches and a growing satellite services sector have a direct impact on the
commercial manufacturing industry. Although satellite manufacturers continued to suffer
from pressure to lower prices, strong demand for broadcasting, broadband, and mobile
satellite services drove an increase in orders, which is projected to continue.32 Nonetheless,
revenues decreased slightly in 2007, in part due to the launching of a higher proportion of
microsatellites.33 Revenue from commercial satellites increased from 25 percent of all sales to
33 percent.
Although US industries continued to dominate the satellite manufacturing market, producing
46 of the 107 payloads launched in 2007 (43 percent), US market share declined by 10
percent from 2005.34 Different strategies are being used to achieve growth in this industry. For
example, EADS Astrium has leveraged its Skynet success into expansion beyond the UK,
particularly to the US and Middle East/Saudi Arabia.35 Thales-Alcatel, on the other hand,
plans to consolidate two of its satellite product lines, radar and optical observation, into one
line of products that could be used for either mission.36 Boeing is using a multiple market
approach — civil, military, and commercial — to maintain a stable business, while
acknowledging that it preferred government sales to less lucrative commercial business; this
position is shared by Lockheed Martin and EADS Astrium.37
2007 Development
India and China influence the commercial space industry
India re-affirmed its entry into the commercial launch market on 23 April 2007 when the
Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) took the Italian astronomy satellite AGILE into space.
It has another contract in place to launch an Israeli classified remote sensing satellite in
2008.38 India is reportedly positioning itself to compete for a portion of the commercial
launch service market by offering low-cost launches. Although at $11-million to send a
352-kilogram spacecraft into low Earth orbit, rates do not appear to be far below similar,
publicly known launch costs, it is difficult to compare costs across different launches and
launchers.39 India also intends to compete in the satellite manufacturing industry.40 Affirming
its growing importance in the space industry, an Aerospace Industries Association (AOA)
survey showed that more than 86 percent of US civil and military aerospace contractors plan
to sign agreements to form joint ventures or partnerships with small Indian aerospace
companies in the next year, just as India is seeking new international partners for its space
industry.41 The European Space Agency has also expressed a desire to outsource to India
subsystems and components for space missions to leverage cost benefits and reliable Indian
research, but cannot because of constraints under current trade rules.42 India bolstered its
presence in the commercial space market with strong sales of remote sensing images to other
countries. In September 2007 India claimed to have captured 20 percent of the global
market.43
Although not commercially competed, China launched Nigeria’s Nigcomsat-1
communications satellite on a Long March 3-B rocket to geostationary orbit. This marked the
first time that China had both manufactured and launched a satellite for another country44
and signaled its reentry into the commercial launch market. Chinese officials claim that China
has been “commissioned to send about 30 foreign satellites into space and signed several
contracts offering commercial launching services for foreign satellites.”45 Developing countries
are the prime focus of these efforts.46 Moreover, because it uses no US components, China is
marketing its manufactured satellites as ITAR-free at prices below industry standard. This new
reality spurred Arianespace to call for vigilance against Chinese dumping (see Trend 4.3).47
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Figure 4.3: Manufacturer share of satellites launched in 200748
2007 Space Security Impact
Continued growth in the commercial space sector is reflected largely by higher revenues and
not necessarily an increase in space activity. However, individual users are becoming more
important stakeholders in space as they demand not only more communications services, but
also satellite navigation/positioning and remote sensing products. Ongoing growth of the
industry suggests that there is overall confidence in the security of space and the ability of both
companies and consumers to continue to rely on space resources. Growing competition in the
commercial launch market may also contribute to space security by providing greater access
to outer space, although tensions may arise if future demand for space resources exceeds
supply.
Trend 4.2: Commercial sector supporting increased access
to space
Space launches
A commercial launch is defined as one in which at least one satellite payload’s launch was
contracted internationally, so that, in principle, a launch opportunity was available to any
capable launch services provider.49 Russian, European, and American companies remain
world leaders in the commercial launch sector, with Russia launching the most satellites, both
commercial and in total in 2007.50 Generally, launch revenues are attributed to the country
in which the primary vehicle manufacturer is based, except in the case of Sea Launch, which
is designated as “multinational.”51
Commercial space access grew significantly in the 1980s. At that time, NASA viewed its
provision of commercial launches more as a means to offset operating expenses than as a viable
commercial venture. European and Russian companies chose to pursue commercial launches
via standard rocket technology, which allowed them to undercut US competitors during the
period when the US was only offering launches through its Shuttle.
Increasing demand for launch services and the ban of commercial payloads on the Space
Shuttle following the 1986 Challenger Shuttle disaster encouraged further commercial launch
competition. The Ariane launcher, developed by the French in the 1980s, captured over 50
percent of the commercial launch market during the period 1988-1997.52 The Chinese Long
March and the Russian Proton rocket entered the market in the early and mid-1990s. The
Long March was later pressured out of the commercial market due to “reliability and export
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control issues.”53 China has opened the possibility of reentering the commercial spaceflight
market by 2020.54 Today Ariane, Proton, and Zenit rockets dominate the commercial launch
market.
Figure 4.4: Worldwide Commercial Orbital Launches (1997-2007)55
Japanese commercial efforts have suffered from technical difficulties and its H-2 launch
vehicle was shelved in 1999 after flight failures.56 Although the H-2 was revived in 2005,
Japan lags behind Russia, Europe, the US, and China in global launches.57 India’s Augmented
Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle performed the country’s first Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
commercial launch, placing German and South Korean satellites in orbit in May 1999.58
Today’s top commercial launch providers include Lockheed Martin and Boeing Launch
Services in the US, Arianespace in Europe, Energiya in Russia, and two international consortia
— Sea Launch and International Launch Service (ILS).59 Sea Launch, comprised of Boeing
(US), Aker Kvaerner (Norway), RSC-Energiya (Russia), and SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash
(Ukraine), launches from a sea-based platform located on the equator in the Pacific Ocean.60
ILS was established as a partnership between Khrunichev State Research and Production
Space Center (Russia), Lockheed Martin Space Systems (US), and RSC-Energiya (Russia). In
2006 Lockheed sold its share to US Space Transport Inc. New commercial launch vehicle
builders such as Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) are seeking to compete by providing
cheaper, reusable launch vehicle designs.
In addition to a proliferation of rocket designs, the launch sector has also seen innovations in
launch techniques. For example, since the early 1990s companies such as the UK’s Surrey
Satellite Technology Ltd. have used piggyback launches — a small satellite is attached to a
larger one to avoid paying for a dedicated launch. It is now also common to use dedicated
launches to deploy clusters of smaller satellites on small launchers such as the Cosmos rocket.
Emerging technologies such as air-launch vehicles and hypersonic “scramjet” engines may lead
to further cost reductions of space launch into LEO.61
Competition and the entry of non-Western launchers have supported a decrease in space
access costs. Specific launch cost data indicates that the cost to launch commercial payloads
into GEO declined by approximately 35 percent in the 1990s, from an average of about
$40,000 per kilogram to $26,000 per kilogram in 2000. There was no clear pricing trend for
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commercial payloads going to LEO during this decade, but launches between 1995 and 2000
clustered around $5,000 per kilogram, with significant variances.62 It should be noted that it
is difficult to compare launch costs across payloads and launch vehicles due to the number of
important differences between them and the fact that launches are negotiated
project-by-project. Moreover, the price of a launch is often not made public, especially since
the increase in competition after 2000.63 Nonetheless, based on current public data it would
appear that the trend in declining costs of the 1990s has ended and prices have consolidated.64
Greater launcher competition and stable launch costs have facilitated steady growth in the
number of actors that can access space either through an independent launch capability or via
the launch capability of others. Forty-seven states have now accessed space; almost all have
been enabled in some way by the commercial sector. Yet despite significant decreases there has
not been a notable increase in commercial space activity.65
Figure 4.5: Revenues for commercial space launches (million)l66
Commercial remote sensing imagery
Until a few years ago only a government could gain access to remote sensing imagery; today
any individual or organization with access to the Internet can use these services through
Google Maps, Google Earth, and Yahoo Maps programs.67 Companies such as Surrey Satellite
Technology Ltd. and SpaceDev have commercialized private research in the area of space and
satellite technologies. There are currently seven companies in Canada, France, Germany,
Israel, Russia, and the US providing commercial remote sensing imagery. The resolution of
the imagery has become progressively more refined and affordable. In addition to optical
photo images, synthetic aperture radar images up to one meter in resolution are coming on
the market. A growing consumer base is driving up revenues. Global commercial remote
sensing revenue is estimated $1.12-billion for 2005 — an 18 percent increase over 2004 —
and rose another 16 percent in 2006, with one report putting global expenditures on remote
sensing products as high as $7-billion in 2006.68 Security concerns have been raised, however,
due to the potentially sensitive nature of the data (see Trend 4.3).
Commercial satellite positioning
The commercial GPS market has rapidly expanded with the introduction of new devices
marketed to individual users. Handheld GPS equipment, which often integrates the GPS
function into other electronics, is increasing demand for what was once a technology used
primarily by government and large businesses.69 The market for these converged devices is just
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starting to accelerate in the US, but has been strong in Europe and Japan for several years.70
Sales of satellite navigation devices in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa doubled in 2006
and a significant increase in GPS-enabled Location Based Services subscribers is expected in
the coming years. Consumer demand is also increasing for dedicated portable navigation
devices.71 Revenue, not included in the satellite market statistics above, is estimated at
$40.7-billion for 2006 compared to $28.5-billion for 2005, as more and more consumers
choose to access this space service.72
Commercial space transportation
An embryonic space tourism industry continues to emerge, seeking to capitalize on new
concepts for advanced, reliable, reusable, and relatively affordable technologies for launch to
near-space and low earth orbit. In early December 2004 the US Congress passed into law the
“Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004.” Intended to “promote the
development of the emerging commercial human space flight industry,” the Act establishes the
authority of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over suborbital space tourism in the
US, allowing it to issue permits to private spacecraft operators to send customers into space.73
In 2006 the ESA announced the “Survey of European Privately-funded Vehicles for
Commercial Human Spaceflight” to support the emergence of a European commercial space
transportation industry.74
The market for commercial space transportation remains small but has attracted a great deal
of interest. By 2006 four orbital space tourists had flown, all on the Russian Soyuz, and Space
Adventures had taken deposits for over 100 space flights, with the cost increasing from
$20-million to between $30- and $40-million.75 In June 2004 SpaceShipOne, developed by
US Scaled Composites, became the first private manned spacecraft.76 By 2005 there were 19
suborbital launch vehicles under development, primarily for the space tourism market.77 This
market is also generating commercial investment in space infrastructure. For example, Bigelow
Aerospace is building a privately owned, inflatable in-space platform.78 While the industry
continues to face challenges — including a lack of international legal safety standards, high
launch costs, and export regulations79 — important liability standards are beginning to
emerge. In 2006 the FAA released final rules governing private human spaceflight
requirements for crew and participants.80 Final rules were also issued for FAA launch vehicle
safety approvals.81
Insurance
Insurance is an important way of managing the risks associated with sustainable access to and
use of space, with rates influencing both the cost of this access as well as the type of coverage
pursued. Insurance rates also influence the ease with which start-up companies and new
technologies can enter the market:82 Although governments play an important role in the
insurance sector insofar as they generally maintain a certain level of indemnification for
commercial launchers, the commercial sector assumes most of the insurance burden. There are
two types of coverage: launch insurance, which typically includes the first year in orbit, and
on-orbit insurance for subsequent years. Most risk is associated with launch and the first year
in orbit. Prior to 1998 the typical insurance rate for a launch plus 12 months of on-orbit
coverage was about seven percent of the satellite and launch vehicle value; after that date a
sharp increase in on-orbit anomalies forced rates up to 20 percent and higher.83 In 2002 the
space insurance industry paid out $830-million in claims while it collected just $490-million
in premiums.84 Eventually revenues stabilized with increasing premiums and few payouts,
resulting in 2005 profits of $880-million.85 As rates increased terms also became more
restricted. Insurers do not generally quote premiums more than 12 months prior to a
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scheduled launch and in-orbit rates are usually limited to one-year terms and often do not
cover events such as terrorism or “Acts of God.”86 Many companies abandoned insurance
altogether. In recent years, however, there has been a softening of the launch insurance market,
with rates dipping to the low teens.87
The market for in-orbit insurance has also been tumultuous, but operators have had more
flexibility in dealing with it. Like launch insurance, rates skyrocketed in the early 2000s and
terms tightened, leading many companies to discontinue insurance and instead self-insure
through the production of satellite backups.88
With the advent of space tourism, the space insurance industry may expand to cover human
spaceflight. In the US, the FAA requires commercial human spacecraft operators to purchase
third-party liability insurance, although additional coverage is optional. Each of the first two
space tourists purchased policies for training, transportation, and time spent in space.89
2007 Development
Launch costs remain high in a tight market following failures
Following launch price increases in 2005 and 2006, prices remained high in 2007 as capacity
remained tight following the 30 January 2007 explosion of Sea Launch’s Proton rocket, which
damaged the launch platform and gas deflector.90 The Sea Launch failure also delayed the
introduction of Land Launch, which will use the same technology to launch from the
Baikonur site in Kazakhstan; launch activity is not expected until 2009.91 A second launch
attempt of the SpaceX Falcon-1 was made on 21 March 2007, following the failure of the
Falcon-1 launch attempt by SpaceX in 2006, but the second stage failed to reach its intended
orbit.92 Overall, high demand coupled with supply restrictions and rising costs for materials
in 2007 raised launch prices.93 Still, there are downward pressures on launch prices that might
have an effect in the near future, including lower insurance costs and new entrants to the
launch market.
Figure 4.6: Commercial space launches in 200794
2007 Development
Lower insurance rates and new entrants to the launch market may reduce
cost of access to space
Launch insurance affects both the cost and risk of access to space. In recent years some satellite
owners had relied on self-insurance in the face of very costly insurance rates, but in 2007 many
returned to more traditional risk management practices as rates declined.95 Insurance capacity
was greater than demand, allowing a 13 percent decrease in rates from the peak in 2004, while
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overall premiums have surpassed losses for five straight years. Premiums for launch and first
year in orbit ranged from 12 to 18 percent, depending on the level of risk, with annual in-orbit
rate at approximately 1.8 percent.96 Moreover, rates for insurance seem to be gaining flexibility
as the market matures. In May 2007 Intelsat secured insurance for eight of its satellites at well
below going market rates, using leverage from the size of its fleet.97 GeoEye was also able to
obtain a good rate for its aging IKONOS satellite based on a new life expectancy analysis
conducted by the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.98 New types of coverage such as
third-party and product liability for private space ventures are being developed, which could
lend support to small launch startups in the future; pricing is a sensitive issue that could
constrain this emerging market.99 Due to launch failures, however, insurers lost approximately
$150-million in 2007, so premiums may rise in the coming year.100
New entrants to the space launch market may also contribute both extra capacity and
competition, which may reduce the cost of space access. India and China are two such
examples (see Trend 4.1), while others include Brazil and Ukraine, which entered into a
partnership in 2007 to form a joint venture company to launch rockets and satellites from the
Alcantara Base in the northeastern Brazilian state of Maranhao using Ukrainian launch
technology. The commercial venture hopes to capture approximately 10 percent of the global
market in the next eight years, marketing itself to countries with satellites, but without launch
capability.101 In the meantime, Arianespace moved to meet increased demand for launch
services, entering into an agreement with Astrium to increase the production rate for Ariane-5
to seven per year beginning February 2008.102 Arianespace also increased the mission capacity
of Ariane-5, providing payload launch opportunities for MSS satellites of various sizes.103
In 2007 the first geostationary commercial launch contact for Falcon-9 was signed, bringing
the total number of launch contracts to seven.104 South Korea is developing a small launch
vehicle, the Korea Space Launch Vehicle, which may signal Korea’s entry into the commercial
launch services market if it is successful.105 Brazil may revamp its rocket launch capability. In
December 2007 a Brazilian rocket commercially launched an Argentinean rocket 121
kilometers to conduct scientific experiments.106 Brazil’s first orbital launch attempt exploded
in 1997. In the long term, Mitsubishi Heavy, which makes and markets Japan’s H-2A heavy
launcher, aims to compete in the commercial space market. Currently its launch costs, at
roughly $90-million, are too high for the commercial market, but it is making efforts to bring
down costs to between $60- and $70-million, in line with international rivals.107 The H-2A
conducted two successful launches in 2008. Even if new launchers do enter the market,
however, untested technologies face significant challenges, including high insurance costs and
a wary clientele.108
2007 Development
Private human suborbital spaceflight expanding, but capabilities limited
The promise of commercial human spaceflight generated continued activity in 2007. To
support the emerging industry, the US Federal Aviation Administration implemented new
guidelines to obtain experimental launch permits for reusable spacecraft, allowing personal
spaceflight entrepreneurs multiple vehicles of a specific design and unlimited launches of the
same per permit. The US projects a $1-billion- per-year market for suborbital flights by
2021.109 Space Adventures bought two more seats on Soyuz flights to the ISS, intending to
market them to space tourists — one for late 2008 and one for early 2009.110 However, this
market is subject to the same capacity constraints as the unmanned launch market: retirement
of the space shuttle in 2010 means that NASA will rely on the Soyuz vehicles to deliver
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astronauts to the International Space Station, thus decreasing the number of seats available for
commercial passengers. The cost of a ticket to the Space Station has subsequently risen from
between $20- and $25-million to between $30- and $40-million.111 This industry may soon
generate excess capacity, however. The European Space Agency has shown interest in personal
spaceflight, performing a study assessing the commercial suborbital market, identifying
hindrances to market development, and determining ways to achieve European entry into the
marketplace.112 EADS Astrium also announced its intention to garner a piece of the
suborbital market, hoping for subsidization from regional development funding.113 Finally, in
2007 Amazon founder Jeff Bezos began advertising for engineers to join his privately funded
space program. His new company, Blue Origin 9, is focusing on human space exploration and
affordable spaceflights for the masses.114
Following the launch on 28 June 2007 of Bigelow Aerospace’s second inflatable module,
Genesis-2, the company has decided to fast-track the launch of its habitable Sundance
module, in part due to rising launch costs.115 It could be capable of supporting a three-person
crew by 2010.116 Bigelow projects that user crews would primarily consist of industry workers,
and would not be space hotels, although some tourist use could occur.117 It has set the price
for sovereign customers (nations wanting to send their astronauts into space) at
$14.95-million for four weeks in the inflatable module, with a possibility of extending the stay
for $2.95-million for each additional four-week period. Private companies could lease the
module for research at $88-million per year for a full module and $4.5-million per month for
a half-module.118
2007 Development
Commercial spaceflight aims for the Moon
Google added its weight to the commercial spaceflight market in 2007: as the sponsor of the
next X-Prize challenge it will provide $30-million to the first privately funded team that can
soft-land a robot on the Moon, travel a minimum distance of 500 meters and transmit
high-definition video and other images and data back to Earth for viewing over the
Internet.119 If the challenge is not met by 31 December 2012, however, the prize value will
drop to $15-million; the final deadline for winning the prize is 31 December 2014, at which
time it will be terminated unless extended by Google and the X Prize Foundation.120 Seven
teams have announced their intentions to compete for the Prize; the first official entrant is
Odyssey Moon of the Isle of Man.121 While the prospects of winning the prize remain distant,
it is generating both substantial interest and substantial investments.
2007 Development
Greater commercial access to high-resolution remote sensing images
Higher resolution imaging is becoming increasingly accessible to the public market, with key
developments taking place in 2007. The launch of DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-1 spacecraft
means that US DOD-sponsored 50-centimeter imagery will be commercially available at
resolutions comparable to highly classified products. Moreover, Germany’s TerraSar-X and
Canada’s Radarsat-2, launched in June and December 2007, are commercial radar remote
sensing satellites offering high-quality resolution imaging, at one meter and three meters
respectively (see Trend 4.3). India launched Cartosat II with one-meter resolution in January
2007, bringing Indian imagery in line with leading commercial services.122
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In a separate development, Google and Spot Image entered into an agreement to improve the
resolution of imagery available for Google Earth users. France’s Spot Image will provide
2.5-meter resolution for extensive areas of Earth.123 Although the data provided by Google
Earth is not current, it has enhanced the general public’s appetite for remote sensing.124
The use of commercial satellite remote sensing images by public users was demonstrated in
2007 when project “Crisis in Darfur” was launched to educate the 200 million users of Google
Earth about the ongoing conflict in the region. The partnership between the US Holocaust
Memorial Museum and Google Earth is being used to map the effects of the conflict,
including the destruction of villages and movement of displaced persons. A similar initiative
is planned to map key sites of the Holocaust.125
Demand for remote sensing products continues to grow, particularly as space-based data
replaces aerial data; expenditures were almost $7.3-billion in 2007. Weather forecasting
accounts for approximately 38 percent of the market — five times the market share of
intelligence gathering.126
Figure 4.7: Commercial remote sensing satellites
System Operator Current Satellites Type Highest Resolution
(meters)
EROS ImageSat International EROS A Optical 1.5
EROS B Optical 0.7
EROS C Optical 0.7
IKONOS GeoEye IKONOS-2 Optical 0.8
OrbView GeoEye OrbView-1 Optical 10,000
OrbView-2 Optical 1,000
OrbView-3 Optical 1
OrbView-4 Optical 1
QuickBird DigitalGlobe EarlyBird Optical 3
QuickBird-1 Optical 1
QuickBird Optical 0.6
Radarsat MDA Radarsat-1 Radar 8
Radarsat-2 Radar 3
SPOT Spot Image SPOT 2 Optical 10
SPOT 4 Optical 10
SPOT 5 Optical 2.5
WorldView DigitalGlobe WorldView-1 Optical 0.5
Disaster Monitoring DMC International AlSAT-1 (Algeria) Optical 32
Constellation Imaging NigeriaSAT-1 (Nigeria) Optical 32
UK-DMC (United Kingdom) Optical 32
Beijing-1 (China) Optical 4
TerraSar TerraSar-X Radar 1
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Space security impact
Sustained competition in commercial space launch may slightly reduce the cost of access to
space in the near future, but in the absence of revolutionized technologies, there is not likely
to be a significant impact on space access. Although the commercial human space flight
industry continues to develop, it has yet to deliver sustainable, low-cost launchers. Moreover,
while some regulatory efforts are being made to support the prospect of private human access
to space, such access may cause challenges to space security, both in terms of the sustainability
of the space environment as well as the applicability of international laws, such as the Outer
Space Treaty. Finally, while the space industry is facilitating greater use of space applications,
in particular remote sensing, there are legitimate fears about the implications for security on
Earth (see Trend 4.3 below).
Trend 4.3: Governments both support and regulate the
commercial space sector as subsidies and national
security concerns continue to play an important role
As national security concerns continue to play an important role in the commercial space
industry, governments play the role of both partner and regulator. On the one hand,
governments have played an integral role in the development of the commercial space sector.
Most spacefaring states consider their space systems an extension of national critical
infrastructure, and a growing number view their space systems as critical to national security.
Full state ownership of space systems has now given way to a mixed system in which many
larger commercial space actors receive significant government contracts and a variety of
government subsidies. Certain commercial space sectors, such as remote sensing or
commercial launch industries, rely more heavily on government customers, while the satellite
communications industry is commercially sustainable even without government contracts.
On the other hand, due to the security concerns associated with commercial space
technologies, governments also play an active role in the sector through regulation, including
export controls and controls on certain applications, such as Earth imaging.
The US Space Launch Cost Reduction Act of 1998 established a low-interest loan program
for qualifying private companies to support the development of reusable vehicles.127 In 2002
the US Air Force requested $1-billion in subsidies from Congress for the period 2004-2009
for Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V and Boeing’s Delta 4 development as part of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.128 To maintain the financial feasibility of the
program, the 2005 Space Transportation Policy requires the Department of Defense (DOD)
to pay the fixed costs to support both companies until the end of the decade.129 The Air Force
accordingly announced that it will divide its planned 23 EELV missions between the two
companies rather than force price-driven competition.130 In 2006 these two launchers were
merged into a single company, the United Launch Alliance. A report commissioned by the
FAA indicates that the success of the US commercial launch industry is viewed as “beneficial
to national interests.”131
Government involvement in commercial activities extends beyond the launch market,
however; the 2003 US Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy directs the US government
to “rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities
for filling imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland
security, and civil users” to “advance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests by maintaining the nation’s leadership in remote sensing space activities, and by
sustaining and enhancing the US remote sensing industry.”132
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The European Guaranteed Access to Space Program adopted in 2003 requires that ESA
underwrite the development costs of the Ariane 5, ensuring its competitiveness in the
international launch market.133 The program explicitly recognizes a competitive European
launch industry as a strategic asset and is designed to ensure sustained government funding for
launcher design and development, infrastructure maintenance, and upkeep.134 It also supports
a continued relationship with Russia to launch the Soyuz from the Kourou launch site in
French Guiana.
Russia’s commercial space sector maintains a close relationship with its government, receiving
contracts and subsidies for the development of the Angara launcher and launch site
maintenance.135 The Russian space program receives subsidies from the US in the form of
contracts for the International Space Station (ISS). The vulnerability of the Russian
commercial space sector was demonstrated in 2002, when Russia’s financial struggles and
inability to fully meet its subsidy commitments forced the Russian space launch company
Energiya to default on loan payments. According to Russian media, the Russian space industry
was to receive only $38-million in subsidies in 2003, not enough to cover existing debts or
ISS commitments.136
China’s space industry also has a close relationship with its government. The 2006 Chinese
White Paper on Space Activities identifies the development of an independent space industry
as a key component to its goals for outer space.137
Commercial satellite positioning
Initially intended for military use, satellite navigation has emerged as a key civilian utility with
a strong commercial market. The US government first promised international civilian use of
its planned Global Positioning System (GPS) in 1983 following the downing of Korean
Airlines Flight 007 that strayed over Soviet territory, and in 1991 pledged that it would be
freely available to the international community beginning in 1993.138 US GPS civilian signals
have dominated the commercial market, but new competition may emerge from the EU’s
Galileo system, which is specifically designed for civilian and commercial use, and Russia’s
GLONASS.139 China’s regional Beidou system may also be available for commercial use by
2008.140
The commercial satellite positioning industry initially focused on niche markets such as
surveying and civil aviation, but has since grown to include automotive navigation,
agricultural guidance, and construction.141 The crux of revenues to the commercial satellite
positioning industry is sales of ground-based equipment. Sales to commercial users first
outpaced those to military buyers in the mid-1990s.142 The commercial GPS market
continues to grow with the introduction of new receivers that integrate the GPS function into
other devices such as cell phones, making it a mainstream electronic.143 Global GPS revenues
for 2005 were estimated at $21.8-billion.144
Export controls
Trade restrictions aim to strike a balance between commercial development and the
proliferation of sensitive technologies that could pose security threats, but achieving that
balance is not easy, particularly in an industry characterized by dual-use technology. Space
launchers and intercontinental ballistic missiles use almost identical technology, and many
civil and commercial satellites contain advanced capabilities with potential military
applications. Dual-use concerns have led states to develop national and international export
control regimes aimed at preventing proliferation. The regime most pertinent to commercial
space security considerations is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
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The MTCR was formed in 1987 by a group of states seeking to prevent the further
proliferation of capabilities to deliver weapons of mass destruction by collaborating on a
voluntary basis to coordinate the development and implementation of common export policy
guidelines.145 The 34 members of the MTCR include Australia, Brazil, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the UK, and the US, with China formally expressing
interest in becoming a member in 2003.146 However, export practices differ among members.
Although the American “Iran Nonproliferation Act” of 2000 limited the transfer of ballistic
missile technology to Iran, for example, Russia is still willing to provide such technology
under its Federal Law on Export Control.147 Most states control the export of space-related
goods through military and weapons of mass destruction export control laws, such as the
Export Control List in Canada, the Council Regulations (EC) 2432/2001 in the EU,
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and
Missile-related Items and Technologies, and the WMD Act in India.148
From the late 1980s to late 1990s, the US had agreements with China, Russia, and Ukraine
to enable the launch of US satellites from foreign sites. However, in 1998 a US investigation
into several successive Chinese launch failures led to allegations about the transfer of sensitive
US technology to China by aerospace companies Hughes and Loral. Concerns sparked the
transfer of jurisdiction over satellite export licensing from the Commerce Department’s
Commerce Control List to the State Department’s US Munitions List (USML) in 1999.149
In effect, the new legislation treated satellite sales like weapons sales, making international
collaborations more heavily regulated, expensive, and time consuming.
Exports of USML items are licensed under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) regime, which adds several additional reporting and licensing requirements for US
satellite manufacturers. A recent US Government report noted that, in total, it now takes
“nine to 20 months on average to gain approval for a satellite export and notify Congress.”150
A subsequent study of the market conditions for US satellite manufacturers argued that
“nearly every potential international buyer of satellites in 2002 … indicated that the US
export control system is a competitive disadvantage for US manufacturers.”151 Recently
European satellite firms have been developing ‘ITAR free’ satellites that use no US
components and thus avoid all ITAR restrictions.152
Finally, because certain commercial satellite imagery can serve military purposes, a number of
states have implemented regulations on the sector. The 2003 US Commercial Remote
Sensing Policy sets up a two-tiered licensing regime that limits the sale of sensitive imagery.153
In 2001 the French Ministry of Defense prohibited open sales of commercial Spot Image
satellite imagery of Afghanistan.154 Indian laws require the ‘scrubbing’ of commercial satellite
images of sensitive Indian sites.155 Canada has recently passed Bill C-25, creating a regulatory
regime that will give the Canadian government “shutter control” — the control exercised by
the executive branch of government over the collection and dissemination of commercial
satellite imagery of a particular region due to national security or foreign policy concerns —
and priority access in response to possible future major security crises.156 Analysts note,
however, that competition among increasing numbers of commercial satellite imagery
providers may eventually make shutter control prohibitively expensive.157
Commercial space systems as critical infrastructure
Space systems, including commercial systems, are viewed by some states as critical national
infrastructure and strategic assets, but the implications are not clear. During the overcapacity
of the 1990s, the US military began employing commercial satellite systems for non-sensitive
communications and imagery applications. During Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001
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the US military used 700 megabytes per second of bandwidth, 75 percent of which was from
commercial systems.158
The US DOD is the single largest customer for the satellite industry. By November 2003 it
was estimated that the US military was spending more than $400-million each year on
commercial satellite services.159 This figure jumped to more than $1-billion a year for
commercial broadband satellite services alone by 2006.160 “DoD estimates that commercial
satellite systems are providing over 80 percent of the satellite bandwidth supporting Operation
Iraqi Freedom.”161 In response, DOD is examining ways to facilitate satellite service
procurement by studying different acquisition methods.162 This would provide a more
long-term, strategic partnership between DOD and its commercial providers.
This growing dependence upon commercial services prompted a December 2003 US General
Accounting Office report to recommend that the US military be more strategic in planning
for and acquiring bandwidth by, among other things, consolidating bandwidth needs among
military actors to capitalize on bulk purchases.163 A 2004 study of the US National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee Satellite Task Force noted the great dependence of
the national security and homeland security communities on commercial space.164
2007 Development
Governments and militaries partner with the commercial industry for satellite imaging,
communications, and launch services
In 2007 governments and militaries continued to be significant consumers of commercial
satellite imaging services, with the launch of publicly funded commercial remote sensing
satellites. The first of two commercial WorldView satellites being developed by DigitalGlobe,
and the only commercial imaging satellite to provide up to 50-centimeter resolution, was
launched on 20 September 2007. It is part of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s
(NGA) NextView Program to combine commercial remote sensing with much more powerful
optics, partly funded by the Pentagon.165 NGA contributed $500-million to secure imagery
for specific DOD high resolution needs.166
Canada’s Radarsat-2 was launched on 14 December 2007. In a public-private partnership, the
Government of Canada, primarily through the Canadian Space Agency, pre-purchased $445
million in data from Radarsat-2. The satellite’s three-meter, all-weather, all-day, all-terrain
satellite images will also be available for commercial sale in accordance with the terms of
Canada’s Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, administered by the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade.167 Similarly, Germany’s TerrSar-X, launched on 15 June
2007, is the result of a partnership between the German Ministry of Education and Science,
the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and the Astrium GmbH.168 It provides up to
one-meter images for scientific research and applications and to the remote sensing market.169
Finally, DigitalGlobe and GeoEye partnered with the US Geological Survey to support the
many space and satellite agencies that form the International Charter “Space and Major
Disasters.”170
Remote sensing is not the only instance of such partnering. The Skynet-5 secure military
communications satellite launched on 11 March 2007 is operated by Paradigm Secure
Communications, a subsidiary of Astrium.171 The UK has priority of use, with excess capacity
available for sale to NATO and other UK allies. The US DOD partnered with Intelsat Ltd.
and Cisco Systems Inc. in 2007 to initiate a technology development program that could
eventually facilitate high-speed Internet access to mobile military units.172 The initial
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technology development cost will be borne by Cisco and Intelsat, in the hope that the military
will make long-term commitments to support future technologies and new acquisition
procedures. The application will be added to an Intelsat satellite already under construction
and is scheduled to be launched during the summer of 2009.
The US military has publicly recognized the importance of the commercial sector to meet
capacity shortfalls.173 The US National Security Space Office (NSSO) intends to upgrade the
Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA), which serves the Department of
Defense, intelligence community, and NASA; the new version will expand the potential role
for COMSATCOM and leverage emerging commercial satellite capabilities. “Commercial
satellites meet 80 percent of the needs of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, four times as much
as during Operation Desert Storm 16 years ago.”174 It is estimated that the US DOD is
spending $1-billion a year on commercial satellite communications.175 Former head of the
NSSO Joe Rouge indicated that the US military will move forward on efforts to create
long-term partnerships with industry.176
A key example of an attempt to shift the dynamic between commercial space and government
space is NASA’s $500-million Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program.
It is designed to spur private development of commercial spacecraft that can service the
International Space Station when the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010, but is struggling.177 The
original program provided funding agreements to SpaceX and Rocketplane Kistler.178
Although SpaceX remains on track,179 Rocketplane Kistler was dropped from COTS in 2007
for failing to meet financial milestones; NASA then entered into agreements with SpaceDev,
SPACEHAB, Constellation Services International, PlanetSpace, and t/Space.180 NASA also
plans to provide half of its space on the ISS as an incentive to participate in the COTS
program,181 and is shopping for commercial and military users of the Ares launch vehicles.
NASA stated that “turning the taxpayer-funded launch vehicles over to other U.S. users would
be an appropriate way for the U.S. government to support the commercial sector.”182 It is not
clear if this strategy will be successful.
2007 Development
Galileo demonstrates the limits to public-private partnerships
The success of public-private partnerships in the commercial space imaging and
communications sectors contrasts sharply with the experience of the Galileo project in Europe.
After a delay of five years, due largely to bureaucratic obstacles and the failure of a
public-private consortium, European governments agreed in December 2007 to provide the
necessary $5-billion to continue work on Galileo — a planned 30-satellite space navigation
system intended to provide Europe with capabilities independent from the US GPS. The
European Commission abandoned the original plan for substantial participation by the
private sector after interests of member countries on behalf of their national industries created
a stalemate.183 This was the first attempt at a global navigation system funded by a
public-private partnership. Unlike other successful examples, it placed a significant risk and
cost burden on the public sector for investment in a public utility that would only see
long-term returns and would have to compete with existing freely available government
systems.
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2007 Development
Ongoing efforts to regulate access to commercial satellite imagery
Controversy surrounding the potential use of Google Earth images by terrorists in Iraq in
2007 sheds light on the ongoing struggle between access to commercial space services and
security needs.184 Although commercial services such as Google Earth are composed of
unclassified photos many states have raised concerns and it is now routine for many
commercial images to be blocked. Google replaced the images of Iraq with prewar data
following complaints by the British government, and was asked by the Indian government to
blur what it referred to as strategic locations in India. Similar policies exist in many other
countries including Australia, Russia, South Korea, Thailand,185 and Israel. In 2007, as
commercial providers launched new, improved capabilities, the Director of the National
Geospacial-Intelligence Agency acknowledged that controls on distribution might need to be
put in place.186 There is “little if any directly applicable international law” governing the
controversy.187 Images of China’s new Jin-class submarine also appeared on Google Earth in
July 2007.188
Germany has addressed the issue with its Satellite Data Security Act, which entered into force
on 1 December 2007. The purpose of the law “is to provide a clearly defined and transparent
procedure for the dissemination of RS [remote sensing]-data” and covers first-time
marketing/dissemination of data, German satellites and satellites operated by German citizens,
and high-grade remote sensing satellites, but excludes governmental satellites operated by
either military or intelligence agencies.189 Similarly, Canada’s Radarsat-2 is the first
commercial remote sensing satellite to be licensed under its new Remote Sensing Space
Systems Act, which allows the government to regulate distribution of data and exercise shutter
control to address issues of national or international security.190
In related developments, litigation was initiated between ImageSat International’s (ISI) minor
shareholders and current management based on claims of lost opportunities and company
devaluaation through management decisions to bow to Israeli pressure and refuse to sell
satellite imaging services to Venezuela.191 Venezuela was able to obtain data from China,
which is to be used in commercial and military applications, as well as satellite and launch
facilities.192 Similarly, Israel’s Ministry of Defense sought agreement from the US government
for China to participate as a Satellite Operating Partner with ISI, allowing it to select targets
and stream images directly into Chinese ground stations. The US agreed, but not without
several restrictions, which may disrupt the deal.193 The issue of distribution of commercial
satellite imagery is likely to intensify as technologies improve and capabilities proliferate.
2007 Development
Private industry joins government in space safety efforts
Few rules govern security and safety in outer space, but following the Chinese intercept of one
of its own satellites on 11 January 2007, Dave McGlade, CEO of Intelsat, added his voice to
those of several governments in calling for a code of conduct or rules of the road to provide
norms and guidelines on space activities.194 The importance of the private sector in space
safety and governance issues has also been highlighted by the US government. Under a
program called Neighborhood Watch, the US DOD is attempting to align government and
industry resources to address growing space security challenges and to increase space
situational awareness.195 The program is intended to enhance safety and reduce risk and
contribute to the sustainable use of key orbits.196
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2007 Development
Export controls try to balance commercial interests with security concerns
US export controls remained a concern in the commercial space industry in 2007 and were
an issue in the Aerospace Industries Association Election for 2008.197 To facilitate reform, US
industry groups formed a coalition to lobby administration officials to relax their
interpretation of the export regulations and reduce the license applications backlog.198 The
effect of controls on industry is difficult to ascertain. While Boeing’s chairman went on record
stating that the company had become more efficient at working the ITAR process199 —
implying that they are not necessarily impeding sector growth — the impact on smaller
businesses or start-ups with fewer resources to devote to the process may be different. In 2007
the US and the UK signed a treaty to ease ITAR restrictions after ITAR waiver discussions
were aborted.200 The same preferred status was given to Australia in a similar agreement.201
Canada and the US also took a step to ease ITAR, beginning with access to defense articles
and services for Canadian citizens with appropriate security clearance.202
Export controls were an issue in Europe as well in 2007; the European Commission unveiled
its new European Space Policy to address the need for an appropriate legal and managerial
framework and define security-related requirements.203 The task is daunting as the many
member states in the EU have their own separate national interests.204
An FBI investigation of India’s Defense Research and Development Organization led to the
arrest of at least five Indian nationals in 2007, creating tension between the countries. They
were charged with acquiring and exporting US dual-use technologies, including computer
chips for India’s missile, space, and Light Combat Aircraft programs, without proper licenses
from the Department of Commerce.205 A Russian court convicted the Russian head of a
Chinese rocket and space technology company in 2007 on similar charges of leaking sensitive
technology.206 Policy changes to a Commerce regulation in 2007 made it more difficult, but
not impossible, for China to purchase high-tech items from the US; however, it only catches
items not on ITAR or the normal Commerce Control List of export controls for China.207
Industries are maneuvering around ITAR restrictions by purchasing ITAR-free satellites and
launch services, which do not use US components. China was able to launch the Chinasat 6B
telecommunications satellite, built by Thales Alenia Space, in its Long March launcher
because the satellite was built without US components. Thales Alenia Space is the only
western company that has developed a product line deliberately designed to avoid US trade
restrictions on its satellite components.208 Arianespace denounced Thales for flouting ITAR,
despite its contracts to launch multiple spacecraft for Globalstar and an option for as many
more.209 Arianespace also cautioned the US against possible Chinese “dumping.”210
Space security impact
The strong relationship between military and commercial uses of space and the security
dimensions of many commercial services has a complex impact on space security. On the one
hand, multiple-use spacecraft could become military targets in the future, resulting in an
overall decrease in security. Alternatively, the proliferation of dual-use assets in space could
make a military attack less useful and, therefore, less likely. Arguably, this could increase overall
space security. There are also pros and cons for government users of commercial systems,
including greater flexibility and options for using space, but fewer security features to protect
this use. The failure of the Galileo partnership, however, demonstrates that the costs and risks
of space access and use remain high, and governments must play a key role in ensuring that
COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-012F 4/17/07 Dnepr Aerocube 2 Russia Aerospace Technology Aerospace SSO
Corporation
2007-020A 5/29/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M065 Russia American Communication Loral LEO
Globalstar
2007-020C 5/29/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M069 Russia American Communication Loral LEO
Globalstar
2007-020D 5/29/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M072 Russia American Communication Loral LEO
Globalstar
2007-020F 5/29/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M071 Russia American Communication Loral LEO
Globalstar
2007-028A 6/28/07 Dnepr Genesis-2 Russia Bigelow Technology Bigelow LEO
Aerospace
2007-036B 8/17/07 Ariane 5ECA BSAT-3A France B-SAT Communication LM/Newtown GEO
2007-012M 4/17/07 Dnepr CalPoly CP3 Russia CalPoly Technology Cal Poly SSO
2007-012Q 4/17/07 Dnepr CalPoly CP4 Russia CalPoly Technology Cal Poly SSO
2007-021A 5/31/07 Chang Zheng 3A Xinnuo 3 China China Communication CAST GEO
2007-031A 4/5/07 Chang Zheng 3B Zhongxing 6B China China Communication Thales/Canne HEO
2007-041A 9/18/07 Delta 7920-10C WorldView-1 US DigitalGlobe Remote sensing Ball SSO
(optical)
2007-032A 7/7/07 Proton-M/Briz-M DirecTV 10 Russia DireccTV Communication Boeing/ES GEO
2007-036A 8/17/07 Ariane 5ECA Spaceway 3 France Huges Network Communication Boeing/HB GEO
System
2007-007A 3/11/07 Ariane 5ECA Insat 4B France Insat Communication ISRO/ISAC GEO
2007-037A 9/2/07 GSLV INSAT 4CR India Insat Communication ISRO/IISAC GEO
2007-016B 5/4/07 Ariane 5ECA Galaxy 17 France Intelsat Communication Thales/Canne GEO
2007-044B 10/5/07 Ariane 5GS Intelsat IS-11 France Intelsat Communication Orbital GEO
2007-063D 12/21/07 Ariane 5GS Horizons 2 France Intelsat Communication Orbital GEO
and Jsat
2007-057A 10/17/07 Proton-M/Briz-M Sirius 4 Russia NSAB Communication LMCSS GEO
2007-044A 10/5/07 Ariane 5GS Optus D2 France Optus Communication Orbital GEO
Networks
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access. Efforts to regulate access to both commercial space technology and data in 2007
reflected ongoing attempts to balance the benefits of secure access to and use of space against
the potential threats it may pose to space security. This balance was better addressed regarding
access to commercial imagery in 2007, but striking a balance between these two components
of space security will become more complicated if commercial capabilities continue to
increase. Finally, the growing interest in the commercial space industry to advance and
participate in space governance initiatives is a positive development for space security, since all
actors share the same interest in the secure and sustainable access to space.
Figure 4.8: Commercial payloads launched in 2007
Space Security 2008
COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-012C 4/17/07 Dnepr SaudiComsat-7 Russia Saudi Arabia Messaging Saudisat SSO
2007-012E 4/17/07 Dnepr SaudiComsat-6 Russia Saudi Arabia Messaging Saudisat SSO
2007-012H 4/17/07 Dnepr SaudiComsat-5 Russia Saudi Arabia Messaging Saudisat SSO
2007-012J 4/17/07 Dnepr SaudiComsat-3 Russia Saudi Arabia Messaging Saudisat SSO
2007-012L 4/17/07 Dnepr SaudiComsat-4 Russia Saudi Arabia Messaging Saudisat SSO
2007-016A 5/4/07 Ariane 5ECA Astra 1L France SES Astra Communication LM/Sunnyvale GEO
2007-056A 11/14/07 Ariane 5ECA Star One C1 France Star One Communication Thales/Canne GEO
2007-009A 4/9/07 Proton-M/Briz-M Anik F3 Russian Telesat Communication Astrium GEO
2007-012K 4/17/07 Dnepr MAST Russia Tethers Technology TUI SSO
Unlimited Ink
2007-012R 4/17/07 Dnepr CSTB 1 Russia UK Technology Boeing SSO
2007-048A 10/20/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M067 Russia Globalstar Communication Loral LEO
2007-048B 10/20/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M070 Russia Globalstar Communication Loral LEO
2007-048C 10/20/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M066 Russia Globalstar Communication Loral LEO
2007-048D 10/20/07 Soyuz-FG Globalstar M068 Russia Globalstar Communication Loral LEO
2007-061A 12/14/07 Soyuz-FG Radarsat-2 Russia Canada Remote sensing MDA LEO
(radar)
2007-026A 6/15/07 Dnepr TerraSar-X Russia Germany Remote sensing EADS LEO
(radar)
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5. Space Support for
Terrestrial Military Operations
This chapter assesses trends and developments in the research, development, testing, and
deployment of space systems that are used to support terrestrial military operations. This
includes warning; communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
meteorology; as well as navigation and weapons guidance applications.
Extensive military space systems were developed by the US and the USSR during the Cold
War. Satellites offered an ideal vantage point from which to monitor the Earth to provide
strategic warning of signs of nuclear attack, such as the launch plume of a ballistic missile or
the light signature of a nuclear detonation. Satellites also offered the first credible means for
arms control verification, leading US President Lyndon Johnson to realize that fears of a
missile gap between the US and the Soviet Union were greatly overstated. The space age
opened new chapters in the development of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
collection capabilities through the use of satellite imagery and space-based electronic
intelligence collection. In addition, satellite communications provided extraordinary new
capabilities for real-time command and control of military forces deployed throughout the
world.
By the end of the Cold War the US and USSR had begun to develop satellite navigation
systems that provided increasingly accurate geographical positioning information. Building
upon the capabilities of its Global Positioning System (GPS), the US began to expand the role
of military space systems, integrating them into virtually all aspects of military operations,
from providing indirect strategic support to military forces to enabling the application of
military force in near-real-time tactical operations through precision weapons guidance. The
development of radar satellites offered the potential to detect opposition forces on the ground
in all weather at all times.
At present the US leads in the deployment of space systems to support military operations,
accounting for over half of all military satellites. Russia maintains the second largest number
of military satellites. Together, these two actors dwarf the military space capabilities of all other
states, although this situation is changing.
This chapter identifies the development of the military space capabilities of the US and Russia
as a distinct space security trend. It also examines the efforts of a growing number of other
states that have begun to develop national space systems to support military operations and
their rapidly expanding capabilities, primarily in the areas of surveillance and
communications. It does not examine military programs pertaining to space systems
protection or negation, or space-based strike capabilities, which are described in their
respective chapters.
Space Security Impact
Over half of all space systems to date have been developed to support terrestrial military
operations, making the military space sector an important driver behind the advancement of
capabilities to access and use space. In addition to encouraging an increasing number of actors
to access space, military space has played a key role in bringing down the cost of space access,
and many of today’s common space applications were first developed for military use. The
increased use of space has also led to greater competition for scarce space resources such as
orbital slots and, in particular, radio frequency spectrum allocations. While disputes over these
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
F
IV
E
112
Space Security 2008
scarce resources also affect the civil and commercial space sectors, they become more acute in
the military field, where they are associated with national security.
Space assets play an important strategic and, increasingly, tactical role in the terrestrial military
operations of certain states. In most cases, space systems have augmented the military
capabilities of advanced states by enhancing battlefield awareness, including, as mentioned
above, precise navigation and targeting support, early warning of missile launch, and real-time
communications. Furthermore, remote sensing satellites have served as a national technical
means of verification of international nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament
regimes. These uses have driven an increasing dependence on space, particularly by the major
spacefaring states.
An increasing number of state actors are integrating space capabilities and space-derived
information into their day-to-day military planning. This can have a positive effect on space
security by increasing the collective vested interest in space security through mutual
vulnerability. The use of space to support terrestrial military operations can also have a
negative impact on space security if potential adversaries, viewing space as a new source of
military threat or as critical military infrastructure, develop space system negation capabilities
to neutralize the advantages of those systems.
Because the space systems that support military operations are seen as vulnerable, actors
acquire greater incentives to protect them by developing space system protection and negation
capabilities, which may lead to an arms escalation dynamic. Concern has been expressed that
extensive use of space in support of terrestrial military operations blurs the notion of “peaceful
purposes” as enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, but state practice over the past 40 years has
generally accepted these applications as peaceful insofar as they are not aggressive in space (see
Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines Trend 2.1). Space has been militarized since the first
satellite, Sputnik, was placed into orbit. Of concern here is not whether militaries should use
space, but rather how the use of space by militaries improves or degrades the security of space.
Trend 5.1: US and Russia continue to lead in deploying military
space systems
During the Cold War, the US and USSR developed military space capabilities at a relatively
equal pace. The collapse of the USSR, however, saw a massive drop in Russian military space
spending while the US expanded its military space capabilities. There has been a general
decrease in the number of military launches by both states in recent years.
Despite this decrease in the number of dedicated military satellites, American and Russian
dependence on military space systems appears to be increasing. While new systems are being
orbited at a slower rate, they have greater capabilities and longevity and are more integrated
with the military. Commercial systems are also playing a rapidly growing military support role.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide an overview of US and Russian military satellites.
United States
The US has dominated the military space arena since the end of the Cold War. The US
currently outspends all other states combined on military space applications, allocating over
$25-billion to military space expenditures in FY2007.1 At the end of 2007, the US had
approximately 136 operational dedicated military satellites, representing over half of all
military satellites in orbit (see Annex Two).2 It continues to place heavy emphasis on
upgrading all aspects of its military space capabilities and by all indications is the actor most
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dependent on its space capabilities. By comparison, it is roughly estimated that Russia
presently operates some 67 dedicated military satellites in orbit.3 Nonetheless, the US is
currently faced with significant challenges in attempts to modernize and upgrade almost all of
its major military space systems, which have been marked with cost overruns and deployment
delays.4
SATCOM
The US military relies heavily on satellite communications for a range of critical capabilities;
they have been described as “the single most important military space capability.”5 The
Military Satellite Communication System (Milstar) is currently one of the most important of
these systems, providing protected communications for the US Army, Navy, and Air Force
through five satellites in Geostationary Orbit (GEO). There is a plan to begin replacing
Milstar satellites with four or five Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites in
2008, which are designed to provide secure strategic and tactical command and control
communications worldwide as part of a cooperative program with Canada, the UK, and the
Netherlands.6 The US hopes to deploy the next-generation Transformation Satellite
Communications System (TSAT) to provide protected, high-speed internet-like information
availability to the military, including laser communications in a second stage.7 Development
has been disrupted by budget constraints and technical challenges, however, causing the
launch of the first reduced-capacity satellite to be rescheduled from 2009 to 2016.8
The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) — the workhorse of the US military’s
super-high frequency communications — is a hardened and jam-resistant constellation that
transmits high-priority command and control messages to battlefield commanders using nine
satellites in GEO. A planned follow-on to this system, the Advanced Wideband System
(AWS), is expected to increase available bandwidth significantly.9 The Global Broadcast
System and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) follow-on satellites provide wideband and secure,
anti-jam communications, respectively. The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is intended
to bridge the transition between retirement of the DSCS and full deployment of the AWS
constellations. Currently, however, it is three years behind schedule.10
The US military also maintains a polar military satellite communications system to ensure
communications in those regions. In addition to these dedicated systems, space-based military
communications use commercial operators such as Globalstar, Iridium, Intelsat, Inmarsat, and
Telstar.11 Increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) is straining both military and
commercial capacity in places such as the Middle East and secure, high-speed, high-volume
data transmission is critical to meet current and future demand.12 The cost of commercial
broadband satellite service is estimated at $1-billion a year. The US DOD will likely remain
dependent on these services in the future, even with the deployment of new systems.
Earth Observation/Early Warning/Intelligence
Space-based early warning systems provide the US with critical missile warning and tracking
capabilities. The first such system, the US Missile Defense Alarm System (MiDAS), began to
be deployed in a polar orbit in 1960. The current US Defense Support Program (DSP) early
warning satellites were first deployed in the early 1970s in GEO, providing enhanced coverage
of the USSR while reducing the number of necessary satellites to four.13 The US plans to
replace the DSP system with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to provide advanced
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surveillance capabilities for missile warning and missile defense.14 However, SBIRS is behind
schedule and significantly over budget, with a final estimated cost five times the original
estimate, up to $10-billion.15 The anticipated US Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) is intended to work with SBIRS to support missile defense responses (see Space
Systems Protection Trend 6.1 and Space Systems Negation Trend 7.2).
The first US optical reconnaissance Corona satellites were launched as early as 1959, with the
Soviets following suit by 1962.16 These early remote sensing satellites had lifetimes of only
days and were equipped with film-based cameras. At the end of their operational lifetimes,
capsules with the exposed film were ejected from the satellite and collected, usually from the
ocean.17 Gradually, resolution of these cameras was improved from about 10 meters to less
than a meter. While the exact resolution of today’s remote sensing satellites remains classified,
the US is generally thought to have optical satellites with resolutions as precise as 10
centimeters.18 As early as 1976 the US began to fit its remote sensing satellites with
charge-coupled devices that took digital images, which could be transmitted back to Earth via
radio signal, providing near-real-time satellite imagery.19 Open source information suggests
that the US currently operates between eight and 10 imagery intelligence satellites through
two optical systems known as Crystal and Misty, and one synthetic aperture radar system
known as Lacrosse. The Improved Crystal satellites have a resolution of up to 6 inches.20 The
US operates between 18 and 27 signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites in four separate
systems — the Naval Ocean Surveillance System, Trumpet, Mentor, and Vortex.21
The Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) is intended to provide next-generation reconnaisance
capabilities through electro-optical and radar remote sensing. Following a five-year delay and
cost increase from $6-billion to $18-billion,22 it was put under review in 2006 and the DOD
is considering the purchase of an interim capability in response to ongoing delays.23
The US military also uses commercial imagery services from DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (see
Commercial Space). For example, Landsat is a dual-use remote sensing imaging satellite used
by the US military for tactical planning. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
provides environmental data in support of military operations. There are several dual-use
civilian-military meteorology spacecraft, including the Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite and the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite.24
Navigation
In 1964 the first navigation system was deployed for military applications by the US Navy,
and its position resolution was accurate to greater than 100 meters. This system and others
that followed were ultimately replaced by the GPS, which was declared operational in 1993
and uses a minimum constellation of 24 satellites orbiting at an altitude of about 20,000
kilometers. On the battlefield GPS is used at all levels, from navigation of terrestrial
equipment and individual soldiers to target identification and precision weapons guidance.
GPS is also an important civil and commercial service (see Civil Space Programs and Global
Utilities Trend 3.4).
Figure 5.1: Characteristics of key US dedicated military space systems25
Launch
Since 2003 the US Air Force (USAF) has promoted Operationally Responsive Spacelift
(ORS), which is a long-term program with three main objectives: (1) Rapid Design, Build,
Test with a launch-ready spacecraft within 15 months from authority to proceed; (2)
Responsive Launch, Checkout, Operations to include launch within one week of a call-up
from a stored state; and (3) Militarily Significant Capability to include obtaining images with
tactically significant resolution provided directly to the theater. This could be made possible
by new launch capabilities, combined with miniaturization technologies that have
dramatically increased the “capability per kilogram on orbit” equation for satellites, and by
having ground satellite spares ready to be launched.26 It could allow the US to replace satellites
on short notice27 allowing the US to rapidly recover from space negation attacks and reducing
general space system vulnerabilities. ORS would also allow deployments of space systems
designed to meet the needs of specific military operations. For example, the US TacSat
microsatellite series are intended for ORS demonstration, combining existing military and
Current programs Function Orbit Constellation Notes on potential
follow-on systems
Defense Satellite Communications GEO 9 Wideband Global SATCOM (2007);
Communications Advanced Wideband System
System III (2009)
Military Satellite Communications GEO 5 Advanced Extremely High
Communication Frequency (2008);
System (Milstar) Transformational Satellite
Communications System
(TSAT) (2016)
Interim Polar Communications GEO 2 Enhanced Polar System (2014)
Satellite Program
UHF Follow-on Satellite Communications GEO 9 Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS) (2010)
Satellite Data System Communications GEO 4
Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program Weather LEO 5
Global Positioning System Navigation MEO 31
Defense Support Program Early Warning GEO 7 Space Based Infrared System
(2009); Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (2007)
N/A Tactical Warning Space Radar (2016)
Crystal Remote sensing LEO 4
Lacrosse Remote sensing LEO 4
Misty Remote sensing LEO 1 Program cancelled (2007)
Naval Ocean Surveillance SIGINT LEO 17
System (NOSS)
Mentor (Advanced Orion) SIGINT GEO 4
Vortex (Mercury) SIGINT GEO 2
Trumpet (SB-WASS) SIGINT HEO 3
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commercial technologies such as remote sensing and communications with new commercial
launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.”28 The satellites are
controlled directly by deployed US commanders.29
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is a $31.8-billion USAF effort that
began in 1994, with the objective of reducing launch costs by at least 25 percent by partnering
with industry to develop launch capabilities that could be used for both commercial and
government purposes.30 To meet future government requirements, both the Lockheed Martin
Corporation and the Boeing Company are pursuing a Heavy Lift launch capability in a joint
venture, the United Launch Alliance (see Commercial Space Trend 4.2). In 2004 Boeing
tested the Delta-4 Heavy, which, despite some difficulties, is expected to provide lift capacity
for 13,130 kilograms into GEO.31 Lockheed’s Atlas-5 Heavy is described as “available 30
months from order,” but there are no specific launch plans.32 As of November 2007 there were
19 successful EELV launches.33
The growing dependence of the US upon space systems to support military operations has
raised concerns about the vulnerability of these assets. As early as 2001 the Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization
warned that US dependence on space systems made it uniquely vulnerable to a “space Pearl
Harbor” and recommended that the US develop enhanced space control capabilities (see
Space Systems Protection and Space Systems Negation).34
Figure 5.2: US military space launches (1957-2007)35
Russia
Russia maintains the second largest fleet of military satellites, but their capabilities remain
focused primarily on providing strategic support. Its current early warning, optical
reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and SIGINT systems were developed during
the Cold War, and between 70 and 80 percent of Russian spacecraft have now exceeded their
designed lifespan.36 Some of Russia’s more critical systems have, however, been maintained
and are currently being upgraded. In 2006, the first year of a 10-year federal space program,
Russia increased its military space budget by as much as one-third over that for 2005,
following a decade of severe budget cutbacks.37 Despite the recent growth in Russia’s
spending, capabilities will only gradually increase because there are significant investments
required to upgrade virtually all parts of its military space systems.
117
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations
SATCOM
Russia maintains several communications systems, most of which are dual-use. The Raduga
constellation of three satellites, promoted as a general purpose system, is reported to have
secure military communications channels.38 The Geizer system is designed to deploy four
GEO satellites as a communications relay system for Russian remote sensing and
communications satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), but currently has only one operational
satellite in orbit.39 The Strela-3 military communications system was deployed in the late
1980s and more recently has been paired with commercial Gonets satellites in the same LEO
orbits, potentially augmenting the military satellite system.40 There are indications that
maintenance of the Strela and Raduga systems will remain a priority for Russia.41 Molniya-1
and -3 satellites are in Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO) and serve as relay satellites for both
military and civilian use. They are being replaced by the Meridian satellite system over the
course of the next few years.42
Earth Observation/Early Warning
The USSR launched its first early warning Oko satellite in 1972 and by 1982 had deployed a
full system of four satellites in HEO to warn of the launch of US land-based ballistic
missiles.43 By the end of the 1990s this system had been replaced by two satellites in HEO
and one in GEO, which provide less reliable coverage of US ballistic missile fields, especially
since one ceased to operate.44 In 1991 Russia began launching US-KMO, a next-generation
early warning satellite system, using a mixture of GEO and HEO satellites. While six satellites
were in orbit by April 2003, the US-KMO system has been plagued with malfunctions and
only one of these satellites is operational today.45 A new system is being planned for 2009.46
Plans have also been announced to restore the space-based component of its missile attack
warning system (MAWS), for which funding has been increased.47
The USSR began using optical reconnaissance satellites in 1962 and by the 1980s it was
electronically transmitting images while still maintaining a film-based system of
photoreconnaissance.48 Russia’s optical remote sensing capabilities have declined since the
Cold War. The three Russian photo electronic reconnaissance systems used today are the
Kobalt, Arkon, and Orlets/Don systems, which in 2006, 2002, and 2006 respectively received
new satellites, but with lifespans of only 60-120 days. In 2005 Russia announced plans for a
constellation of high-resolution space radars in the next few years, using Arkon-2 and
Kondor-E satellites. The Arkon-2 satellite will provide photos with a resolution of up to one
meter while the Kondor-E satellite will have multirole radar that provides high-resolution
images along two 500-kilometer sectors to the left and right of its orbit.49 The current status
of the program is unclear. Russia maintains two SIGINT satellite systems, neither of which is
fully operational. US-PU/EORSAT is dedicated to detecting electronic signals from surface
ships, while Tselina is used for more general signals intelligence purposes.
Navigation
The first Soviet navigational system is thought to have been the Tsyklon system deployed in
1968. Tsyklon was followed by the Parus military navigation system, deployed in 1974 and
still operating, with an accuracy of about 100 meters.50 Currently, however, this constellation
provides more services to the civilian than the military sector. The USSR began development
of its second major navigation system, GLONASS, in 1982. Unlike Tsyklon and Parus,
GLONASS can provide altitude as well as longitude and latitude information by using a
minimum constellation of 24 satellites at a 19,100-kilometer orbit.51 With a full constellation,
the navigational system is supposed to have resolution comparable to that of the GPS.52 By
December 2007 there were between 18 GLONASS satellites in orbit, approximately 14 of
which were in operation (see Civil Space and Global Utilities Trend 3.4).53
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Launch
As noted in Figure 5.3, Russia has tended to maintain an average annual satellite launch rate
slightly higher than that of the US. This has not been sufficient, however, to keep its military
space systems fully operational since Russian satellites have much shorter lifespans and require
more frequent replacements. Forced to prioritize, Russia has focused first on its early warning
systems, and more recently has moved to complete the GLONASS navigation system.54 In
2004 Russia stated that it would focus on “maintaining and protecting” its fleet of satellites
and developing satellites with post-Soviet era technology.55
Figure 5.3: USSR/Russia military space launches (1957-2006)56
2007 Development
US focus on major upgrades to critical systems, but some progress more than others
The US remained the world leader in both the number of military space launches and the
development of military space capabilities in 2007, but its systems are beginning to age and
require significant upgrades. The USAF has indicated that it will need $100-billion to
purchase satellites and aircraft in the next five years alone, and will have to replace all of its
satellites within the next decade as most are nearing the end of their lifespans.57 Although
some major program upgrades progressed in 2007, budget cuts and delays continued to affect
others.
SATCOM
Launch of next-generation military communications systems was a major US focus in 2007
as the existing DSCS and Milstar program are aging and higher capabilities are required to
meet current military demands for speed, bandwidth, and security. Although the Wideband
Global SATCOM (WGS) program is several years behind schedule, the first of five satellites
was launched on 10 October 2007. Once operational in 2008 it will be the US DOD’s highest
capacity communications satellite, providing more bandwidth than the entire DSCS system,
but with fewer protection capabilities.58 The complete system is valued at $1.8-billion.
Negotiations are ongoing with US allies to participate in the program and contribute to its
funding.59 In 2007 Australia agreed to bear the costs for the fifth satellite.60 Funding for the
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Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program was reduced in the budget
request by $20-million to $700-million. The authorization bill for FY2008 added
$125-million, however, for procurement of a fourth satellite, reflecting continuing “concerns
about a potential gap in protected communications.”61 Intended to replace Milstar until
TSAT is operational, the program has suffered from delays as well as a 20 percent cost increase,
but is now on track for a first spacecraft launch in 2008.62 The Milstar system, which has been
operating for four decades, was successfully reconfigured on-orbit to maximize the output of
its communications system.63
TSAT remained a priority in 2007 despite setbacks. The program, which is intended to
provide 100 times more bandwidth than the current Milstar system, only has funding until
2013, but launch of the first satellite has been pushed back once again from 2014 to 2019 or
2020.64 Funding levels have also been scaled down: the FY2008 budget request for the TSAT
program was $964-million, or half of what was projected two years ago.65 Nonetheless, the
program continues to be a priority, and funding has steadily increased, by 43 percent in
FY2007 and another 30 percent in FY2008.66 Its total procurement cost is estimated at
$25-billion.
Early Warning
The 23rd and final US DSP satellite was launched into GEO on 10 November 2007 onboard
a Delta-4 Heavy launch vehicle.67 The DSP satellites are the mainstay of the US space-based
missile early-warning system and have been in operation since November 1970. As the service
life of the remaining DSP satellites comes to an end, DSP function will be shifted to the
USAF’s next-generation SBIRS. The SBIRS system is currently planned to include three
satellites in GEO and two sensor payloads piggybacking on classified reconnaissance satellites
in HEO. However, the constellation is not expected to provide global coverage without a
fourth GEO satellite.68 Although launch of the first SBIRS GEO satellite was planned for
2007, design failure caused change requirements of $1-billion and forced a launch delay of
one year.69 Overall, the SBIRS program is estimated to cost $11-billion and is seven years
behind schedule. The program received almost $1-billion in FY200870 (see Space Systems
Protection Trend 6.1).
Congressional support faltered in 2007 for the Alternative Infrared Satellite System, renamed
Third Generation Infrared Surveillance Program (3GIRS), which approved only
$75.9-million of the USAF’s $230.887-million request for FY2008. Once viewed as a
potential replacement for SBIRS, the program is now articulated as a next-next-generation
system (see Space System Protection Trend 6.1).
Earth Observation
The National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program completed
a restructuring process in 2007 following significant delays and cost overruns, particularly due
to issues with sensor development. A program review was conducted by the DOD, NASA,
and the Department of Commerce, which have jointly invested in the program.71 The new
plan for the project decreased its complexity, increased its cost to $12.5-billion, and delayed
launch of the first two satellites by three to five years.72 The NPOESS is a next-generation
low-earth orbiting satellite system that will monitor the Earth’s weather, atmosphere, oceans,
land, and near-space environment for both civil and military users. Several technologies for
the system underwent testing in 2007, but the first satellite is not expected to be launched
until 2013.73 The NPOESS Preparatory Project, consisting of one satellite being built by Ball
Aerospace, constitutes a risk reduction platform for the NPOESS mission, by providing data
continuity between the Earth Observing System Terra and Aqua missions and NPOESS.
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Navigation
The most recent phase of modernization for the GPS neared completion in 2007 with delivery
of the eighth and final 2R block satellite to the USAF and launch of the fourth and fifth 2R-M
satellites on 7 and 20 December 2007. The constellation currently consists of five 2R-M
satellites and 12 original 2R satellites in a 30-satellite constellation.74 The 2R-M satellites
feature modernized antenna panels, which give increased signal power to receivers on the
ground.75 A critical review of the next modernization process, GPS 3, was completed in 2007.
It will provide improved navigation and timing accuracy and be less vulnerable to jamming.76
GPS 3 was authorized to receive $487.2-million for FY2008, a $100-million cut from the
budget request that reflects concern for challenges between the development and acquisition
plans77 To address reliability concerns for commercial users of the GPS system, President Bush
announced his decision to eliminate the degradation capability, known as Selective Availability
(SA), from the new GPS 3 line of satellites. This additional step was taken to assure users of
GPS availability after the 2000 announcement by the US that it would not intentionally
degrade its signal through its SA ability.78
Launch
The US DOD opened the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office on 21 May 2007,
as mandated in the FY2007 Authorization Act and as part of an acquisition plan for ORS.79
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the ORS Office continued to
examine the utility of microsatellites for the US military in 2007, following the success of the
TacSat mini-satellite program.80 The TacSat-2 microsatellite launched on 16 December 2006
ceased operations on 21 December 2007. In its one year of operational life it demonstrated
rapid development and deployment of a spacecraft suitable for tactical use, collecting tactically
relevant imagery and signals intelligence data, among other things. The longevity of the
satellite has boosted plans to further develop the ORS concept.81 The TacSat-3 spacecraft bus
was delivered to the USAF in September 2007. The program is designed to meet the demands
of the US forces for flexible, affordable, and responsive satellite systems. The critical design
and review, integration, and delivery for TacSat-3 were completed in less than 24 months.82
See also Space Systems Protection Trend 6.4.
2007 Development
US continues to face setbacks on remote sensing projects
Reports emerged in 2007 that the NRO’s classified Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)
program had been cancelled in 2005 at a loss of at least $4-billion in what has been called “the
most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50-year history of American spy satellite
projects.”83 Adding to troubles faced by the NRO, sources also revealed that the Misty Stealth
Reconnaissance Imaging program had been cancelled due to costs, schedule delays, and poor
performance.84 The NRO is now reportedly working on a new multibillion-dollar spy satellite
program called BASIC, planned to begin operations by 2011.85 The NRO suffered another
loss when it declared that the experimental spy satellite NROL-21 (US-193) launched late in
2006 failed in orbit. The satellite had not been in communication since reaching its position
in LEO. It was reportedly designed to “demonstrate a new and unique blend of optical and
radar imaging capabilities.”86 The NRO lost hundreds of millions of dollars on the satellite.87
Another classified satellite referred to as NROL-24 (USA-198) was launched on 10 December
2007 and is thought to be a Satellite Data System imagery data relay satellite.88 These events
leave US military reconnaissance capabilities largely based on outdated systems. While there
is not a gap in coverage, “the constellation is fragile.”89
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In a related development, the USAF Space Radar program (previously known as Space Based
Radar) also showed signs of trouble in 2007. Intended to provide all-weather intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance using high-resolution imagery and ground movement
identification, its lifecycle cost is estimated at between 20 and 25 billion dollars.90 Classified
funds were requested for the program for the FY2008 budget, which was approved in the
authorization bill. Congress expressed concern about the overall approach of the program as
well as its track record, however, and ordered an analysis of alternatives and a plan for
expenditure of 2008 funds, authorizing only $40-million in spending until the plan has been
reviewed.91
In the meantime, the US continues to use commercial imagery data to meet some of its data
needs, as directed under the 2003 US Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy. The first of
two commercial WorldView satellites being developed by DigitalGlobe, the only commercial
remote sensing satellite to provide up to 0.5-meter resolution, was launched on 20 September
2007. It is part of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA’s) Next View Program,
to ensure accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security. It was partially
financed by the NGA, which contributed $500-million to secure imagery for specific DOD
high-resolution needs.92
2007 Development
Russia continues to invest in military programs to maintain its space-based capabilities,
with focus on revitalizing GLONASS
In 2007 Russia reconsidered its space strategy to pursue satellites with longer service lives.
With its constantly aging fleet of a large number of Soviet-era satellites that have lifespans of
five to six years, Russia is aiming to produce multipurpose, new-generation communications
satellites with possible service lives of seven to 10 years. The new GLONASS K satellites being
developed are expected to have service lives of up to 12 years.93 Although Russia has
historically launched more military satellites than the US, this higher frequency has not
translated into greater capabilities because of the high replacement rate. Russia plans to spend
over $200-billion on defense over the next decade and has a 10-year space budget of
$10.5-billion — which is still less than what the US spends every year on space.94
Navigation
Completing the GLONASS satellite navigation system is the highest priority for Russia and
negotiations are underway with the US and the Europe to fully integrate GLONASS with the
GPS and Galileo systems.95 Six GLONASS satellites were launched on 26 October and 25
December 2007, bringing the current constellation to 18, of which 14 are believed
operational. According to Russian media sources, 20 GLONASS satellites are needed to
provide complete coverage of Russia, and 24 for global coverage.96 The budget for GLONASS
has been increased significantly in order to complete the project originally begun during the
Cold War: $380-million in federal funding was allocated in 2007, up from $181-million in
2006.97 Nonetheless, fears were expressed that the system will not be completed before
2010-2011 and that ongoing problems with the ground segment may hamper its success.98
Moreover, 12 of the current satellites are older models nearing the end of their lifespans; their
loss could also affect the future success of the program.99 The inadequacies of the GLONASS
system are also becoming more apparent. Not only is it inaccurate, providing at best positional
accuracy of 10-17 meters, but it is also unstable, sometimes providing no reading at all.100
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Communications and Intelligence
Russia also launched a small number of communications, remote sensing, early warning, and
intelligence satellites in 2007. The Raduga 1-8 (or 1M) communications relay satellite was
launched on 9 December 2007 as part of Russia’s secure system for military communications,
joining Raduga 1-5 and Raduga 1-7.101 Cosmos-2427, a Kobalt-M military optical remote
sensing satellite for imaging, was launched in June. Designed to deliver a returnable film
capsule, it is the third of its type launched since 2004.102 The satellite re-entered in August
2007 after completing its mission, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense — the typical
lifespan of these satellites is 60 days.103 Meanwhile, launch of a new Persona optical remote
sensing satellite was delayed to 2008.104
Early warning
On 23 October 2007 Cosmos-2430 satellite was launched — it is a first-generation US-KS
(Oko) early warning satellite.105 The launch did not serve to increase the capabilities of the
system, which still does not provide 24-hour coverage of the US, because the Cosmos-2393
US-KS satellite launched in 2004 appears to have ended operations. The space-based portion
of Russia’s early warning system thus remains at just three satellites.106 However, there are
reports that Russia has commenced work on a new system, EKS (the Integrated Space
System), and that tests for the program will begin in two years.107 Russian early warning
capabilities are also being upgraded with a new radar station at Armavir, which was scheduled
to be ready for combat service by late 2007 but does not appear to be operating yet.108 This
radar is similar to the Voronezh-DM radar, which became combat-ready last year. Russia leases
out many of its radar facilities.109
Launch
To maintain its high rate of military launches, Russia announced plans to build a launch
facility for military and civilian satellites in the eastern Amur region of the country, near the
border with China. The station is expected to begin operations is 2015.110
2007 Space Security Impact
The US is slowly progressing with modernization of its space systems. The focus is on meeting
the bandwidth and secure communications needs of today’s military and preventing gaps in
next-generation capabilities, both of which are elements of secure and sustainable use of space.
Troubles faced by the NRO, however, demonstrate weaknesses in its abilities to manage
complex projects, research and development, and acquisitions, which may continue to hinder
major system upgrades. Continued dependence on space assets increases US vulnerability in
space, and it is not yet clear if efforts to protect those assets in the future will contribute to or
detract from the security of outer space. The Russian focus on revitalizing GLONASS and its
aging satellite fleet could also be positive for space security by providing redundancy for the
US GPS, more reliable and secure early warning capabilities, and more secure satellite
communications.
Trend 5.2: More actors developing military space capabilities
By the end of 2004 the US and USSR/Russia had together launched more than 2,000 military
satellites, while the rest of the world had only launched between 40 and 50.111 The UK,
NATO, and China were the only other actors to launch dedicated military satellites until
1988, when Israel launched its first. In 1995 France and Chile both launched dedicated
military satellites.112 Traditionally, military satellites outside of the US and Russia have been
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almost exclusively intended for telecommunications and reconnaissance. Recently, however,
states such as China, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Spain have been developing satellites
with a wider range of SIGINT, navigation, and early warning functions.
During the Cold War, states allied with either the US or the USSR benefited from their
capabilities. Today, declining costs for space access and the proliferation of space technology
enable more states to develop and deploy military satellites, usually relying on the launch
capabilities and manufacturing services of others states or the commercial sector. Nonetheless,
in the absence of their own dedicated military satellites, many actors rely on dual-use satellites,
acquire existing satellites from others, or purchase data and services from satellite operators.113
Figure 5.4: Minimum resolutions for remote sensing target identification114
Europe
European states have developed a range of space systems to support military operations, with
France having the most advanced and diversified independent military space capabilities.
Traditionally, European states have not had separate military and civil space budgets.
European military space spending has recently been estimated at $1.35-billion.115
While European states have pursued independent space capabilities for military support,
many of these systems are also shared, in particular Earth observation. The highly classified
Besoin Operationnel Commun (BOC) provides the framework for space systems cooperation
between the ministries of defense of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Greece.116
France’s Helios-1 and -2 military observation satellites in LEO are included under this
agreement. The French Ministry of Defense procurement agency (DGA) manages the
program, retaining direct control over the management of the ground segment while
delegating the space segment responsibility to the French space agency, the Centre National
d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES).117 Germany’s first dedicated military satellite, Sar-Lupe-1
launched in 2006, is also part of this agreement. It is the first of five all-weather synthetic
aperture radar (SAR) high-resolution remote sensing satellites and will be joined by Italy’s
planned system of four Cosmo radar satellites, which are to be integrated with France’s
Pleiades high-resolution dual-use optical remote sensing satellites (2008).118 In 2005 the UK
launched an imagery microsatellite TopSat, built by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.
There are also several dedicated and dual-use satellite communications systems in Europe. In
2006 France completed the Syracuse III next-generation communication system with the
launch of Syracuse-3B. The system has been described as “the cornerstone in a European
military Satcom system.”119 France also maintains the dual-use Telecomm-2 communications
satellite and the military Syracuse-2 system.120 The UK operates a constellation of three
dual-use Skynet-4 UHF and Super High Frequency (SHF) communications satellites in
Target on Detection General Precise Technical
the Ground Identification Identification Analysis
Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
Aircraft 4.5 1.5 1.0 0.045
Nuclear weapons components 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.015
Rockets and artillery 1.0 0.6 0.15 0.045
Command and control headquarters 3.0 1.5 1.0 0.09
Ports and harbors 30.0 15.0 6.0 0.3
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GEO, with next-generation Skynet-5 satellites to follow.121 Spain launched the dedicated
military communications satellite Spainsat in 2006 to provide X-band and Ka-band services
to the Ministry of Defense. Spain also owns the dual-use communications satellite
XTAR-EUR and the dual-use Hispasat system, which provides X-band communications to
the Spanish military. In 2006 Germany signed a procurement contract with MilSat Services
GmbH. The system, scheduled for operation in 2009, will provide the German Armed Forces
with a secure information network to assist its units on deployed missions.122 Italy’s Sicral
military satellite provides secure UHF, SHF, and EHF communications123 Syracuse, Skynet,
and Sicral all provide SHF capacity for NATO.
Other military space capabilities in Europe include France’s constellation of four SIGINT
satellites know as Essaim, launched in 2004. France also plans to launch two Spirale early
warning microsatellites for a probative research and technology demonstration program by
2008.
The EU has called for a more coherent approach to the development of space systems capable
of supporting military operations and has begun to actively develop dual-use systems. The
joint EU and European Space Agency (ESA) Global Monitoring for Environment and
Security (GMES) project will collate and disseminate data from satellite systems and is
anticipated to be operational by 2012. It will support activities prioritized in the European
Security and Defense Policy, such as natural disaster early warning, rapid damage assessment,
and surveillance and support to combat forces.124
The Galileo satellite navigation program, initiated in 1999 and jointly funded by the EU and
the ESA, will provide location, navigation, and timing capabilities.125 Although intended for
civilian use, there have been recent calls to use its dual-purpose capabilities for military
applications, but all EU/ESA members do not share this view.126 ESA, which has traditionally
been restricted to working on projects designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, has begun
to consider investing in dual-use, security-related research. Space surveillance, Earth
observation, and data-relay satellites have been identified as priorities.127 Moreover, potential
projects such as a global, European-coordinated space-surveillance system are being described
in dual-use terms, with reference to “multiple” end-users. Although end-users could
potentially use ESA-developed applications for military purposes, the ESA itself would not be
designing or operating military spacecraft.128
China
China does not maintain the same separation between civil and military space programs —
officially its space program is dedicated to science and exploration.129 Leadership of the space
program is provided by the Space Leading Group, whose members include three senior
officials of government bodies that oversee the defense industry in China.130 Although the
Chinese military’s role in the space program is unclear, the space program is certainly
governmental. Most of China’s satellites are civilian or commercial, but could be used for
military purposes given the nature of dual-use satellite technology.
China has advanced Earth observation capabilities. It began working on space imagery in the
mid-1960s, launching its first reconnaissance intelligence satellite in 1975.131 It successfully
launched 15 recoverable film-based satellites, the last of which was reportedly
decommissioned in 1996. Several of these satellites were also reported to carry “domestic and
foreign commercial microgravity and biomedical experiments.”132 Today China maintains
two ZY-2 series digital imagery satellites in LEO that could support tactical reconnaissance
and surveillance.133 In 2005 China launched the Beijing-1 (Tsingshua-1) microsatellite,
125
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations
which is a civil Earth observation spacecraft that combines a multispectral camera with a
high-resolution panchromatic imager and could also support the military.134 More recently,
in 2006 China launched the civilian SAR Remote Sensing Satellite-1 (Yaogan-1) for “scientific
experiment, survey of land resources, appraisal of crops and disaster prevention and
alleviation.”135 While some Western sources also give the satellite a military designation,
JianBing-5,136 there is currently no evidence to suggest that it is being used for military
purposes, although it certainly has a dual-use capability.
Western experts believe that Chinese military satellite communications are provided by the
DFH series satellite, officially known as ChinaSat-22. Officially a civilian communications
satellite, ChinaSat-22 is thought to enable “theater commanders to communicate with and
share data with all forces under joint command” through C-band and UHF systems.137 A
replacement satellite was launched in 2006.138 China also operates four Beidou regional
navigational satellites designed to augment the data received from the US GPS system and to
enable China to maintain navigational capability if the US were to deny GPS services in times
of conflict.139 Beidou may also improve the accuracy of China’s intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and cruise missiles140 It is scheduled to be operational in 2008. In 2006
China committed to building a global satellite navigation system, the Beidou-2 or “Compass”
system, expanding on the regional system. The planned global system will have five satellites
in GEO and 30 in MEO to provide positioning accuracy within 10 meters for military,
commercial, and civilian users. The cost of the system is not known.141
China experimented with electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites, called “technical
experimental satellites,” in the mid-1970s but these programs have since been discontinued.
It relies on modern air, sea, and land platforms, not satellites, to perform SIGINT missions;
however, in 2006 China launched two Shi Jian experimental satellites (SJ-6/2A and SJ-6/2B)
that some Western experts believe are providing signals intelligence (SIGINT), although their
official purpose is to measure the space environment.142
South Asia
India does not operate any dedicated military satellites, but it is undergoing a process of
greater military use of outer space and its space program is certainly governmental. It has one
of the oldest and largest space programs in the world, which has developed a range of
indigenous dual-use capabilities. Space launch has been the driving force behind the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO). It successfully launched its Satellite Launch Vehicle
(SLV) to LEO in 1980, followed by the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) in 1994,
the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 1994, and the Geostationary Satellite Launch
Vehicle (GSLV) in 2004.
During this time ISRO developed a series of civilian Indian Remote Sensing satellites and
currently maintains a constellation of six satellites that provide imagery for the Indian military.
Two in particular are suitable for reconnaissance with resolutions up to one meter —
Cartosat-2 and the Technology Experiment Satellite, which provides tactical and strategic
intelligence to the armed forces.143 India’s Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance System
was to be launched in 2007.144 It is intended to provide India with dedicated military satellite
intelligence, including military shutter control over key satellites, through the use of the
Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in New Delhi and a satellite
control facility in Bhopal. It would incorporate Cartosat-1 and -2, TES, as well as GLONASS.
Although behind schedule, India’s civilian Remote Imaging Satellite (Risat), will provide the
country’s first SAR remote sensing system capable of all-weather, day-and-night Earth
imaging.145 India’s military also uses images from Russian and Israeli satellite feeds.146
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India also has one of the most extensive domestic satellite communications networks in Asia,
with nine satellites currently in operation.147 Metsat-1 provides meteorological services from
GEO. India is also developing GAGAN, the Indian Satellite-Based Augmentation System for
US GPS (2009-2010), to be followed by the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
(IRNSS), which will provide an independent satellite navigation capability (see Civil Space
and Global Utilities Trend 3.4).148 Although these are civilian-developed and -controlled
technologies, they are used by the Indian military for their dual-purpose applications.149
Moreover, there are indications that India’s armed forces may develop a larger role in outer
space in the near future. India continues to plan the creation of a military Aerospace
Command, but its exact composition and function are still vague.150 And if the US-India
civilian nuclear cooperation deal is approved, sanctions will be removed that could allow for
greater cooperation between ISRO and the military (see Commercial Space Trend 4.3).151
Pakistan’s space-based capabilities are significantly less advanced than India’s. China launched
Pakistan’s Badar-1 multipurpose satellite in 1990; in 2001 Russia launched the Badar-2 Earth
observation satellite.152 Pakistan plans to construct the Remote Sensing Satellite System
(RSSS) to provide high-resolution satellite images to its military, but its status is unclear.153
While India and Pakistan seem intent on developing space systems to support military
operations, significant progress remains a longer-term objective.
East Asia
The commercial Superbird satellite system provides military communications for Japan,
which also has four “information gathering” remote sensing satellites — two optical and two
radar — that were launched in 2003 and 2007 following growing concerns over North Korean
missile launches.154 Officially called the Information Gathering Satellite series under the
control of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, IGS 3A and 3B provide images of up to
one-meter resolution to the Japanese military.155 Japan is primarily interested in monitoring
the Korean Peninsula, but the IGS system provides a scan of the entire planet at least once a
day.156 The Japanese Defense Agency also plans to construct a large-scale image
communications system intended to cover East Asia, parts of the Middle East, and Africa.157
In December 2003 South Korea announced its intentions to increasingly use space for military
purposes.158 South Korea operates the civilian Kompsat-1 satellite with 6.6-meters resolution,
which is “sufficient for [military] mapping although not for military intelligence
collection.”159 It also bought 10 Hawker 800 series satellites from the US, and has operated
them for signals intelligence since 1999.160 On 22 August 2006 Sea Launch launched South
Korea’s dual military/commercial Koreasat 5 (Mugunghwa 5) communications satellite to
replace Koreasat-2 by providing Ku band, C band, and military SHF band communications.
Jointly owned by the French Agency for Defense Development (DGA) and South Korea’s KT
Corp, it will provide secure communications for South Korea’s defense forces.161 South Korea
also launched the Kompsat-2 high-resolution Remote Sensing Satellite for Earth mapping in
2006.162 Although a civilian spacecraft, its one-meter resolution could allow it to serve as a
reconnaissance asset.163
In July 2004 Thailand signed a deal with the European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company (EADS) Astrium to provide its first Earth observation satellite, which is expected
to be used for intelligence and defense.164 Taiwan has also announced plans to launch a
$300-million reconnaissance satellite, but it continues to face delays. In the meantime, a
Taiwanese official stated that military and security authorities will have to increase their
reliance on images taken from their existing Formosa-2, with a resolution of 1.8 meters.165
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Middle East
Israel’s space program reflects an interest in exploiting space systems in support of terrestrial
military operations, including operational and tactical missions. Israel operates the dedicated
military Ofeq-5 system, which provides both panchromatic and color imagery at resolutions
of less than one meter for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes.166 It frequently passes
over Arab territory in the region. Its capabilities are augmented by the dual-use Eros-A and B
imagery satellites, the latter able to capture black-and-white images at 70-centimeter
resolution.167 Israel plans to launch a dedicated military satellite for secure communications
by 2010. In the meantime it uses commercial services provided by Israel’s Amos-1 and -2,
Tadiran Communications Wi-Max wireless broadband, and Motorola-Israel.168 In 2005 Israel
successfully tested the latest Shavit Space Launch Vehicle, intended to give Israel independent
launch capabilities.169
Iran launched its first satellite, the Sina-1, in 2005 with the support of a Russian launcher. It
has a resolution precision of approximately 50 meters.170 Although the satellite is intended to
collect data on ground and water resources and meteorological conditions, the head of Iran’s
space program said that it is capable of spying on Israel.171 However, its poor resolution means
that it is not very useful for military purposes. Iran also has a nascent space launch vehicle
program, which some speculate is linked to its development of intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles and the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5.172
Australia
Until recently the Australian defense forces used X-band facilities on satellites owned by the
US and other allies.173 In 2003, however, Australia launched the Defence C1 communications
satellite. The satellite will be part of a new Australian Defence Satellite Communications
Capability system, which will provide the country’s defense forces with communications
across Australia and throughout the Asia Pacific region in the X, Ka, and UHF radio frequency
bands.174
Canada
Canada does not yet have a dedicated military satellite program, but uses commercial satellite
communication, surveillance, and imaging services.175 In June 2005, however, Canada’s
Department of National Defence announced the creation of Project Polar Epsilon, a
$52.1-million joint space-based wide area surveillance and support capability that will provide
all-weather, day/night observation of Canada’s Arctic region and ocean approaches.176 The
project will link to information from RADARSAT and other sources to produce high quality
imagery for military and other applications.177 Canada will also have its first access to
dedicated military satellite communications when the US AEHF satellite system becomes
operational (2010).178 A low-cost ($27-million) Joint Space Support Project (JSSP) is
intended to provide surveillance information for commanders in the field via direct in-theatre
download of space imagery provided by commercial satellites such as Radarsat-2, and also
provide space situational awareness data gathered by the US Space Surveillance Network.179
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Figure 5.5: States’ first dedicated military satellites and their function180
Military satellite-owning state
Satellite-owning state
Year State/Actor Satellite Description
1958 US Project SCORE Communications and experimental satellite
1962 USSR Cosmos-4 Remote sensing (optical)
1969 UK Skynet-1A Communications
1970 NATO NATO-1 Communications
1975 China FSW-0 No. 1 Remote sensing (optical)
1988 Israel Ofeq-1 Remote sensing (optical)
1995 Francec181 Helios-1A Remote sensing (optical)
1995 Chile Fasat-Alfa Communications and remote sensing (optical)
1998 Thailand TMSAT Communications
2001 Italy Sicral Communications
2003 Australia Optus and Defence-1 Communications
2003 Japan IGS-1A and IGS-1B Remote sensing (optical)
2006 Spain Spainsat Communications
2006 Germany SARLupe-1 Remote sensing (radar)
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* Note that other states have civil or commercial satellites that may be used for military purposes,
as described in this chapter.
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Figure 5.6: Dedicated military satellites launched in 2007
2007 Development
Europe developing a range of integrated military capabilities, both dedicated and dual-use
European states launched a range of communications, imaging, and intelligence capabilities
to support terrestrial military operations in 2007, and the prospect of a European satellite
navigation system solidified. The new European Space Policy, released in May 2007 and
adopted by both the European Commission and the ESA, makes specific reference to defense
and security applications, indicating a shifting focus to support increasing synergies between
military and civil space programs.182
Communications
The Ariane-5 launched the UK’s Skynet-5A and -5B military communications satellites on 11
October and 9 November 2007. Skynet-5 is a next-generation, three-satellite system to
provide high-speed secure communications to the British forces.183 Both of these X-band
spacecraft were brought online later in the year. Unlike a traditional military communications
system, Skynet 5 is the result of a public-private partnership between the British Ministry of
Defence and Paradigm Secure Communications, which operates the satellites and provides the
necessary services.184 The UK has priority of use, with excess capacity available for sale to
NATO and other UK allies. In 2007 Germany continued to develop its first military secure
communications system, Satcom BW, which is scheduled for launch in 2008. This
geostationary multimissions system will be fitted with payloads including super high
frequency, ultra high frequency, and Ku-band transponders. Services are expected by early
2009, with an operational lifetime of 15 years.185
Earth Observation
Earth imaging was a major European focus in 2007. The second German SAR-Lupe synthetic
aperture radar satellite was launched on 2 July 2007, followed by the third on 1 November
2007. The remaining two satellites of this dedicated military system are scheduled for launch
in 2008. The system allows Earth imaging data to be gathered under any weather, light, or
terrain conditions.186 It is part of the highly classified Besoin Opérationnel Commun (BOC),
which provides the framework for space systems cooperation between the ministries of defense
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Greece.187 There is a proposal to formalize this
agreement into the Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Observation (Musis), which could be operational by 2015.188 Italy’s
Cosmo-SkyMed X Band radar satellite system is also part of this agreement. The first two
satellites were placed into orbit on 8 June and 9 December 2007. The system is dual-use,
funded by both the Italian Ministry of Research and Ministry of Defence, and implemented
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by the Italian Space Agency.189 It is intended to monitor and survey the globe to manage
environmental risks, national security, and scientific and commercial use.190 It provides
high-resolution, X band, synthetic aperture radar capabilities that could be integrated with
France’s Pleiades optical system, now delayed until 2010.191
In September 2007 it was announced that Arianespace had been selected to launch the four
Elisa demonstrator satellites together with the first Pleiades satellite. The demonstrator project
is sponsored by the French defense procurement agency (DGA) to prepare the ground for the
future ROEM (Renseignement d’Origine ElectroMagnétique) electromagnetic
reconnaissance program. Its purpose is to keep databases for electronic warfare up-to-date, and
to detect and monitor activities during operations.192
Navigation
Europe’s efforts to build an independent space-based navigation system, a fully-funded
EU-ESA program begun in 1999 called Galileo, almost faltered in 2007, but solidified at the
end of the year. Galileo is a program of the European Commission of the EU in partnership
with the ESA, which is responsible for implementing the technical aspects. After significant
delays and the failure of a public-private consortium to build and operate the system,
European governments agreed in 2007 to provide the necessary $5-billion to continue work
on the 30-satellite space navigation system. EU budget ministers agreed to fill a €2.4-billion
hole entirely with money from the EU 2007 and 2008 budgets.193 Originally scheduled to
become operational in 2008, the program is now scheduled for completion in 2013; over
$1.5-billion has already been spent on the program.194 At the end of 2007 only one
experimental satellite, built by Surrey Satellite Technology Systems, was in orbit but a second
is expected to be launched in 2008. Galileo is highlighted as a priority in the European Space
Policy; although intended for civilian and commercial purposes, it would be a potential area
for synergies with military users.
2007 Development
China investing to achieve self-reliance in space
China’s announcement to replace all of its communications and broadcast satellites with
indigenous models by 2010 is indicative of its efforts to achieve self-reliance in space,195 which
appears to be driven through the development of advanced dual-use capabilities. Reports
emerged in 2007 that China is developing 15 different types of satellites, including Earth
observation, intelligence, signals intelligence, small, and micro,196 all of which would have
dual-use capabilities.
China launched the Compass-M1 test satellite into MEO in April 2007. It is intended for
system in-orbit validation and to secure the frequency filings for the Compass regional
navigation system following launch of a Beidou Test System satellite into GEO on 2 February
2007.197 The Beidou Test System for China’s satellite navigation plans is currently active and
provides service to navigation terminals in China. Unlike other navigation systems, Beidou is
composed of four satellites in GEO. The Compass system is intended to build on the Beidou
Test System, first by providing regional service either in 2008 or 2009. Plans for a global
system of 30 satellites in MEO and five in GEO are currently conceptual, but entail 24-hour
all-weather coverage to provide precise time and orbit information on L-band frequencies.
Although Compass falls under China’s defense ministry, it is intended to provide both an
Open Service with position accuracy of 20 meters and an Authorized Service that will be
“highly reliable even in complex situations.”198 Concerns have been expressed that Compass
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will use the same radio frequencies as Galileo and possibly GPS (see Space Environment Trend
1.4); however, China maintains that this is still under negotiation. Some analysts have
suggested that using the same radio frequencies would make it more difficult for the Compass
system to be jammed.199
China also launched Yaogan-3 (Remote Sensing Satellite-3) on 11 November 2007. A civilian
satellite intended to monitor Earth resources, estimate crop yields, and assist with natural
disasters, this SAR satellite is also described by some unsourced Western reports as having a
military designation, Jian Bing-6, and as funded by the People’s Liberation Army.200 SAR
provides a wide range of powerful civilian and military applications. Like other SAR satellites
launched in 2007, including Italy’s Cosmo-SkyMed and Canada’s Radarsat-2, it is possible
that Yaogan-3 will be used for both civilian and military purposes. Yaogan-3 and an optical
imaging satellite, Yaogan-2, were both launched secretly and little information has been
provided on their uses, aside from the generic description of China’s remote sensing
program.201
China also launched the civilian China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS-2B)
developed with Brazil. Unlike previous satellites launched through this partnership, the
CBERS-2B carries a high-resolution camera capable of providing black-and-white images
with a resolution of 2.5 meters, which could support some military applications.202 Brazil has
plans to boost its military spending by over 50 percent in 2008. The amount is pegged at
$5-billion; however, it is unclear how much of it will be directed to military space
infrastructure. Brazil has pointed out that it plans to overhaul all areas of its armed forces.203
Its space activities are under the authority of the Brazilian Air Force.
2007 Development
Focus on remote sensing capabilities in the Middle East and Asia
On 11 June 2007 Israel launched the military optical remote sensing Ofeq-7 satellite, which
became operational later that year. Ofeq-7 is the most advanced Earth imaging satellite
launched from the Middle East, and significantly increases Israel’s reconnaissance capabilities
in the region. Its digital high-resolution camera can identify objects as small as approximately
0.5 meter.204 The lifespan of the satellite is expected to be four to six years.205 This enhanced
optical imaging capability is expected to be complemented by the launch of Israel’s TecSat
(Polaris) SAR imaging satellite by ISRO in early 2008. The classified satellite encountered
technical difficulties in 2007, pushing back its launch date.206 It is anticipated that its SAR
technology will be capable of providing sharp pictures of sub-meter resolution, in all-day,
all-weather, all-terrain conditions. Choosing India’s launch service is thought to demonstrate
a new era of significant military space cooperation between Israel and India.207
As competition for military space dominance increases in the Middle East, the Israeli Ministry
of Defense is also developing the Ofeq-8 and the Ofeq-Next satellites. As well, in 2007 Israel
signed a deal with state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) to develop the next-generation
Amos-4 communications satellite, which will be available to commercial customers as well as
Israeli political-military users. However, the satellite is not expected to be operational until
2012.208
Egypt’s civilian Egyptsat-1 microsatellite, jointly built by Egypt’s National Authority for
Remote Sensing and Space Sciences and the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Ukraine, was
launched onboard a Dnepr-1 launch vehicle on 17 April 2007. Weighing just 100 kilograms,
it has an infrared imaging sensor and a high-resolution multispectral imager to transmit
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black-and-white, color, and infrared images. It is intended to support construction,
cultivation, and to fight desertification (see Civil Space and Global Utilities Trend 3.2).209
Egypt has not released public details about the resolution or clarity of the images it provides.
An Israeli source has made an unconfirmed claim that it can detect objects as small as 4 meters
and accuses it of gathering intelligence on Middle Eastern countries.210 Whatever the case, the
use of outer space resources appears to be affecting perceptions of terrestrial security in the
Middle East.
After several years of anticipation, Turkey awarded a $250-million contract for its first military
optical reconnaissance satellite GOKTURK in 2007. It is intended to have an 80-centimeter
resolution, and the launch is planned for 2011.211
Japan successfully launched a fourth Earth observation satellite of the Information Gathering
Satellites (IGS) program on 24 February 2007, along with an experimental optical satellite.
The program is under the control of a special Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office of the
Cabinet Secretariat, rather than the Ministry of Defense, and provides intelligence support to
the government.212 The launch completed Japan’s four-satellite constellation, giving it an
all-weather, daily, global observation capability based on two optical and two radar satellites
with up to one-meter resolution.213 However, this capability was diminished when one of the
satellites, launched in 2003, failed in orbit in March 2007.214 Moreover, there are concerns
that despite the size of the program, higher-quality images can be obtained from the US, or
even commercial sources.
India’s Cartosat-2A was planned for launch in 2007, but delayed until 2008 for technical
reasons. The original satellite Cartosat-2 was launched on 10 January 2007, but suffered
problems once in orbit that affected the quality of its images.215 Cartosat-2A, intended for
cartographic purposes, was built and will be operated by ISRO, but has dual-use military
applications. Secretary of the Department of Space and Chairman of ISRO, G Madhavan
Nair has explained that “[[w]e don’t put a restriction on anybody using it,”216 confirming
beliefs that India’s civil space program is available for military use. Indeed, earlier reports
indicated that the Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance System to provide India with
dedicated military satellite intelligence was to become operational by the end of 2007, but its
current status is not clear.217 Cartosat-2A, like the original satellite, will carry a powerful
panoramic camera and is intended to provide images with a resolution of one meter.218
Plans for the establishment of the much talked about Indian Aerospace Command (as part of
the Indian Air Force) were again announced by the Indian Air Chief Marshal in 2007.219
However, instead of a fully fledged aerospace command, a space cell has been established
under the Air Vice Marshal,220 and a dialogue on the shape of the eventual aerospace
command is expected to take place between the three branches of the Indian armed forces. A
core group of people has also begun training to staff the future command. These developments
occurred in the wake of reported revisions to India’s defense doctrine to support the use of
space to enhance the functional effectiveness of its armed forces (Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
Trend 2.4).
Finally, India signed an agreement with Russia in January 2007 to jointly use the GLONASS
global navigation system, which supports both military and civilian users.221
A plan to replace and upgrade Taiwan’s civilian-classified Formosat-2 optical remote sensing
satellite was blocked, at least temporarily, when a classified budget for an optro-electronic
remote sensing satellite was cancelled in January 2007. Formosat-2 is anticipated to stop
operating by 2009. Although a civilian satellite, it is suspected of providing support to Taiwan’s
COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-006A 3/8/07 Atlas V 401 ASTRO (orbital US US Technology Boeing LEO
express)
2007-003A 2/3/07 Chang Zheng 3A Beidou 4 China China Navigation CAST GEO
2007-011A 4/14/07 Chang Zheng 3A Beidou 5 China China Navigation CAST MEO
2007-030A 7/2/07 Soyuz SAR-Lupe 2 Russia Germany Remote sensing OHB SSO
(Radar)
2007-053A 11/1/07 Kosmos-11K65M SAR-Lupe 3 Russia Germany Remote sensing OHB SSO
(Radar)
2007-025A 6/11/07 Shavit 1 ‘Ofeq-7 Israel Israel Remote sensing IAI LEO
(Optical)
2007-005A 2/24/07 H-IIA 2024 IGS 4A Japan Japan Remote sensing MELCO SSO
(Optical)
2007-005B 2/24/07 H-IIA 2024 IGS 4B Japan Japan Remote sensing MELCO SSO
(Radar)
2007-022A 6/7/07 Soyuz-U Kosmos-2427 Russia Russia Remote sensing Arsenal LEO
(Optical)
2007-029A 6/29/07 Zenit-2M Kosmos-2428 Russia Russia Signals KBYu LEO
intelligence
2007-038A 9/11/07 Kosmos-11K65M Kosmos-2429 Russia Russia Navigation, Polyot LEO
data relay
2007-049A 10/23/07 Molniya 8K78M Kosmos-2430 Russia Russia Early warning Lavochkin HEO
2007-052A 10/26/07 Proton-K/DM-2 Kosmos-2431 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-052B 10/26/07 Proton-K/DM-2 Kosmos-2432 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-052C 10/26/07 Proton-K/DM-2 Kosmos-2433 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-058A 12/9/07 Proton-M/Briz-M Kosmos-2434 Russia Russia Communication NPO PM GEO
2007-065A 12/25/07 Proton-M/DM-2 Kosmos-2435 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-065B 12/25/07 Proton-M/DM-2 Kosmos-2436 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-065C 12/25/07 Proton-M/DM-2 Kosmos-2437 Russia Russia Navigation Polyot MEO
2007-007B 3/11/07 Ariane 5ECA Skynet 5A France UK Communication Astrium GEO
2007-056C 11/14/07 Ariane 5ECA Skynet 5B France UK Communication Astrium GEO
2007-006 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 MEPSI Picosat US US Technology AFRL LEO
2007-006B 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 Midstar 1 US US Technology USNA LEO
2007-006C 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 Nextsat US US Technology Boeing LEO
(orbital express)
2007-006D 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 STPSat-1 US US Technology AertoAstro LEO
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military, and the budget for the upgraded spacecraft was part of a secret budget for Taiwan’s
National Security Bureau.222 Formosat-2 has a resolution of 1.8 meters.
Figure 5.7: Dedicated military payloads launched in 2007
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2007 Development
Canada to use dual-use satellites to monitor the Arctic, develop military support capabilities
Canada’s Radarsat-2 was launched on 14 December 2007 aboard a Russian Soyuz launch
vehicle.223 Although a commercial satellite providing 3-meter, all-weather, all-day, all-terrain
satellite images, it was primarily financed by the Canadian Space Agency, and includes an
experimental Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI) mode known as Moving Object
Detection Experiment (MODEx). This mode will support experiments and demonstrations
on the use of space based synthetic aperture radar for detecting, measuring and monitoring
vehicles. This mode is wholly owned and funded by Defence Research and Development
Canada (DRDC), however it is expected to provide an important tool for both military and
civil users.224 Germany’s commercial TerraSar-X and Italy’s Cosmos-SkyMed-1, both
launched in 2007, include similar technology experiments. The Canadian government has
declared that Radarsat-2 will help assert its sovereignty over the Arctic by providing enhanced
land and sea surveillance capabilities for the Canadian Forces.225
In a related project, the Canadian Department of National Defence is moving forward with
project Polar Epsilon, expected to reach initial operating capacity on the country’s west coast
by 2010. It is a $52.1-million joint project features a space-based wide area surveillance and
support capability that will provide all weather, day/night observation of Canada’s Arctic
region and ocean approaches.226 The project will link to information from Radarsat and other
sources to produce high quality imagery for the military.227
Canada’s DRDC is also investigating the use of microsatellites to meet the needs of the
Canadian forces deployed on missions.228 Currently, the Canadian Forces rely entirely on the
US DOD and the commercial sector for space support. A responsive space effort has been
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COSPAR Launch Launch Satellite Launch State Primary Primary Orbit
Date Vehicle Name State Function Manufacturer Type
2007-006E 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 Falconsat-3 US US Technology USAFA LEO
2007-006F 3/9/07 Atlas V 401 CFESat US US Technology SSTL/LANL LEO
2007-027A 3/09/07 Atlas V 401 USA 194 US US Signals LMA LEO
(NROL-30) intelligence
2007-027C 3/09/07 Atlas V 401 USA 194 P/L 2 US US Signals LMA LEO
intelligence
2007-046A 10/11/07 Atlas V 421 WGS SV-1 US US Communication Boeing HEO
2007-047A 10/7/07 Delta 7925-9.5 Navstar GPS IIR-M4 US US Navigation LMMS/VF MEO
2007-054A 11/10/07 Delta 4H DSP F23 (USA 197) US US Early warning TRW GEO
2007-060A 12/10/07 Atlas V 401 USA 198 US US Comsat, relay, LMA HEO
NROL-23 early warning
2007-062A 12/20/07 Delta 7925-9.5 Navstar GPS US US Navigation LMMS/VF MEO
IIR-M5
2007-014A 4/24/07 Minotaur 1 NFIRE US US Research GD/Gilbert LEO
2007-023 6/07/07 Delsta 7420-10C Cosmo-1 US Italy Remote sensing Alenia Spazio LEO
(radar)
2007-059A 12/9/07 Delta 7420-10 Cosmo-2 US Italy Imaging (radar) Alenia Spazio LEO
136
established by the Space Systems Group at the DRDC to develop an indigenous military space
capability, influence Canada’s space strategy, and contribute to allied space effort. Two
examples are the Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) and the Maritime
Monitoring and Messaging Microsatellite (M3MSat). Both missions are jointly managed and
funded by the DRDC and the Canadian Space Agency and cost less than $12-million.
2007 Development
Potential use of space for military purposes in Nigeria
In 2007 the Nigerian Space Agency supported the need to integrate space technology with
that of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Suggestions were made to establish a space command to
monitor the progress of this integration.229 Even though Nigeria is a new entrant into space,
its ambitions to be a regional player are becoming more apparent. Nigeria is developing its
second imaging satellite, which is expected to be launched in 2008.230
2007 Space Security Impact
The continued drive for more states to develop and deploy both dedicated military and
dual-use space systems was reflected in 2007 along with a growing emergence of strategic
partnerships. While an increase in the use of space for military purposes demonstrates the
continued accessibility of the space environment and greater access to space technologies,
states continue to operate and develop their space programs with considerable secrecy,
reducing transparency of space operations. There are indications that these developments are
affecting perceptions of security on Earth; how this in turns affects the security of space will
depend on how states react to perceived threats from and in space. As more states become
dependent on space systems for military operations and national security, mutual vulnerability
may provide incentives to enhance the security of outer space or to develop capabilities to
quickly negate space systems. The growing diversity of space systems for global navigation and
positioning and communications may enhance the security of space operations by providing
redundancy, particularly if they are interoperational.
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6. Space Systems Protection
This chapter assesses trends and developments related to the research, development, testing,
and deployment of physical capabilities to better protect space systems from potential
negation efforts, which are examined in more detail in the Space Systems Negation chapter.
Physical protection capabilities are designed to mitigate the vulnerabilities of the
ground-based components of space systems, launch systems, communications links to and
from satellites, and satellites themselves.
While physical capabilities can provide a certain degree of protection from potential
negation efforts, they cannot make satellite systems invulnerable. Consequently, initiatives
to prevent the proliferation and use of negation capabilities covered in the chapters on Laws,
Policies and Doctrines and Commercial Space are also critical for protection, as is the
achievement of collective space security as defined by the Space Security Index.
Both active and passive means can be used to provide three main types of space systems
protection: capabilities to detect space negation attacks; physical and electronic means to
withstand attacks on ground stations, communications links, and satellites; and
reconstitution and repair mechanisms to recover from space negation attacks. While attacks
on the space negation capabilities of others, such as suspected anti-satellite (ASAT) systems,
are considered protection measures by some, they are indistinguishable from other ASAT
systems and are thus addressed in the Space Systems Negation chapter.
The ability to detect, identify, and locate the source of space negation attacks through early
warning and surveillance capabilities is critical to space protection efforts, since it is
important to know whether the failure of a space system is being caused by technical or
environmental factors or by the deliberate actions of an attacker. Detection of an actual
attack is often a precondition for effective protection measures such as electronic
countermeasures or simply maneuvering a satellite out of the path of an attacker. The ability
to detect an attacker is also a prerequisite for deterrence.
Protecting satellites, satellite ground stations, and communications links depends on the
nature of the space negation threat that such systems face, but in general terms they can
include cybernetic attacks against space system computers, electronic attacks on satellite
communications links, conventional or nuclear attacks on the ground- or space-based
elements of a space system, and directed energy attacks such as dazzling or blinding satellite
sensors with lasers.
A more advanced space systems protection capability is the ability to recover from a space
negation attack in a timely manner by reconstituting damaged or destroyed components of
the space system. While capabilities to repair or replace ground stations and reestablish
satellite communications links are generally available, capabilities to rebuild space-based
systems are much more difficult to develop. Capabilities to protect systems against
environmental hazards such as space debris are examined in the Space Environment chapter.
Space Security Impact
Most space systems remain unprotected from a range of threats, assessed by experts to
include (in order of decreasing likelihood): (1) electronic warfare such as jamming
communications links, (2) physical attacks on satellite ground stations, (3) dazzling or
blinding of satellite sensors, (4) hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons, (5) pellet cloud attacks on
low-orbit satellites, (6) attacks in space by microsatellites, and (7) high-altitude nuclear
detonations (HAND).1 Other potential threats include radiofrequency weapons,
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high-powered microwaves, and “heat-to-kill” ground-based laser ASATs. Growing
awareness of the vulnerabilities of space systems has led actors to develop space systems
protection capabilities to better detect, withstand, and/or recover from an attack.
Nonetheless, there are no effective protections against the most direct and destructive types
of negation such as the use of kinetic or high-powered energy force against satellites aside
from preventing proliferation and use of such capabilities.
These protection capabilities can have a positive impact on space security by increasing the
ability of a space system to survive negation efforts, thus helping to assure secure access to
and use of space. The ability to detect and survive an attack could also help to deter
negation attempts. Actors may refrain from attacks on well protected space systems if such
attacks would seem to be both futile and costly.
However, the space security dynamics of space negation and protection are closely related.
The use of protective measures to address system vulnerabilities could offer a viable
alternative to offensive means to defend space assets. Given the concerns surrounding space
debris, passive defensive measures may offer more sustainable approaches.
Because it is currently difficult to distinguish between satellite failures caused by
environmental factors and deliberate attacks, some experts argue that greater space
situational awareness (SSA) is critical to improvements in space security.2 However, SSA
raises dual-use concerns as it can also be used to track and target foreign satellites and is part
of US space control programs.
Under some conditions, protection systems can have a negative impact on space security.
Like many defensive systems, they can stimulate an arms escalation dynamic by motivating
adversaries to develop weapons to overcome protection systems. Conceivably, robust
protection capabilities could also reduce an actor’s fear of retaliation, reducing the threshold
for using space negation capabilities. Finally, protection, which often increases the mass of
the space system, can have cost implications that affect space access and use, and can thereby
reduce the number of actors with secure use of space.
Trend 6.1: US and Russia lead in general capabilities to detect
rocket launches, while US leads in the development
of advanced technologies to detect direct attacks
on satellites
The ability to distinguish space negation attacks from technical failures or environmental
disruptions is critical to maintaining international stability in space. Early warning also
enables the mounting of physical protection efforts, although the type of protection
available may be limited. Detecting attacks on satellite ground stations is not addressed in
any detail in this trend assessment since this capability is available to almost all actors with
a conventional military capability.
Detecting rocket launches
During the Cold War the USSR and the US developed significant space-based early
warning systems to detect ballistic missile and space rocket launches. These systems also
provided some ability to detect the ground-based launch of an ASAT by monitoring the
trajectory of the launch to see if it could place its payload into the same area as that of an
existing satellite. Only the US and Russia currently have a space-based early-warning
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capability, although France is due to launch two early warning demonstrator satellites,
Spirale-1 and Spirale-2, in 2008.3
The USSR launched its first space-based early warning Oko satellite in 1972 and had fully
deployed the system by 1982. To maintain a continuous capability to detect the launch of
US land-based ballistic missiles, the system had a minimum of four satellites in Highly
Elliptical Orbits (HEO). Over 80 Oko satellite launches allowed the USSR/Russia to
maintain this capability until the mid-1990s. By the end of 1999 the Oko system was
operating at the minimum possible level of four HEO satellites, which have since been lost
and replaced by two satellites in HEO. The Oko system now provides coverage of US
intercontinental ballistic missile fields about 12 hours a day, but with reduced reliability —
capable of detecting massive attacks but not individual missile launches.4
The Oko system is complemented by an additional early-warning satellite in
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), which is believed to be a next-generation US-KMO or
Prognoz satellite capable of detecting missiles against the background of the Earth.5 Russia
began launching Prognoz in 1991. There have been up to six launches, but the program has
been plagued by satellite malfunctions. Despite setbacks Russia completed construction of
a new command and control station in 1998.6 The complete system would be composed of
up to seven GEO satellites and provide global coverage; only one is currently active. A new
system is being planned for 2009.7 Plans have also been announced to restore the
space-based component of its missile attack warning system (MAWS), for which funding
has been increased.8
Russia’s early warning capabilities also include nine land-based radar stations, including a
new Voronezh meter-band early warning radar near Lekhtusi in the Leningrad Region,
which was put online in 2006, closing a seven-year coverage gap in its northwestern region.9
The US military has always emphasized space protection as one of the key pillars of its space
doctrine.10 First launched in 1970 US Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning
satellites have provided the US with the capability to detect missile/rocket launches
worldwide. By 2002 the DSP system had increased from four to seven GEO satellites,
enhancing reliability by allowing certain areas to have additional satellite coverage.11
The US Air Force (USAF) initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the Space
Tracking and Surveillance Systems (STSS) to replace the DSP satellites in 1994; however,
both face ongoing delays, funding shortfalls, and cost overruns.12 When completed, these
systems will be capable of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles and potential
ground-based kinetic-kill ASATs. The SBIRS constellation will consist of three GEO
satellites, but four are needed for global coverage. It will also include a spare satellite and
additional sensors on two classified HEO satellites. By 2005 the total system cost had grown
to an estimated $10.64-billion from $4.15-billion in 1995.13 The first infrared sensor was
launched in 2006 and the first GEO satellite was scheduled for launch in 2008.14 Escalating
costs led to the initiation of a parallel program in 2006: the Alternative Infrared Satellite
System (AIRSS), supposedly designed to provide DSP-like functions with a simpler and
cheaper design than that of SBIRS.15
The STSS system under development by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) aims to
track missiles through space, differentiate missile warheads from decoys and debris, and
provide targeting data for a missile defense interceptor using a system of 20 to 30
sensor-satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). The program has been restructured and renamed
several times since 2001, and has experienced significant cost growth.16 Two STSS
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experimental satellites are scheduled for launch in 2008.17 STSS has dual-use applications
for space systems negation efforts and space-based strike capabilities.
Sea-based and terrestrial assets perform ballistic missile launch detection and tracking for
China, France, and the UK. China’s four Yuan Wang tracking ships are used for satellite
tracking as well as missile detection and tracking. China is also believed to have one Large
Phased-Array Radar for missile launch detection near Xuanhua in the west.18 France
employs the Monge tracking ship with ARMOR radars to track ballistic missiles, primarily
for its missile testing program. On the Monge ship there are two C-band ARMOR radars
with 10-meter receiver dishes capable of viewing objects up to 4,000 kilometers.19 Royal
Air Force Fylingdales in North Yorkshire, UK is a major space surveillance site with a Large
Phased-Array Radar operating in the UHF frequency range. Fylingdales is one of three
radars in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, which performs missile launch
detection for Europe and the US. The radar also acts as a collaborative sensor for the US
Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and is currently being updated to play a role in the US
ballistic missile defense program.20 Another early warning system has been proposed for the
Czech Republic.
Detecting ASAT attacks
Most actors have a basic capability to detect a ground-based electronic attack on their space
systems, such as jamming, by sensing the interference signal of the attacker or detecting the
loss of communications with the system under attack. Many actors also have the capability
to use multiple sensors to geo-locate the source of jamming signals, which helps to
determine if the interference is intentional. It is also reasonable to assume that all actors
operating a satellite have some capability to detect spoofing (feeding a false signal), since
basic electronic error code checking routines are relatively simple to implement. However,
early warning for such attacks remains a challenge.
Directed energy attacks such as laser dazzling or blinding and microwave attacks move at
the speed of light, so advance warning is very difficult to obtain. These attacks can be
detected either by the loss of a data stream from optical or microwave instrumentation or
by thermal sensors. Onboard satellite-specific laser sensors can detect either the key laser
frequencies or radiant power. Such capabilities could trigger a variety of reactive passive
protection measures, such as automated mechanical shutters or the release of smoke to
block the laser, which might prevent damage, depending on the sophistication of the
attacker.21 Only US satellites are known to have such capabilities, and only Russia, France,
Germany, and perhaps China have reconnaissance satellites that might employ such
capabilities.
Space-based conventional ASATs can be detected through the tracking of satellite
maneuvers to monitor whether a satellite is in an orbit that could allow it to intercept or
attack another satellite. Both the US and Russia have a limited ability to do this through
their space surveillance capabilities. The US has been slowly augmenting this capability with
the development of the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), the Deep View radar, and the
Large Millimeter Telescope and SBSS; however, these programs are generally under-funded
and behind schedule. EU states have also discussed the feasibility of developing an
independent space surveillance system (see Space Environment Trend 1.3). In 2004 the US
began moderating access to satellite orbital information from its SSN because such data can
also be used to support negation efforts.22 While the ability to constantly monitor all
satellites to detect hostile maneuvers would constitute a significant protection capability, no
space actor currently has this ability.
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Another approach to detection would be to place sensors on every satellite to allow the
detection of nearby satellites and negation efforts. While no actor has fully developed these
capabilities, the ongoing US Radio Frequency Threat Warning and Attack Reporting
(RFTWARS) program aims to develop a lightweight, low-power radio frequency sensor
suite to attach to individual satellites to provide situational awareness.23 The US is also
developing capabilities to detect electromagnetic interference on satellites through its Rapid
Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program. This largely
classified program is defined by the US as a defensive counterspace system designed to
identify, locate, and report attacks on US space systems, thus enabling timely deployment
of defensive responses.24 The system has been operating since 2005 with six fixed ground
stations and three deployable ground segments.25 Finally, the USAF is developing the
Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS) to shadow a
space asset and provide local, on-orbit space situational awareness and anomaly
characterization.26 The first ANGELS launch is currently expected in 2009.
A high altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) can be detected by using gamma
ray/X-ray/neutron flux detectors in orbit. Only the US and Russia are known to have such
capabilities, and no other actors are known to be developing them. The US developed and
launched 12 Vela series satellites, which would detect nuclear tests, to monitor compliance
with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. Subsequently such instruments were integrated with
DSP early warning satellites and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.27 Russia
integrates nuclear detonation warning sensors onto its GLONASS satellites. Actors in direct
line of sight could also detect a HAND.
2007 Development
Russia upgrades its early-warning systems, but results are limited
On 23 October 2007 Cosmos 2430, a first-generation US-KS (Oko) early-warning satellite,
was launched into HEO.28 However, this did not serve to increase the capabilities of the
system, which only provides 12-hour coverage of the US, as a similar satellite launched in
2004 appears to have ended operations, leaving Russia with an eight-month capability gap.
The space-based portion of Russia’s early warning system thus remains at just three satellites
— two in HEO and one next-generation UK-KMO satellite in GEO.29 However, there are
reports that Russia has begun work on a new system called EKS (the Integrated Space
System) and that on-orbit tests for the program will begin in 2009–2010.30
Russia also maintained efforts to end its dependence on foreign, ground-based
early-warning radar stations as some of its current capabilities are based outside of Russian
territory. According to the head of the Russian Space Force, Colonel-General Vladimir
Popovkin, Russia intends to use systems only within its own territory and is likely to end
usage of radars at Gabala, Azerbaijan, and Balkhash, Kazakhstan.31 In July 2007 Russia
withdrew its treaty with Ukraine for the use of two Soviet-era radars located at Mukachevo
and Sevastopol, terminating it as of January 2008.32 Russia has a program to build six new
Voronezh-M phased array radars along its west, south-west, and southern borders,
beginning with radars located in Lekhtusi and Armavir.33 The Lekhtusi radar system began
operations in December 2006 while construction of the Armavir facility was completed in
May 2007. Although Armavir was expected to come online by December 2007 testing
delays pushed the date into 2008.34 The Southward facing Armavir radar provides roughly
the same coverage as the Soviet-era early warning radar in Azerbaijan, and will be able to
track rocket launches from the Middle East.35 The Lekhtusi Voronezh-M radar is estimated
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to cost $80-million, while the remainder stations are estimated at $60-million each.36
Despite this costly effort Russian early-warning capabilities will not be significantly
increased, as systems are largely replacements for existing ones.
In additional to the new radars the Don-2N radar of the Moscow anti-ballistic missile
system received an upgrade to its computational hardware and software in 2007.37
2007 Development
US early-warning upgrade efforts continue to face challenges, but also some success
The 23rd and final US DSP satellite was launched into GEO on 10 November 2007
onboard a Delta-4 Heavy rocket.38 As the service life of the remaining DSP satellites comes
to an end, the DSP function will be shifted to the USAF’s next-generation SBIRS. The
SBIRS system is currently planned to include three satellites in GEO and two sensor
payloads piggybacking on classified reconnaissance satellites in HEO. However, the
constellation is not expected to provide global coverage without a fourth GEO satellite.39
Several advances were made in 2007 toward launch of the first SBIRS GEO satellite in
2008, including testing of the infrared sensor used for detection, delivery of software for the
launch, and testing of the ground segment.40 In October 2007, however, a classified GEO
satellite with a design similar to that of the SBIRS model suffered a failure, causing its
mission to be terminated. Changes to correct a similar problem with the SBIRS satellite are
expected to delay the program by one year and add $1-billion to the cost.41 The first SBIRS
GEO satellite is now expected to be launched in 2009.42 The SBIRS program is estimated
to cost $11-billion and is seven years behind schedule. The program is expected to receive
$587-million in FY 2008.43
Due to the numerous delays and cost overruns of SBIRS the Alternative Infrared Satellite
System, now renamed Third Generation Infrared Surveillance Program, (3GIRS),44 was
initiated by the USAF in December 2006 as a less complex alternative using existing
technologies. Contracts were awarded to Raytheon, General Dynamics, and SAIC to begin
work on the program in 2007.45 However, in 2007 the objective of the AIRSS program
changed from competing with SBIRS to becoming a SBIRS follow-on as the Air Force tries
to determine how many SBIRS GEO satellites to purchase to provide global coverage.46
The AIRSS program is estimated to cost $3.3-billion from FY2007 to FY2013. But
Congressional support for the program faltered in 2007 when Congress approved only
$75.9-million of the Air Force’s $230.887-million request for FY2008. This decision
reflects the fact that AIRSS is now no longer envisioned as a backup for SBIRS, but as a
potential follow-on. The Air Force will decide whether to purchase the fourth SBIRS GEO
satellite or opt for 3GIRS in the FY2010 budget.47
The second layer of US next-generation space-based ballistic missile detection and tracking,
the MDA’s STSS, is also significantly over cost and behind schedule. The US Congress cut
the FY2008 budget for the program by $100-million (see Space Based Strike
Capabilities).48
2007 Development
US focus on space situational awareness and space protection
Following the Chinese satellite intercept on 11 January 2007 US President Bush sent a
classified memo to relevant government agencies calling for improved space situational
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awareness capabilities (SSA).49 At least nine tasks related to improving US SSA were listed
in the memo. The State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) were directed
to find ways to prevent future anti-satellite launches and to manage the consequences
should one occur. One potential approach being investigated is to share SSA data among
nations with space surveillance capabilities.
In a related development, funding for SSA efforts was increased by more than $100-million
by the US Congress in the FY2008 budget authorization.50 Programs that received
additional funds include a variety of SSA and also potential space control functions
including the Space Fence, RAIDRS, ORS, the Maui Space Surveillance System, Panoramic
Survey Telescope and Rapid Response System, Space Situation Awareness research, the
High Accuracy Network Discrimination System, Space Control, testing capabilities, and
awareness.51 The Maui Space Surveillance System, which tracks satellites, is scheduled to
receive $42-million, up from $5-million in FY2007. RAIDRS received an $11-million
increase to $64-million. An initial cut in funding for the Space Fence was reversed and
overall SSA operations spending was increased from $187-million to $197-million.52
The US Congress also directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of National
Intelligence to create a Space Protection Strategy that establishes “the priority within the
Nation’s space programs on the protection of national security space systems,” highlighting
the growing vulnerability of space systems demonstrated by the Chinese satellite intercept.
It claimed that protection and SSA capabilities could together help to mitigate that
vulnerability and called for better coordination between the two.53
2007 Development
Global development of space surveillance capabilities
Following years of debate over a potential European system54, in 2007 the European Space
Agency proposed creation of an agency to provide space weather forecasting and space
surveillance services. The scope, budget, and source of funding of the proposed agency, as
well as the potential contribution of data by various ESA member states will be discussed at
a scheduled ESA ministers meeting in November 2008.
Also in 2007 the head of Ukraine’s Pivdenne Design Bureau claimed in an interview that
the country has an independent ability to detect and monitor objects in orbit, but this
capability has not been verified by outside sources. The Ukrainian system was apparently
used to monitor three of the country’s Earth observation satellites along with Egyptsat-1.
The interview also indicated that a similar system is being built for Egypt, and that
negotiations are underway between Ukraine and Kazakhstan for cooperation on a similar
deal.55
In Canada MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. was awarded a $65-million contract
by the Department of National Defence to develop the information system for the
SAPPHIRE program. SAPPHIRE will be Canada’s first space-based space surveillance
satellite and is designed to monitor natural and manmade objects in GEO from altitudes of
6,000 km to 40,000 km. Data gathered will be integrated with the US Space Surveillance
Network and used to update the US Satellite Catalog.56 The spacecraft is expected to be
launched in 2010 and cost $96.4-million, which includes the launch and two years of
operating expenses.57
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2007 Space Security Impact
As space actors seek to improve their launch detection and space surveillance capabilities,
space security could be enhanced through greater transparency of space activities, more
accurate threat detection, and greater redundancy, which can support protective responses
and overall confidence. The benefits of space surveillance could be increased with data
sharing among different actors. Yet the continued drive for independent space tracking
systems indicate broader mistrust that could reduce space security, particularly as many
aspects of these capabilities are enablers for space system negation. In this context, as
demonstrated by the US focus on the space protection/negation elements of space
situational awareness, greater transparency may not make actors feel more secure in space.
Trend 6.2: The protection of satellite ground stations is a concern,
while the protection of satellite communications links is
poor but improving
Protection of satellite ground stations
Satellite ground stations and communications links are the likeliest targets for space
negation efforts since they are vulnerable to a range of widely available conventional and
electronic weapons. Military satellite ground stations and communications links are
generally well protected, whereas civil and commercial assets tend to have fewer protection
features. A study published by the US President’s National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee emphasized that the key threats to the commercial satellite fleet are
those faced by ground facilities from computer hacking or possibly, but less likely,
jamming.58 Satellite communications can usually be restored, however, and ground stations
rebuilt for a fraction of what it costs to replace a satellite.
The vulnerability of civil and commercial space systems raises concerns, since a number of
military space actors are becoming increasingly dependent on commercial space assets for a
variety of applications. Many commercial space systems have a single operations center and
ground station,59 leaving them potentially vulnerable to some of the most basic attacks,
such as car bombs. As a notable example, the US GPS was operational for five years before
a second primary ground station was completed.60 Responding to such concerns, in 2002
the US General Accounting Office recommended that “commercial satellites be identified
as critical infrastructure” (see Commercial Space Trend 4.3).61 In the event of an attack the
use of standardized protocols and communications equipment could allow alternative
commercial ground stations to be brought online.
Electronic protection
Most, if not all, space actors are capable of providing effective physical protection for their
satellite ground stations within the general boundaries of their relative military capabilities,
although they may not elect to do so. Thus this chapter focuses on the increasingly critical
area of the protection of satellite communications links. This is also an area in which space
negation efforts have recently been undertaken, during times of peace and of conflict (see
Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1).
Satellite communications links require specific electronic protection measures to safeguard
their utility. Although unclassified information on these capabilities is difficult to obtain,
one can assume that most space actors, by virtue of their technological capabilities to
develop and operate space systems, are also able to take advantage of simple but reasonably
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robust electronic protection measures. These basic protection capabilities include: (1) data
encryption; (2) error-protection coding to increase the amount of interference that can be
tolerated before communications are disrupted; (3) directional antennas that reduce
interception or jamming vulnerabilities, or antennas that utilize natural or manmade
barriers as protection from line-of-sight electronic attacks; (4) shielding and radio emission
control measures that reduce the radio energy that can be intercepted for surveillance or
jamming purposes; and (5) robust encryption onboard satellites.62
Sophisticated electronic protection measures are generally unique to the military
communications systems of technologically advanced states. These advanced protection
capabilities include: (1) narrow band excision techniques that mitigate jamming by using
smaller bandwidth; (2) burst transmissions and frequency-hopping (spread-spectrum
modulation) methods that communicate data in a short series of signals, or across a range
of radio frequencies, to keep adversaries from “locking-on” to signals to jam or intercept
them; (3) antenna side-lobe reduction designs that mitigate jamming or interception
vulnerabilities by providing more focused main communication beams and reducing
interference from jamming in the side-lobe regions; and (4) nulling antenna systems
(adaptive interference cancellation), which monitor interference and combine antenna
elements designed to nullify or cancel the interference.63 This last technique is considered
the most comprehensive anti-jamming technique in existence.64
During the Cold War the US and the USSR led in the development of satellite
communications protection systems. The US currently appears to be the leader in
developing advanced satellite communications protection. For example, US/NATO Milstar
communications satellites use multiple anti-jamming technologies, employing both
spread-spectrum modulation and antenna side-lobe reduction. Adaptive interference
cancellation is being developed for next-generation satellites.65 Through its Global
Positioning Experiments project, the US has demonstrated the ability of GPS airborne
pseudo-satellites to relay and amplify GPS signals to counter signal jamming.66 The US and
several other countries are currently developing laser-based communication systems, which
could provide a degree of immunity from conventional jamming techniques in addition to
more rapid communication; however, they continue to face technological challenges.67 The
US has also initiated a Cyberspace Command responsible for the military’s Internet and
other computer networks, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum, which could cover
satellite protection from directed energy weapons and communications jamming.68
Technologies to protect against electronic jamming are increasingly available commercially.
In response to several jamming incidents in past years allegedly attributed to the Falun
Gong, in 2005 China launched its first anti-jamming satellite, the Apstar-4
communications satellite.69 China is also reportedly upgrading its Xi’an Satellite
Monitoring Center to monitor and diagnose satellite malfunctions, eliminate harmful
interference, and prevent purposeful damage to satellite communications links.70
2007 Development
Slow but steady progress on laser satellite communication links
The US and Europe are slowly moving to the use of optical satellite communication links,
which could provide both a degree of immunity from conventional jamming techniques
and more rapid communications, but technological challenges remain.71 In 2007 the US
MDA tested a laser communication terminal developed by Tesat Spacecom of Germany and
carried aboard the MDA’s NFIRE satellite.72 The German laser terminal was added after the
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removal of the “kill vehicle” that was originally part of NFIRE. The experiments focused on
satellite-to-ground communication; the data will be used to characterize the laser module’s
performance. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which are competing to build the
Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) space segment, validated their laser
communications technology, developed for the Risk Reduction and System Definition
phase.73 A decision between the two systems was expected in 2007 but was not made.
France’s Astrium Satellites and its subsidiary Tesat Spacecom in Germany launched a
civil-military laser communication program in 2007.74 The program will have four main
applications: intersatellite communication; satellite-to-ground communication; links with
deep space missions; and transmissions between low flying aircraft, low earth orbit satellites,
and GEO satellites. Astrium has previously demonstrated satellite-to-aircraft laser
communication with the Lola system, while Tesat Spacecom has laser terminals onboard the
US NFIRE satellite and the German TerraSAR-X, also launched in 2007. The ESA is set to
decide whether to include a laser terminal onboard the Sentinel series of Earth observation
spacecraft for the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program.
Tesat Spacecom and Oerlikon Space AG signed an agreement in June 2007 to collaborate
on the development and manufacture of laser communication terminals for the GMES
satellites if approved.75 The companies will base their terminals on the system developed for
Tandem-X, which has a data rate of 3–5 Gbits/s over 40,000 km. In November 2007
Oerlikon simulated laser transmission over a distance of 1.5-million km.76
2007 Development
US RAIDRS Unit becomes operational
Although the system has been operating since 2005, in May 2007 the USAF officially
activated the 16th Space Control Squadron, which will be responsible for RAIDRS. The
new unit will eventually be based at the Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. The RAIDRS
program received a funding boost in FY 2008 from $53-million to $64-million following
concerns raised by the Chinese satellite interception.
2007 Development
Renewed focus on protecting commercial satellites
A call in 2007 for more protection measures for commercial satellites used by the US
military was followed by willingness on behalf of commercial satellite operators to invest in
special anti-jamming antennas and other defensive measures on the condition that the
government’s procurement strategy shift to encourage such long-term investments.77
Currently the Defense Information System Agency awards contacts strictly based on the
lowest bid, and satellite service providers are unwilling to shoulder the extra cost of
expensive defensive measures. Anti-jamming systems used by the US military were put on
the market for commercial satellites by EMS Technologies in 2007. It anticipates that 25
percent of the commercial satellite market will be interested in purchasing the
system.782007 Space Security Impact
Developments in 2007 had a mixed impact on space security. While some progress has been
made toward securing ground-to-satellite communications through the use of laser links,
progress remains slow due to major technological challenges and communication links
remain vulnerable. In the meantime, a greater ability by the US to identify and respond to
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sources of interference might enhance the security of some systems, but efforts to better
protect commercial satellites will only be effective if market incentives are in place.
Trend 6.3: Protection of satellites against some direct threats
is improving but remains limited
After attacks on satellite ground stations and communications links the most significant
space systems protection challenge is the defense of satellites from direct attack by
conventional, nuclear, or directed energy weapons. In this case, the primary source of
protection for satellites is derived from the difficulties associated with launching an attack
of conventional weapons into and through the unique space environment to specific
locations. Directed energy weapons must overcome atmospheric challenges and be
effectively targeted at satellites, which orbit at great distances and move at very high speeds.
Twenty-eight actors are assessed to have a suborbital launch capability that allows them to
launch a conventional or nuclear payload into LEO attitudes for a few minutes before it
descends back into the Earth’s atmosphere. Ten actors have developed an orbital launch
capability; eight of these actors have demonstrated the capability to reach GEO. The fact
that LEO can be reached in a matter of minutes, while GEO takes about a half-day to reach
by completing a Hohmann transfer orbit, illustrates the unique protection dynamics
associated with different orbits.79 Some military systems are being placed into higher orbits
such as Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) or GEO, but orbits are largely dictated by function.
Russia leads in use of HEO applications.
There are defender advantages in space: for example, the distances and speeds involved in
satellite engagements can be exploited to enhance satellite protection. Satellites in lower
altitude orbits are more difficult to detect with space-based infrared sensors because of their
proximity to the Earth’s atmosphere. Lower orbits are also less predictable because of greater
atmospheric effects such as fluctuations in density in the upper atmosphere, which alter
satellite drag. For example, at an altitude of about 800 kilometers the predictability of orbits
is limited to an error of approximately one kilometer for a prediction one day in advance of
the calculation, using readily available models. Higher operational orbits also raise the
power demands for terrestrial radars, leaving only optical systems capable of tracking
satellites in altitudes beyond 5,000 kilometers. Surface finishes and designs optimized for
heat dissipation and radar absorption can also reduce the observation signatures of a
satellite, further complicating negation targeting efforts. Nonetheless, if an actor has the
ability to overcome these natural defenses, there are few options available for physically
protecting a satellite against a direct attack.
Protection against conventional weapons
Efforts to protect satellites from conventional weapons such as kinetic hit-to-kill, explosive,
or pellet cloud methods of attack assume that it is almost impossible to provide physical
hardening against such attacks because of the high relative velocities of objects in orbit. As
previously discussed, however, the difficulty of attacking into and maneuvering through
space facilitates the protection of satellites from conventional weapons threats. For example,
tests of the Soviet co-orbital ASAT system in the 1960s and 1970s were limited to
opportunities when the longitude of the interceptor launch site matched that of the target
satellite, which only occurred twice per day. This introduced an average delay of six hours
between a decision to attack a satellite in LEO and the launch of an interceptor.
Space Security 2008
Once an interceptor has been launched toward a satellite, it has committed a significant
amount of its limited fuel to a specific attack strategy. Evasive maneuvers by the targeted
satellite can force an interceptor to expend valuable fuel and time in reorienting its line of
attack. While such defensive maneuvers require valuable fuel mass and few satellites carry
extra fuel specifically for this purpose, all operational satellites have some fuel allocated to
maintain their orbital positions, known as “station keeping,” in case of natural orbital
disturbances. These evasive maneuvers must only be large enough to avoid the weapons
effects or target acquisition range of the interceptor,80 but the extra fuel required might
represent more than 10–20 percent of the satellite cost.81
An interceptor is also vulnerable to deception by decoys deployed from a target. For
example, an interceptor’s radars could be deceived by the release of a cloud of metal foil
known as “chaff”; its thermal sensors could be spoofed by devices imitating the thermal
signature of the satellite; or its sensors could be jammed.82
Dispersion is a well established practice in terrestrial conflict that can be applied to satellite
operations. Redundancy in satellite design and operations offers a number of protection
advantages. Since onsite repairs in space are not cost-effective, satellites tend to employ
redundant electronic systems to avoid single point failures. Many GEO communications
satellites are also bought in pairs and launched separately into orbit to provide system-level
redundancy. Over the longer term, on-orbit repair and robotic servicing capabilities will
likely further improve the survivability of space systems. While signature reduction has been
developed, particularly in the context of reconnaissance satellites, costs are significant. The
US National Reconnaissance Office, for example, developed a stealth satellite program
referred to as Misty, which was cancelled in 2007 following enormous cost overruns.83
In general, there is currently little redundancy of commercial, military, or civilian space
systems, particularly of the space-based components, because of the large per-kilogram cost
of launch. But commercial satellites are increasingly exploiting slack in the commercial
telecommunications systems to allow for distribution and redundancy.
Greater dependence on space systems is increasing the motivation for redundancy. China,
the European Space Agency (ESA) and the EU (in partnership with others), and Japan are
developing satellite navigation systems that will increase the redundancy of such systems on
two levels. First, constellations of satellites such as the GPS and the proposed EU Galileo
system are inherently protected by redundancy, since the loss of one satellite might reduce
service reliability but not destroy the entire system. Second, different but often
interoperable systems could create redundancy of entire navigation systems, as the US and
EU agreed to do in 2004 with the GPS and Galileo systems (see Civil Space Programs and
Global Utilities Trend 3.4).84
Higher orbits can also be utilized to take advantage of longer warning times and greater
access difficulties. To some extent, Russia has led in the use of higher orbits by using HEO
applications. The use of this orbit allows Russia to obtain better coverage of the US for a
longer duration. Increasingly the US is recognizing the benefits of higher orbits and using
them; other space actors are slowly following suit.
Technology development such as that by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for the Orbital
Express program may enable space-based defenses for kinetic attacks by developing
architecture for future automated on-orbit spacecraft servicing. If successful, future on-orbit
servicing could enable greater maneuverability for defensive purposes and extend the life of
satellites, although it would also have notable dual-use capabilities.85 On the other hand,
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more active space-based defensive systems may be indistinguishable from ASATs,
particularly because many space-based kinetic threats in space cannot be countered except
with a preemptive attack.86 Moreover, more active measures to counter kinetic threats to
satellites could create large amounts of space debris, doing more harm than good.
Protection against nuclear attack
Since all current nuclear weapon states also have suborbital space access, the capability to
carry out a HAND attack is within the capability of at least these states. While unhardened
satellites are quite vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons, there are three general
measures that can be used to protect them: (1) radiation hardening, (2) electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) shielding, and (3) scintillation and blackout avoidance.87
Radiation hardening enables satellites to withstand the effects of nuclear weapons through
the use of radiation-tolerant components and automatic sensors designed to switch off
non-essential circuits during a nuclear detonation. Photovoltaic or solar cells, employed as
power sources in many satellites and particularly vulnerable to radiation effects, can be
replaced by nuclear reactors, thermal-isotopic generators, or fused silica-covered
radiation-resistant solar cell models built with gallium arsenide.
EMP shielding protects sensitive satellite components from the voltage surges generated by
nuclear detonations reacting with the environment and the internal voltages and currents
generated when X-rays from a nuclear detonation penetrate a satellite.88 Technical measures
to protect satellites from external EMP effects include: (1) metal shields and conductive
coatings to prevent EMP radiation from entering satellite cavities, (2) linking and
grounding of the exterior components of a satellite to create a Faraday cage that will prevent
transmission of EMP radiation to interior components, (3) grounding straps and surge
arresters to maintain surfaces at the same electrical potential, and (4) microwave filters that
isolate internal satellite electronics from external electromagnetic radiation. The use of
graphite composites instead of aluminum construction panels can further reduce the
number of liberated electrons capable of disrupting components. Electro-optic isolators,
specialized diodes, and filters can also be used to shield internal satellite circuits.
Scintillation and blackout protection measures can be used to avoid the disruption and
denial of communications between satellites and their ground stations caused by nuclear
detonations that generate an enhanced number of charged particles in the Earth’s radiation
belts. Protection against these communications failures can be provided by crosslink
communications to bypass satellites in a contaminated area and enable communications via
other satellites. Higher frequencies that are less susceptible to scintillation and blackout
effects, such as EHF/SHF (40/20 gigahertz), can also be used.
Early space protection efforts undertaken by the US and the USSR during the Cold War
were aimed at increasing the survivability of strategically important satellites in the face of
nuclear attack. US systems such as the DSP early warning, Defense Satellite
Communications System communications, and GPS navigation satellites were all hardened
against the radiation and EMP effects of nuclear weapon detonations, as are all current
generation military satellites of advanced space actors. Robust production lines, the use of
satellite constellations, and responsive launch readiness contributed to the survivability of
the USSR’s space capabilities from nuclear attack. Both the US and Russia maintain
hardening to protect against a HAND on their military assets, as do the UK and France. It
is not clear from open sources whether China, India, and Israel employ such measures.
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Most commercial spacecraft must install radiation-hardening to guarantee lifespan
(typically 15 years) and include automated switch-off and recovery modes that protect
systems from natural radiation events, such as solar flares. Generally commercial satellites
are not specifically protected from the EMP effects that would result from a HAND.
However, some commercial spacecraft components are radiation-hardened by using
materials developed for military specifications, which may provide some limited protection.
Any physical protection normally creates an increased cost and it seems unlikely that the
space industry will harden its satellites without significant prompting and subsidization
from governments.89 Protection measures vary in cost; for example, hardening against the
radiation effects of a nuclear detonation is estimated to be about two to five percent of
satellite costs, while hardening against the EMP effects of a nuclear detonation can be up to
10 percent of satellite costs.90
The US is pursuing technologies other than hardening to reduce the damaging long-term
radiation belts caused by a HAND. The US High Frequency Active Auroral Research
Program includes research on active measures to reduce the concentration of ionic particles
in the upper atmosphere following a HAND.91 Such measures would reduce the probability
of satellite malfunction in the aftermath of a HAND.
Protection against a directed energy attack
The simplest form of directed energy weapon makes use of a ground-based laser directed at
a satellite to temporarily dazzle or disrupt sensitive optics. Optical imaging systems on a
reconnaissance satellite or other sensors, such as the infrared Earth sensors that are part of
the attitude control system of most satellites, would be most susceptible to laser
interference. Because the attacker must be in the line of sight of the instrument,
opportunities for attack are limited to the available territory below the satellite. A more
advanced directed energy attack designed to degrade or damage sensitive optical or thermal
imaging sensors requires higher laser powers (see Space Systems Negation). Protection
measures that address these threats include: (1) laser sensors, mechanical shutters, or spectral
or amplitude filters to protect from intense laser illumination; (2) the use of multiple
imaging frequencies, including those attenuated by atmospheric absorption, to reduce the
effectiveness of the laser weapon itself; and (3) the use of indirect imaging angles to avoid
direct ground-based laser illumination. While such measures can help to prevent permanent
damage, they may require a temporary disruption of the satellite’s functions.
Highly advanced lasers capable of damaging other satellite subsystems through heating or
shock continue to require higher power. Vulnerable subsystems include solar panels and
some electronics. Protection can be provided by ablative coatings and isolated shields on the
exterior of spacecraft; the use of spin stabilization to dissipate heat; and the selection of
power generation technology other than photovoltaic cells, which can be damaged by
lasers.92 The use of higher orbits provides significant protection from this type of attack
because of the distances involved; modest shields in GEO can prevent the destruction of a
non-imaging satellite by laser heating.93 Protection against microwave weapons, which use
high-powered short pulse beams to degrade or destroy unprotected electronics, can be
provided by over-voltage and over-current protection circuits within a satellite’s receivers.
The US currently leads the way in both systems protection policy and technology to protect
from directed energy attack. But commercial satellites typically lack protection from laser
or microwave attack. Besides the US, only France and Russia are assessed to employ means
such as higher orbits or spectral filtering on reconnaissance satellites to provide protection
from directed energy attacks.
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2007 Development
US continues to pursue space-based satellite protection
In 2007 the USAF awarded a $29.5-million contract to Orbital Sciences Corporation to
upgrade the ANGELS program.94 They are to be launched into space attached to a host
satellite and detach once in orbit. The ANGELS satellite, designed to have a three-year
lifespan, would have the ability to autonomously navigate around the host and perform
inspections, detect and characterize unknown objects approaching the “keep out zones”
around the host, and detect jamming. The FY2008 budget approved for the program
includes funds for on-orbit testing and identification of technological options for
incorporating the ANGELS satellite into LEO and GEO satellites.95 Launch of the first
satellite is anticipated in 2008. While the ANGELS satellites are intended to provide
localized threat assessments, it is not clear what responses could be anticipated; the
ANGELS program is intended to develop tools for “high value satellite defense.”96 While
there are concerns about its potential use for space systems negation, information in open
literature does not indicate that it will have the capacity to significantly change orbit to
target foreign satellites.
In a different approach to space-based systems protection, two spacecraft for the Orbital
Express program, ASTRO and NextSat, were launched into LEO on 5 March 2007
onboard an Atlas-5 launch vehicle.97 Developed by prime contractor Boeing with DARPA
and NASA, Orbital Express aims to develop architecture for future automated on-orbit
spacecraft servicing.98 The two spacecraft launched in 2007 completed a number of
missions, testing automated approach and docking, fuel transfer, and component exchange.
The results of these experiments demonstrated the feasibility of conducting automated
satellite refueling and repair, which could extend the life of satellites and enable greater
maneuverability for defense against threats. However, long- and short-range autonomous
approach of a non-cooperative target was also demonstrated, raising the prospect that the
technology could also support space-based negation capabilities. At the end of July 2007,
after completion of the tests, ASTRO and NextSat were decommissioned.99
Another program exploring technologies for space-based protection from direct threats is
the DARPA Tiny, Independent, Coordinating Spacecraft (TICS) program, which would
involve small 10-pound satellites that could be quickly air launched by fighter jets to form
protective formations shielding larger satellites from direct attacks. At $6-million in
FY2008, the program is small, but one of its key objectives is to make TICS satellites
relatively cheap.100 The program could have an inherent anti-satellite capability, however, if
used to swarm non-cooperative aircraft (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.4).
2007 Space Security Impact
The development of autonomous on-orbit servicing satellites and nanosatellites for local
space surveillance has the potential to improve space security for the actors employing those
technologies by providing better on-orbit threat identification and response options to
protect the space-based components of satellite systems. However, the basic technologies
involved are also applicable for spacecraft negation and raise questions about the
implications of more active space-based protection systems for the security of other actors
in space. The overall impact on space security will depend greatly on how the relevant
technologies are used and how transparent the usage is. Moreover, space-based protection
capabilities themselves could be defeated by a determined attacker.
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Trend 6.4: US leads in developing capabilities to rapidly rebuild
space systems following direct attacks on satellites
The capability to rapidly rebuild space systems in the wake of a space negation attack could
reduce vulnerabilities in space and increase the ability to recover from an attack. It is
assumed that actors capable of operating a satellite are also able to recover from an electronic
attack since such attacks do not, in most cases, cause permanent damage. It is also assumed
that space actors have the capability to rebuild satellite ground stations. This assessment
examines capabilities to rebuild space systems by launching new satellites into orbit in a
timely manner to replace satellites damaged or destroyed by a space negation attack.
Although efforts are underway to enable rapid recovery, no actor currently has this
capability.
During the Cold War the USSR and the US led in the development of economical launch
vehicles capable of rapidly launching new satellites as a means to repair space systems
following an attack. The USSR/Russia has launched less expensive, less sophisticated, and
shorter-lived satellites than those of the US, but has also launched them more often.
Soviet-era pressure vessel spacecraft designs, still in use today, have an advantage over
Western vented satellite designs that require a period of out-gassing before the satellite can
enter service.101 In principle Russia has the capacity to deploy redundancy in its space
systems at a lower cost and to allow quicker space access to facilitate the reconstitution of
its systems. Indeed in 2004 Russia conducted a large military exercise that included plans
for the rapid launch of military satellites to replace space assets lost in action.102 A
significant number of Russia’s current launches, however, are of other nations’ satellites;
Russia continues to struggle to maintain existing military systems in operational condition.
Thus little redundancy is actually leveraged through this launch capability.103
The US leads in the development of next-generation responsive space capabilities. Since
2003 the USAF has promoted Operationally Responsive Space, with three main objectives:
(1) Rapid Design, Build, Test with a launch-ready spacecraft within 15 months from
authority to proceed; (2) Responsive Launch, Checkout, Operations to include launch
within one week of a call-up from a stored state; and (3) Militarily Significant Capability to
include obtaining images with tactically significant resolution provided directly to the
theater. New launch capabilities form the cornerstone of this program. Indeed the USAF
Space Command’s Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond notes, “An operationally
responsive spacelift capability is critical to place timely missions on orbit assuring our access
to space.”104 Several programs, including Falcon, address this concern.105 Initial steps
include a Small Launch Vehicle (SLV) subprogram for a rocket capable of placing 100 to
1,000 kg into LEO on 24-hours notice for under $5-million; however, the program is
ultimately linked to a long-term prompt global strike capability.106 Under this program
AirLaunch LLC is developing the QuickReach air-launch rocket and SpaceX is working on
the Falcon-1 to fulfill the SLV requirements.107 The USAF TacSat microsatellite series is
also intended for ORS demonstration, combining existing military and commercial
technologies such as imaging and communications with new commercial launch systems to
provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.”108 A full ORS capability could
allow the US to replace satellites on short notice,109 enabling rapid recover from space
negation attacks and reducing general space system vulnerabilities, but it remains in the
distant future.
The concept for a US Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) or military space plane first emerged
in the 1990s as a small, powered, reusable space vehicle, operating as an upper stage of a
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reusable launch vehicle.110 Two technology demonstrators have been built, including the
X-40 (USAF) and the X-37A (NASA/DARPA).111 India is working on a similar design, the
Reusable Launch Vehicle, but it is not anticipated before 2015.112 The commercial space
industry is contributing to responsive launch technology development through
advancements with small launch vehicles, such as the Falcon-1 developed by Space
Exploration Technologies (see Commercial Space Trend 4.2).
Interest is increasing in the development of air-launched microsatellites, which could reduce
costs and allow rapid launches as they do not require dedicated launch facilities. The
Russian MiG-launched kinetic energy anti-satellite weapon program was suspended in the
early 1990s, but commercial applications of similar launch methods continue to be
explored. As early as 1997 the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau was carrying out research,
using a MiG-31 to launch small commercial satellites into LEO.113 The Mikron rocket of
the Moscow Aviation Institute’s Astra Centre, introduced in 2002, was designed for launch
from a MiG-31 and is capable of placing payloads of up to 150 kg into LEO.114 More
recently plans have been announced by Kazakhstan.115 The US has been using the Pegasus
launcher, first developed by Orbital Sciences Corporation in 1990, to launch military small
payloads up to 450 kg from a B-52 aircraft.116 Other efforts include the China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) plan to launch small payloads released from
a modified H-6 bomber.117
2007 Development
US increases efforts for Operationally Responsive Space
Since 2003 the USAF has promoted the concept of Operationally Responsive Space. This
vision was given renewed emphasis in April 2007 with the release of a US congressional
report on ORS. The report laid out the motivations and requirements of ORS, as well as a
roadmap for implementation. In May a DOD Operationally Responsive Space Office was
opened at the Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico to coordinate the development of
hardware and doctrine in support of ORS across the various agencies, with personnel drawn
from across the Army, Air Force, Navy, DARPA, National Reconnaissance Office, and
NASA. Funding officially began on 1 October 2007 and the budget for FY2008–2013 is
estimated to be around $400-million.118
The ORS report recommended a three-tier approach to achieve operationally responsive
space. Tier 1 would make use of existing satellites and re-task them as required, with a
response timeframe of minutes to days after the initial request. Tier 2 involves building and
launching small satellites on short notice to begin operations within weeks of a request. Tier
3 is similar to Tier 2, except that cutting edge technologies would be incorporated,
extending the timeframe to a year from the date of request. According to the ORS report,
Tier-1 capability is expected to be available in FY2007, while Tier-2 and -3 capabilities are
expected to be available in late FY2008.
A key component of the ORS program is the TacSat series of experimental small satellites
intended to test the ability of small satellites to carry militarily useful payloads, falling under
Tiers 2 and 3 of the ORS report. TacSat-2, managed by the USAF Research Lab, was
launched in December 2006 and successfully completed its mission in 2007. The
814-pound spacecraft carried instruments, including a one-meter-resolution optical
telescope and a signals intelligence package.119 The Air Force Research Lab is also managing
the TacSat-3 program. The satellite will carry a hyperspectral imager in its payload, which
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Alliant Technologies delivered in September 2007, and is scheduled for launch in June
2008.
Responsive launch capabilities are also essential for ORS. In 2007 SpaceX declared the
Falcon-1 rocket operational, despite a premature second-stage shutdown during its second
test flight on 20 March 2007. The next flight of the rocket is scheduled to carry Malaysia’s
RazakSAT Earth observation satellite into orbit.120 Falcon-1 is part of the SLV portion of
the DARPA/USAF Falcon project that seeks to develop launch vehicles that can send a
450-kg payload into LEO on 24-hours notice for less than $5-million. AirLaunch LLC is
developing the QuickReach rocket and SpaceX is working on the Falcon-1 to fulfill the
Falcon requirements.121 In 2007 AirLaunch LLC was granted clearance by USAF and
DARPA to begin the next development phase of the QuickReach rocket. The company
plans to focus this phase on the liquid-oxygen-propane vapor pressurization propulsion
system. The ORS Office also intends to provide funding for the development of low-cost
responsive launch vehicles and is monitoring the results of the DARPA/USAF Falcon SLV
program.122
A full ORS capability could allow the US to replace satellites on short notice, enabling rapid
recover from space negation attacks and reducing general space system vulnerabilities.
2007 Development
Small and nanosatellite research may contribute to passive protection in space
Several developments took place in the US in 2007 to support the operational use of small
satellites. NASA announced that it had developed a low-cost, 200-pound satellite with no
moving parts or propellants.123 The first FASTSAT prototype was developed in less than 11
months at a cost of less than $4-million. The satellite can have a payload of up to 110
pounds and can be launched by either SpaceX’s Falcon-1 or Rocketplane Kistler’s K-1
rockets, both of which were designed for responsive, affordable space launch. Boeing
developed and launched the CubeSat Testbed-1 on 17 April.124 The satellite weighs less
than two pounds and is intended to demonstrate several software and hardware technologies
for nanosatellites. ATK won a $3.3-million USAF contract, with an option for an
additional $4.7-million, to develop a small satellite propulsion system combining both
chemical and electrical methods.125 DARPA released a Call for Proposal for System F6,
which seeks to research, develop, and test a satellite architecture where the functionality of
a single satellite is replaced by a cluster of free-fly subsatellites that wirelessly communicate
with each other.126 Each subsatellite of the system can perform a separate function or
duplicate the function of another module. The use of smaller and smaller satellites to
provide operational requirements in outer space, as well as the use of defensive clusters of
satellites or the inclusion of space-based backup systems, could contribute to space systems
protection strategies, including ORS..
Other actors that are seeking to develop more advanced microsatellites include China, ESA,
Israel, Russia, the UK, Canada, and India.
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2007 Space Security Impact
Whether efforts on more responsive space launch and flexible deployment of microsatellites
will enhance the secure use of space systems remains unclear. The formal definition of the
US ORS concept and the continued development of small satellites and launch vehicles are
steps toward a rapid replacement capability, but an operational ORS capacity remains fairly
distant. Further studies are also needed to determine the survivability of small satellites
against potential threats. Nonetheless, the use of small and relatively low-cost satellites for
a greater range of applications potentially allows actors to replace outdated, malfunctioned,
or attacked satellites more often and quickly. Constellations of smaller satellites can also
provide enhanced protection through redundancy, but because they are difficult to detect
and track, transparency of and confidence in space activities could be reduced.
7. Space Systems Negation
This chapter assesses trends and developments related to the research, development, testing,
and deployment of capabilities designed to negate the use of space systems. It also assesses the
development of space situational awareness capabilities, including space surveillance, which is
a key enabling technology for space systems negation since tracking and identifying targeted
objects in orbit are prerequisites to most negation techniques. The development of
technologies and capabilities that may be used to negate space systems is not necessarily linked
to policies to use them.
Space systems negation efforts can involve taking action, from the ground or from space,
against the ground-based components of space systems, the communications links to and
from satellites, space launchers, or satellites themselves. Negation can be achieved through the
application of cybernetic or electronic interference, conventional weapons, directed energy
(lasers), or nuclear capabilities used to carry out what are often referred to in the United States
as the five Ds: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction.
Many space negation capabilities apply to widely proliferated military equipment, technology,
and practices. These include conventional attacks on ground stations, hacking into computer
systems, jamming satellite communications links, using false radio transmissions (spoofing),
or simple camouflage techniques to conceal the location of military space assets.
Space negation capabilities that involve attacks on satellites themselves are more sophisticated.
With the exception of ground-based laser dazzling or blinding, a basic launch capability is
required to directly attack a satellite. Space surveillance capabilities are also required to
effectively target satellites in orbit. Some space-based negation techniques require highly
specialized capabilities, such as precision maneuverability or autonomous tracking.
Degradation and destruction can be provided by conventional, directed energy, or nuclear
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.1 Conventional anti-satellite weapons include precision-guided
kinetic-kill vehicles, conventional explosives, and specialized systems designed to spread lethal
clouds of metal pellets in the orbital path of a targeted satellite. A space launch vehicle with a
nuclear weapon would be capable of producing a High Altitude Nuclear Detonation
(HAND), causing widespread immediate electronic damage to satellites, combined with the
long-term effects of false radiation belts, which would have an adverse impact on many
satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).2
Space Security Impact
Space systems negation capabilities are directly related to space security since they enable an
actor to restrict the secure access to and use of space by other actors. The dynamics of space negation
and space protection are closely related. For example, robust space negation efforts will likely
succeed in the face of weak protection measures. Like other offense-defense relationships in
military affairs, this space security negation-protection dynamic raises concerns about an arms
race and instability as actors compete for the strategic advantages that space negation
capabilities appear to offer. Different negation activities are likely to stimulate different
responses.3 While interruption of communication links would probably not be viewed as very
provocative, physical destruction of satellites would be liklier to trigger an arms race.
Soviet and US concerns that early warning satellites be protected from direct attack as a
measure to enhance crisis management were enshrined in bilateral treaties such as the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties (see Laws, Policies, and
Doctrines). Recent space war games have also underscored the challenges generated by space
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negation efforts focused on “blinding” the strategic communications and attack warning
capabilities of an adversary.4
These security concerns are compounded by the fact that many key space capabilities are
inherently dual-use. For example, space launchers are required for many ASAT systems;
microsatellites offer great advantages as space-based kinetic-kill vehicles; and space surveillance
capabilities can support space debris collision avoidance strategies as well as targeting for ASAT
weapons.
It is noteworthy that the application of some destructive space negation capabilities, such as
kinetic-kill ASATs, would generate space debris that could potentially inflict widespread
damage on other space systems and undermine the sustainability of space security. Similarly,
a HAND is indiscriminate in its effects and would generate long-term negative impacts on
space security. These concerns have led some experts to argue that carefully targeted space
negation efforts may have a positive impact on space security if such efforts prevent the
targeted actor from using space systems to inflict widespread, long-term damage to the space
environment or otherwise prevent access to space.
Trend 7.1: Proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations
and communications links
The most vulnerable components of space systems are the ground stations and
communications links, which are susceptible to attack from widely accessible weapons and
technologies. An attack on the ground segments of space systems with conventional military
force is the most likely space negation scenario. System sabotage; physical attack on the
ground facility by armed invaders, vehicles, or missiles; and interference with power sources
would require modest military means.
The US leads in developing advanced technologies to temporarily negate space systems by
disrupting or denying access to satellite communications. The Department of Defense
(DOD) “Counterspace Systems” budget line item has had steady funding for early-stage
research and technology development of offensive programs “to disrupt, deny, degrade or
destroy an adversary’s space systems, or the information they provide, which may be used for
purposes hostile to US national security interests.”5 In 2004 the mobile CounterCom system,
designed to provide temporary and reversible disruption of satellite communications signals,
was declared operational.6 The US “Space Control Technology” program seeks to “continue
development and demonstration of advanced counter-communications technologies and
techniques…leading to future generation counter-communications systems and advanced
target characteristics.”7 The mission description for this program notes that, “consistent with
DoD policy, the negation efforts of this program focus only on negation technologies which
have temporary, localized, and reversible effects.”8 The 2004 Presidential Directive on
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems calls for development of capabilities to
selectively deny, as necessary, GPS and other navigation services.9
Electronic and information warfare techniques, including hacking into computer networks
and electronic jamming of satellite communications links, are negation capabilities that are
becoming increasingly available to both state and non-state actors. Incidents of electronically
jammed media broadcasts have been reported in recent years, including interruptions to US
broadcasts to Iran,10 Kurdish news broadcasts,11 and Chinese television (allegedly by the
Falun Gong).12 Iraq’s acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment for use against US GPS-guided
munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggests that jamming capabilities are
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proliferating the equipment was reportedly acquired commercially from a Russian company,
Aviaconversiya Ltd..13 The US CounterCom system is largely based on commercially available
components.14
2007 Development
Tamil Tigers illegally broadcast radio and television on Intelsat signals
Following complaints by the Sri Lankan government reports emerged in 2007 that the Tamil
Tigers were illegally using an Intelsat signal to broadcast radio and television.15 Although
Intelsat took steps to correct the problem, the event raises questions about the vulnerability of
commercial satellites to external threats. The Tamil Tigers indicated that they had been using
the Intelsat-12 satellite since May 2005, uplinking their programming from secret locations
in Tamil-controlled regions of Sri Lanka.16 While Intelsat maintains that the Tamil Tigers
illegally used the free satellite transponders, the Tigers claim to have been using the service
legally. Questions such as how the Tamil Tigers managed to accomplish the feat and why it
took Intelsat so long to correct the situation remain unanswered. After Intelsat discontinued
the Tamil Tiger’s broadcast, the group tried to launch a second satellite television channel,
TTN. Arrangements were made with Globecast, a subsidiary of France Telecom to uplink the
programming to the Hotbird satellite.17 Protests by the Sri Lankan government and the
subsequent investigation into TTN revealed that the station was operating without a license
from the French Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, and the station faces closure.18
2007 Development
Mysterious jamming incidents demonstrate continued ease of jamming satellite
communications
In September 2007 reports of satellite TV interruptions spread across Israel and Lebanon.19
The source of the interference was not positively identified, but started at the same time as an
Israeli air strike on a facility in Syria.20 Originally thought to have been caused by the jamming
tactics used by the Israeli force to disrupt air defense radars, an official Israeli investigation
pointed to a different source of the interference: a Dutch ship operating as part of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Mediterranean.21 The Dutch government
has since denied the claim and the investigation continues, with Russian and German vessels
raised as potential causes.22 The interference has disrupted the finances of the Israeli Yes
satellite television company, resulting in thousands of cancelled viewer contracts and the
launching of a class-action lawsuit against the company.23 Eutelsat also investigated an
unidentified source of interference in January 2007.24 While unintentional satellite
interference is an ongoing problem that relates to constraints on space resources such as
frequencies and orbital slots, it also demonstrates the ease with which satellite signals, if not
adequately protected, can be jammed by relatively low-grade technology.
2007 Development
Intrusion of secure computer networks in China, UK, Germany, France, and the US
Government computer networks in the UK, Germany, France, and the US reported incidents
of hacking in 2007.25 Networks affected include those belonging to the office of the German
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Chancellor, the French Ministry of Defense, and the US Department of Defense.26 The
German Federal Office of Information Security discovered Trojan software installed on
computers in the Chancellor’s office and Pentagon officials acknowledged that some
computers on a network serving the Office of the Secretary of Defense were shut down due
to the intrusions. The attacks were thought to have originated from China, although the
identities of those involved are unknown.27 The purpose of the intrusions is thought to be
information gathering and probing of network defenses.28 According to a senior Chinese
government official, Chinese computer networks were also under attack in 2007.29 These
attacks illustrate the weaknesses of even supposedly secured networks against computer
invasions.
2007 Development
US and China upgrade capabilities for cyber attacks, jamming
The USAF initiated an upgrade of the CounterCom satellite jamming system it first deployed
in 2004. The CounterCom system is a “mobile, ground-based antenna that can jam the signals
from a single satellite in geosynchronous orbit.”30 The upgrade aims to fully equip two
squadrons with seven jamming systems, up from the current two. USAF also started
pre-acquisition work for next-generation jammers, which will have “enhanced capabilities for
SATCOM denial” using largely commercially available components.31 The USAF also intends
to reduce the number of authorization steps and shorten the decision time to launch offensive
cyber attacks against enemy networks. The goal is to provide lower-ranking officers with the
authority to launch attacks so that they could take place within minutes.32 Currently the only
authority rests with the President and the Secretary of. Electronic jamming is in keeping with
the USAF preference for temporary and reversible means of space systems negation. In 2007
the US Army reported that it had deployed and is using a “wildly successful”33 ground-based
system that is complementary to the USAF CounterCom to deny US enemies the ability to
use commercial space capabilities.
Reports emerged in November 2007 that China had deployed advanced GPS jamming
systems on vans throughout the country. Given the relatively weak signals of GPS, incidents
of jamming are not new — for example, Russian systems have been used in Iraq and North
Korea — but these have been easily defeated by the US military. Efforts to protect against the
Chinese jammers may be more difficult.34
2007 Space Security Impact
Incidents of both deliberate and unintentional satellite interference in 2007 demonstrate the
vulnerability of satellite communications and computer networks to external attacks.
Moreover, the significant security and financial costs that result from interference show the
debilitating effect that relatively low-cost, low-technology threats can have on the security of
space operations. Facilitating and dispersing authorization for attacks could also create greater
instability. It should be noted, however, that interference with satellite communications and
ground stations is generally temporary and reversible and is less provocative and escalatory
than other types of space system negation.
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Trend 7.2: US leads in the development of space situational
awareness capabilities to support space negation
Driven by Cold War security concerns the US and USSR were pioneers in the development
of space surveillance capabilities. Today a growing number of space actors are investing in
space surveillance to facilitate debris monitoring, satellite tracking, and near Earth object
(NEO) detection. Although the US remains dominant, Russia maintains relatively extensive
capabilities in this area, and China and India have significant satellite tracking, telemetry, and
control assets essential to their civil space programs. China is reportedly upgrading its Xi’an
Satellite Monitoring Center, which is the primary control center for China’s network of 13
monitoring stations. Upgrades include increased orbit determination and tracking capabilities
of domestic and foreign satellites, which could be used to target negation activities against
space-based assets.35 The satellite intercepted by China on 11 January 2007 was tracked and
targeted from this center.36 Canada, France, Germany, and Japan are all actively expanding
their ground- and space-based space surveillance capabilities (see Space Environment Trend
1.3).
The US explicitly links space surveillance with its space control doctrine and desire to achieve
“space situational awareness.” The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated that the US
would “pursue modernization of the aging space surveillance infrastructure, enhance the
command and control structure, and evolve the system from a cataloging and tracking
capability to a system providing space situational awareness.”37 Space Control is defined by
the US Air Force (USAF) as “combat, combat support, and combat service support operations
to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies, and when directed,
deny an adversary freedom of action in space.”38i
The US Space Surveillance Network is the primary provider of space surveillance data. It has
limited capabilities to provide real-time data collection, however, and restrictions were placed
on the distribution of the data in the 2004 Defense Authorization Act.39 The Space
Situational Awareness Integration Office was created in 2002 within USAF Space Command,
with responsibilities to oversee the integration of space surveillance to achieve space situational
awareness.40 Space-based surveillance, demonstrated by the US in the late 1990s through the
Space Visible Sensor experiment,41 is being pursued through the Space-Based Surveillance
System (SBSS), described in the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan as “a constellation of optical
sensing satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable defensive and
offensive counterspace operations.”42 A pathfinder SBSS satellite is set for launch in 2009.43
But funding issues have bedeviled efforts to improve US space surveillance. In 2006 the US
DOD cancelled the Orbital Deep Space Imager program, intended to develop satellites that
would “provide a predictive, near real-time operating picture of space to enable space control
operations” in GEO, citing budgetary constraints.44 Traditional US willingness to provide
space surveillance data to other governments and commercial firms has been challenged over
the past several years — both for cost reasons and because of concerns about satellite security45
(see Space Environment Trend 1.3).
2007 Development
Space surveillance capabilities highlight vulnerability of satellites to detection
During its first 16 months of operations the French space surveillance radar GRAVES
detected between 20 and 30 satellites in LEO that are not listed in the official US Defense
Department satellite catalog. These satellites are assumed to belong to the US, as the DOD
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catalogue excludes information on sensitive US satellites. French officials are planning to use
the GRAVES radar data in negotiations with the US to remove sensitive French satellites from
the catalog, but are waiting for more data from German space surveillance radars. French
officials have claimed that they have enough information to determine the size, location, orbit,
and transmitting frequency of the unlisted satellites.46
The GRAVES space surveillance radar is operated by the French Air Force. The radar is a
bistatic design, with an emitter located near the Dijon Air Base in eastern France and a receiver
located 400 km away on the Plateau d’Albion in Provence. The system, overflying France at
an altitude between 400 km and 1000 km, is capable of detecting spacecraft as small as one
meter in diameter.47 More than 2,200 objects have been detected and categorized since
GRAVES became operational at the end of 2005. The GRAVES system, together with similar
systems in Germany and the UK, may contribute to a European Space Surveillance system.48
Governments of the European Space Agency will be asked to approve this project in a meeting
in 2008 (see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.1).
Funding for US space situational awareness (SSA) efforts was increased by more than
$100-million by the US Congress in the FY2008 budget authorization.49 This followed a
classified memo by President Bush to relevant government agencies calling for improved SSA
capabilities.50 Also in 2007 the head of Ukraine’s Pivdenne Design Bureau claimed in an
interview that the country has an independent ability to detect and monitor objects in orbit,
linked with its ability to control space; however, this capability has not been verified by outside
sources51 (see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.1).
2007 Development
Orbital Express satellite demonstrates automated approach using Space Situational
Awareness data
In 2007 the DARPA/NASA Orbital Express program demonstrated the potential use of SSA
data to support an automated approach to foreign satellites. Tracking data from the US Space
Surveillance Network (SSN) were used by the Astro spacecraft in the initial stages of its
approach to NextSat in the final experiment of the program.52 During the experiment the two
spacecraft were initially separated by more than 300 km. After the sensors onboard Astro lost
track of NextSat at a distance of 310 km, the ground controllers used data from the SSN to
provid Astro with a location fix for NextSat. Astro then maneuvered toward the predicted
location of NextSat and its optical and infrared sensors were able to reacquire the satellite (see
Space Systems Protection Trend 6.3).
2007 Space Security Impact
Space surveillance can support both protection and negation activities. Efforts to develop and
enhance space surveillance systems can have a positive impact on space security by increasing
the ability of actors to safely operate in space, enhancing transparency of outer space activities,
and providing a redundancy of capabilities. But the potential for such capabilities to support
deliberate attacks against satellites and other space objects is demonstrated through the
centrality of space surveillance in identifying foreign satellites, space control efforts, and close
proximity operations, depending on the extent to which the capability were integrated into
military command systems. Transparency in the collection and use of space surveillance data
would enhance its positive contribution to the security of outer space.
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Trend 7.3: Ongoing proliferation of ground-based capabilities to
attack satellites
As noted in Figure 7.1 a variety of American and Soviet/Russian programs during the Cold
War and into the 1990s sought to develop ground-based ASAT weapons employing
conventional, nuclear, or directed energy capabilities.
Figure 7.1: History of ground-based ASAT programs53
Conventional (kinetic hit-to-kill) weapons
Launching a payload to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is the fundamental
requirement for a conventional ASAT capability. Twenty-eight actors have demonstrated
suborbital launch capabilities; 10 of this number have demonstrated an orbital launch ability
(see Civil Space and Global Utilities Trend 3.1). With tracking capabilities, a payload of metal
pellets or gravel could be launched into the path of a satellite by suborbital rockets or missiles
(such as a SCUD missile).54 Kinetic hit-to-kill technology requires more advanced sensors to
home in on the target. Targeting satellites from the ground using any of these methods would
likely be more cost-effective and reliable than space-based options.55
System Actor Dates No. Intercepts Description of program
Bold Orion air-launched US 1959, single test 0 Air-launched ballistic missile passed within 32
ballistic missile kilometers of the US Explorer VI satellite
SAtellite INTerceptor US (USAF) 1960-1962, idea Designed as a co-orbital surveillance system,
(SAINT) abandoned in the 0 the satellite could be armed with a warhead or
late 1960s ‘blind’ the enemy satellite with paint
Program 505 US (US Army) 1962-1964 1? Nike-Zeus nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missile
system employed as an ASAT against orbital
vehicles
Program 437 US (USAF) 1963-1975 1? Nuclear-armed Thor ballistic missile launched
directly into the path of the target
Co-orbital (IS) ASAT USSR 1963-1972, 12? Conventional explosives launched into orbit
1976-1982 near target, detonated when within range of
one kilometer
Polaris submarine US (US Navy) 1964-late 1960s ? Submarine-launched ballistic missile fitted with
launched ASAT tracking sensors and launched into orbit as
satellite passed overhead to detonate a warhead
filled with steel pellets in satellite’s path
Laser ASAT USSR 1975-1989 0 Sary Shagan and Dushanbe laser sites reported
to have ASAT programs
Air-Launched Miniature US (USAF) 1982-1987 1 Missile launched from high-orbit F-15 aircraft to
Vehicle destroy satellite with a high-speed collision
MiG-31 Air-launched ASAT USSR 1980-1985 ? Exploration of kinetic-kill ASAT to be launched
from MiG-31 aircraft, never tested
MIRACL Laser US (USAF) 1989-1990, tested 1 Megawatt-class chemical laser fired at satellite
in 1997 though not to disable electronic sensors
recognized as an ASAT test
Ground-Based Kinetic US (US Army) 1990-2004 0 Kinetic-kill vehicle launched from the ground
Energy ASAT China (PLA) 2007- 1 to intercept and destroy a satellite
Medium-range ballistic Destroyed the Feng Yun 1C weather satellite
missile-based kinetic
energy ASAT
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USAF Counterspace Operations Doctrine Document 2-2.1 outlines a set of “counterspace
operations” designed to “preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage …
using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means.”56 It describes the planning for and
execution of such operations, including legal considerations and targets, which include
satellites; communications links; ground stations; launch facilities; command, control,
communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR);
and third-party providers. Among the tools for offensive counterspace operations, the
document lists direct ascent and co-orbital ASATs, directed energy weapons, and electronic
warfare weapons.
The US Army invested in ground-based kinetic energy ASAT technology in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The small, longstanding Kinetic Energy (KE) ASAT program was terminated
in 1993 but was later granted funding by Congress in FY 1996 through FY2005.57 Congress
appropriated $14-million for the KE ASAT for FY2005 through the Missile Defense Agency’s
(MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense Products budget.58 It is part of the Army Counterspace
Technology testbed at Redstone Arsenal.59 However, the US has not conducted a kinetic
energy ASAT demonstration since 1985.
The US has deployed a limited number of ground-based exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)
interceptors for ballistic missile defense purposes.60 EKVs use infrared sensors to detect
ballistic missiles in midcourse and maneuver into the trajectory of the missile to ensure a hit
to kill.61 With limited modification, the EKV could act as an ASAT against satellites in
LEO.62 Russia has developed a long-range (350 kilometer) exoatmospheric missile, the
Gorgon, for its A-135 anti-ballistic missile system.63 Russia continues to observe a voluntary
ASAT test moratorium. The precise status of its ASAT system is not known, but it is most
likely no longer operational.64 China has developed an advanced kinetic ASAT capability,
demonstrated by tests in 2005 and 2006 that culminated in the destruction of a Chinese
weather satellite on 11 January 2007.65 The UK, Israel, and India are also exploring
techniques for exoatmospheric interceptors.66
Nuclear weapons
A nuclear weapon detonated in space generates an electromagnetic pulse that is highly
destructive to unprotected satellites, as demonstrated by the US 1962 Starfish Prime test.67
Given the current global dependence on the use of satellites, such an attack could have a
devastating and wide-ranging impact on society. As noted above both the US and USSR
explored nuclear-tipped missiles as missile defense interceptors and ASAT weapons. The
Russian Galosh ballistic missile defense system surrounding Moscow employed nuclear-tipped
interceptors from the early 1960s through the 1990s.68
China, the member states of ESA, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, and the US possess
space launch vehicles capable of launching a nuclear warhead into orbit, although placing
weapons of mass destruction in outer space is prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. North
Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are among the 18 states that possess medium-range ballistic missiles
that could launch a mass equivalent to a nuclear warhead into LEO without achieving orbit.
Eight states are assessed to possess nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan,
Russia, the US, and the UK. North Korea has an ongoing nuclear program and attempted to
detonate a nuclear device in 2006.69 Iran reportedly ended its nuclear weapons program in
2003, but the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to investigate potential illegal
uranium enrichment activities.70 Iran also has an active long-range missile program.
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Directed energy weapons
The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US the
USSR/Russia and China. All states have access to low-powered lasers, which could be used to
“dazzle” unhardened satellites in LEO, and many may already have the capability to use
low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites in LEO.71 In 1997 the US
Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test fired against a satellite in a
420-km orbit, damaging the satellite’s sensors. Reportedly, it was a 30-watt laser used for
alignment that actually damaged the target satellite’s sensors,72 suggesting that even a
commercially available low-watt laser functioning from the ground could be used to “dazzle”
or temporarily disrupt a satellite.73 The megawatt class MIRACL laser system is able to dazzle
and blind sensors in GEO and heat to kill electronics on satellites in LEO — a significant
ASAT capability. Similarly the USAF Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New
Mexico is undertaking laser experiments under the Advanced Weapons Technology program
that was characterized as “experiments for application including antisatellite weapons” and
called for a demonstration of “fully compensated beam propagation to Low-Earth orbit
satellites” in the FY2007 budget request. Funding was only authorized after the USAF denied
any intent to test Starfire as an ASAT.74 Until 2004 the US was developing a Counter
Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS) that employed lasers to temporarily disrupt
surveillance satellites by dazzling their sensors.75
The Airborne Laser currently under development in the US is central to plans for future Boost
Phase Ballistic Missile Defense.76 The project achieved “first light” in 2004 in a ground-based
test of the chemical oxygen iodine laser.77 This technology is assessed by some experts to have
ASAT capabilities; however, the Airborne Laser continues to suffer from serious technology
challenges, schedule delays, and cost concerns within Congress.78 Other US High Energy
Laser projects include the Joint High Power Solid State Laser (JHPSSL).79
China operated a high-power laser program as early as 1986 and is now believed to have
multiple hundred-megawatt lasers.80 Chinese researchers are also studying adaptive optics to
maintain beam quality over long distances and the use of solid state lasers in space; both
technologies could apply to ASAT applications.81 In 2006 China reportedly used a
ground-based laser to illuminate an American reconnaissance satellite flying over Chinese
territory.82 It is difficult to verify from public sources the nature of the laser beam, the physical
effects on the spacecraft, or the intent behind the illumination.83
A summary of the technologies that are required to support the development of ground-based
capabilities to attack satellites is provided in Figure 7.2 below.
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Figure 7.2: Technologies required for the development of ground-based capabilities to attack satellites
2007 Development
China tests direct ascent missile against its own satellite, triggers protective response
Previously unreported attempts by China to intercept a satellite with a missile on 7 July 2005
and 6 February 2006 culminated in a successful intercept on 11 January 2007.84 The target
was the retired Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) weather satellite, launched in 1999 into a
Sun-Synchronous orbit with an altitude of 850 km.85 Reports indicate that the missile was
launched from a mobile launcher at the Xichang Space Launch Center, or a site close to it.
The FY-1C was moving south when the kill vehicle collided with it at high velocity. The
booster that delivered the kinetic kill vehicle is believed to be based on a medium-range,
two-stage, solid-fuelled ballistic missile, possibly the DF-21.86 A significant amount of large
and small debris was ejected into popular LEO, GEO, and sun-synchronous orbits. China is
the second country to successfully carry out a kinetic hit-to-kill intercept of a satellite, and this
is the first instance of a ground-launched intercept. It demonstrates the country’s advanced
tracking, targeting, and precision guidance capabilities in space, as well as its ability to use
those technologies for space negation purposes. Despite the test China is not believed to
currently have enough interceptors for a full ASAT system that could destroy multiple
satellites in LEO, although it could produce more.87 The intention of the satellite intercept is
not clear. In response to concerns expressed by many states Chinese authorities maintain that
the test was “not targeted at any country and will not threaten any country.”88 Both the US
and Russia ceased testing kinetic anti-satellite systems during the Cold War (see Space
Environment Trend 1.1 and Laws, Policies and Doctrines Trend 2.2).
Demonstrating the sensitive negation-protection dynamics of space, the US response appears
to focus on increasing its ability to detect future attacks on its space assets and to replace lost
capabilities should an attack or equipment failure occur. US President George W. Bush sent a
classified memo to relevant government agencies calling for improved situational awareness
capabilities and directing the US State Department and the US Department of Defense
(DoD) to look for ways to prevent future ASAT launches and to manage the consequences.
The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act contains a provision that requires the
Capabilities Conventional Directed energy Nuclear
Pellet cloud Kinetic-kill Explosive Laser Laser Laser heat- HAND
ASAT ASAT ASAT dazzling blinding to-kill
Suborbital launch ■ ■ ■ ■
Orbital launch ■ ■ ■ ■
Precision position/ maneuverability ■
Precision pointing ■ ■ ■
Precision space tracking (uncooperative) ■ ■ ■ ■
Approximate space tracking (uncooperative) ■ ■ ■
Nuclear weapons ■
Lasers > 1 W ■
Lasers > 1 KW ■
Lasers > 100 KW ■
Autonomous tracking/ homing ■
Key: ■ = Enabling capability
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Secretary of Defense to develop a Space Protection Strategy for periods beginning in 2008 and
continueing through to 2025.89 The first report on the strategy is due six months after the
bill’s enactment. Previously announced funding cuts to US SSA efforts were reversed and the
various programs received an overall funding boost in the FY2008 budget.90 The US
Operationally Responsive Space program also received $20-million above the original
$87-million requested for a total of $107-million.
Efforts are ongoing to develop High Altitude Airships and long endurance unmanned air
vehicles to supplement US space capabilities.
In 2007 India also focus on protecting its satellites, renewing plans to create an aerospace
defense command, although such a capability remains several years away.91
2007 Development
US continues development of ballistic missile defense systems and considers use against
a de-orbiting satellite
US BMD programs achieved several milestones in 2007, including nine launches that met
basic testing objectives.92 These intercepts included five by the Aegis BMD system (short- to
medium-range) and one by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System
(long-range), which have the capability of reaching LEO. The GMD system has only
completed two end-to-end tests of engagement sequences since 2002, however, and some
sensor elements such as the Forward Based X-band-Transportable Radar (FBX-T) have yet to
show that they can pass tracking and surveillance data to the GMD system in real time.93
Interceptors on the Aegis BMD system and the GMD system both use infrared sensors to
detect ballistic missiles in midcourse and maneuver into the trajectory of the missile to ensure
a hit to kill.94 Some experts assess that, with limited modification, these systems could act as
ASATs.95 In December 2007 MDA was asked by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
if it would be possible to intercept its failed US-193 reconnaissance satellite that had
de-orbited and would reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in 2008.96
The US also continued to pursue boost-phase BMD capabilities, which could potentially be
used to prevent an actor from launching a satellite. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
program has spent almost $1-billion over the past five years, with requests for large increases
over the next few years.97 While the KEI aims to provide boost-phase missile defense through
“a fast-burn, high velocity, mobile interceptor,” the program is plagued with technological
challenges.98 Still, the KEI completed several development tests in 2007, including “booster
hypersonic wind tunnel tests,” and it acquired “Facilities and Range support services for first
booster flight.”99
In addition to the KEI program, Raytheon and the MDA are modifying the AIM-120
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) under the Network Centric
Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) program to develop an air to air missile suitable for
boost phase intercepts. The program completed several tests in 2007, including the imaging
of an Orion sounding rocket at close range by a NCADE seeker mounted on an AIM-9X
missile, but is quite small, with a budget of only $6-million in FY2008.100
The Airborne Laser (ABL) also achieved several hardware and performance advances in 2007.
Mounted on a modified Boeing 747 jet, the ABL is a high-powered chemical laser to be used
as a direct energy interceptor for short-range ballistic missiles in boost phase. In 2007 the
illuminator laser was successfully fired more than 50 times during in-flight tests and the
chemical main laser was integrated into the ABL aircraft. Integration will continue in 2008,
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with missile interception flight tests currently planned for 2009.101 The ABL aircraft, which
is equipped with the Surrogate High Energy Laser, also demonstrated one full engagement
sequence in flight on 24 July 2007. The test involves detecting and tracking a target board
carried by a modified KC-135 using the Target Illuminator Laser (TILL), illuminating the
target with the Beacon Illuminator Laser (BILL) and adjusting for atmospheric distortions
using BILL reflections, and finally illuminating the target board using the surrogate laser.102
The Airborne Laser program had a budget of $598-million in FY2007, and $513-million was
approved for FY2008, a reduction of $35-million, although both the House and Senate
initially opted to cut the program by at least $200-million.103
Funding for the program comes despite its being “a high risk technology development and
demonstration program”; it has “suffered numerous delays and cost increases since its
inception in 1996, and it is currently estimated that it will cost $5.1-billion from inception to
the completion of the first test to shoot down a target missile, currently scheduled for 2009.
The original cost estimate to complete the first shoot-down test was $1-billion.” Even if
successful, “the first shoot-down test will not determine whether the ABL could be made
operationally effective or affordable. There are inherent operational constraints in the ABL
concept that would have to be overcome. Additional testing would be required to demonstrate
operational capability and military utility. Furthermore, even if the follow-on testing were
successful, the system would likely not provide an operational capability until 2018 or
later.”104 While it is developing and testing advanced laser applications that could form the
basis of directed energy anti-satellite capabilities, technical challenges to the program remain
daunting.
2007 Development
Ballistic missile defense efforts in Japan, and India could lay the foundation for potential
ground-based ASAT capabilities
As the desire for a BMD capability spreads, so too do the technical capabilities, which could
be modified for the purposes of space systems negation. Japan is the largest international
BMD partner with the US. On 17 December 2007 the destroyer JS KONGO became the
first Japanese ship to successfully perform a sea-based mid-course intercept against a ballistic
missile target during the Japan Flight Test Mission-1.105 JS KONGO is an Aegis-class
destroyer equipped with the Aegis Missile Defense System. During the flight test an Aegis
SM-3 missile detected, tracked, and intercepted an exoatmospheric target missile launched
from the US Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. The ship also previously
participated in two earlier tracking exercises where its radar detected and tracked target
missiles launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility. The Aegis SM-3 is a fairly mature
technology that could be modified for use against satellites in LEO. But current Japanese
policy prohibits ASAT activities and changing this policy requires an amendment to the
Japanese constitution.
India is attempting to build its own indigenous BMD system and achieved several successes
in 2007, although the program is not yet capable of threatening satellites and there are no
plans to pursue exoatmospheric capabilities. India reportedly tested a hypersonic Advanced
Air Defense interceptor missile against a modified Prithvi target missile.106 The missile was
tracked using the long-range tracking radar, developed with the help of Israel, and the
intercept occurred at an altitude of 15 km. A few days earlier there was a similar test of an
intercept at an altitude of 50 km.107 Many technological challenges still face India’s BMD
efforts, but it continues to progress.
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Figure 7.3: Ballistic missiles with a range over 1000 km by country108
* Limited deployment according to DOD Report to Congress on PRC military power
** Limited deployment according to DOD Report to Congress on PRC military power
n Possible testbed for multistage missile technologies. Involved in the satellite launch attempt in 1998
‡ Not explicitly mentioned in newspaper article http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945859.html
Ω Imported from China
Country System Name Status Range (km) Payload (kg)
Asia
China CSS-2 (DF-3/3A) Operational 2,650/2,900 2,150
CSS-3 (DF-4) Operational 5,500 2,200
CSS-4 (DF-5/5A) Operational 12,000/13,000
CSS-5 (DF-21) Operational 1,800 600
DF-25 Operational 1,700 2,000
CSS-9 (DF-31) Operational* 8,000 700
DF-31A Operational** 12,000 800
CSS-N-3 (JL-1) (SLBM) Operational 2,500 500
CSS-NX-5 (JL-2) (SLBM) Operational n 2,000-8,000 1050-2,800
India Agni-II Operational 2,000/2,500 1,000
North Korea Nodong Operational 1,300 700-1,000
Taepodong I Testbed n 1,500-2,000 1,000
Pakistan Ghauri I (Hatf V/Nodong) Operational 1,300 500-750
Ghauri II Operational 1,500-2,000 700
Shaheen II Operational 2,000/2,500 750-1,000
Russia and United States
Russia SS-18 (Satan) Operational 9,000-11,000 8,800
SS-19 (Stiletto) Operational 10,000 4,350
SS-24 (Scalpel) Operational 9,000-11,000 8,800
SS-25 (Sickle) Operational 10,500 1,000-1,200
SS-27 (Topol-M) Operational 10,500 1,000-1,200
SS-N-18 (Stingray) (SLBM) Operational 6,500 1,600
SS-N-23 (Skiff) (SLBM) Operational 8,300 2,800
United States Minuteman III (MK-12/12A) Operational 9,650+ 1,150
MX Peacekeeper Operational 9,650+ 3,950
Trident II (D5) (SLBM) Operational 7,360+ 2,800
Europe
France M-45 (SLBM) Operational 6,000 ?
United Kingdom Trident II (D5) (SLBM) Operational 7,360+ 2,800
Middle East
Iran Shahab III Operational 1,300 750-800
Ashoura Operational n 2,000 n n
Israel Jericho III Operational n ‡ 3,000-6,500 1,000-1,300
Saudi Arabia Dong Feng-3 (CSS-2)Ω Operational 2,600 2,150
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2007 Development
Ongoing development of high-energy lasers and adaptive optics
Several actors are developing ground-based lasers, adaptive optics, and tracking systems that
would allow laser energy to be accurately directed at a passing satellite. Low-power beams are
useful for ranging and tracking satellites, while high-energy beams are known to cause
equipment damage. Adaptive optics is a technology that enables telescopes to rapidly adjust
their optical components to compensate for distortions. This technology could be applied to
produce detailed images of satellites. Ground- and aircraft-based lasers could also use the same
technologies to maintain the cohesion of a laser beam as it travels through the atmosphere,
enabling more energy to be delivered on target at a greater distance. There is worldwide
interest in adaptive optics research and development, and a number of industrial countries
such as Canada, China, Japan, Russia, the US, and India are involved.109 Actors that are
developing laser satellite communication systems, such as France, Germany, and Japan, also
inherently have the ability to track and direct a laser beam at a satellite. Several actors have
demonstrated the technical ability to generate relatively high-powered laser beams. Both Israel
and the United States have developed prototypes of laser systems that are capable of destroying
artillery shells and rockets at short ranges.
Following background information denying any intent to test the system as an ASAT, the
USAF Starfire Optical Range requested $5.7-million in FY2007 to test fire a laser at a satellite
in LEO.110 There is no public information emerged that such a test took place in 2007, but
the US DOD received $44-million in funding for Starfire in the FY2008 budget.111 The
Chinese government is devoting resources to high-power solid state laser research.112 As of
2007 power outputs in the single-digit kilowatt range have been achieved. While this output
is much lower than the 100 kW considered necessary for a weapon, the 1997 MIRACL test
demonstrated that even low-power lasers can damage satellites. South Korea is also interested
in developing laser systems for use against North Korean missiles and artillery shells, and
hopes to deploy a system starting in 2010.113 Japan is interested in developing an air- and
ground-based laser system for BMD. The Japanese Ministry of Defense plans to request
funding for research and development for a ground-based system in its FY2008 budget and it
is also interested in participating in the US ABL program.114 Indian defense scientists are also
reportedly experimenting with “high-power laser weapons.”115
2007 Space Security Impact
The Chinese satellite intercept in January 2007 ended a 20-year pause in known ASAT testing
and demonstrated a current capability to destroy LEO satellites. The successful destruction of
FY-1C and the debris cloud created are both negative developments in space security,
compounded by a potential spiral of capabilities and tests — indicated by US anti-ballistic
missile activities — as well as other protective responses. The continued development of high
energy lasers combined with adaptive optics could have a negative impact on space security as
it has the potential to cause permanent damage to a satellite. The same technologies could also
be applied to satellite tracking and identification. The development of theater-level ABM
capabilities by the various actors, although not a direct threat to space objects, is cause for
concern, because most of the necessary technologies, such as target detection, tracking,
homing, command and control networks, and boosters, are also applicable to ASAT roles.
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Trend 7.4: Increasing access to space-based negation-enabling
capabilities
Deploying space-based ASATs, whether using kinetic-kill, directed energy, or conventional
explosive techniques, would require somewhat more advanced enabling technologies beyond
the fundamental requirements for orbital launch. Many of these technologies could be
advantageous for a variety of civil, commercial, or non-negation military programs, but
microsatellites, maneuverability, and other autonomous proximity operations are essential
building blocks for a space-based negation system. A summary of the existing capabilities of
key space actors that are considered enabling technologies for the development of space-based
ASATs is provided in Figure 7.4.
Space-based weapons targeting satellites with conventional explosives, referred to as “space
mines,” could employ microsatellites to maneuver near a satellite and explode within close
range. Relatively inexpensive to develop and launch and with a long lifespan, microsatellite
technology serves many useful purposes. A microsatellite’s purpose would be difficult to
determine until detonation and, because of its small size, a space-mine microsatellite would be
hard to detect, particularly if launched discreetly.
The proliferation of microsatellite technology has involved a wide array of new state,
commercial, and academic actors engaging in satellite research and development. At least 30
states have at some time employed microsatellites (see Civil Space Programs and Global
Utilities Trend 3.1). In 2000 the partnership between China and Surrey Satellite Technology
Ltd. of the UK saw the launch of the Tingshua-1 microsatellite and companion Surrey
Nanosatellite Application Platform to test on-orbit rendezvous capabilities.116
A variety of ongoing US programs are developing advanced technologies that would be
foundational for a space-based conventional ASAT program, including maneuverability,
docking, and onboard optics. The USAF Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) employs
microsatellites to test proximity operations, including autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering,
and close-up inspection of a target. XSS-11 was launched in 2005 and flew successful repeat
rendezvous maneuvers. The MDA Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), designed to
provide support to ballistic missile defense, at one point was planning to employ a kill vehicle
to encounter a ballistic missile at close range, with a sensor to record the findings. However,
in 2005 MDA cancelled the kill vehicle experiment after Congress expressed concerns about
its applicability to ASAT development.117 In 2006 the US launched a pair of Microsatellite
Technology Experiments (MiTEx) satellites into an unknown geostationary transfer orbit.
The MiTEx satellites are technology demonstrators for the Microsatellite Demonstration
Science and Technology Experiment Program (MiDSTEP) sponsored by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the US Air Force and the US Navy. A major
goal of the MiTEx demonstrations is to assess the potential of small satellites in GEO for
defense applications.118 Another missile defense technology that could enable space systems
negation would be the space-based interceptor (SBI) (see Space-Based Strike Capabilities
Trend 8.1).119
Space Security 2008
Figure 7.4: Enabling capabilities of key actors for space-based kinetic-energy ASATs*
* This figure highlights enabling technologies for space-based kinetic-kill negation capabilities. It does not imply that these actors
have such negation systems or even programs to develop them, merely that they have prerequisite technologies that would
make acquisition of such a system a shorter-term possibility.
Autonomous rendezvous capacity was also the objective of NASA’s Demonstration of
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) spacecraft, relying on the Advanced Video
Guidance Sensor and GPS to locate its target.152 In 2005 the ASAT capability of
maneuverable microsatellites was demonstrated when the DART unexpectedly collided with
the target satellite and bumped it into a higher orbit.153
The DARPA Orbital Express program will develop on-orbit refueling and reconfiguring —
servicing necessary to maneuver a space-based ASAT.154 These programs use smaller, lighter
components and are consistent with a growing US emphasis on responsive space programs
(see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.3).
On-orbit servicing is also a key research priority for German and Canadian civil space
programs and supporting commercial companies. The joint German-Russian-Canadian
on-orbit servicing program, Technology Satellite for Demonstration and Verification of Space
Systems, is testing proximity operations and on-orbit maintenance of satellites. It will explore
“in-orbit qualification of the key robotics elements (both hardware and software) for advanced
space maintenance and servicing systems, especially with regard to docking and robot-based
capturing procedures.” Germany’s Spacecraft Life Extension System project plans a satellite
“tugboat” to keep satellites in orbit beyond their intended lifespans.155 The ConeXpress
Orbital Life Extension Vehicle being developed by Orbital Recovery is set to be the first
commercial satellite that is specifically designed to rendezvous with a target satellite in GEO.
There is no evidence to suggest that these programs are intended to support space systems
Capability China EU/ESA France UK India Israel Japan Russia Ukraine US
Space launch vehicles
Land – Fixed120 X X X X X X X X X
Land – Mobile121 L L L L L X L X122
Sea L123 X124,125 X126 X127
Air D128 X129
Space tracking (uncooperative)
Optical (passive) X130 X X131 X132 X133 X134 X135
Radar X136 X137 X138 X139 X140 X141
Laser142 X X X X X X X X X
Autonomous rendezvous
Cooperative D143 X144 D145
Uncooperative D146 F147 D
Proximity operations
Cooperative D148 X149
Uncooperative D150 X151
High-g, large-
∆V upper stages X X X L D X X X X
Microsatellite construction X X X X X X X X X X
Key: X = Existing capability F = Flight-tested capabiity D = Under development L = Latent capability
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negation purposes, but the technologies could conceivably be modified for such an
application.
Researchers at Chinese universities are analyzing on-orbit homing and rendezvous methods,
although it is unclear whether the research is original and Chinese-initiated or merely a review
of previously conducted foreign research.156
2007 Development
US and European states testing space-based technologies with potential negation
capabilities
The USAF’s XSS-11 program uses microsatellites to test proximity operations, including
autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering, and close-up inspection of a target in LEO. It was
launched in 2005 and funding for a follow-on XSS mission was requested. The FY2007
budget included $26.6-million to complete the bus and payload for the next XSS satellite, to
perform environmental testing, and to begin integration with the launch vehicle.157 The
program received $28.9-million in FY2008.158 The budget request indicated that XSS-11
remained in orbit in 2007 and that another launch is planned for 2009. The fact that the
program is linked to the Advanced Weapons Technology element of the budget suggests that
it could evolve into an ASAT program.159
A smaller program aimed at developing similar technologies, the Microsatellite
Demonstration Science and Technology Experiment Program (MiDSTEP) sponsored by
DARPA, the USAF, and the US Navy, integrates a variety of advanced technologies into
microsatellites that can operate as high as GEO orbits. These technologies include lightweight
optical space situation awareness sensors, lightweight power, chemical and electrical
propulsion systems, and active radio frequency sensor technologies. They are being
demonstrated in space through Microsatellite Technology Experiments (MiTEx) satellites
launched in 2007.160 The project received $8-million in FY2007 and requested $10-million
in 2008 to study the results of the MiTEX experiments. While there is little public
information available to verify the intent of the MiDSTEP program, the stated technologies
could have ASAT applications.161 The experimental Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
upper-stage motor has solar panels, high performance delta-V motors, long lifetime attitude
control thrusters, a high performance star tracker, and large capacity fuel tanks.162 It is
thought to possess greater capability and have a longer lifespan than is required to transfer a
pair of microsatellites to GEO and could potentially be designed to maneuver for close
proximity operations with other satellites. Potential uses include passive reconnaissance
missions or more hostile negation efforts to interfere with or even damage satellites. These
activities could be done discreetly, as such small satellites are difficult to reliably detect and
track, particularly in GEO.163
Other US programs developing a range of space-based, dual-use maneuvering, autonomous
approach, and docking capabilities include the DARPA/NASA Orbital Express program,
which demonstrated the feasibility of conducting automated satellite refueling and repair in
2007; and the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS)
program, intended to shadow a space asset and provide local, on-orbit space situational
awareness and anomaly characterization, with first launch planned for 2009.164 These
programs are covered in more detail in Space Systems Protection Trend 6.3. DARPA and the
NRL are also developing a space tug capable of physically maneuvering another satellite in
orbit under a program called Front-End Robotic Enabling Near-Term Demonstrations
(FREND). It is “designed to allow interaction with geosynchronous orbit (GEO)-based
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military and commercial spacecraft, extending their service lives and permitting satellite
repositioning or retirement.”165 In August 2007 the Alliance Spacesystem LLC delivered a
prototype robotic arm to the NRL for FREND, while a second arm built to spaceflight
requirements is scheduled to be delivered in July 2008.166
The NRL has developed and ground tested the guidance and control algorithms to enable a
spacecraft-mounted robotic arm to autonomously grapple another satellite not designed for
docking.167 Although not the intention of the program, the capabilities being developed could
have applications for space-based systems negation, particularly because the docking and
maneuvering capabilities are being designed for use against satellites that could be
non-cooperative. Program funding remains modest, however, at $14.4-million for FY 2008.
Another program exploring technologies for space-based protection from direct threats is the
DARPA Tiny Independent Coordinated Spacecraft (TICS) program, which would create
small (10-pound) satellites that could be quickly air launched by fighter jets to form protective
formations shielding larger satellites from direct attacks (see Space Systems Protection Trend
6.3).168 The program objective to create small satellites that are “hard to detect,” can be
inserted into “any common operational orbit,” with “little or no warning,” and include
“advanced robotic technologies” could potentially be used against non-cooperative
spacecraft.169
Advanced space-based technologies with dual-use characteristics are also being developed
elsewhere. Sweden is developing Europe’s first automated rendezvous and proximity operation
mission.170 The PRISMA mission is to demonstrate technologies for autonomous formation
flying, approach and rendezvous, proximity operations, and final approach and recede
operations.171 The mission is funded by the Swedish National Space Board; the Swedish Space
Corporation is the main contractor. Project partners include the German Aerospace Center
(DLR), the French Centre National d’Études Spatiales (CNES), and the Technical University
of Denmark (DTU). Similar to the US Orbital Express mission, the PRISMA mission will
launch two small satellites into orbit. The 140 kg MAIN satellite is fully maneuverable and
will perform all the maneuvering. The 50 kg TARGET will be the reference spacecraft that
MAIN will approach using GPS and RF sensors. MAIN and TARGET passed their Critical
Design Review in February 2007 and the main propulsion of MAIN was delivered in
September of that year. The mission is scheduled to be launched in the second half of 2008
and the total development cost is just under 230-million SEK ($38.64-million).172
2007 Space Security Impact
The emergence of advanced space-based capabilities is likely to complicate space security
because of the range of passive protection and more active negation functions that they can
serve, with the line between these types of activities unclear. These technologies could be used
to enhance knowledge of local space and gather information on other, potentially hostile,
satellites or to support on-orbit servicing of satellites to extend their lifespans or recover from
negation efforts. But all of the capabilities described have clear space negation applications.
Currently, however, these programs are still experimental and their funding levels are relatively
low. The more immediate consequence is the challenge posed by not knowing what the threats
are, largely because of the secrecy of many technology programs.
8. Space-Based Strike Systems
This chapter assesses trends and developments related to the research, development, testing,
and deployment of space-based strike capabilities and systems. Space-based strike systems
operate from Earth orbit with the capability to damage or destroy either terrestrial targets
(land, sea, or air) or terrestrially launched objects passing through space (e.g., ballistic
missiles), via the projection of mass or energy. Earth-to-space and space-to-space strike
capabilities, often referred to as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, are addressed in the Space
Systems Negation chapter. Space systems that support Earth-based strike capabilities, such
as reconnaissance satellites, are addressed in Space Support for Terrestrial Military
Operations.
Mass-to-target strike systems collide with a target, damaging it through the combined mass
and velocity impact of the weapon, or hit a target with inert or explosive devices. One
mass-to-target concept is the US missile defense Space-Based Interceptor (SBI), which is
designed to accelerate toward and collide with a ballistic missile in its boost phase. Another
mass-to-target concept is the hypervelocity rod bundle — an orbital uranium or tungsten
rod that would be decelerated from orbit and reenter the Earth’s atmosphere at high velocity
to attack ground targets.
Energy-to-target strike systems, often called directed energy weapons, transfer energy
through a beam designed to generate sufficient heat or shock to disable or destroy a target.
This beam could be generated using lasers, microwaves, or neutral particle beams. An
example of an energy-to-target SBSS is the US Space-Based Laser (SBL) concept for missile
defense. An SBL would attempt to use a satellite to direct an intense laser beam at a missile
during its launch phase, heating it to the explosion point. An SBL satellite would require
an energy source to power the laser, optical systems to generate the laser, and precise attitude
control to point the laser beam accurately at the target for a relatively sustained period of
time. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) canceled the SBL program in 2000, although
some classified work on the concept may be ongoing.1
While no space-based strike systems have yet been tested or deployed, the US and the
former USSR devoted considerable resources to the development of key space-based strike
capabilities during the Cold War. The US continues to develop SBI enabling technologies
within the context of its missile defense program. In addition to assessing the status of these
dedicated space-based strike programs, this chapter also assesses efforts of space actors to
develop key technologies required for space-based strike capabilities, even if they are not
being pursued for that purpose. It is generally accepted that only the most advanced
spacefaring states could overcome the technical hurdles to deploy effective space-based
strike systems in the foreseeable future.
Space Security Impact
Space-based strike systems can have a direct impact on all aspects of space security. An actor
with a space-based strike capability, such as an SBI, could use such a system to deny or
restrict another actor’s ability to access space by attacking its space launch vehicles.
Moreover, since some space-based strike systems may also be capable of attacking satellites,
they could be used to restrict or deny the use of space assets and may generate additional
space debris or electromagnetic interference.
The deployment of a space-based strike system would enable an actor to threaten and even
attack actors on Earth with very little warning and would constitute a departure from
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current practice regarding the military use of space. The psychological effects of such a
“Sword of Damocles” could be far-reaching. It would also raise questions regarding the
interpretation of the “use of outer space for peaceful purposes” as enshrined in the preamble
of the Outer Space Treaty, which remains a point of contention in space law.2 It would
directly threaten space security since actors would no longer enjoy freedom from
space-based threats.
Because actors may seek to offset space-based threats, the deployment of space-based strike
systems would most likely encourage the development of ASAT weapons and legitimize
attacks on space assets in self-defense. Certain normative restrictions and moratoria upon
such attacks could be undermined. For rapid response times, strike systems would have to
be placed in low earth orbit, making them vulnerable to attack.3 Further, the testing and
deployment of ASAT systems in response to space-based strike installations could generate
space debris, undermining the sustainable use of space for all actors over the longer term
(see Space Environment).
Some argue that space-based strike capabilities may be necessary to protect space systems
from attack.4 Indeed, the protection of satellites and the missile defense potential of
space-based strike systems are two of the most commonly cited justifications for their
development. As noted in Space Systems Negation, it is argued that these systems could be
used to protect the security of space assets against space negation attacks that might inflict
long-term and disproportionate damage to the space environment or otherwise deny access
to space.
Trend 8.1: While no space-based strike systems have been
tested or deployed, the US continues to consider a
space-based interceptor for its missile defense system
No known integrated space-based strike systems have been tested or deployed.5 The most
advanced space-based strike effort during the Cold War primarily focused on the
development of mass-to-target weapons. In the 1960s the USSR developed the Fractional
Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) to deliver a nuclear weapon by launching it into a
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at 135-150 kilometers in altitude; it would de-orbit after flying
only a fraction of one orbit, destroying an Earth-based target.6 FOBS was not a space-based
strike system, although it demonstrated capabilities that could be used in the development
of an orbital bombardment system. A total of 24 launches — 17 successful — were
undertaken between 1965 and 1972 to develop and test the USSR FOBS system.7 It was
phased out in January 1983 to comply with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, under
which deployment of FOBS was prohibited. It is not publicly known whether nuclear
weapons were orbited through the FOBS efforts.
The US and USSR both pursued development of energy-to-target space-based strike
systems in the 1980s, although today these programs have largely been halted. In 1985 the
US held underground tests of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser for the SBL, under the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), although the effort proved unsuccessful and was abandoned. The
US also performed a Relay Mirror Experiment in 1990, which tested ground-based laser
re-directing and pointing capabilities for the SBL.8 In 1987 the USSR’s heavy-lift Energiya
rocket launched a 100-ton payload named Polyus, which by some reports included a neutral
particle beam weapon and a laser. Due to a failure of the attitude control system, the
payload did not enter orbit.9
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The USSR’s neutral particle beam experiments were reportedly halted in 1985. The US SBL
program was cancelled in 2000 and the SBL office closed in 2002.10 Although indirect
research and development continue through the US MDA, the technology for the SBL does
not exist.11 Approximately $50-million was allocated to both the Department of Defense
(DOD) Directed Energy Technology and High Energy Laser Research programs in
FY2007; however, Congress cut funding for Laser Space Technology development.12 Other
larger classified budgetary programs are suspected of continuing work on space-based
directed energy technologies.13
Under SDI in the 1980s the US invested several billion dollars in research and development
of a space-based strike concept called Brilliant Pebbles. While the SDI never developed or
deployed a fully operational system, the US did test some propulsion and targeting
subsystems for Brilliant Pebbles. Research and development efforts in the US for
space-based strike capabilities declined in the 1990s, but have been revived since 2000
through the SBI. SBI continues to be the most substantial space-based strike research and
development program. The current SBI concept was developed to contribute to missile
defense by providing a capability to intercept missiles as they pass through space. As with
ground-based ASAT systems, SBI capabilities could conceivably be used for offensive
attacks on satellites.
One of the first key tests of US SBI-enabling technologies was the 1994 Clementine lunar
mission to test lightweight spacecraft designs “at realistic closing velocities using celestial
bodies as targets.”14 It has been succeeded by the US Air Force’s Experimental Spacecraft
System (XSS) with the objective to develop and demonstrate the capabilities of various
microsatellite technologies, although the program has no direct relationship to MDA’s SBI
program (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.4). The US Near-Field Infrared Experiment
(NFIRE) is designed to include many of the key capabilities required for an SBI, including
appropriate sensors, propulsion, and guidance units.15 There is ongoing debate within the
US Congress on whether the NFIRE system should be allowed to launch an independent
“kill vehicle” to intercept a missile. This mission has been revised several times.16 Under
none of these revisions has the kill vehicle included the propulsion unit required for homing
in on a missile, so it cannot be called an integrated space-based strike system. Revival of the
interceptor is listed as justification for a second NFIRE mission in the FY2007 budget
request “in response to congressional encouragement in the FY 06 Defense Appropriations
bill to complete development of the Kill Vehicle.”17 However, MDA has repeatedly stated
that it has no plans to revive it. The US has also completed a phase-one study for the
Microsatellite Propulsion Experiment (MPX), which would include two two-stage,
anti-missile propulsion units — a key requirement for an SBI capability.18
Longer-term US plans include the deployment of an SBI testbed.19 While such a system
would have limited operational utility, it could constitute the first deployment of a
space-based strike system. A summary of completed and planned US space-based
strike-related missions is provided in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: Recent and planned US space missions testing SBI technologies or integrated systems
Since its first appearance on the budget in FY2004 under the Ballistic Missile Defense
Interceptor Program, the allocation for Space Test Bed has been scaled back financially and
the timeline has been extended. The budget request in FY2004 was $14-million with initial
tests scheduled for 2008. By FY2005 initial experiments had been pushed back to
2010–2011. The amount of funding requested has dropped sharply, from $1.5-billion for
FY2003–2007 to $290-million through FY2013, but goals and timelines have remained
stable in recent years.21 The meaning of these budget cuts is not clear. It is possible that
Space Test Bed is receiving more funds from classified accounts, or funding is being diverted
to other classified programs. While the program remains on the books, the FY2007
authorization bill restricted the DOD from using funds for the “testing or deployment of
space-based interceptors” until 90 days after submitting to Congress a detailed report on the
project, including, inter alia, “an analysis of implication on foreign policy and national
security, as well as probable responses from other countries.”22
While the development of an integrated space-based strike vehicle may be possible within
years rather than decades, building a militarily effective strike system with global coverage
remains a significant challenge. A truly global system would require hundreds or even
thousands of vehicles in orbit, and thus a launch capacity about five to 10 times greater than
the current US launch capacity.23 An examination of the technical feasibility of such a
system for missile defense, conducted by the American Physical Society, estimated that
launch costs alone for a system covering latitudes that include Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
would likely exceed $44-billion.24 The US Congressional Budget Office estimated the full
cost of a system with a similar coverage of the globe, but with the capability to intercept
only liquid-fueled ballistic missiles with longer launch timelines, at between $27-billion and
$40-billion. Such a system presumed considerable advances in kill vehicle components.
Without these advances, coverage would cost between $56-billion and $78-billion.25
In summary, there have been no space-based strike systems tested or deployed to date,
although Cold War-era programs did support considerable development and testing of key
technologies. Prohibitive costs and reduced perceived needs led Russia and, to a lesser
degree, the US to drastically cut funding for space-based strike programs, particularly the
energy-to-target types. More recently the US has pursued the development of SBI in the
context of its ballistic missile defense program, although both political and financial
challenges to its completion remain.
Mission Stage Launch Agency Description
Clementine Complete 1994 DOD & NASA Tested lightweight sensors at realistic closing
velocities using the moon and asteroids
as targets
NFIRE Ongoing 2007 MDA Testing space-based plume detection and
early-warning and tracking capabilities, and
missile defense models and simulations20
MPX Planned N/A MDA Two two-stage anti-missile propulsion units
SBI testbed Planned 2010-2012 MDA Three to six integrated SBIs as a testbed for
a full SBI system
Space-Based Strike Systems
2007 Development
NFIRE successfully tests sensor system in space for missile defense
The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) NFIRE satellite was launched on 24 April 2007
on a US Air Force Minotaur rocket from NASA’s Wallops facility off the coast of Virginia.26
The primary Track Sensor Payload (TSP) is designed to collect both high- and
low-resolution imagery from a missile plume using long-, medium-, and short-wave
infrared.27 It is intended to test a sensor system to observe and differentiate a missile plume
from its rocket, a critical piece of data to enable space-based missile defense interception.
The first test of the system took place on 23 August 2007 when a modified Minuteman II
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. The NFIRE satellite observed the missile plume as the Minuteman passed
within 3.5 km at its closest point — the test cost approximately $25-million. The total
program cost $300-million.28
A second sensor originally planned to fly on a “kill vehicle” in close proximity to the target
missile was cancelled in 2004, removing any potential weapons component to the system.
Nonetheless, the test was an important milestone in the development of the enabling
technology for space-based boost phase missile defense. While some analysts cite concerns
that it could be used to support future space-based interceptors or to target satellites, MDA
officials contend that there are currently no plans to develop such systems.29
2007 Development
Multiple Kill Vehicle received boost in FY2008 budget allocation
Citing concern over loss of focus, the US Congress eliminated all funding for the Multiple
Engagement Payload (MEP) in the FY2008 Defense Authorization bill and instead directed
MDA to focus its efforts on the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) development. Congress cut
$40-million from MDA’s requested program budget, authorizing $231.2-million.30
In contrast to the MEP, which was being developed for the US Navy’s Standard Missile-3,
the MKV is proposed to be used for both the mid-course Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
and boost-phase Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). While the MKV is not a direct
component of a space-based strike system, MDA officials in the past have acknowledged
that it would be a technology enabler for SBI.31
2007 Development
Congress cuts funding for the Space Test Bed
The follow-on program to the NFIRE is the Space Test Bed, an MDA program with the
goal of developing the infrastructure for space-based missile interceptors.32 In opposition to
the President’s budget request of $10-million, the US Congress allocated no funds for this
program in 2007,33 although requests for funds are expected to continue in the future.
2007 Space Security Impact
The ongoing absence of space-based strike systems and infrastructure continued to support
the security of outer space in 2007. While precursor technology development continued
through the NFIRE test and MKV program, restraint exercised by US policymakers is
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positive and indicates concern for space security and the challenge of balancing terrestrial
missile defense requirements with the need to maintain freedom from space-based threats.
Trend 8.2: A growing number of countries are developing more
advanced space-based strike-enabling technologies
through other civil, commercial, and military programs
Due to the potentially significant effects of space-based strike systems on space security
dynamics, it is important to assess research into advanced enabling technologies that could
support the development of space-based strike capabilities. The enabling technologies
described below are dual-use. None are related to dedicated space-based strike programs,
but are part of other civil, commercial, or military space programs. While there is no
evidence to suggest that states pursuing these enabling technologies intend to use them for
space-based strike purposes, the dual-use applications of these advances do bring actors
technologically closer to such a strike capability.
The advanced enabling technologies listed in Figure 8.2 are those required for each of the
major space-based strike concepts over and above basic space access and use capabilities,
such as orbital launch capability, satellite manufacturing, satellite telemetry, tracking and
control, mission management, and Earth imaging. This analysis is based on the
characteristics of these weapons systems as widely described in open source literature.34
Figure 8.2: Advanced space-based strike enabling capabilities*
SBI Hypervelocity SB munitions SB munitions SBL Neutral particle
rod bundle delivery delivery beams
Precision position ■ ■ ■ ■
maneuverability
High-G thrusters ■
Large ∆-V thrusters ■ ■ ■ ■
Global positioning ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Missile homing sensors ■ ■
Global missile tracking □ □ □
Global missile early warning □ □ □
Launch on demand ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Microsatellite construction ■
High-power laser systems ■
High-power generation ■ ■
Large aperture deployable ■
optics
Precision attitude control ■ ■
Precision re-entry ■ ■ ■
technology
Nuclear weapons ■
Key: ■ = Required □ = Needed but not necessarily on the primary SBSW crat(s)
* This figure highlights enabling technologies for space-based strike. It does not imply that these actors have such strike capabilities or even programs to
develop them, merely that they have prerequisite technologies that would make acquisition of such a system a shorter-term possibility.
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A precision position maneuverability capability to ensure that an object can be moved to a
specific location with an accuracy of less than 10 meters has been demonstrated by only a
few actors. Both the US and Russia have performed a large number of space dockings that
require such capability. The European Space Agency has completed the development of this
capability for its Automated Transfer Vehicle, which will dock at the International Space
Station in 2008. The Chinese manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou series, is also equipped with
a docking mechanism.35
High-G thrusters that provide the large acceleration required for final stages of missile
homing are under development by the US for the SBI. No other state is currently assessed
to have such a capability. A large delta (∆)-V thruster capability that enables a change in
velocity required to maneuver in orbit or de-orbit to reach the target is fundamental for
several space-based strike concepts. This is a relatively common capability that has been
demonstrated by all actors with rocket technology, including the 29 states that have
demonstrated orbital or suborbital space access.
Accurate global positioning capabilities required for all space-based strike concepts are
possessed primarily by the US (GPS) and Russia (GLONASS), although the GLONASS
system is not fully operational at present. All other actors with space access are involved to
some degree in the development of navigation systems — for example, the planned EU
Galileo system, the Chinese Beidou constellation, and the Japanese Quazi-Zenith Satellite
System (see Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities Trend 3.4). It is also noteworthy that
many actors could make use of the global positioning afforded by the US and Russian
systems.
Missile homing sensors, which provide real-time directional information during the missile
homing phase required for the SBI concept, are a capability common to most advanced
military powers, including the US, Russia, and Israel, which have developed such systems
for their ground-based missile defense capabilities. India and Japan are also developing this
capability.36
Relatively extensive global missile warning and missile tracking capabilities, required for the
SBI and SBL concepts, were developed by the US and the USSR during the Cold War (see
Space Systems Protection Trend 6.1). Early warning of missile launches is currently
provided by the US Defense Support Program satellites and the Russian Oko and Prognoz
satellites; both states are working on upgrades and/or replacements for these systems. The
US Space-based Infrared System-High and Space Tracking and Surveillance System are
being designed to be more advanced in this regard, although both systems are behind
schedule.37 No other states currently have space-based early-warning capabilities, but
France is developing two early-warning satellites, Spirale-1 and -2, to launch in 2008.38
Launch-on-demand capabilities to maintain an effective global space-based strike system are
provided by rockets with an operational readiness of less than one week. Russia currently
leads with the shortest average period between launches, but no state yet possesses a
launch-on-demand capability. The US is developing a responsive launch capability through
its Falcon program.39 Some commercial actors, in particular Space-X, are aiming to provide
more responsive and less expensive space launches (see Space Systems Protection Trend
6.4).40 Although US concepts for a military space plane envision launch-on-demand
capabilities, physical constraints would limit its utility.41
Microsatellite construction, which allows for reduced weight and increased responsiveness of
space-based interceptors, is also a key enabling capability for an effective SBI system. China,
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ESA, France, Israel, Russia, the UK, the US, Canada, and India have all developed
microsatellites.
High-power laser systems envisioned for an SBL have only been developed to any extent by
the US, initially through its SBL effort and more recently through its Airborne Laser,
MIRACL, Joint High Power Solid-State Laser (JHPSSL), and Starfire programs (see Space
Systems Negation Trend 7.3). None of those efforts have reached fruition due to continuing
technical challenges. China has also operated a high-power laser program since 1986 and it
now has multiple hundred-megawatt lasers.42 The technology does not exist to build a
high-power space-based laser.43
High-power generation systems for space, necessary for powering the SBL concept and for
high thrust propellants for kinetic strike capabilities, have been developed and deployed
both by the US and former Soviet Union, particularly through the use of nuclear power. For
example, the US System for Nuclear Auxiliary Power-10A mission launched in 1965 had a
45-kilowatt thermonuclear reactor. NASA is working on several nuclear projects under
Project Prometheus.44 Between 1967 and 1988 the USSR launched 31 low-powered
reactors in Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites.45 While no other states have developed
such capabilities for space, all states with a launch capability also have nuclear power
programs.
Large deployable optics and precision attitude control — both needed for the SBL concept, and
the latter applicable for all space-based strike concepts — have been developed by a number
of actors, including China, ESA, France, Japan, Russia, and the US, for military
reconnaissance or civil astronomical telescope missions.46 India and Israel are currently
developing such capabilities (see Civil Space Programs and Global Space Utilities). China
has announced plans for a civilian telescope that will demonstrate precision attitude control
capabilities.47i
Precision reentry technology, needed to prevent burn-up and lateral lift caused by atmospheric
for kinetic space-to-Earth strike concepts has been developed by states with a human
spaceflight capability, namely China, Russia, and the US. ESA has this capability under
development with its Applied Re-entry Technology program and through the joint
NASA-ESA Crew Return Vehicle (X-38).48 France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales
(CNES) has announced the development of a new reentry vehicle program for civil space
purposes.49 The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has some experimental reentry vehicle
programs.50 States with nuclear weapons have also developed precision reentry technologies
for their nuclear warhead reentry vehicles. The capabilities needed for a rapid strike from
space are more advanced, however, due to the higher speed at which reentry would occur.51
Figure 8.4 provides a schematic overview of the space-based strike enabling technologies
possessed or under development by key space actors, as discussed above. Only actors that
have developed orbital space access are included, since this is a prerequisite for all
space-based strike systems.
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Figure 8.3: Space-based strike enabling capabilities of key space actors52
2007 Development
Prompt Global Strike program authorized by the US Congress
Following Congressional testimony by the then Commander of USSTRATCOM, General
Cartwright,55 the US Congress has refocused development efforts for a US prompt global
strike capability. The FY2008 Defense Authorization bill provided $100-million for a new
Prompt Global Strike program, combining funds from the US Navy Conventional Trident
Modification Program and US Air Force Common Aero Vehicle (CAV – part of the Falcon
program). It is unlikely that this program will result in the development of a space-based
weapon system. The US Congress has issued explicit instructions to the Department of
Defense about the areas to which funding can be applied and asked for a report on the
future roadmap within 90 days of the bill’s implementation.56 Still, several advanced
enabling technologies will be developed, including “advanced propulsion, payload delivery
and dispensing mechanisms, weapon system command and control, and advanced
non-nuclear, kinetic, and other enabling capabilities,”57 which would be required to
support a space-based strike system.58
The latest phase of the DARPA/USAF Falcon program is the HTV-3X (formerly CAV,
described above), which motivated a new USAF/DARPA program called Blackswift in
Advanced Capability China EU/ESA France UK India Israel Japan Russia Ukraine US
Precision position
maneuverability ■ □ ■ ■
High-G thrusters □
Large ∆-V thrusters ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Accurate global
positioning53 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ■
Anti-missile homing sensors ■ ■ □ ■ □ ■ ■
Global missile tracking ■ ■
Global missile early warning □ ■ ■
Launch on demand □ □
Microsatellite construction ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
High-power laser systems ■ □
High-power generation (■) □
Large deployable optics ■ ■ ■ □ □ □ ■ ■
Precision attitude control □ ■ ■ □ ■ ■ ■ ■
Precision reentry technology ■ □ ■ ■ □ ■ ■
Nuclear power ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
SBSW
Space-based laser (□) (□)
Space-based interceptors (□) □
Hypervelocity rod bundle
SB munitions delivery (conventional)
Neutral particle beam (□) (□)
Key: ■ = Some capability54 □ = Capability under development (□) = Past development (■) = Past capability
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2007.59 Originally, HTV-3 was supposed to be boosted by a rocket; the HTV-3X is
conceptualized to fly at Mach-6 using a combined cycle engine, and is planned to take-off
and land like a conventional airplane. Blackswift is a flight test program aimed at developing
the concepts of HTV-3X.60 The USAF signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the
project with DARPA in September 2007 and will contribute roughly $800-million dollars
US towards the program.61 Details of the program are vague. “…it could be part of the
global strike mission or a reconnaissance strike aircraft…”62 Nonetheless, the Blackswift
project seems to be part of the new Prompt Global Strike program, along with the
CAV/HTV.
2007 Development
Report outlines the potential costs to deploy space-based weapons
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments released a preliminary assessment
outlining a “rough order of magnitude estimates” of the potential costs of acquiring and
supporting various space-based weapon systems, including space-based missile defense,
space-based ASATs, and space-based weapons that can target the Earth.63 In all three cases
the report concluded that other options, primarily terrestrial, were more cost-effective;
however, there is wide variance in costs, technological demands, and effectiveness across
different options.
Overall, the report found space-based boost-phase ballistic missile defense to be the least
feasible both in terms of technology and cost.64 An optimistic Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) study indicates that such a system is estimated to need a minimum of 368 satellites
to cover potential threats from only North Korea and Iran, assuming intercept speeds of 4
km/second with at least two satellite in range of the threat area at any given time. This
resulted in a 99.5 percent absentee rate, meaning that each satellite would only be over the
threat area for 0.5 percent of the time.65 A smaller number of interceptors could potentially
be used if there were a “technological leap” in kill vehicle miniaturization.66 The potential
20-year cost of such a system is estimated at between $29- and $290-billion, depending on
technology levels and capability, but even the most advanced system would have modest
capabilities that could be easily overcome.
The report found the potential of space-based weapons to be greatest for a terrestrial strike
or prompt global strike capability, but high costs and technology challenges still apply.67
CBO and RAND studies indicate that a system of 30 satellites with 40 maneuverable
reentry vehicles (common aero vehicles) carrying conventional munitions, plus spares,
could cost $12-billion in acquisitions over 30 years. A similar cost is estimated for a ‘Rods
from God’ system.68 For both missile defense and terrestrial strike, laser systems are deemed
to be much more expensive and technologically inferior.
2007 Development
Upgrades in US global missile tracking and warning
Both satellites for the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) completed acceptance
testing; after significant delays they are scheduled for launch in November 2008 as part of
the MDA sensor network69 (see Space Systems Protection Trend 6.1 and Space Systems
Negation Trend 7.1). The second layer of US next-generation space-based ballistic missile
detection and tracking, the STSS is designed as a constellation of satellites in low Earth
orbit intended to detect and track ballistic missiles, with specific focus on the mid-course
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phase; differentiate the missile warheads from decoys and debris; and provide targeting data
to the missile defence network. It is also testing sensor performance against ground-based
and airborne targets.70 It is significantly over cost and behind schedule. Construction of the
STSS is now near completion and prime contractor Northrop Grumman completed
thermal vacuum testing of two STSS demonstration satellites in 2007.71 The two satellites
are scheduled to be launched in tandem from Cape Canaveral in 2008 and will be linked
to MDA’s Missile Defense Space Experimentation Center.72 The STSS ground segment also
passed its final test and operational readiness demonstration in 2007.73 However, the House
cut the FY2008 budget for the program by $100-million.74
The US also conducted talks with the Czech Republic over the course of 2007, during
which the two nations agreed to pursue installation of a missile defense radar near the Czech
town of Misov.75 The agreement proposed to move an existing mid-course tracking radar
from the Kwajalein test range to the Czech Republic.76
2007 Development
The US, Europe, China, and Russia continue research and development of global
positioning systems
China added its first Medium Earth Orbit global positioning satellite on 13 April 2007.
The Compass-M1 was successfully launched onboard a Long March 3A booster from
Xichang Launch Center.77 The previous four Beidou satellites were all placed in
geostationary orbit over Asia (see Space for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.2).
Although the Galileo satellite navigation system was initially proposed as a public-private
partnership, the European Transport Council voted on 8 June 2007 to fund it using solely
public money.78 Another agreement on 29 November 2007 opened the procurement
process to competitive bidding79 (see Civil Space and Global Utilities Trend 3.3).
Russia launched nine Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) satellites in 2007 on
three dates to bring its navigation constellation to 13 operational satellites, still short of the
24 satellites needed for full operation.80 India also announced in 2007 that it will be
partnering with Russia on the GLONASS constellation after discussing the possibility of
joining with the US GPS system81 (see Space for Terrestrial Military Operations Trend 5.1).
2007 Development
Continued progress in air-based laser technology
The Airborne Laser (ABL) program had a series of successive tests to bring it closer to
operational reality. These included the first in-flight firing of the laser through ABL’s turret,
first active tracking of a non-cooperative airborne target, and the first successful tracking of
a vertically dynamic target in the form of a climbing F-1682 The ABL would be a
high-powered chemical laser mounted on a modified Boeing 747 jet to be used as a direct
energy interceptor for short-range ballistic missiles in boost-phase. Despite progress,
however, it remains “a high risk technology development and demonstration program”
which has “suffered numerous delays and cost increases since its inception in 1996, and it
is currently estimated that it will cost $5.1-billion from inception to the completion of the
first test to shoot down a target missile, currently scheduled for 2009”83 and significant
technological challenges remain (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.3).
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2007 Space Security Impact
Space-based weapons designed to strike terrestrial targets will require sophisticated
technological developments that, at present, few spacefaring states seem able to exploit. The
development of dual-use capabilities that also provide enabling technologies for space-based
strike systems continued in 2007, although there is no evidence that states are developing
such capabilities for strike purposes. Nonetheless, the potential for space-to-Earth strike
systems will continue to pose a challenge to the international community as advanced
space-based technologies continue to be developed. While some enabling technologies for
space-based strike are specific to that purpose and include significant technology barriers,
many are advanced technologies associated with other space applications and have been
developed for a variety of purposes by several different actors; this means that if one actor
were to pursue a space-based strike capability, others could follow.
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Chile
Fasat-Bravo Zenit-2 Russia Imaging LEO 10/07/1998
China
Zhongxing-22A Chang Zheng 3A China Communications GEO 12/09/2006
Zhongxing-20 Chang Zheng 3A China Communications HEO 14/11/2003
(Feng Huo)
Feng Huo 1 Chang Zheng 3A China Communications GEO 25/01/2000
Yaogan 3 Chang Zheng 4B China Imaging LEO 11/11/2007
Yaogan 2 Chang Zheng 2D China Imaging LEO 25/05/2007
Yaogan 1 Chang Zheng 4B China Imaging LEO 26/04/2006
Zi Yuan 2C Chang Zheng 4B China Imaging LEO 06/11/2004
Zi Yuan 2 Chang Zheng 4B China Imaging LEO 27/10/2002
Beidou 5 Chang Zheng 3A China Navigation MEO 13/04/2007
Beidou 4 Chang Zheng 3A China Navigation GEO 02/02/2007
Beidou 3 Chang Zheng 3A China Navigation GEO 24/05/2003
Beidou Chang Zheng 3A China Navigation GEO 20/12/2000
Beidou Chang Zheng 3A China Navigation HEO 30/10/2000
France
Syracuse 3A Ariane 5GS France Communications GEO 13/10/2005
Syracuse 3B Ariane 5ECA France Communications GEO 08/11/2006
Helios 2A Ariane 5G+ France Imaging LEO 18/12/2004
Helios 1A Ariane 40 France Imaging LEO* 07/07/1995
Clementine Ariane 40 France Signals Intelligence LEO 03/12/1999
Essaim 4 Ariane 5G+ France Signals Intelligence LEO 18/12/2004
Essaim 3 Ariane 5G+ France Signals Intelligence LEO 18/12/2004
Essaim 2 Ariane 5G+ France Signals Intelligence LEO 18/12/2004
Essaim 1 Ariane 5G+ France Signals Intelligence LEO 18/12/2004
Germany
SAR-Lupe 3 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Imaging LEO 01/11/2007
SAR-Lupe 2 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Imaging LEO 02/07/2007
SAR-Lupe 1 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Imaging LEO 12/19/2006
Israel
Ofeq-7 Shavyit 1 Israel Imaging LEO 10/06/2007
Satellite name Launch vehicle Launching Function Orbit Launch date
state
Based on Jonathan McDowell’s Satellite Database (1 January 2008). Due to the nature of some military satellites, it is not always
known when a satellite changes its status from operational and operational to in orbit but no longer operational. This list only
discounts satellites which are publicly known to be inactive and as such is likely to overestimate the number of active satellites
in some cases.
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Ofeq-5 Shaviyt 1 Israel Imaging LEO 28/05/2002
Italy
COSMO 2 Delta 7420-10 France Imaging LEO 09/12/2007
COSMO 1 Delta 7420-10C France Imaging LEO 08/06/2007
Sicral Ariane 44L France Communications GEO 07/02/2001
Japan
IGS Radar-2 H-IIA 2024 Japan Imaging LEO 24/02/2007
IGS Optical-3 H-IIA 2024 Japan Imaging LEO 24/02/2007
Verification
IGS Opitcal-2 H-IIA 202 Japan Imaging LEO 11/09/2006
IGS-1b H-IIA 2024 Japan Imaging LEO 28/03/2003
IGS-1a H-IIA 2024 Japan Imaging LEO 28/03/2003
Russia
Raduga-1M Proton-M/Briz-M Russia Communications GEO 09/12/2007
Meridian No. 1 Soyuz-2-1A Russia Communications HEO 24/12/2006
Gonets-D1 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Communications LEO 21/12/2005
Kosmos-2409 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 23/09/2004
Kosmos-2408 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 23/09/2004
Raduga-1 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Communications GEO 27/03/2004
Kosmos-2401 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 19/08/2003
Kosmos-2400 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 19/08/2003
Molniya-1T Molniya 8K78M Russia Communications HEO 02/04/2003
Molniya-1T Molniya 8K78M Russia Communication HEO 18/02/2004
Kosmos-2391 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 08/07/2002
Kosmos-2390 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Communications LEO 08/07/2002
Kosmos-2386 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 28/12/2001
Kosmos-2385 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 28/12/2001
Kosmos-2384 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 28/12/2001
Raduga-1 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Communications GEO 28/08/2000
Kosmos-2371 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Communications GEO 04/07/2000
Kosmos-2352 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications MEO 15/06/1998
Molniya-1T Molniya 8K78M Russia Communications HEO 24/09/1997
Kosmos-2339 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 14/02/1997
Satellite name Launch vehicle Launching Function Orbit Launch date
state
Key: * Older than 10 years ** Older than 15 years (or suspected of being dead)
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Kosmos-2338 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 14/02/1997
Kosmos-2337 Tsiklon-3 Russia Communications LEO 14/02/1997
Molniya-1T Molniya 8K78M Russia Communications HEO 28/09/1998
Raduga Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Communications GEO* 30/09/1993
Kosmos-2430 Molniya 8K78M Russia Early Warning HEO 23/10/2007
Kosmos-2422 Molniya 8K78M Russia Early Warning HEO 21/07/2006
Kosmos-2393 Molniya 8K78M Russia Early Warning HEO 24/12/2002
Kosmos-2379 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Early Warning GEO 24/08/2001
Kosmos-2368 Molniya 8K78M Russia Early Warning HEO 27/12/1999
Kosmos-2427 Soyuz-U Russia Imaging LEO 07/06/2007
Kosmos-2392 Proton-K/17S40 Russia Imaging MEO 25/07/2002
Kosmos-2436 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2007
Kosmos-2435 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2007
Kosmos-2434 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2007
Kosmos-2433 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/10/2007
Kosmos-2432 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/10/2007
Kosmos-2431 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/10/2007
Kosmos-2429 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 11/09/2007
Kosmos-2425 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2006
Kosmos-2426 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2006
Kosmos-2424 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2006
Kosmos-2419 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2005
Kosmos-2418 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2005
Kosmos-2417 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2005
Kosmos-2414 Kosmos-11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 20/01/2005
Kosmos-2413 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/12/2004
Kosmos-2412 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/12/2004
Kosmos-2411 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 26/12/2004
Kosmos-2407 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 22/07/2004
Kosmos-2404 Proton-K/Briz-M Russia Navigation MEO 10/12/2003
Kosmos-2403 Proton-K/Briz-M Russia Navigation MEO 10/12/2003
Kosmos-2402 Proton-K/Briz-M Russia Navigation MEO 10/12/2003
Kosmos-2398 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 04/06/2003
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Kosmos-2396 Proton-K/DM-2M Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2002
Kosmos-2395 Proton-K/DM-2M Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2002
Kosmos-2394 Proton-K/DM-2M Russia Navigation MEO 25/12/2002
Kosmos-2381 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 01/12/2001
Kosmos-2382 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 01/12/2001
Kosmos-2378 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 08/06/2001
Kosmos-2375 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 13/10/2000
Kosmos-2374 Proton-K/DM-2 Russia Navigation MEO 13/10/2000
Kosmos-2361 Kosmos 11K65M Russia Navigation LEO 24/12/1998
Kosmos-2428 Zenit-2M Russia Signals Intelligence LEO 29/06/2007
Kosmos-2421 Tsiklon-2 Russia Signals Intelligence LEO 25/06/2006
Kosmos-2406 Zenit-2 Russia Signals Intelligence LEO 10/06/2004
Kosmos-2369 Zenit-2 Russia Signals Intelligence LEO 03/02/2000
Kosmos-2360 Zenit-2 Russia Signals Intelligence LEO 28/07/1998
South Korea
Koreasat 5 Zenit-3SL France Communications GEO 22/08/2006
Spain
XTAR-EUR Ariane 5ECA France Communications HEO 12/02/2005
Spainsat Ariane 5ECA France Communications GEO 11/03/2006
UK
Skynet 5B Ariane 5ECA France Communications GEO 14/11/2007
Skynet 5A Ariane 5ECA France Communications GEO 11//03/2007
Skynet 4F Ariane 44L France Communications GEO 07/02/2001
Skynet 4E Ariane 44L France Communications GEO 26/02/1999
Skynet 4D Delta 7925-9.5 US Communications GEO 10/01/1998
Skynet 4C Ariane 44LP France Communications GEO** 30/08/1990
Topsat Kosmos 11K65M Russia Imaging LEO 27/10/2005
US
USA 198 Atlas V 421 US Communications HEO 10/12/2007
WGS SV-1 Atlas V 421 US Communications GEO 11/10/2007
NMARS Space Shuttle US Communications LEO 10/12/2006
USA 169 (Milstar 6) Titan 401B/Centaur US Communications GEO 08/04/2003
DSCS III A-3 Delta 4M US Communications GEO 11/03/2003
Satellite name Launch vehicle Launching Function Orbit Launch date
state
Key: * Older than 10 years ** Older than 15 years (or suspected of being dead)
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USA 164 Titan 401B/Centaur US Communications GEO 16/01/2002
USA 162 Atlas IIAS US Communications HEO 11/10/2001
USA 157 Titan 401B/Centaur US Communications GEO 27/02/2001
USA 155 Atlas IIAS US Communications HEO 06/12/2000
USA 153 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO 20/10/2000
USA 179 Atlas IIAS US Communications HEO 31/08/2004
UHF F/O F11 Atlas 3B US Communications GEO 18/12/2003
(USA 174)
DSCS III B-6 Delta 4M US Communications GEO 29/08/2003
USA 148 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO 21/01/2000
UHF F/O F10 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO 23/11/1999
MUBLCOM Pegasus XL/HAPS US Communications LEO 18/05/1999
UHF F/O F9 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO 20/10/1998
UHF F/O F8 Atlas II US Communications GEO 16/03/1998
CAPRICORN Atlas IIA US Communications HEO 29/01/1998
USA 135 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO 25/10/1997
UFO F7 (UHF F/O F7) Atlas II US Communications GEO* 25/07/1996
USA 125 Titan 405A US Communications LEO* 03/07/1996
Milstar DFS 2 Titan 401A/Centaur US Communications GEO* 06/11/1995
UFO F6 (UHF F/O F6) Atlas II US Communications GEO* 22/10/1995
USA 113 Atlas IIA US Communications GEO* 31/07/1995
UFO 5 (UHF F/O F5) Atlas II US Communications GEO* 31/05/1995
Milstar DFS 1 Titan 401A/Centaur US Communications GEO* 07/02/1994
NATO 4B Delta 7925 US Communications GEO* 08/12/1993
USA 97 Atlas II US Communications GEO* 28/11/1993
UHF F/O F2 Atlas I US Communications GEO* 03/09/1993
USA 93 Atlas II US Communications GEO* 19/07/1993
USA 82 Atlas II US Communications GEO* 02/07/1992
USA 78 Atlas II US Communications GEO* 11/02/1992
NATO 4A Delta 7925 US Communications GEO** 08/01/1991
LES 9 Titan IIIC US Communications GEO** 15/03/1976
DSP F23 (USA 197) Delta 4H US Early Warning GEO 11/11/2007
DSP F21 (USA 159) Titan 402B/IUS US Early Warning GEO 06/08/2001
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DSP F20 (USA 149) Titan 402B/IUS US Early Warning GEO 08/05/2000
DSP F22 Titan 402B/IUS US Early Warning GEO 14/02/2004
DSP F18 Titan 402B/IUS US Early Warning GEO 23/02/1997
DSP F17 Titan 402A/IUS US Early Warning GEO* 22/12/1994
DSP F13 Titan 34D/Transtage US Early Warning GEO** 29/11/1987
Tacsat 2 Minotaur US Imaging LEO 16/12/2006
USA 186 Titan 404B US Imaging LEO 19/10/2005
USA 182 Titan 405B US Imaging LEO 30/04/2005
USA 161 Titan 404B US Imaging LEO 05/10/2001
USA 152 Titan 403B US Imaging LEO 17/08/2000
USA 144 Titan 404B US Imaging LEO 22/05/1999
DMSP 5D-3 F-16 Titan II SLV US Imaging LEO 18/10/2003
DMSP 5D-3 F-15 Titan II SLV US Imaging LEO 12/12/1999
USA 133 Titan 403A US Imaging LEO 24/10/1997
USA 129 Titan 404A US Imaging LEO* 20/12/1996
USA 69 Titan 403A US Imaging LEO** 08/03/1991
Navstar GPS IIR-M5 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation HEO 20/12/2007
(USA 199)
Navstar GPS IIR-M4 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 17/10/2007
Navstar GPS IIR-M3 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 17/11/2006
Navstar GPS IIR-M2 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation HEO 25/09/2006
Navstar GPS IIR-M1 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 26/09/2005
Navstar GPS IIR-13 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation HEO 06/11/2004
Navstar GPS IIR-12 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 23/06/2004
Navstar GPS IIR-11 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 20/03/2004
Navstar GPS IIR-10 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 21/12/2003
(USA 175)
Navstar GPS IIR-9 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 31/03/2003
(USA 168)
Navstar GPS IIR-8 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 29/01/2003
(USA 166)
GPS IIR-7 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 30/01/2001
GPS IIR-6 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 10/11/2000
GPS IIR-5 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 16/07/2000
Satellite name Launch vehicle Launching Function Orbit Launch date
state
Key: * Older than 10 years ** Older than 15 years (or suspected of being dead)
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GPS IIR-4 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 11/05/2000
GPS SVN 46 Delta 7925-9.5 US Navigation MEO 07/10/1999
GPS SVN 38 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO 06/11/1997
GPS SVN 43 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO 23/07/1997
Navstar SVN 30 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 12/09/1996
Navstar SVN 40 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO 16/07/1996
Navstar GPS 33 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO 28/03/1996
Navstar GPS 36 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 10/03/1994
Navstar GPS 34 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 26/10/1993
Navstar GPS 35 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 30/08/1993
Navstar GPS 39 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 26/06/1993
Navstar GPS 37 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 13/05/1993
Navstar GPS 29 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 18/12/1992
Navstar GPS 32 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 22/11/1992
Navstar GPS 27 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 09/09/1992
Navstar GPS 26 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 07/07/1992
Navstar GPS 28 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 10/04/1992
Navstar GPS 25 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO* 23/02/1992
Navstar GPS 24 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO** 04/07/1991
Navstar GPS 23 Delta 7925 US Navigation MEO** 26/11/1990
Navstar GPS 15 Delta 6925 US Navigation MEO** 01/10/1990
NNS O-23 Scout G-1 US Navigation LEO**
NNS O-25 Scout G-1 US Navigation LEO**
NNS O-31 Scout G-1 US Navigation LEO** 25/08/1988
NNS O-32 Scout G-1 US Navigation LEO** 26/04/1988
USA 194 P/L 2 Atlas V 401 US Signals Intelligence LEO 15/06/2007
USA 194 (NROL-30 Atlas V 401 US Signals Intelligence LEO 15/06/2007
USA 184 Delta 4M+(4,2) US Signals Intelligence HEO 28/06/2006
USA-181 P/L 2 Atlas 3B US Signals Intelligence LEO 03/02/2005
USA 181 Atlas 3B US Signals Intelligence LEO 03/02/2005
USA 173 P/L 2 Atlas IIAS US Signals Intelligence LEO 02/12/2003
USA 173 Atlas IIAS US Signals Intelligence LEO 02/12/2003
USA 171 Titan 401B/Centaur US Signals Intelligence GEO 09/09/2003
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USA 160 P/L 2 Atlas IIAS US Signals Intelligence LEO 08/09/2001
USA 160 Atlas IIAS US Signals Intelligence LEO 08/09/2001
USA 139 Titan 401B/Centaur US Signals Intelligence GEO 09/05/1998
USA 136 Titan 401A/Centaur US Signals Intelligence HEO 08/11/1997
USA 122 Titan 403A US Signals Intelligence LEO 12/05/1996
USA 121 Titan 403A US Signals Intelligence LEO* 12/05/1996
USA 120 Titan 403A US Signals Intelligence LEO* 12/05/1996
USA 119 Titan 403A US Signals Intelligence LEO* 12/05/1996
USA 118 Titan 401A/Centaur US Signals Intelligence GEO* 24/04/1996
USA 116 Titan 404A US Signals Intelligence LEO* 05/12/1995
USA 112 Titan 401A/Centaur US Signals Intelligence HEO* 10/07/1995
USA 103 Titan 401A/Centaur US Signals Intelligence HEO* 03/05/1994
ANDE-FCAL Space Shuttle US Calibration LEO 10/12/2006
RAFT1 Space Shuttle US Calibration LEO 10/12/2006
RADCAL Scout G-1 US Calibration LEO* 25/06/1993
DMSP 5D-3 F-17 Delta 4M US Meteorology LEO 04/11/2006
(USA 191)
DMSP 5D-2 F-14 Titan II SLV US Meteorology LEO 04/04/1997
DMSP 24547 Atlas E US Meteorology LEO** 24/03/1995
DMSP 23545 Atlas E US Meteorology LEO* 29/08/1994
ANDE-MAA Space Shuttle US Science LEO 10/12/2006
MTI Taurus 1110 US Science LEO 12/03/2000
NFIRE Minotaur 1 US Technology LEO 24/04/2007
CFESat Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
Falconsat-3 Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
STPSat-1 Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
Nextsat Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
MidStar 1 Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
ASTRO Atlas V 401 US Technology LEO 9/03/2007
MEPSI 2A/2B Space Shuttle US Technology LEO 10/12/2006
USA 189 Delta 7925-9.5 US Technology GEO 21/06/2006
USA 188 Delta 7925-9.5 US Technology GEO 21/06/2006
USA 187 Delta 7925-9.5 US Technology GEO 21/06/2006
XSS-11 (USA 165) Minotaur US Technology LEO 11/04/2005
GeoLITE Delta 7925-9.5 US Technology GEO 18/05/2001
TSX-5 Pegasus XL US Technology LEO 07/06/2000
MSX Delta 7920-10 US Technology LEO* 24/04/1996
Satellite name Launch vehicle Launching Function Orbit Launch date
state
Key: * Older than 10 years ** Older than 15 years (or suspected of being dead)
Chapter One Endnotes
1 David Wright, “Space Debris,” Physics Today (October 2007) at 36.
2 Kevin Whitelaw, “The Problem of Space Debris,” (4 December 2007), U.S. News and World Report ,
online: http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2007/12/04/the-problem-of-space-debris.html.;
“Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions,” NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (29 April 2005),
online: http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html.
3 Zengyao Han, “Space Debris Protection,” Presentation to International Space University, Space Debris
Theme Day, Beijing, China, (25 July 2007).
4 8 Orbital Debris Quarterly News (2004) at 5.
5 10(2) Orbital Debris Quarterly News (2006) at 1-2.
6 William J. Broad, “Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat,” New York Times (6 February
2007), online: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/science/space/06orbi.html?ei=5070&en=
52e4fd924f69b8b9&ex=1179374400&pagewanted=print.
7 D. Mehrholz, L. Leushacke, W. Flury, R. Jehn. H. Klinkrad. M. Landgraf, “Detecting, Tracking and
Imaging Space Debris” (February 2002), 109 ESA Bulletin at 128.
8 Jeremy Singer, “Space-Based Missile Interceptors Could Pose Debris Threat,” Space News (13
September 2004).
9 US National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1995) at 4-5, online: The National Academies Press http://books.nap.edu/
books/0309051258/html/index.html.
10 Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Fact Sheet, “Space Debris Basics: What Are the
Risks?” online: The Aerospace Corporation http://www.aero.org/capabilities/cords/debris-risks.html.
11 “Monthly Number of Catalogued Objects in Earth Orbit by Object Type” (January 2007), 11(1)
Orbital Debris Quarterly News at 8.
12 NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris, Photo Gallery, online:
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/photogallery/photogallery.html (date accessed: 24 April 2007).
13 US National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment at 4.
14 US National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment at 2.
15 Nicholas L. Johnson, “Space Debris, Its Causes and Management,” Presentation to Congress in
Washington, DC, sponsored by Representative Adam Schiff, D-CA and organized by the Monterey
Institute of International Studies (24 July 2002).
16 The cases mentioned in the text box are from the following sources, respectively: (1) Kenneth Silber,
“Space Junk Piles High,” Insight on the News (18 November 1996); (2) Johnson, 2002; Keith Phucas,
“Impact of Space Debris,” Times Herald (2 February 2003); (3) Rob Stein, “NASA Explores Whether
Space Debris at Fault: Possibility that Columbia Was Fatally Wounded by Rock, Rubble is Considered,”
Washington Post (6 February 2003) at A14; (4) Michael Katz-Hyman, “The Death of the Solwind
Satellite,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Space Security Briefs (14 July 2005), online: The Henry L.
Stimson Center http://www.stimson.org/?SN=WS20050714867; (5) Phillip S. Clark, “Space Debris
Incidents Involving Soviet/Russian Launches,” (1994), online: Friends and Partners in Space
http://www.friends- partners.org/oldfriends/jgreen/bispaper.html; D S McKnight, “Determining the
Cause of a Satellite Breakup: A Case Study of the Kosmos 1975 Breakup,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology (9 March 1992) at 19; David J. Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations
(Colorado Springs, CO: Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1993) at 154; (5) Kenneth Silber, “Space Junk
Piles High.”
17 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 2, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf.
18 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
19 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
20 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
EN
D
N
O
TES
197
Endnotes
21 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 3, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf.
22 Kevin Whitelaw, “The Problem of Space Debris,” U.S. News (4 December 2007), online:
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2007/12/04/the-problem-of-space-debris.html.
23 Kevin Whitelaw, “The Problem of Space Debris.”
24 Brtian Berger, “NASA’s Terra Satellite Moved to Avoid Chinese ASAT Debris,” Space.com (6 July
2007), online: http://www.space.com/news/070706_sn_china_terra.html.
25 Nicholas Johnson et al., “Characterization of the Breakup of the Pegasus Rocket Body 1994-029B,”
Second European Conference on Space Debris, Darmstadt, Germany (17-18 March 1997).
26 Nicholas Johnson et al, “Characterization of the Breakup of the Pegasus Rocket Body 1994-029B.”
27 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
28 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
29 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 3, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf.
30 Laura Grego, “A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs” (30 May 2006), online: Union of
Concerned Scientists http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-
programs.html.
31 Anatoly Zak, “IS Anti-satellite System,” Russian Space Web (updated 24 February 2008), online:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html.
32 “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations,” 13th Ed., NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
(May 2004), online:
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/SatelliteFragHistory/13thEditionofBreakupBook.pdf.
33 Laura Grego, “A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs.”
34 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org (date
accessed: 1 February 2008).
35 Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy missile hits dying spy satellite, says Pentagon,” Washington Post
(21 February 2008), online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/02/20/
ST2008022001497.html.
36 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 11, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf.
37 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2007) at 11, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv11i1.pdf.
38 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 12.
39 Orbital Debris Quarterly (April 2007) at 3, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv11i2.pdf.
40 Orbital Debris Quarterly (April 2007) at 3.
41 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
42 Orbital Debris Quarterly (January 2008) at 2.
43 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, online: Space Track http://www.space-track.org
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
44 “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines at the UN,” (July 2005), 9 Orbital Debris Quarterly News at 1.
45 Peter B. de Selding, “FCC Enter Orbital Debris Debate,” Space News (28 June 2004); “Mitigation of
Orbital Debris,” 70 Federal Register (12 October 2005) at 59276.
46 Alessandro Rossi, “The Earth Orbiting Space Debris,” (2005), 170 Serbian Astronomical Journal at
1-12.
198
Space Security 2008
47 ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook (Noordwijk, NE, 19 February 1999); R. Walker et al., Update
of the ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook (European Space Agency, QinetiQ, July 2002), online:
European Space Agency http://www.esrin.esa.it/gsp/completed/execsum00_N06.pdf.
48 “European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard,” Issue 1, Revision 0 (27 September 2000);
F. Alby et al., “A European Standard for Space Debris,” (1999), online: European Space Agency
gate.etamax.de/NoCDebris/Publications/Alby%20et%20al-ANAE-2002.pdf.
49 Peter B. de Selding, “China Says Work Underway to Mitigate Space Junk,” Space News (3 September
2007).
50 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 511th Meeting, Unedited
transcripts (17 June 2003) at 5, online: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
http://www.oosa.unvienna. org/Reports/transcripts/copuos/2003/COPUOS_T511E.doc.
51 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines” (5 October 2004) at 3, 13, online: http://www.iadconline.org/docs_pub/IADC.SD.
AI20.3.10.2004.pdf.
52 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines” at 3, 13.
53 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “Protection Manual Version 3.3” (April 2004),
online: http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub.
54 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “New FCC Orbital Debris Ruling: ISO
TC20/SC14 to Develop Standard for Orbital Debris Mitigation” (6 June 2004), online:
http://intranet.aiaa.org/industryresources/PDF/FCCSATRulingPR.pdf.
55 “Electrodynamic Tethers: Clean Up Debris - Power or Boost Spacecraft,” Technovelgy.com (11 May
2004), online: http://www.technovelgy.com/ct/Science-Fiction-News.asp?NewsNum=252; “The
Terminator Tether Aims to Clean up Low Earth Orbit,” Technovelgy.com (5 November 2004),
online: http://technovelgy.com/ct/Science-Fiction-News.asp?NewsNum=252; “Terminator Tether -
EDT Solution To Space Debris Update,” Technovelgy.com (17 November 2004), online:
http://technovelgy.com/ct/Science-Fiction-News.asp?NewsNum=264; Orbital Recovery Ltd., “Orbital
Recovery Fact Sheet,” online: http://www.orbitalrecovery.com/images/fact_sheet_v1_5.pdf; Tariq
Malik, “Orbital Assistance: ConeXpress Spacecraft Could Extend Satellite Missions,” Space.com
(2 June 2004), online: http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/conexpress_techwed_
040602.html; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “ConeXpress-OLEV (CX-OLEV),” online: Gunter’s Space Page
http://www.skyrocket.de/space/index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/
conexpress-ors.htm.
56 Carmen Pardini, Toshiya Hanada, Paula H. Krisko, “Benefits and Risks of Using Electrodynamic
Tethers to De-Orbit Spacecraft,” IAC-06-B6.2.10, online: Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub.
57 “Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-fourth session,” United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (6 March 2007) at 43-45, online: United Nations
Office for Outer Space Affairs http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_890E.pdf.
58 “Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-fourth session,” at 43-45.
59 “Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-fourth session,” at 43.
60 “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty Second Session,” at 17.
61 International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, GA Res. A/62/217 UNGAOR, 62nd
Sess. (2007) at 6.
62 Orbital Debris Quarterly (October 2007) at 1.
63 Peter B. de Selding, “China Says Work Under Way to Mitigate Space Junk,” Space News
(3 September 2007).
64 Data provided by Fernand Alby, CNES, in “Space debris: Despite Chinese test, some improvement,”
Space Daily (29 January 2008), online: http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Space_debris_
Despite_Chinese_test_some_improvement_999.html.
65 Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),” online:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/index.html.
199
Endnotes
66 “Improving Our Vision: Approaches for Shared Space Situational Awareness,” Report of the Sept.
15-16, 2006 Conference, The Antlers Hotel, Colorado Springs, CO, The World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information and The U.S. Air Force Academy’s Center for Space and Defense
Studies (2007) at 10. The Space Based Visible (SBV) Sensor ceased operations in 2008. Amy Butler,
“Space-Based Visible Sensor Ceases Ops,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report (10 June 2008), online:
http://www.aviationnow.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=space&id=news/Spacey061008.x
ml&headline=Space-Based%20Visible%20Sensor%20Ceases%20Ops.
67 Peterson Air Force Base, 20th Space Control Squadron, Detachment 1, “Fact Sheet,” online:
www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4729 (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
68 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,” 117 Stat. 1565 Public Law 108–136—24
(November 2003), online: CelesTrack http://www.celestrak.com/Norad/elements/Section913.pdf.
69 Bruce deBlois, Richard Garwin, Scott Kemp, and Jeremy Marwell, “Space Weapons Crossing the US
Rubicon” (Fall 2004), 29 International Security at 50-84; Jeremy Singer, “Surveillance Remains Most
Pressing Space Control Need,” Space News (11 October 2004).
70 DARPA, Tactical Technology Office, “Deep View,” (18 February 2008), online:
http://www.darpa.mil/tto/Programs/deepview.htm; RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet
(February 2007), at 256, online: Defense Technical Information Center
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/ Y2008/DARPA/0603287E.pdf.
71 DARPA, Tactical Technology Office, “Space Surveillance Telescope” (18 February 2008), online:
http://www.darpa.mil/tto/Programs/sst.htm; RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (February
2007), at 253.
72 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena,” 87(7) Air Force Magazine (July 2004), online:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2004/0704space.asp; Jeremy Singer, “Briefs – Pentagon Cancels
Funds For Deep Space Imager,” Space News (20 February 2006).
73 “The SSS Space Surveillance System,” Jane’s Space Directory (23 December 2003); Center for
Defense Information, “Improving Our Vision,” at 10.
74 Sourcebook on the Okno Space Surveillance Site, Version of 28 September 2006, online: Federation
of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/okno.pdf.
75 “The SSS Space Surveillance System,” Jane’s Space Directory (23 December 2003).
76 “The SSS Space Surveillance System.,” Jane’s Space Directory (23 December 2003).
77 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Defense,” (May 2006), online: Russian Strategic Forces
http://russianforces.org/ eng/defense/.
78 “Imminent Delivery of the French Surveillance System,” 75 France ST Special Reports (24 August
2005), online: France-Israel Teamwork in Science
http://www.fitscience.org/media/upload/FranceST_075.pdf; “Graves Le système français de
surveillance de l’espace,” Onera (4 May 2006), online: http://www.onera.fr/dprs/graves/index.php;
Federation of American Scientists, “A GRAVES Sourcebook,” (29 October 2006), online:
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/graves.pdf.
79 Jacques Bouchard as quoted in “Imminent Delivery of the French Surveillance System,” 75 France
ST Special Reports.
80 GlobalSecurity.org, “German Space Agencies,” online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/
germany/agency.htm#ref21 (date accessed: 10 July 2008); W. Flury, “Agenda Item 8: Space Debris,
European Space Agency,” Presentation to the 41st session of UN Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) (16-27 February 2004) at 7,
online: UN Office for Outer Space Affairs http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/COPUOS/stsc/2004/
presentations/flury2.ppt.
81 “Successful Trial for BNSC-funded Space Surveillance Project,” Spacewar (9 November 2006), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Successful_Trial_For_BNSC_funded_Space_Surveillance_Project_
999.html.
82 Walter Flury et al., “Searching for Small Debris in the Geostationary Ring – Discoveries with the
Zeiss 1-metre Telescope,” 104 ESA Bulletin (November 2000), online: European Space Agency
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet104/flury104.pdf.
200
Space Security 2008
83 Heiner Klinkrad, “Monitoring Space – Efforts Made by European Countries,” presented at the
International Colloquium on Europe and Space Debris, sponsored by the Académie National de l’Air
et de l’Espace, Toulouse, France (Nov. 27-28, 2002), online: Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/klinkrad.pdf.
84 European Space Agency, “Spacecraft Operations, Space Debris Avoidance,” online:
http://www.esa.int/spacecraftops/ESOC-Article-fullArticle_idBanner-1092735449782_item_
selected-19_5_00_par-47_1091629030048.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
85 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Places Priority on Space Surveillance,” Defense News (27 March 2006),
online: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1639067&C=airwar.
86 “Improving our Vision” at 11 (see Note 31).
87 “China Reports Progress in Space Debris Research,” Xinhua (14 August 2003), online: Xinhuanet
English http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-08/14/content_1113433.htm.
88 “Alarm System Warns of Space Debris,” China Daily (11 August 2003).
89 “China First Space Debris Monitoring Center Settles PMO,” People’s Daily (11 March 2005);
“CAS Sets up the First Space Debris Monitoring Center in China,” People’s Daily (16 March 2005).
90 Globalsecurity.org, “Chinese Space Facilities” (last modified 19 October 2005), online: http://www.
globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/facility.htm.
91 “Space Debris Radar Station Operational,” Japan Times (9 April 2004).
92 IADC Observation Campaigns, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee presentation to
43rd Session of COPUOS Science and Technology Sub-Committee (February 2006), online:
http://www.iadc-online.org/docs_pub/UN_Presentation_2006_final.pdf.
93 University of British Columbia, “MOST, Canada’s First Space Telescope,” online: Astronomy at the
University of British Columbia http://www.astro.ubc.ca/MOST/milestones.html (date accessed:
10 July 2008).
94 “Canada Considers Military Microsatellites,” Space News (1 September 2003).
95 W. Harvey et al., “The Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSAT) Mission Enables an
Efficient Space-based Survey (NESS Project) of Interior-to-Earth-Orbit (IEO) Asteroids,” 38 Lunar
and Planetary Science (2007), at 2372.
96 Analysis by Brian Weeden, Technical Consultant, Secure World Foundation.
97 Stew Magnuson, “Murky Picture of What’s Happening in Space Worries Air Force Officials,” National
Defense (December 2007), online: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/December/
Murky.htm.
98 Marcus Weisgerber, “In the wake of PDM IV… Funding cuts delay ‘space fence’ upgrade acquisition
schedule,” Inside the Air Force (19 January 2007), online: http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2007/
January/01252007/01252007-16.htm.
99 US House of Representatives, “House and Senate Conference Report on H.R. 3222,” (6 November
2007). On 12 October 2007 President Bush signed a classified memo directing multiple agencies and
the military to improve SSA capabilities, with focus to be placed on countering China’s ASAT
capability. See Amy Butler, “Bush Memo Orders Space Situational Awareness,” Aerospace Daily and
Defense Report (12 October 2007).
100 Zachary Peterson, “Air Force Seeks to Develop a Better Space Surveillance Network,”
Inside the Air Force (16 March 2007), online: The Integrator http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/
2007/March/03222007/ 03222007-15.htm.
101 Jefferson Morris, “Decisions on SBSS Expected After Fall Analysis,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report
(11 June 2007), online: Aviation Week <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.
jsp?channel=defense&id=news/SBSS061107.xml; Jeremy Singer, “Air Force Mulls Second
Space-Surveillance Satellite,” Space News (23 May 2007).
102 Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force T-Sat, Space Fence Could be Facing Delays,” Space News (17 January
2007); Center for Defense Information, “Space System Profile: The Space Fence” (21 February 2008),
online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3843; US Senate,
“Conference Report,” H.R. 3222 Department of Defense Appropriations (6 November 2007), at 289
(421 of 621 PDF), online: http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_hr3222crtxt.pdf
201
Endnotes
103 US Strategic Command, “US Strategic Command History” (March 2007), online:
http://www.stratcom.mil/about-ch.html.
104 Janene Scully, “Space Unite Settles at VAFB,” Santa Maria Times (29 October 2007), online:
http://www.santamariatimes.com/articles/2007/10/29/news/centralcoast/news03.txt.
105 Peter B. de Selding, “French Say ‘Non’ to US Disclosure of Secret Satellites,” Space News (8 June
2007).
106 “Ukraine launches system for monitoring outer space,” redOrbit (28 November 2007), online:
http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/1161248/ukraine_launches_system_for_monitoring_outer_space/
?source=r_space.
107 Wendy Keyzer, “MDA Awarded Contract To Build Canadian Information Solution For Surveillance
Of Space Objects,” MDA News Release (4 October 2007), online: CNW Group
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/October2007/04/c8747.html.
108 Chris Wattie, “Canada will launch own spy satellite: Project Sapphire,” National Post (14 November
2006) at A6.
109 Xiaodan Du, “China launches major project to monitor space with network of observatories,” CCTV
(6 January 2008), online: http://www.cctv.com/english/20080106/100834.shtml.
110 Tim Bonds et al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications: Wideband Investment Options for
DoD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000) at 17.
111 Michael Calabrese and J.H. Snider, “Up in the Air,” Atlantic Monthly (September 2003) at 46-47;
Albert “Buzz” Merill and Marsha Weiskopf, “Critical Issues in Spectrum Management for Defense
Space Systems,” Crosslink (Winter 2002) at 14-19, online: Aerospace Corporation
http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2002/02.html.
112 Albert Merill and Marsha Weiskopf, “Critical Issues in Spectrum Management for Defense Space
Systems”at 18.
113 Philip McAlister, “Follow the Money: Satellite Opportunities with the US Government”
(17 November 2003), online: Futron Corporation http://www.futron.com/pdf/sat%20oppor
%20with%20us%20govt.pdf.
114 Glen Elfers and Stephen B. Miller, “Future US Military Satellite Communication Systems,” Crosslink
(Winter 2002), online: Aerospace Corporation http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/
winter2002/08.html.
115 The last four of the 14 Defense Satellite Communications System satellites received these Service Life
Enhancement modifications, providing “substantial capacity improvements” (“Wideband Gapfiller
Satellite,” Boeing Satellite Systems, Fact Sheet). MILSATCOM, “Defense Satellite Communications
System,” online: Air Force Link http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=95 (date accessed: 10
July 2008).
116 Theresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course (Washington, DC: Center
for Defense Information, September 2004) at 49.
117 Theresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space at 49.
118 “Satellite interference: still a problem,” Asia Satellite News (7 March 2006), online: Telecom Asia
http://www.abu.org.my/public/documents/Satellite_ISOG-%20Telecom%20Asia7mar06.pdf.
119 John C. Tanner, “SPACE JAM: Fighting Satellite Interference from the Ground up,” Telecom Asia
(1 November 2003) at 16-22, online: Look Smart, Find Articles http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0FGI/is_11_14/ai_111694639.
120 John C. Tanner, “Space JAM.”
121 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, News Release, “DoD
Moves Forward With Next Steps For Spectrum Relocation” (16 July 2007), online: DefenseLink
http://www. defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11131.
122 Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, “The Great Indian Spectrum Dispute,” The Financial Express (13 August
2007), online, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/The-Great-Indian-Spectrum-Dispute/210194/.
123 International Telecommunication Union, Constitution and Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union: Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference (Marrakesh, 2002). For an
excellent description of the role of ITU see Francis Lyall, “Communications Regulations: The Role
202
Space Security 2008
of the International Telecommunication Union,” (1997), 3 Journal of Law and Technology, online:
The University of Warwick http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_3/lyall/.
124 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Art. 45 para. 197.
125 M.Y.S. Prasad, “Space-Based Telecommunications including Tele-Education & Telemedicine –
Implications to the Area of Space Law,” in Proceedings of the Space Law Conference 2005: Bringing
Space Benefits to the Asian Region, Bangalore, India (26-29 June 2005).
126 Albert Merill and Marsha Weiskopf, “Critical Issues in Spectrum Management for Defense Space
Systems” at 15.
127 Albert Merill and Marsha Weiskopf, “Critical Issues in Spectrum Management for Defense Space
Systems”at 16.
128 European Commission, Press Release, “EU and US a Step Further to Agreement over Galileo satellite
Navigation,” (25 February 2004), online: European Union http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/
2004/20040030.htm.
129 Maricel E. Estavillo, “ASEAN to Harmonize Radio Frequency Spectrum,” BusinessWorld (4 October
2005); European Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament, A Forward
Looking Radio Spectrum Policy for the European Union: Second Annual Report, document COM (2005)
411 final (June 2005), online: European Union http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2005/com2005_0411en01.pdf.
130 This figure is an estimate based on Jonathan’s Satellite Catalogue by Jonathan McDoweel. This is a
catalog of all satellites that includes a column on the satellite status, which is updated when a satellite
reenters the Earth’s atmosphere or when publicly available information shows that a satellite is no
longer operational. The catalog figure for the number of operational satellites in most cases is an
over-estimate since it sometimes takes several years for knowledge that a satellite is no longer in
operation to become public. The following method is used to estimate the range given: of those
satellites shown as operational in the catalog; (1) for the upper estimate, those that are over 15 years
old as of the end of 2006 are assumed to be non-operational; and (2) for the lower estimate, those
that are over 15 years old as of the end of 2006 and 1/3 of those that are over 10 years old are
assumed to be non-operational. This age cutoff is both realistic from the point of view of approximate
statistics of satellite longevity and also because satellites of such age are often insignificant in capability
compared to those of the current system. More importantly, the method of estimation seems to fit
with the data points known on active GPS satellites. A clear limitation is that such approximations
should vary according to the longevity and capabilities of different types, rather than the blanket
assumption made here.
131 Joel D. Scheraga, “Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space” (1987), 6 Cato Journal at 891.
132 Col. John E. Hyten, USAF, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War? Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict
in Space,” (Fall 2002), 16 Air and Space Power Journal at 90, note 11. Current US FCC policies
require US direct broadcast satellites (DBS) to be spaced nine degrees apart, placing greater constraint
on the availability of orbital slots in GEO. US Federal Communications Commission, “DBS
Spacing,” online: Federal Communications Commission http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sd/dbs_spacing/ (date
accessed: 10 July 2008).
133 Joel D. Scheraga, “Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space,” at 891.
134 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union Art. 33 para. 2.
135 Ram Jakhu, “Legal Issues of Satellite Telecommunications, the Geostationary Orbit, and Space
Debris,” 5(2) Astropolitics (2007) at 182.
136 Attila Matas, “Cost Recovery for Satellite Network Filings,” ITU Regional Radiocommunication
Seminar, Abu Dhabi (22-26 April 2007), online: http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/space/support/workshop/
doc_presentation_en/Cost%20recovery_AM.pdf.
137 Ram Jakhu, “Legal Issues of Satellite Telecommunications,” at 182-183.
138 Report by the Secretary-General, “Implementation of Cost Recovery for Satellite Network Filings,”
ITU Council 2007 (4-14 September 2007).
139 Peter B. de Selding, “Europe concedes to U.S. on one GPS, Galileo roadblock,” Space News (6 January
2004); “Talks narrow differences on GPS/Galileo signals,” GPS World (February 2004), online: BNET
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BPW/is_2_15/ai_n6170804.
203
Endnotes
140 “EU, US to Make GPS and Galileo Satellite Networks Compatible” EU Business (26 July 2007)
online: http://www.eubusiness.com/Telecoms/1185465602.28/; “US says to reach GPS-Galileo
agreement this week,” Reuters, (16 July 2007), online: http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/
idUSL1674424620070716.
141 Gibbons Media and Research LLC, “Compass: And China’s GNSS Makes Four,” Inside GNSS
(November/December 2006), online: http://www.insidegnss.com/node/115.
142 Gibbons Media and Research LLC, “Compass: And China’s GNSS Makes Four.”
143 “Boeing Completes On-Orbit Handover of Wideband Global SATCOM Satellite to US Air Force,”
Boeing Press Release (28 January 2008), online: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.rss.
spacewire.html?pid=24630.
144 “Wideband Gapfiller Satellite,” Boeing Satellite Systems, Fact Sheet, online:
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/bss/factsheets/702/wgs/wgs_factsheet.html (date accessed:
10 July 2008). The last four of the 14 Defense Satellite Communications System satellites received
these Service Life Enhancement modifications, providing “substantial capacity improvements.” See
US Air Force, “Defense Satellite Communications System, Fact Sheet,” online: http://www.af.mil/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=95 (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
145 “Advanced EHF – wait for it” (3 January 2007), online: DailyWireless http://www.dailywireless.org/
2007/01/03/advanced-ehf-wait-for-it/; “Air Force Extends TSAT Decision,” Satellite Today (8 January
2008), online: http://www.satellitetoday.com/military/headlines/21881.html.
146 “Net reaches out to final frontier,” BBC News (13 April 2007), online: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/technology/6551807.stm.
147 Richard Russel, Speech at the World Radiocommunication Conference, Geneva (22 October 2007),
online: US Mission to the United Nations in Geneva
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2007/1022RussellTranscipt.html.
148 “C-Band Frequency Spectrum Safeguarded…A Huge Sat Industry Win!” SatNews Daily, online:
http://www.satnews.com/cgi-bin/display_story.cgi?number=1251969280 (date accessed: 1 February
2008).
149 “Northrup Grumman Develops World’s Fastest Transistor to Support Military’s Need for Higher
Frequency and Bandwidth,” Space War (12 December 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Northrop_Grumman_Develops_World_Fastest_Transistor_
To_Support_Militarys_Need_For_Higher_Frequency_And_Bandwidth_999.html.
150 Sam Ghattas and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Mysterious satellite transmissions assaulting Israeli satellite
TV broadcasts,” International Herald Tribune (10 October 2007), online:
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/10/africa/ME-GEN-Whos-Jamming-Israel.php.
151 Kristin Roberts, “U.S. officials confirm Israel strike on Syria,” Reuters (12 September 2007),
online: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN1228366420070912.
152 “UN ships may be disrupting Israeli satellite television,” Shortwave Central (10 October 2007),
online: http://mt-shortwave.blogspot.com/2007/10/un-ships-may-be-disrupting-israeli.html.
153 Lewis Page, “Mystery Israeli satellite telly disruption blamed on UN,” The Register (11 October 2007),
online: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/11/israeli_satellite_telly_banjaxed_by_germans_
n_cloggies/page2.html.
154 Sam Ghattas and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Mysterious satellite transmissions assaulting Israeli satellite
TV broadcasts.”
155 David Shiga and AFP, “Mysterious source jams satellite communications,” New Scientist (26 January
2007), online: http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn11033.
156 Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group, “Interference Matrix Database,” online:
http://www.suirg.org/interference/report_display.php (date accessed: 12 February 2008).
157 “Potentially Hazardous Asteroids,” NASA Near Earth Object Program (22 July 2008), online:
http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/pha.html.
158 Russel Schweickart, “The Asteroid Impact Threat: Decisions Upcoming,” presentation to the 37th
COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Montreal, Quebec (July 2008).
204
Space Security 2008
159 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Near-Earth Object Science Definition Team, “Study
to Determine the Feasibility of Extending the Search for Near-Earth Objects to Smaller Limiting
Diameters,” (22 August 2003) at iv, online: http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/neoreport030825.pdf.
160 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Study to Determine the Feasibility of Extending the
Search for Near-Earth Objects to Smaller Limiting Diameters,” at iv.
161 Paul Jay, “Canadian scientists unveil plans for asteroid-hunting satellite,” Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation News (26 June 2008), online: http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/06/26/
neossat-asteroid.html.
162 Russell Schweickart, “The Asteroid Impact Threat: Decisions Upcoming.”
163 Edward Lu and Stanley Love, “Gravitational Tractor for Towing Asteroids,”, 438 Nature
(9 November 2005) at 177-178.
164 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Near Earth Object Survey and Defelction Analysis
of Alternatives”; Thomas Graham Jr. and Russell L. Schweickart, “NASA’s Flimsy Argument for
Nuclear Weapons,” Scientific American (February 2008).
165 “NEO Discovery Statistics,” NASA Near Earth Object Program (21 July 2008), online:
http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats/.
166 Russel Schweickart, “The Asteroid Impact Threat: Decisions Upcoming.”
167 “ASE Standing Committee on NEOs,” Association of Space Explorers, online: http://www.space-
explorers.org/committees/NEO/neo.html (date accessed: 20 July 2008).
168 Future role and activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, working paper submitted
by the Chairman, COPUOS, 50th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.268 (10 May 2007).
169 “Summary and Recommendations,” Report of the 2007 Planetary Defense Conference, George
Washington University, Washington, DC (5-8 March 2007), online: The Aerospace Corporation
http://www.aero.org/conferences/planetarydefense/2007papers/WhitePaperFinal.pdf.
170 “Summary and Recommendations,” Report of the 2007 Planetary Defense Conference.
171 “Near Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives,” NASA Report to Congress
(March 2007), online: NASA NEO Program Office http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_
NEO_report_march07.pdf.
Chapter Two Endnotes
1 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, 59 Stat. 1031, 145 U.K.T.S. 805,
24 U.S.T. 2225, T.I.A.S. No. 7739.
2 Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer
Space, Report of the Secretariat, UN General Assembly Document, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space document A/AC.105/769 (18 January 2002).
3 Frans von der Dunk, “The Sky is the Limit – But Where Does It End?” Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2006) at 84-94.
4 The US interpretation of “peaceful” as synonymous with “non-aggressive” was a logical extension of
the US effort to gain international recognition of the permissibility of reconnaissance satellites while
simultaneously discouraging military space activities that threatened these assets — two major goals of
US policy during the period predating the Outer Space Treaty (1957-67). See Paul B. Stares, The
Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-84 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) at 59-71.
5 Ivan A. Vlasic, “The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Bupendra
Jasani, ed., Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (London: Taylor and Francis, 1991).
6 Elizabeth Waldrop, “Weaponization of Outer Space: U.S. National Policy,” (Winter 2005) High
Frontier at 37, online: The University of Michigan Law School www.law.umich.edu/curriculum/
workshops/governance/WkshpPaper2006_Waldrop.pdf.
7 Lucy Stojak, “Key Concepts in Space Arms Control,” Report to Foreign Affairs Canada (February
2005) at 11.
205
Endnotes
8 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 6 I.L.M. 386 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (entered into force on 10 October 1967).
9 “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,” Article II; convention
opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972.
10 Peter Haanappel, “Enforcing the Liability Convention: Ensuring the Binding Force of the Award of
Claims Commission,” in Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, eds., Space Law: current problems and
perspectives for future regulation (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2005) at 115.
11 Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Niklas Hedman, “The results of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee
Working Group on ‘Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects’
2005 – 2007,” International Astronautical Congress (2007) at 3.
12 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Convention of Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space” (2006), online: http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SORegister/nat_reg_notif_idx.html
(date accessed: 16 June 2008).
13 Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Michael Gerhard, “Registration of Space Objects: Which are the
Advantages for States Resulting from Registration?” in Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, eds.,
Space Law: current problems and perspectives for future regulation, at 122.
14 Reuters, “Large Nations Fail to Register Satellites” (17 August 2001).
15 Jonathan McDowell, “Adherence to the 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space,” (11th Ed., Revised July 15, 2007), online: Jonathan’s Space Page http://www.planet
4589.org/space/un/un_paper1.html#Tab1; United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs,
“Convention of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.”
16 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 5 December 1979,
1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Agreement] (entered into force 11 July 1984),
Article 3(4).
17 Moon Agreement.
18 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Backgrounder: International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space
Weapons,” (February 2004), online: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/
page.cfm?pageID=1157.
19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution Database, online:
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
20 “UNGA First Committee Voting Record on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,
A/C.1/60/L.27” (25 October 2005), online: Reaching Critical Will
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/votes/L.27.pdf.
21 Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 1985) at 93.
22 Outer Space Treaty, Article III.
23 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, 5 August
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Test Ban Treaty].
24 US Department of State, Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 26 May 1972, TIAS 7503.
25 Agreement on Measures to Improve the US-USSR Direct Communications Link, 30 September 1971,
UNTS 806, no. 402 (1972). See also UNTS 807, no. 57.
26 Some believe that the ABM Treaty, annulled in 2002, was particularly important because it prohibited
the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems, as well as limiting the
development of other types of ABMs.
27 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of the Environmental Modification
Techniques, 18 May 1977, UST 31, no. 333.
28 Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, at 93.
29 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Sub-marine
Launched Ballistic Missiles, 31 May 1988.
206
Space Security 2008
30 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 9 November 1992, 30 ILM 1, Article XV(2).
31 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Article XV, 18 June 1979 not in force, ILM 18, no. 1112; Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Article IX, 31 July 1991, Strategic Treaty
Documents no. 102-20.
32 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 8 December 1987, ILM 27 no.90, Article XII.
33 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States and Government of the Russian
Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems
and Notifications of Missile Launches, White House Fact Sheet, 4 June 2000.
34 Given the usefulness of some space technologies in the development of missiles, MTCR export
controls are perceived by some countries, notably those outside the regime, as a restrictive cartel
impeding access to space.
35 See Missile Technology Control Regime Website, online: http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html.
36 Brought into effect on 25 November 2002.
37 Michel Bourbonnière, “LOAC and the Neutralization of Satellites or IUS in Bello Satellitis” in
International Security Research and Outreach Programme Report (Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Canada, May 2003) at 17-23.
38 Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., “The Law and the Military Uses of Outer Space,” Speech delivered
at the Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island (1 May 2003), online: Eisenhower Institute
http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/grahambriefing.htm.
39 Dr. Peter Van Fenema, interview by author, McGill University, Montreal, 25 February 2005.
40 “Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” UN General Assembly Document A/59/174 (23
July 2004); “Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development Adopted by UNISPACE III, as
it Concludes Two-Week Session,” UNISPACE III Conference, Press Release (30 July 1999), online:
United Nations http://www.un.org/events/unispace3/.
41 Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law (Geneva: United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/2005/29) at 132.
42 Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, at 131-136.
43 “Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the
Weaponization of Outer Space,” CD/1645 (6 June 2001).
44 “Transparency and confident building measures in outer space activities,” United Nations General
Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/66 (6 January 2006), online: United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf/5063335733dce716852570c200516189/479505242538
e0d5852570a1004a6bd8/$FILE/60-66.pdf.
45 Union of Concerned Scientists, “A Treaty Limiting Anti-Satellite Weapons” (May 1983), online:
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1153.
46 The Henry L. Stimson Center, “Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Incidents and
Dangerous Military Practices in Outer Space” (2004), online: http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/
codeofconduct.pdf.
47 “Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security,” Conference Report, United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva (30-31 March 2006).
48 Gordon Johndroe, quoted in Craig Covault, “China’s ASAT test will intensify US-China faceoff on
space,” Aviation Week (21 January 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_
generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw012207p2.xml; Richard Spencer, “Chinese missile destroys
satellite in space,” The Telegraph (21 January 2007), online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/newa/main
/jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/19/wchina19.xml.
49 Rüdiger Lüdeking, EU Deputy Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, “Address
delivered on behalf of the EU to the Plenary Session of the CD” (24 January 2007), online: Reaching
Critical Will http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/
Jan24Germany_EU.pdf.
207
Endnotes
50 “Japan’s Abe charges China satellite test illegal,” Agence-France Press (31 January 2007), online:
spacewar.com http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Japan_Abe_Charges_China_Satellite_
Test_Illegal_999.html. See also Ambassador Tarui of Japan, “Statement to the Plenary Session of the
CD” (13 February 2007).
51 Martin Staff, “China Officially Announces Anti-Satellite Test Successful,” Space War (24 January
2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Officialy_Announces_Anti_Satellite_
Test_Successful_999.html.
52 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel wary of China ASAT test,” Defense News (May 2 2007), online:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F-2527890&C=mideast.
53 “China missile worries India,” The Times of India (20 January 2007).
54 “India in aerospace defence plan,” BBC (28 January 2007), online:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6307875.stm.
55 Report of the UNGA First Committee, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, UNGAOR, 62nd
Sess., UN Doc. A/62/389 (2007) at 2. See also Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, United
Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/20, UNGAOR, 62nd Sess. (2007).
56 Proposals were received from the governments of Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Cuba,
Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), the Russian Federation, and
Ukraine. See Report of the Secretary-General on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer
Space, UNGAOR 62nd Sess., UN Doc. A/62/114 (2007); see also Report of the Secretary-General on
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space, Addendum, UNGAOR, 62nd
Sess., UN Doc. A/62/114/Add. 1 (2007).
57 Report of the Secretary-General on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space at 3.
58 Report of the Secretary-General on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space,
Addendum, UN Doc. A/62/114/Add. 1 (2007) at 5-8.
59 Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, United Nations General
Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/43, UNGAOR, 62nd Sess. (2007).
60 The Henry L. Stimson Center website, endorsements page, online: http://www.stimson.org/space/
?SN=WS200701191170 (date accessed: 10 July 2008). The concept of a Code of Conduct has been
endorsed by representatives from US Strategic Command, the EU, Canada, France, Intelsat, the US
Congress, as well as by publications including The Economist, Space News, and Aviation Week and
Space Technology.
61 Report of the Secretary-General on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space,
Addendum, at 5-8.
62 United States Strategic Command, “Advance Questions for General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
Nominee for Commander” (2007), online: US Senate Committee on Armed Services
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/September/Chilton%2009-27-07.pdf.
63 David McGlade, Op-Ed, Space News (19 February 2007).
64 Corinne Contant-Jorgenson, Petr Lála and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, eds., Cosmic Study on Space Traffic
Management (Paris: International Academy of Astronautics, 2006) online:
http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Studies/spacetraffic.pdf.
65 Each year, the International Space University holds a Space Studies Program (SSP) that brings
together graduate students and space professionals from all over the world for an intensive nine-week,
interdisciplinary, intercultural, and international curriculum of lectures, workshops, site visits, and
research. A key aspect of each year’s SSP is the Team Project in which the students produce a space
research project on a topic of international relevance.
66 International Space University, Space Traffic Management: Final Report (Beijing: ISU, Summer Session
Program 2007) at vii, online: http://www.isunet.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=374&Itemid=5.
67 The Henry L. Stimson Center website, online: http://www.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS200702131213.
68 Phil Meek, Associate General Counsel, US Air Force, “Space Law for the 21st Century: Challenges
for Security in Space,” Presentation at the International Space Security Conference: Scope and
Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Defence
and International Security Studies, New Delhi (13-14 November 2007).
208
Space Security 2008
69 COPUOS has two standing subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal
Subcommittee, as well as the stand-alone IADC. COPUOS and its two subcommittees each meet
annually to consider questions put before them by UNGA, reports submitted, and issues raised by the
Member States. The committee and the subcommittees, working on the basis of consensus, make
recommendations to the UN General Assembly. Question of the peaceful use of outer space, UN General
Assembly Resolution 1348 (15 December 1958). COPUOS was made permanent by International
co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UN General Assembly Resolution 1472 (12 December
1959).
70 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines at the UN,” 9 Orbital Debris Quarterly News (July 2005) at 1.
71 United Nations Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General Assembly
document A/60/20 (2005).
72 See “Working Paper on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” submitted by the
Mongolian People’s Republic to the Committee on Disarmament, CD/272 (5 April 1982).
73 “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” Official Records of the General Assembly,
A/RES/40/87 (12 December 1985). See also “Mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee under item 5
of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space,” Conference on Disarmament, CD/1059 (14 February 1991) and previous documents under
the same title.
74 These recommendations included: improved registration and notification of information, the
elaboration of a code of conduct or of rules of the road as a way to reduce the threat of possible
incidents in space; the establishment of “keep-out zones” around spacecraft; the elaboration of an
agreement dealing with the international transfer of missile technology and other sensitive technology;
and widening the protection offered to certain satellite systems under US-USSR/Russia arms control
agreements.
75 Hereinafter referred to as the “Amorim proposal.”
76 Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects: Working paper submitted
by the Chairman of the Working Group on the Practice of States and International Organizations in
Registering Space Objects, COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.266
(2007).
77 New agenda item on practice in registering space objects of States and international organizations: Working
paper submitted by Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, India, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 42nd Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.241 (2003); see also UN
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.241/Add. 1 (2003), which added the Czech Republic and Japan as additional
sponsors of the working paper; Practice of States and international organizations in registering space
objects at 1-2.
78 Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects at 4-8.
79 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on its Forty-Sixth
Session held in Vienna from 26th March to 5th April 2007, COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, 46th Sess.,
UN Doc. A/AC.105/891 (2007) at 20; Report of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
UNGAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. A/62/20 (2007) at 30-31. Recommendations on
enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space
objects, GA Res. A/RES/62/101, UNGAOR, 62nd Sess., (2007).
80 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on
its Forty-Fourth Session held in Vienna from 12-23 February 2007, COPUOS Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, 44th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/890 (2007) at 20.
81 nternational Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, GA Res. A/62/217 UNGAOR, 62nd Sess.
(2007) at 6. See also Report of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, 62nd Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. A/62/20 (2007) at 18.
82 Future role and activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, working paper submitted
by the Chairman, COPUOS, 50th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.268 (10 May 2007).
83 Conference on Disarmament, The P6 Vision Paper, CD Doc. CD/1809 (2007).
84 Conference on Disarmament, The P6 Vision Paper, CD Doc. CD/1809 (2007) at 3-4.
209
Endnotes
85 Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the
United Nations, CD Doc. CD/1831 (2007).
86 See “Speaking Notes for Magnus Hellgren, Minister, Swedish Delegation to First Committee on the
occasion of the Panel on Outer Space Issues in the First Committee Plenary on 22 October 2007,”
online: Reaching Critical Will http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com07/
statements/22octhellgren.pdf.
87 See Conference on Disarmament, Presidential Draft Decision, CD Doc. CD/2007/L1 (29 June 2007);
Conference on Disarmament, Complementary Presidential Statement Reflecting an Understanding of the
Conference on the Implementation of CD/2007/L1, CD Doc. CD/2007/CRP.5 (29 June 2007);
Conference on Disarmament, Draft Decision by the Conference, CD Doc. CD/2007/CRP.6 (29 June
2007). These three documents form the Presidential Proposal.
88 Conference on Disarmament, Presidential Report to the Conference on Disarmament on Part I of the
2007 Session, CD Doc. CD/1820 (2007) at 3.
89 In particular China, Pakistan, and Iran registered their worries and concerns regarding the resumption
of substantive work on 21 June 2007 and Pakistan expressed further concern about the Presidential
Draft Decision on 16 August 2007. See Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the One
Thousand and Seventy-Third Plenary Meeting, CD Doc. CD/PV.1073 (21 June 2007); and Final
Record of the One Thousand and Seventy-Eighth Plenary Meeting, CD Doc. CD/PV.1078 (16 August
2007); Conference on Disarmament, Presidential Report to the Conference on Disarmament on Part III
of the 2007 Session, CD Doc. CD/1828 (2007), Annex III.
90 Office of Science and Technology Policy, US National Space Policy (6 October 2006), online:
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf.
91 US National Space Policy.
92 “Russia May Cooperate with US in Space Programs,” Itar-Tass (21 January 2004).
93 “Status Report Requested of RAMOS Program,” CDI Missile Defence Update, No. 16 (2003).
94 European Space Agency, Permanent Representation in Russia, online: European Space Agency
http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ESA_Permanent_Mission_in_Russia/index.html (date accessed:
10 July 2008).
95 “Russia, China Discuss Joint Space Projects,” Space.com (9 November 2006), online:
http://www.space.com/news/061109_russia_china_missions.html; Vinay Shukla,
“Putin Clears Space Pact with India,” Rediff India Abroad (6 November 2006), online:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/06russia.htm.
96 Susan Eisenhower, Thomas Graham Jr., and Robert J. Lawson, Space Security 2003 (Toronto:
Northview Press, 2004) at 37.
97 “Russia to remain Leading Space Power – Head of Roscomosmos,” RIA Novosti (19 August 2005).
98 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in
2006” (October 2006), online: People’s Daily Online http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
20061012_311157.html.
99 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities”
(2000), online: People’s Daily Online http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/spacepaper/
spacepaper.html.
100 “China’s Space Activities” (2000).
101 Signatories include China, Iran, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Thailand.
102 “China’s Space Activities” (2000).
103 Indian Space Research Organisation, “International Cooperation,” online:
http://www.isro.org/international.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
104 David Long, “The Evolution and Shape of European Space Policy,” Report to Foreign Affairs Canada
(May 2004) at 18.
105 European Space Agency, Press Release No. 21 of 2007, “Europe’s Space Policy becomes a reality
today” (22 May 2007), online: http://www.esa.int/esaCP/Pr_21_2007_p_EN.html.
210
Space Security 2008
106 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007) 212 final (26 April 2007) at 5, online: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/space/
doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf.
107 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007) 212 final (26 April 2007) at 6.
108 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy at 8.
109 Assembly of the Western European Union, The Space Dimension of the ESDP: Report submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee Document A/1881 (30 November 2004), online:
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1881.pdf.
110 China National Space Administration, “‘Eleventh-Five-Year-plan of the Science Space Program’ Z
issued by COSTIND,” (19 March 2007), online: http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620682/
n639462/94761.html.
111 “China approves five-year space development plan,” (11 May 2007) online: Chinese Embassy, UK,
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zyxw/t318095.htm.
112 “China’s space ambitions key to nation’s strength: Hu,” Space Daily (12 December 2007), online:
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinas_space_ambitions_key_to_nations_strength_Hu_999.html.
113 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in
2006.”
114 “China’s National Defense in 2006.”
115 In alphabetical order: ASI (Italy), BNSC (United Kingdom), CNES (France), CNSA (China), CSA
(Canada), CSIRO (Australia), DLR (Germany), ESA (European Space Agency), ISRO (India), JAXA
(Japan), KARI (Republic of Korea), NASA (United States of America), NSAU (Ukraine), Roscosmos
(Russia). “Space Agencies” refer to government organizations responsible for space activities. See The
Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination, online: NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
178109main_ges_framework.pdf.
116 The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination at 2.
117 NASA, Press Release No. 07-126, “NASA, 13 Space Agencies Release Exploration Strategy
Framework” (31 May 2007), online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/may/
HQ_07126_Exploration_Framework.html.
118 NASA, Press Release No. 07-126.
119 The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination at 2.
120 Joint Publication 3-14 is all but silent on the space strike mission, stating only that “currently there
are no space force application assets operating in space.” US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine;
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-1 (9 August 2002) at x.
121 US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations,
at x.
122 US Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, Transformation Flight Plan (November
2003), online: http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf.
123 US Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1 (2 August 2004) at 2.
The Counterspace Operations document represents the views of the USAF and not necessarily those of
the US Government.
124 For a discussion of the spectrum of views regarding space weapons see Peter L. Hays, “Current and
Future Military Uses of Space,” Outer Space and Global Security (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2003) at 21-64.
125 US Department of Defense, Space Policy Directive 3100.10 (Updated 9 July 1999).
126 US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations,
Joint Publication 3-14; US Air Force, 2004 USAF Posture Statement (2003).
127 National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Public Law 106-38 (6 January 1999).
128 US National Space Policy.
211
Endnotes
129 See Government of the Russian Federation, “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the
Russian Federation,” FBIS-SOV 19, no. 222 (1993), Section 3.1, first published Rossiiskie vesti (18
November 1992) at 1-2; Government of the Russian Federation, “Draft Russian Military Doctrine”
BBC Monitoring (1999), Section 1.5, first published Krasnaya Zvezda (9 October 1999) at 3-4;
Government of the Russian Federation, “Russian Federation Military Doctrine” Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(22 April 2000), Section I.5; Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, “Russian Federation Ministry
of Defence Brochure: Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces”
Moscow (2003), Section II at 13.
130 Government of the Russian Federation, “Draft Russian Military Doctrine,” BBC Monitoring
(9 October 1999), Section 1.10.a.
131 Government of the Russian Federation, “Russian Federation Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimaya gazeta
(22 April 2000), Section II.3; Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, “Russian Federation Ministry
of Defence Brochure: Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,”
Moscow (2003), Section IV at 18-19.
132 “Russian Space Forces Commander Outlines Priorities,” BBC Monitoring (30 April 2001).
133 “Putin Reiterates Priorities in Developing Space Forces,” Interfax (7 April 2003).
134 “Svobodny Cosmodrome Has Special Role in Russia’s Space Programs — Space Troops Chief,”
Interfax (14 April 2003).
135 Andrew Gowers, Robert Cottrell, and Andrew Jack, “Transcript: Interview with Vladimir Putin,
13 December,” Financial Times (15 December 2001) at 2.
136 Steve Gutterman, “Reports: Russia threatens retaliatory steps if any country deploys weapons in
space,” Associated Press (2 June 2005); Rebecca Johnson, “PAROS Discussions at the 2004 UN
First Committee” (20 October 2004), online: Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
http://www.acronym.org.uk/un/2004paro.htm.
137 “China’s Space Activities in 2006.”
138 Government of China State Council Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2004”
(27 December 2004), online: Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/
doctrine/natdef2004.html.
139 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in
2006” (29 December 2006), online: FAS http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/
doctrine/wp2006.html.
140 K.K. Nair, Space, the Frontiers of Modern Defence (India: Centre for Air Power Studies, 2006) at 75.
The author notes that China’s PLA “has outlined its mission regarding military space as consisting of
two categories. The first is information supporting, and the second, battlefield combating, which
loosely corresponds to missions of force enhancement and counter-space operations in western
parlance.”
141 Martin Staff, “China Officially Announces Anti-Satellite Test Successful,” Spacewar (24 January
2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Officialy_Announces_Anti_Satellite_
Test_Successful_999.html.
142 “Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the
European Space Policy,” White Paper, European Commission (2003) at 6-7, online: The European
Union http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/whitepaper/pdf/spwhpap_en.pdf.
143 Dr. Thomas Beer, ESA HQ, Paris – Security Strategy and Partnership Development Office, “The
European Space Agency: Enhancing the European Space and Defence Policy,” Presentation at the
International Space Security Conference, Scope and Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, New Delhi
(13-14 November 2007), online: Space Security Programme http://www.spacesecurityprogramme.org/
uploads/ssp/space_sec_session%201_Dr.%20Thomas%20Beer.pdf.
144 Report of the Panel of Experts on Space and Security, European Commission Project Number 200446 (1
March 2005) at 26, online: European Union http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/news/article_2262.pdf.
145 Report of the Panel of Experts on Space and Security, at 26.
146 “European Space Policy,” Green Paper, European Commission (2003) at 4, online: European Union
http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/doc_pdf/space-green-paper_en.pdf; “Space: A New European
212
Space Security 2008
Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy”
at 6-7.
147 European Commission, “Cooperation in Space Gets Major Boost,” Press Release (18 February 2005),
online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/news/article_2151_en.html.
148 Michèle Alliot-Marie, “Discours de Madame le Ministre de la Défense: Lancement du satellite
HELIOS II,” Ministry of Defence, (18 December 2004).
149 Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, open for signature 30 May 1975, entered
into force 30 October 1980, 14 ILM 864, Article II.
150 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Air Force to Lead Israel’s Military Activities in Space,” Defense News (27
February 2006), online: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1556062&C=mideast. See also
Diganit Paikowsky, “Israel’s space program as a national asset,” 23 Space Policy (2007), 90-96.
151 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Embraces New War Doctrine,” Defense News (8 November 2004).
152 “India Begins Work on Space Weapons Command,” Space War (12 April 2006), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/India_Begins_Work_On_Space_Weapons_Command.html.
150 “Draft Bill Would Open Space to Military Use,” The Yomiuri Shimbun (17 September 2006). See also:
“Bill to Broaden Japan’s Military Use of Space,” IOL (17 September 2006), online:
www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=31&art_id=qw1158479280523B212.
154 Department of National Defence, Canada, Strategic Vectors: Air Force Transformation Vision (2004)
at 14-16.
155 Hiroshi Kiyohara, “Japan’s New Space Law being hamstrung by Political Turmoil,” Res Communis (2
December 2007), online: University of Mississippi School of Law http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/
2007/12/02/guest-blogger-hiroshi-kiyohara-japans-new-space-law-being-hamstrung-by-political-turmoil/.
156 “Draft Bill Would Open Space to Military Use,” The Yomiuri Shimbun (17 September 2006). See also:
“Bill to Broaden Japan’s Military Use of Space,” IOL (17 September 2006), online:
http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=31&art_id=qw1158479280523B212.
157 Wendell Minnick, “Law Would Give Japanese Sats a Military Role,” Defense News (9 April 2007)
at 20.
158 Wendell Minnick, “Japan’s New White Paper Cites Concerns About North Korea, China,” Defense
News (9 July 2007) at 6.
159 “India in aerospace defence plan,” BBC (28 January 2007), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/6307875.stm.
160 “Process On For Establishing Aerospace Command,” Terra Daily (20 November 2007), online:
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Process_On_For_Establishing_Aerospace_Command_999.html.
161 “Army to unveil Space Vision 2020 at commanders’ meet,” The Indian Express (23 October 2007),
online: indianexpress.com, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/231390.html.
162 Rahul Bedi, “IAF draft defence doctrine envisages a broader role,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (22 August
2007) at 14; “Army to unveil Space Vision 2020 at commanders’ meet,” The Indian Express
(23 October 2007).
163 Rahul Bedi, “IAF draft defence doctrine envisages a broader role” at 14.
164 Assembly of the Western European Union, Space and the ESDP, Assembly Fact Sheet No. 7
(December 2007), online: http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/Fact%20sheet
%207E%20PESD%20et%20Espace.pdf?PHPSESSID =f3137d60.
165 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007) 212 final (26 April 2007) at 8.
166 Délégation à l’information et à la communication de la Défense (DICoD), Let us make more space for
our defence: Strategic guidelines for a space defence policy in France and in Europe (Paris: DICoD, 2007).
167 The current French Military Programme Law will come to an end in 2008. It spans the five-year
period 2003-2008. The target budget is originally cited in Euros as 650-million.
213
Endnotes
Chapter Three Endnotes
1 Sea Launch is a consortium of four companies — Boeing Commercial Space Company (USA),
Kvaerner ASA (Norway), RSC-Energiya (Russia), and SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash (Ukraine) —
that provides a seabased launch platform using the Zenit rocket for space access.
2 International Launch Services (ILS) uses the launch vehicles of three companies — the Khrunichev
State Research and Production Space Center (KhSC) (Russia), which provides the Proton and Angara
launch vehicles; Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (USA), which provides the Atlas family of
launch vehicles; and RSC Energiya (Russia), the previous supplier of the Block DM fourth stage for
the Proton K. International Launch Services, online: http://www.ilslaunch.com/partnerships/.
3 Data from Gunter Dirk Krebs, online: Gunter’s Space Page http://www.skyrocket.de/space/ (date
accessed: 10 July 2008). Dark grey indicates an independent orbital launch capability and dots
indicate launch sites.
4 Krebs, “Gunter’s Space Page.”
5 Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd., online: http://www.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=5 (date accessed:
10 July 2008).
6 South Africa is in the process of creating a national space agency as well as a space policy, and plans to
launch a remote sensing satellite in 2008. Peter Martinez and Imraan Saloojee, “Space Policy Initiative
Lifts Off,” 6 DST Magazine (December 2004), at 28, online: www.dst.gov.za/publications-policies/
magazine/vol6_html/volume6.pdf; Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa,
Draft National Outer Space Policy (2008), online: South African Space Portal http://www.space.
gov.za/downloads/Draft_policy.pdf. Nigeria, which launched its space agency in 2001, launched its
first communications satellite in 2007 (Nigcomsat-1) with the help of China, and signed an
agreement with Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. for a second remote sensing satellite (Nigeriasat-2), to
be launched in 2008. “Nigeria Orbits First Comsat; Plans to Land Nigerians on the Moon by 2030,”
SatNews Daily (15 May 2007), online: http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4451/; Peter B. de
Selding, “Surrey Signs Deal to Build Nigeriasat-2,” Space News (14 November 2006). Egypt, which
has two communications satellites, launched in 1998 and 2000, had its first remote sensing satellite
launched in 2007, with the assistance of Ukraine. Egyptsat-1, tracking information, online:
http://www.n2yo.com/satellite.php?s=31117 (date accessed: 1 February 2008). Algeria, which
approved its space agency in 2002, launched its first remote sensing satellite, Alsat-1, in 2002 as
part of the Disaster Monitoring Constellation, and plans to have Alsat-2 launched in 2008. Algerian
Space Agency, “Space Activities in Algeria” (October 2007), online: http://www.space.gov.za/
alc2007/programme/Haned.pdf.
7 Jonathan’s Space Report, “Satellite Catalogue and Launch Catalogue,” online: http://planet4589.org/
space/log/satcat.txt (date accessed: 10 July 2008); Mark Wade, “Chronology 2004,” Encyclopedia
Astronautica.
8 “Disaster Monitoring Constellation Partners Hold 4th Meeting,” Space Daily (14 December 2003),
online: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/eo-03zzzzl.htm.
9 Eric Hagt, Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space (Washington, DC: World Security Institute, 2006)
at 88.
10 N. Fathi, “Iran Says it Launched Suborbital Rocket Into Space,” New York Times (26 February 2007),
online: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/middleeast/26iran.html.
11 There are doubts, however, as to whether the launch took place. A source in the Russian Ministry of
Defence was quoted by the Russian News Agency Novosti stating that no rocket launch was detected
by the Gabala early warning station in Azerbaijan, nor did the Russian Space Surveillance System
detect any new objects. K. Hilal, “Iran’s Announcement of a Space Rocket Test: Fact or Fiction?”
WMD Insights (4 April 2007), online: CNS http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/wmdi070404.htm; see
also “Iran launch: space shot or political stunt,” New Scientist (3 March 2007). US intelligence also
questioned whether the rocket launch took place.
12 See I. Lee, J.-J. Lee, J.-M. Choi, “Satellite Research and Development in Korea” at 4, in S. Kurnaz et
al., eds. Proceedings of 3rd Conference on Recent Advances in Space Technologies (12 – 14 June 2007,
Turkey, Istanbul), online: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/4283955/4283956/04283957.pdf
?isnumber=4283956&prod=CNF&arnumber=4283957&arSt=1&ared=4&arAuthor=Lee%2C+In%3
B+Lee%2C+Joo-Jin%3B+Choi%2C+Joon-Min.
214
Space Security 2008
13 “South Korean Rocket To Make First Launch In 2008,” Space Travel with reference to RIA Novosti
(31 October 2007), online: Space Travel http://www.space-travel.com/reports/South_Korean_
Rocket_To_Make_First_Launch_In_2008_999.html.
14 “Vietnam Establishes Space Technology Institute,” Space Daily (4 April 2007), online:
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Vietnam_Establishes_Space_Technology_Institute_999.html.
15 State Scientific Centre of Russia, “Kazakh Space Agency is Established,” Central R&D Institute for
Robotics and Technical Cybernetics (6 April 2007), online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3719_1.html.
16 “Kazakh Premier Vows to Support National Space Programmes,” excerpt from a report by
Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency (1 February 2008), online: Red Orbit http://www.redorbit.com/
news/space/1237958/kazakh_premier_vows_to_support_national_space_programmes/index.html.
17 O. Spadavecchia, “SA Sets Target Date for Creation of New National Space Agency,” quoting the
Department of Trade and Industry Deputy Minister R. Davies, Engineering News (27 August 2007),
online: http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=115566.
18 K. Czart and M. Łukasik, “Polish Deputies Aim to Establish a National Space Agency,” Polish
Astronomy Portal (1 January 2008), online: http://www.astronomia.pl/english/index.php?w=1&id=104.
19 “ISRO to Launch New Genre of Micro-Satellites,” Space Daily (10 September 2007), online:
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/ISRO_To_Launch_New_Genre_Of_Micro_Satellites_999.html.
20 The project is supported by the CEEX program; information from BITNET-CCSS online:
http://research.bitnet.info/last_projects.htm.
21 “Nigeria Orbits First Comsat; Plans to Land Nigerians on the Moon by 2030,” SatNews Daily (15
May 2007), online: http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4451/.
22 “Launch of First Russian Microsatellites is Planned for 2008,” State Scientific Centre of Russia,
Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (6 March 2007), online:
http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3623_1.html (in Russian).
23 In June Surrey Satellites completed a Baseline Design Review for a Geostationary Mini-satellite
Platform, Surrey Satellite Technology Space Update No. 7, at 3, online: http://zenit.sstl.co.uk/
documents/SSU7.pdf. Original figure cited as 2.28-million Euros.
24 “Lavochkin NPO,” Director-General Polishchuk in the interview with the Interfax agency at the
MAKS 2007 aerial-space exhibition in Russia, also saying that there will be bases on the Moon,
including those for Moon mining and extraction of mineral resources and energy generation.
“Lavochkin NPO Develop New Generation of Moon Research Vehicles,” State Scientific Centre of
Russia, Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (22 August 2007),
online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/4033_1.html (in Russian).
25 A list of all civil space agencies is available at Spacesecurity.org, “Directory of Space Actors” (January
2007), online: http://www.spacesecurity.org/publications.htm.
26 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, Raymond Ghirardi and Xavier Pasco, The Cambridge
Encyclopedia of Space (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 73-77.
27 Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 69.
28 Jane’s Space Directory (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2001) at. 14; European Space Agency,
“Annual Report 2006” (July 2007), online: http://www.esa.int/esapub/annuals/annual06/
ESA_AR2006.pdf at 110.
29 Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 96-97.
30 Ed Stoddard, “SA to Launch Micro-satellite from Russia as Cabinet Approves Plans for Space
Agency,” Cape Times (1 August 2006), online: http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php
?fSetId=198&fSectionId=271&fArticleId=3370073.
31 K.S. Jayaraman, “India Increases Space Budget 24 Percent for 2005-2006,” Space News (7 March
2005); K.S. Jayaraman, “Record Setting Indian Space Budget Includes Funds for Large Satellites,”
Space News (6 March 2006).
32 Dean Cheng, “Dragons in Orbit: China’s Space Program Merits Greater Attention,” Space News
(21 August 2006). Figures quoted from members of China’s National Space Administration place its
budget as high as $2-billion. “Chinese spends a 10th of NASA budget on space activities,” Xinhua
(12 October 2006), online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/12/content_5194441.htm.
In 2006 Lou Ge, the vice-administrator of the China National Space Administration, estimated the
215
Endnotes
Chinese space budget to be $500-million. Lou Ge quoted in Jeff Foust, “China, competition, and
cooperation,” The Space Review (10 April 2006), online: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/599/1.
33 Eric Hagt, Mutual Assured Vulnerabilities in Space, at 87.
34 Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 81.
35 Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 68-69.
36 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “FY 2007 Budget and 2006 Strategic Plan” (2006),
online: http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/index.htm. See annual increases under previous budget
statements.
37 Brian Berger, “No Raise for NASA for 2007,” Space News (12 December 2006).
38 “ESA Gets 10 Percent Budget Hike for 2005,” Space News (26 January 2005).
39 “Top Official Deplores Decline of Russian Space Program,” The Sunday Morning Herald (12
December 2002), online: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/11/1039379887168.html;
Olga Zhdanovich, discussion with author (Montreal, Quebec, 26 February 2005).
40 “The Government has Approved,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 November 2005) at 28.
41 RIA, “Russia To Spend More on Space Over Next Decade,” Space Daily (10 April 2006), online:
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_To_Spend_More_On_Space_Over_Next_Decade.html;
“Russia remains leader in spacecraft launches – space agency,” RIA Novosti (26 December 2006),
online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061226/57833667.html.
42 N. Peter, “Space Policy, Issues and Trends in 2006/2007” (6 September 2007) at 14, online: European
Space Policy Institute http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/
6th%20espi%20report.pdf.
43 Data from Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space.
44 “Russia Approves Space Funding,” CNN News (26 October 2005).
45 “Bush Unveils Vision for Moon and Beyond,” CNN (15 January 2004), online:
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/space/01/14/bush.space/.
46 NASA, Release 06-224, “NASA Set to Launch Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter in 2008” (18 May
2006), online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/may/HQ_06224_LRO_update.html.
47 NASA, Release 06-361, “NASA Unveils Global Exploration Strategy and Lunar Architecture”
(4 December 2006), online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/dec/
HQ_06361_ESMD_Lunar_Architecture.html.
48 Dennis Overbye, “NASA to Cut Back Scientific Missions because of Budget,” New York Times
(1 March 2006).
49 Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 68-69.
50 Agence France-Presse, “China to launch permanent human space station within 15 years” (18 May
2004); “China denies timetable for space station,” Xinhua (7 November 2007), online:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/07/content_7027496.htm.
51 Christian Science Monitor and Reuters, “Politician urges NASA to postpone shuttle’s retirement,”
Christian Science Monitor (18 December 2007), online: http://space.newscientist.com/channel/
human-spaceflight/space-shuttle/dn13098-politician-urges-nasa-to-postpone-shuttles-retirement.html.
52 Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Return Vision: Japan’s Space Agency Counts ISS at Centre of 20-year Road Map,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology (April 2005) at 32.
53 K.S. Jayaraman, “India’s Space Agency Seeks Government Approval of Human Spaceflight Program,”
Space News (10 November 2006).
54 Data from Verger et al., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space.
55 Indian Space Research Organization, “Milestones of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO),”
online: http://www.isro.org/mileston.htm (date accessed: 16 January 2008).
56 Surrey Satellites Technologies Ltd., Press Announcement, “Surrey Launches Two More Satellites from
Russia” (10 July 1998), online: http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/SSC/CSER/UOSAT/press/
tmsat-fasat- pr3.html.
216
Space Security 2008
57 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007) 212 final (26 April 2007) at 5, online: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
space/doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf.
58 Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, online: http://www.gmes.info/what_is/index.html
(date accessed: 25 April 2007).
59 Sean O’Keefe, “Remarks at the US Space Foundation Annual Symposium,” Colorado Springs, CO
(31 March 2004), online: NASA http://www.nasa.gov/audience/formedia/speeches/
ok_colorado_springs_033104.html.
60 NASA, Spinoff 2004 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), online:
http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/.
61 OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance, International Futures Programme (2007), at 36. Originally
sourced OECD/IFP Research (2007).
62 K.S. Jayaraman, “Record-Setting Indian Space Budget Includes Funds for Large Satellites,” Space News
(6 March 2006); “India Expands Human Space Launch Plans With One Third Increase in Space
Budget” (28 February 2007), online: Space Ports http://spaceports.blogspot.com/2007/02/
india-funds-human-space-launch-plans.html.
63 “Russia To Spend More on Space Over Next Decade,” Space Daily with reference to RIA Novosti
(10 April 2006), online: http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_To_Spend_More_
On_Space_Over_Next_Decade.html.
64 Law on the federal budget, all budget laws with annexes are accessible from Russian Federal Ministry
of Finance, online: http://www1.minfin.ru/ru/budget/federal_budget/.
65 Other sources report that this number is 713.2 million euros; see Peter B. de Selding, “CNES Targets
Non-ESA Space Projects for Budget Growth,” Space News (30 April 2007); CNES presentation,
online: Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education http://www.nauka.gov.pl/mn/_gAllery/
27/54/27541/20070525_CNES.pdf (date accessed: 1 February 2008).
66 According to AIA President and CEO J. Douglass, “NASA Restoration Amendment to Aid U.S.
Space Efforts,” Aerospace Industries Association Press Release (5 October 2007), online:
http://www.aia-aerospace.org/aianews/pr_detail.cfm?Content_ID=562; Brian Berger, “No Raise for
NASA for 2007,” Space News (12 December 2006).
67 “FY 2008 NASA Funding Bill,” 5 FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News (8 January 2008),
online: http://www.aip.org/fyi/2008/005.html.
68 Dean Cheng, “Dragons in Orbit: China’s Space Program Merits Greater Attention,” Space News
(21 August 2006). Figures quoted from members of China’s National Space Administration place its
budget as high as $2-billion. “Chinese spend a 10th of NASA budget on space activities,” Xinhua
(12 October 2006), online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/12/content_5194441.htm.
69 “India Expands Human Space Launch Plans with One-Third Increase in Space Budget,” (28 February
2007), online: Space Ports http://spaceports.blogspot.com/2007/02/india-funds-human-space-
launch-plans.html; “Russia To Spend More on Space Over Next Decade;” law on the federal budget;
CNES. Other sources report that this number is 713.2 million euros; see Peter B. de Selding, “CNES
Targets Non-ESA Space Projects for Budget Growth”; CNES presentation; J. Douglass, “NASA
Restoration Amendment to Aid U.S. Space Efforts”; “FY 2008 NASA Funding Bill”; Dean Cheng,
“Dragons in Orbit: China’s Space Program Merits Greater Attention.” Figures quoted from members
of China’s National Space Administration place its budget as high as $2-billion. “Chinese spends a
10th of NASA budget on space activities”; European Space Agency, “How big is ESA’s budget?”
online: http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGG4SXG3AEC_index_0.html; from BMWi Haushaltsordung
2007, online: http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/H/haushalt-2007-bmwi-
regierungsentwurf,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. According to some sources
the German space budget in 2007 was 874 Million euros (1291859400 USD): 67% ESA, 20% NP,
13% R&D; see online: “German Space Policy and Strategy: The German Space Programme,” xxx,
Presentation at Eurisy Conference Areas and Mechanisms for Collaboration between Turkish and
European Actors in Space Activities (22-23 October 2007), online: http://www.eurisy.org/
doceurisy/20071021_Turkey/Presentations/Presentations/1_6%20Germany%20Space%20Policy_
Weissenberg.pdf; Italian Space Agency (ASI) General balance sheet 2007 online:
http://www.asi.it/Allegati/20071017071208Bilancio_Preventivo_Finanziario_Decisionale_Assestato_
Esercizio_2007.pdf; Maxime Bernier, “The Canadian Space Agency 2007-2008 Estimates: Report on
217
Endnotes
Plans and Priorities” at 67, online: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/csa-asc/csa-asc_e.pdf; J.-S. Cho,
“Budget for Space Projects Remains Flat,” The Korea Times (16 January 2008), online:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/01/123_17396.html; I. Taniguchi,
“Industrialization of Space Development and Utilization in Japan,” JAXA (20 July 2007) online:
http://www.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol31/index_e.html; “New chief vows to reinvigorate Italian space
activities,” Physics Today (May 2007) at 29.
70 “China launches new remote sensing satellite,” Xinhua (25 May 2007), online: http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2007-05/25/content_6155537.htm; Stephen Clark, “Chinese put up hush-hush
observation satellite,” Spaceflight Now (14 November 2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/
news/n0711/14yaogan3/.
71 “China, Brazil give Africa free satellite land images,” Space Mart (28 November 2007), online:
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/China_Brazil_give_Africa_free_satellite_land_images_999.html.
This intention is also reflected in the Brazilian National Policy regarding the matter, as presented
during the COPUOS legal subcommittee in February 2008.
72 For information about the cooperation see “China Launches 3rd Earth Observation Satellite,”
RIA Novosti (19 September 2007), online: http://en.rian.ru/world/20070919/79431180.html.
73 “ISRO Offers Support for Disaster Management in Asia-Pacific,” The Hindu Business Line
(23 November 2007), online: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/11/23/stories/
2007112352081000.htm.
74 “PSLV Successfully Launches Four Satellites,” ISRO press release (10 January 2007), online:
http://www.isro.org/pressrelease/Jan10_2007a.htm.
75 Egyptsat-1, tracking information, online: http://www.n2yo.com/satellite.php?s=31117
(date accessed: 1 February 2008).
76 “Egypt: First Earth Observation Satellite (Egyptsat-1) Launched” (03 Mary 2007), online:
http://vague.eurecom.fr/thematicdirs/news/snews617774.
77 “Chinese Plan Human Space Launch,” United Press International (20 November 2007), online:
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Science/2007/11/20/chinese_plan_human_space_launch/1044;
“China Aims at 2008 for Next Crewed Spaceflight,” Space.com (5 March 2007), online:
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/ap_070305_shenzhou7_delay.html; Patrick Goodenough,
“China’s Space Ambitions on the Rise,” CNS News (9 January 2008), online: http://www.cnsnews.
com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200801/INT20080109a.html.
78 The Kliper had a mix of support and opposition from ESA members, which made funding
the project tenuous. In July 2006 the tender for Kliper was cancelled. Konstantin Lantratov,
“Affordable Space Projects from Russia,” Kommersant (21 August 2007), online:
http://www.kommersant.com/t795701/r_3/n_25/Space_Rocket_Launch/.
79 Y. Zaitsev, “Russia set to implement ambitious space program (Part II),” RIA Novosti (20 December
2006), online: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20061220/57396095.html; “In 2008 the Investors for the
Kliper Spaceship Project Will be Determined,” State Scientific Centre of Russia, Central R&D
Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (12 December 2007), online:
http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3428_1.html (in Russian); N. Sevastyanov, interview with RIA Novosti,
“Russia’s space exploration: its future lies with bold new projects,” RIA Novosti (17 August 2007),
online: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070817/72126740.html.
80 “Russia, India, May Join Hands on ‘Kliper’ Space Shuttle,” Aviation and Aerospace (29 December
2007), online: domain-b.com http://www.domain-b.com/aero/space/launch_veh/
20071229_kliper.html.
81 A.J.S. Rayl, “Europe and Russia Join Forces to Study Advanced Crew Transportation System – Japan
May Also Contribute,” Planetary News: Human Spaceflight (28 June 2006), online: The Planetary
Society http://www.planetary.org/news/2006/0628_Europe_and_Russia_Join_Forces_to_Study.html.
82 K. Cowing, “First Stage Design Problems Arise for NASA’s Ares 1 Rocket,” SpaceRef.com (16
November 2007), online: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1244; “Concerns about
Ares 1,” Space Politics (30 November 2007), online: Space Politics http://www.spacepolitics.com/
2007/11/30/concerns-about-ares-1/.
83 “NASA Concludes Review of Constellation Program,” SatNews (25 May 2007), online:
http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4507/.
218
Space Security 2008
84 “SpaceDev, SpaceHab and Constellation Services Sign NASA Space Act Agreements,” Space Travel
(19 June 2007), online: http://www.space-travel.com/reports/SpaceDev_SpaceHab_And_
Constellation_Services_Sign_NASA_Space_Act_Agreements_999.html.
85 “ISRO’s Recoverable Space Capsule Returns,” The Times of India (22 January 2007),
online: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1364183.cms.
86 European Space Agency, “Final Preparations for First Human-rated Spacecraft to Be Launched from
Europe’s Spaceport,” Press Release (18 December 2007), online: Spaceref.com
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.nl.html?pid=24317.
87 “KAGUYA (SELENE) Image Taking of Earth-Rise by HDTV,” JAXA, NHL (13 November 2007),
online: http://www.jaxa.jp/press/2007/11/20071113_kaguya_e.html; T. Ueno, “Japan’s Lunar
‘Princess’ Shoots for the Moon,” Reuters (14 September 2007), online: http://www.reuters.com/
article/sphereNews/idUST11303420070914?sp=true&view=sphere. The original value quoted is
55-billion yen.
88 “Japan’s Lunar Explorer Enters Observation Orbit,” Moon Daily (22 October 2007), online:
http://www.moondaily.com/reports/Japan_Lunar_Explorer_Enters_Observation_Orbit_999.html.
89 “Kaguya – Another Chapter for the Lunar Saga,” (14 September 2007), online: Red Orbit
http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/1066163/kaguya__another_chapter_for_the_lunar_saga/
index.html.
90 “China and ESA Launch Moon Mission – Chang’e-1,” Science Daily (25 October 2007),
online: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071024115241.htm.
91 “NASA: China may get to Moon before US can return,” Associated Press (08 October 2007),
online: Fox News http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,299514,00.html.
92 “China has no Timetable for Human Moon Landing,” People’s Daily (26 November 2007),
online: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90881/6309737.html.
93 As per Deputy Economy Minister P. Hintze, “Germans Shoot the Moon: Space Craft to Enter Lunar
Orbit,” Deutsche Welle (7 November 2007), online: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
0,2144,2880216,00.html.
94 European Space Agency, “Chandraayan-1 Overview,” online: http://www.esa.int/esaSC/
SEM7YH2MDAF_index_0_m.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
95 S. Ramachandran, “India Sets Its Sights on Mars,” Asia Times (19 April 2007), online:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ID19Df02.html.
96 Reuters, “South Korea Eyes Moon Orbiter in 2020, Lander in 2025,” (20 November 2007),
online: http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSSEO24596320071120.
97 See general information on the project on the official website of NPO Lavochkin, online:
http://www.laspace.ru/rus/phobos.php; L.M. Zelenyj, A.V. Zakharov and K.M. Pichkhadze,
“What are We Looking for on Phobos,” Russian Federal Space Agency, online:
http://www.federalspace.ru/Doc1Show.asp?DocID=16 (date accessed: 1 February 2008) (in Russian);
“China and Russia to Launch Joint Mars Mission,” New Scientist (28 March 2007), online:
http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn11490.
98 Roy Gibson, “The history of international space programs,” 23 Space Policy (2007) at 155.
99 John Krige, “The politics of European collaboration in space,” 36 Space Times: Magazine of the
American Astronautical Society (September – October 1997) at 6, cited in Roger D. Launius, “Notes
from the Field,” 2 Comparative Technology Transfer and Society (April 2004) at 28.
100 Dennis Overbye, “NASA to Cut Back Scientific Missions because of Budget,” New York Times
(1 March 2006).
101 Videocosmos, “Mir Station,” online: http://www.videocosmos.com/mir.shtm (date accessed:
25 April 2007)
102 NASA, “History of Shuttle-Mir,” online: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/shuttle-mir/images/
timeline.pdf (date accessed: 25 April 2007).
103 Alexander Anekeev, “Statistics on International Orbital Station” (2006), online: Human Astronautics:
Figures and Facts http://space.kursknet.ru/cosmos/english/other/siss.sht.
219
Endnotes
104 European Space Agency, “How Much Does it Cost?” online: http://www.esa.int/export/esaHS/
ESAQHA0VMOC_iss_0.html (date accessed: 25 April 2007).
105 As of January 2007 China, Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea had
signed agreements to cooperate on Galileo.
106 “China, Brazil to Co-Launch 2nd Satellite in Latter Half Year,” People’s Daily (13 July 2002).
107 Chinese National Space Administration, “China’s Space Activities in 2006,” White Paper
(12 October 2006), online: http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620682/n639462/79381_1.html.
108 “NASA, 13 Space Agencies Join in Historic Space Cooperation Agreement,” Satnews Daily
(5 June 2007), online: http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4550/.
109 Ch. Bodeen (citing P. Zhaoyu, assistant director of the Lunar Exploration Program Centre),
“China Insists There’s No Asia Space Race,” Space.com (1 November 2007), online:
http://www.space.com/news/ap-071101-china-nospacerace.html.
110 “Russia and India Sign Joint Lunar Research Deal,” RIA Novosti (13 November 2007), online:
Space Daily http://www.moondaily.com/reports/Russia_And_India_Sign_Joint_
Lunar_Research_Deal_999.html.
111 “Russia, Europe Favor Enlarged Soyuz Capsule for Future Lunar Ship,” (23 October 2007), online:
Russian Space Web http://www.russianspaceweb.com/soyuz_acts_origin.html; “Russia And Europe
Discuss Developing New Human Spacecraft,” Space Daily (18 January 2007), online:
http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Russia_And_Europe_Discuss_Developing_New_Human_Spacec
raft_999.html; “Roskosmos and ESA will Together Develop a Spaceship for Moon and Mars Flights,”
State Scientific Centre of Russia, Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news
line (22 August 2007), online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/4031_1.html (in Russian).
112 Y. Zaitsev (RIA Novosti), “Partnership in Space,” Space Daily (15 October 2007), online:
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Partnership_In_Space_999.html.
113 P. Ghosh, “NASA to Support UK Moon Mission,” BBC (14 December 2007), online:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7143197.stm.
114 Roskosmos press secretary Panarin in the interview with the RIA News agency, “Russia and the USA
Agreed on the ISS Exploitation Plan till 2011,” State Scientific Centre of Russia, Central R&D
Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (5 June 2007), online:
http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3906_1.html (in Russian).
115 “US Rejected Russian Request for Joint Moon Program,” Space Daily (29 April 2007), online:
http://www.moondaily.com/reports/US_Rejected_Russian_Request_For_Joint_Moon_Program_
999.html.
116 See official website, online: http://www.jwst.nasa.gov/about.html (date accessed: 1 February 2008);
regarding project costs, see US Government Accountability Office, “NASA James Webb Space
Telescope: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Key to Addressing Program Challenges,” Report
to the Congressional Committees (13 July 2006), online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06634.pdf.
117 “Construction of Soyuz Launch Base in French Guiana Begins,” Space Travel (27 February 2007),
online: http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Construction_Of_Soyuz_Launch_Base_
In_French_Guiana_Begins_999.html.
118 From the interview of President of the Air Start Corporation Karpov with RIA Novosti agency,
“Russia and Indonesia entered the Practical Phase of the ‘Air Start’ Project,” State Scientific Centre of
Russia, Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (21 March 2007),
online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3669_1.html (in Russian).
119 G. Thompson, “Russia, Indonesia Sign $1.2b Arms Deal,” ABC News (6 September 2007), online:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/06/2026434.htm.
120 “Putin Approved the Treaty on Space Cooperation with Korea,” State Scientific Centre of Russia,
Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics news line (29 June 2007), online:
http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/3979_1.html (in Russian).
121 Brian Berger, “Griffin Agrees to Explore Working with China in Several Areas of Space Science” Space
News (26 September 2006); Warren Leary, “NASA Chief in China to Discuss Space Cooperation,”
New York Times (24 September 2006).
220
Space Security 2008
122 “U.S. halts China space ventures,” Washington Times (2 February 2007); New Scientist Space and AFP,
“US rethinks cooperation with China in space,” New Scientist (3 February 2007).
123 Futron Corporation, “Trends in Space Commerce” (US Department of Commerce, Office of Space
Commercialization, June 2000).
124 Space Foundation, The Space Report (Colorado Springs: Space Foundation, 2006) at 77. From ABI
Research, Table of Contents for Satellite Positioning Systems and Devices: Global Markets for GPS,
GALILEO, GLONASS, and Other Satellite-Based Positioning Technologies (2005), online:
http://www.abiresearch.com/products/market_research/Satellite_Positioning_Systems_and_Devices.
125 “The Sky’s the Limit,” Economist (8 March 2001); Giovanni Bisignani, Director, International Air
Transport Association, “State of the Air Transport Industry,” International Air Transport Association
64th General Meeting (2 June 2008), online: http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2008-06-02-01.htm.
126 US Department of Commerce, Office of Space Commercialization, “Trends in Space Commerce,”
(June 2001).
127 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Coordinational Scientific Information Center,” online: Russian Space
Agency http://www.glonass-center.ru/frame_e.html (date accessed: 25 April 2007).
128 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space,” from the working paper, “The American Academy
of Arts and Sciences Project ‘Reconsidering the Rules of Space’” (June 2004), online: Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/space/20040700aaas.shtml.
129 European Union, “Satellite Navigation” (6 April 2006), online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/
russia/sector/satellite_navigation_en.html; “Russia to Lift GLONASS Restrictions for Accurate
Civilian Use,” GPS Daily (14 November 2006), online: http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_
To_Lift_Glonass_Restrictions_For_Accurate_Civilian_Use_999.html.
130 Jonathan’s Space Report, “Satellite Catalogue and Launch Catalogue,” online:
http://planet4589.org/space/log/satcat.txt (date accessed: 25 April 2007); Mark Wade, “Chronology
2004,” online: Encyclopedia Astronautica http://www.astronautix.com/.
131 “The Beidou System,” Presentation to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Summer Symposium,
Beijing, August 2004.
132 “China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” GPS Daily (3 November 2006), online:
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/China_Starts_To_Build_Own_Satellite_Navigation_System_999.html.
133 K.S. Jayaraman, “India to Develop Regional Navigation System,” Space News (22 May 2006).
134 Interagency GPS Executive Board, “Joint Announcement, Second Japan-US GPS Plenary Meeting,
2002” (16 October 2002).
135 Paul Kallender, “Impass over Japan’s QZSS System Persists,” Space News (23 December 2004).
136 European Commission, Press Release, “GALILEO: YES, at Last!” (26 March 2002), online: Europa
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/478.
137 “Where It’s at: A European Satellite-navigation Network Is on Its Way,” Economist (29 January 2004).
138 European Union, “Galileo Services” (1 March 2006), online:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/programme/services_en.htm.
139 “Galileo navigation satellites hugely over budget,” New Scientist (23 May 2006), online:
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn9210.
140 Peter B. de Selding, “Europe concedes to U.S. on one GPS, Galileo roadblock,” Space News (6 January
2004); “Talks narrow differences on GPS/Galileo signals,” GPS World (February 2004), online: BNET
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BPW/is_2_15/ai_n6170804.
141 Peter B. de Selding, “Europeans Raise Red Flags Over Chinese Satellite Navigation Plan,” Space News
(16 June 2006).
142 Jonathan’s Space Report, “Satellite Catalog and Launch Catalog,” online:
http://planet4589.org/space/log/satcat.txt.
143 WMO Space Programme, “Current Polar-Orbiting Satellites Coordinated within CGMS”
(25 November 2005).
144 Peter de Selding, “Europe Moves Ahead With Weather Satellite Blacklist,” Space News
(9 January 2006).
221
Endnotes
145 US Environment Protection Agency, “Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS),”
online: http://www.epa.gov/geoss/basic.html (date accessed: 25 April 2007).
146 Group on Earth Observations, “Declaration of the Earth Observation Summit” (31 July 2003);
US Environment Protection Agency, “Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).”
147 Surrey Satellite Technologies, Press Release, “SSTL Readies First DMC Satellite for November
Launch” (19 November 2002).
148 COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat, interview with author, 16 May 2005.
149 International Cospas-Sarsat Programme, “Information Bulletin” (19 February 2007), online:
http://www.cospas-sarsat.org/DocumentsInformationBulletin/Bul19-Feb07_E_web.pdf at 5.
150 COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat, interview with author, 16 May 2005; International Cospas-Sarsat
Programme, “Information Bulletin” at 6.
151 T. Barnes and V. Samson, “Galileo Funding Approved,” 11 CDI Space Security Update (5 December
2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4152#10.
152 “EU Nations ‘Close’ to Political Agreement on Satnav Project,” EU Business (29 November 2007),
online: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1196335922.02/.
153 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007), 212 final (26 April 2007), at paragraph 3.1, online: http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/space/doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf.
154 “Russia’s Glonass Now Offered Free to Users,” Satnews Daily (21 May 2007), online:
http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4480/.
155 N. Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early Warning
Capabilities,” WMD Insights (December 2007/January 2008), online: http://www.wmdinsights.com/
I21/I21_RU1_RussianMilitary.htm; “3 GLONASS Satellites Launched with Proton-K from
Baikonur,” State Scientific Centre of Russia, Central R&D Institute for Robotics and Technical
Cybernetics news line (26 October 2007), online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/4200_1.html (in Russian).
156 “Russia prepares to launch 3 GLONASS satellites on December 25th,” RIA Novosti (25 December
2007), online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071225/94088531.html.
157 Y. Zaitsev, “GLONASS Potential Still to be Realised,” GPS Daily (1 May 2007), online:
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/GLONASS_Potential_Still_To_Be_Realised_999.html.
158 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Did GLONASS Failure Sink Ivanov’s Chance at the Presidency?” Eurasia Daily
Monitor (6 February 2008), online: Jamestown News www.jamestown.org/edm/
article.php?article_id+2372780.
159 “Glonass Navigation System Available to India – Russia,” RIA Novosti (21 January 2007),
online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070122/59520011.html.
160 White House press secretary quoted in “Selective Availability: Complete Dead,” Inside GNSS
(19 September 2007), online: ww.insidegnss.com/node/200.
161 J. Ray, “Upgraded Satellite Launched for the GPS Constellation,” Spaceflight Now (17 October
2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/d328/; see also information on the 20 December
2007 launch, “Modernized GPS Satellite Built by Lockheed Martin Successfully Launched from Cape
Canaveral,” Lockheed Martin news (20 December 2007), online: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/
news/press_releases/2007/12-20gps.html.
162 Agence France-Presse, “US plans GPS satellite navigation upgrade to rival EU,” (21 November 2007),
online: AFP http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j3ZQCFnCij_rImToHsjrq61fyFhQ.
163 “EU, US to Make GPS and Galileo Satellite Networks Compatible,” EU Business (26 July 2007),
online: http://www.eubusiness.com/Telecoms/1185465602.28/.
164 “China puts new navigation satellite into orbit,” Xinhua (3 February 2007), online:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/03/content_5689019.htm; “China Launches
‘Compass’ Navigation Satellite,” Xinhua (14 April 2007), online:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/14/content_5974414.htm.
222
Space Security 2008
165 “China Develops Beidou Satellite Monitoring System for Dangerous Chemicals Transportation,”
People’s Daily (13 August 2007), online: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/
90882/6238244.html; J. Walko, “China Set to Launch Rival to GPS, Galileo,” EE Times online
(2 May 2007), online: http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197003167.
166 Gibbons Media and Research LLC, “Compass: And China’s GNSS Makes Four,” Inside GNSS
(November/December 2006), online: http://www.insidegnss.com/node/115.
167 “ESA and EC take major step forward in Global Monitoring for Environment and Security,”
GIS Development (20 December 2007), online: http://www.gisdevelopment.net/news/viewn.
asp?id= GIS:N_dyifzkcthx. Original value cited is 48-million euros.
168 “ESA & Thales Alenia Space Complete Contract for GMES Sentinel-1,” 383 France in Space
(7 November 2007), online: Office of Science and Technology, French Embassy in the US
http://www.france-science.org/home/page.asp?LNG=us&target=nfo-let&PUBLID=9&LIVRID=8710.
Original value of the contract cited as 229-million euros.
169 NOAA, “NOAA, GSA Officially Open New Environmental Satellite Centre,” News (11 June 2007),
online: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2007/s2872.htm.
170 NOAA, “NOAA, NASA to Restore a Key Climate Sensor to NPOESS Preparatory Project,” Press
Release (4 November 2007), online: http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2007/apr07/
noaa07-r307.html.
171 “Internal Report to White House on Implications of NPOESS Climate Observation Crisis,” Climate
Science Watch (4 June 2007), online: http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/index.php/csw/
details/npoess_ostp_report/.
Chapter Four Endnotes
1 Rolf Skaar, “Commercialization of space and its evolution,” European Space Policy Institute
Report 4 (May 2007), at 5, online: http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/
commercialisation.pdf.
2 Eurospace, “Facts & Figures: The European Space Industry in 2002” (2004), at 7, online:
http://www.eurospace.org/.
3 Space Foundation, The Space Report 2007 Update (Colorado Springs: Space Foundation 2007), at 4,5.
The figures reported are based on those in the Space Foundation Report, but do not include the
figures for government spending, only commercial revenues.
4 Futron Corporation, State of the Satellite Industry Report, “2005 Satellite Industry Statistics” (June
2006), at 8, online: http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource_center/reports/SIA_2005_Indicators.pdf;
Futron Corporation, State of the Satellite Industry Report, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics” (June
2007), at 6,7, online: http://www.sia.org/PDF/2007StateofSatelliteIndustryReport.pdf; The Space
Report 2007 Update at 4,5. Estimates of satellite service revenues for 2006 vary, with the Futron
Corporation citing $62.8-billion and the Space Foundation citing $111.1-billion, the latter based on
data from a range of sources.
5 Futron Corporation, State of the Satellite Industry Report, “2007 Satellite Industry Statistics” (June
2008), at 6, online: Satellite Industry Association http://www.sia.org/files/2008SSIR.pdf.
6 US Federal Aviation Administration, “The Economic Impact of Commercial Space Transportation
on the US Economy: 2002 Results and Outlook for 2010” (March 2004), at 3, online:
http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/2004Economic_Impact.pdf.
7 Communications Satellite Corporation, or COMSAT, is a private communications satellite company
organized and started by the US Congress. See Comsat International, “Comsat International History,”
online: http://www.comsatinternational.com/about/history.html (date accessed: 25 April 2007);
President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), “Satellite Task
Force Report, Factsheet” (March 2004), at 6.
8 John Higginbotham, “Private Possibilities in Space,” in Edward L. Hudgins, ed., Space: The Free
Market Frontier (New York: Cato Institute, 2002), at 146.
223
Endnotes
9 Futron Corporation, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics,” at 9; Space Foundation, The Space Report
2007 Update, at 4,5. The figures reported are based on those in the Space Foundation Report, but do
not include the figures for government spending, only commercial revenues.
10 “Satellite Task Force Report, Factsheet,” at 6.
11 Space Foundation, The Space Report (2006), at 52.
12 Data taken from annual commercial launch reports by the Futron Corporation, available online:
http://www.futron.com/resource_center/friends_of_futron/report_archives/launch_report.htm
(date accessed: 25 April 2007).
13 “2005 Satellite Industry Statistics,” at 15. The Federal Aviation Administration calculates launch
revenues to be about half of these figures, reporting $1.2-billion in 2005 and $1.4-billion in 2006.
Federal Aviation Administration, “Commercial Space Transportation 2006 Year in Review” (2006),
online: http://ast.faa.gov/rep_study/yir.htm.
14 Peter B. de Selding, “Launch Price Increases Expected despite Overcapacity,” Space News
(19 September 2005).
15 FAA, “2006 Year in Review,” at 7.
16 Futron Corporation, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics.”
17 FAA, “2006 Year in Review,” at 13.
18 Futron Corporation, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics,” at 13. Satellite manufacturing revenue is
recorded in the year that the satellite is delivered/launched, not the year in which it is ordered.
19 Futron Corporation, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics,” at 14.
20 John S. Edwards, “Waiting for the Rebound; Commercial Communications Satellite Makers and
Their Suppliers Eye Moderate Market Growth,” 164(3) Aviation Week & Space Technology
(16 January 2006), at 161.
21 Space Foundation, The Space Report 2008: The Authoritative Guide to Space Activity (Colorado
Springs: Space Foundation, 2008), at 7.
22 Futron Corporation, “State of the Satellite Industry Report 2008,” at 7.
23 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “2007 Year in Review” (2008), at 6, online: http://www.
faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2007_Year_In_Review_Jan_2008.pdf.
24 Futron Corporation, “Launch Report” (January 2008), online:
http://www.futron.com/pdf/friends_of_futron_reports/launch_reports/FutronLR2008-01.pdf.
25 Futron Corporation, “Launch Report” (January 2008).
26 Futron Corporation, “Launch Report” (January 2007).
27 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “2007 Year in Review” (2008), at 7, online: http://www.
faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2007_Year_In_Review_Jan_2008.pdf.
28 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “2007 Year in Review,” at 8.
29 ABI Research, cited in The Space Report 2008 at 15.
30 Futron Corporation, “State of the Satellite Industry Report” (June 2008), at 8.
31 Futron Corporation, “State of the Satellite Industry Report” (June 2007).
32 Michael A. Taverna and Robert Wall, “Pick and Choose: Buoyant demand and improving outlook
seen for telecom satellite manufacturers,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (10 September 2007),
at 28.
33 Futron Corporation, “State of the Satellite Industry Report” (June 2008), at 13.
34 Futron Corporation, “Launch Report” (January 2008).
35 Michael A. Taverna and Douglas Barrie, “Eastern Star: Saudi affiliate, UAE satellite buy could fuel
expansion of Astrium milsatcom business,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (26 November 2007),
at 41.
36 Peter B. de Selding, “Thales Alenia Merging Satellite Platforms,” Defense News (16 July 2007), at 38.
224
Space Security 2008
37 Howard Chambers, “Trends in the Commercial Satellite Industry,” Keynote speech presented to
Euroconsult 2007, Paris, France (5 September 2007), online: http://www.boeing.com/news/
speeches/2007/chambers_070905.html; Michael A. Taverna and Robert Wall, “Pick and Choose,”
at 28.
38 Israel Ashdod, “More than Money – IAI Critical to Israel’s Defense, Says Peres and Upcoming
Launch,” SatNews Daily, online: http://www.satnews.com/cgi-bin/display_story.cgi?number=
1338907555 (date accessed 12 March 2008).
39 Anil Penna, “India launches Israeli satellite in boost to space business,” Agence France-Presse
(21 January 2008), online: http://www.canada.com/topics/technology/science/story.html
?id=68e69c99-33d2-4106-b739-a891169539c2&k=11055; “India commercial rocket takes off,” BBC
News (23 April 2007), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6582773.stm; for launch price
comparisons see FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “2007 Year in Review” (2008), at 17-19.
40 K. Raghu, “India to build a constellation of 7 navigation satellites by 2012,” livemint.com/The Wall
Street Journal (5 September 2007), online: http://www.livemint.com/2007/09/05002237/
India-to-build-a-constellation.html.
41 Caitlin Harrington, “US aerospace industry seeks Indian partnerships,” Jane’s Defence News (3 Jan
2007), at 18; Frank Morring, Jr., ed., “In Orbit: Open for Business,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology (2 April 2007), at 19.
42 “European space agencies keen on outsourcing work to India,” Sify News (27 September 2007),
online: http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14534803.
43 T.S. Subramanian, “ISRO entrenched in remote-sensing images market,” The Hindu (23 September
2007), online: http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/23/stories/2007092360451200.htm.
44 Edward Codey, “China builds and launches a satellite for Nigeria,” The Washington Post
(14 May 2007), online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
05/13/AR2007051301264.html.
45 AP, “Satellite launch for Nigeria marks expansion for China’s launching,” KomoTV.com
(24 May 2007), online: http://www.komotv.com/news/tech/7494812.html.
46 Jim Yardley, “Snubbed by US, China Finds New Space Partners,” New York Times (24 May 2007),
online: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html.
47 “Arianespace warns US over Chinese space ‘dumping,’” (30 November 2007), online:
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gRSPI2HxWsPwjfICbGanIw4VN0SQ.
48 Futron Corporation, “Manufacturing Report” (January 2008), online: http://www.futron.com/
pdf/friends_of_futron_reports/satellite_manufacturing_reports/FutronSM2008-01.pdf.
49 Futron Corporation, “Futron Launch Report” (January 2006). Effective 1 January 2006 commercial
launches are defined by Futron as including launches where at least one payload procured launch
services commercially. This definition differs from the standard used by the Federal Aviation
Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation; Federal Aviation Administration,
“Commercial Space Transportation: 2005 Year in Review” (January 2006), online:
http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/2005_YIR_FAA_AST_0206.pdf.
50 Tamar H. Mehuron, “2004 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine (August 2003), online: Air Force
Association http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug2003/0803spacealmanac.pdf; Futron Corporation,
“Futron Launch Report” (January 2008).
51 “Commercial Space Transportation: 2005 Year in Review,” at 7.
52 US Senate, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Testimony of Jerry Rising,
Lockheed Martin Corporation (23 September 1998), online:
http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/0923ris.pdf.
53 Futron Corporation, “Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price per pound to Orbit 1990-2000”
(6 September 2002), at 4-5, online: http://www.futron.com/pdf/FutronLaunchCostWP.pdf.
54 “China Eyes Commercial Space Flights in 20 Years,” Agence-France Presse (3 November 2004).
55 All data derived from Federal Aviation Administration, “Commercial Space Transportation Year in
Review” (1997 through 2007), online: http://ast.faa.gov/rep_study/yir.htm.
56 Frank Sietzen, Jr., “The H-II Failure: Japan’s Commercial Launch Industry Take a Hit,” Space.com
(18 November 1999), online: http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/launches/hs_japan_991118.html.
225
Endnotes
57 Futron Corporation, “Futron Launch Report” (December 2006).
58 US Senate, “Space Launch Cost Reduction Act of 1998, Introduced in Senate” (22 May 1998);
Marcia Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and
Satellite Exports,” Issue brief for the US Congress (3 February 2003), at 16, online: US Department
of State http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17353.pdf.
59 Sea Launch, “History,” online: http://www.sea-launch.com/history.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
60 Sea Launch, “Sea Launch Facilities,” online: http://www.sea-launch.com/slfacilities.htm (date accessed:
10 July 2008).
61 A number of commercial space companies such as Orbital Sciences Corporation, Airlaunch LLC,
Transformational Space Corporation, and Northrop Grumman are working on air-launch
technologies, which may have implications for the commercial launch industry. Orbital Sciences
Corporation, “Pegasus,” online: http://www.orbital.com/PrinterFriendly.php?NavMenuID=291 (date
accessed: 25 April 2007); Transformational Space Corporation, Press Release, “t/Space Demonstrates
New Air-Launch Technology” (14 June 2005), online: SpaceRef.com http://www.spaceref.com/news/
viewpr.html?pid=17117; Jeremy Singer, “DoD Small-Rocket Contract Produces Fierce Competition,”
C4ISR Journal (2 June 2005), online: http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=890851; Leonard
David, “Hybrid Air-Rocket Concept Touted for Rapid Launch,” Space News (4 April 2006); Haninah
Levine, “The Future is Coming – Will We Notice the Difference?” (26 September 2005), online:
Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=
3152&programID=68&from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm. India aims to cut future
satellite launch costs to between $500 and $1,000 per kilogram to LEO with a scramjet, but it is not
anticipated before 2015. Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Space Transportation,
“Quarterly Launch Report, 2nd Quarter 2006” (2006), at 2; V. Brinda et al., “Mission Analysis of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstrator,” American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, 13th International Space Planes and Hypersonics Systems and Technologies (2005).
62 Futron Corporation, “Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit 1990-2000”
(6 September 2002), at 3, online: http://www.futron.com/pdf/FutronLaunchCostWP.pdf. Prices
quoted in pounds and converted to kilograms by the author.
63 Futron Corporation, “Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit 1990-2000.”
64 Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Space Transportation, “Quarterly Launch Report, 2nd
Quarter 2006,” (2006), at 2; V. Brinda et al., “Mission Analysis of a Reusable Launch Vehicle
Technology Demonstrator.”
65 “Space Transportation Costs,” at 6.
66 All data derived from Federal Aviation Administration, “Commercial Space Transportation Year in
Review.” This data differs from the figures provided by the Futron Corporation in Figure 4.2.
67 Missy Frederick, “Internet Mapping Portal Competition Benefits Satellite Imagery Businesses,”
Space News (24 April 2006).
68 Futron Corporation, “2006 Satellite Industry Statistics,” at 12.
69 Kim Thomas, “Mobile Telephones Offer A New Sense of Direction,” Financial Times (London)
(17 November 2006), at 7.
70 Canalys, “Smart Mobile Device and Navigation Trends Report 2006/2007” (2006), online:
http://www.canalys.com/reports/index.htm.
71 Dan Llett, “Heading Toward A Host of Services,” Financial Times (London) (18 October 2006), at 7;
Canalys, “Smart Mobile Device and Navigation Trends Report 2006/2007.”
72 Space Foundation, The Space Report 2007 Update, at 5.
73 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, H.R. 3752, 108th Congress (8 March 2004);
Erica Werner, “Congress Passes Bill Allowing Space Tours,” Associated Press (9 December 2004);
“No Waiting on Commercial Space Launch Bill,” Space News (25 October 2004).
74 ESA, “ESA to Help Europe Prepare for Space Tourism” (20 July 2006), online: http://www.esa.int/
SPECIALS/GSP/SEM2YABUQPE_0.html. As part of the initiative European private companies with
plans for space tourism activities may submit proposals to ESA, which will select a maximum of three
that will receive further study. Each company that submits a proposal selected by ESA will receive
150,000 euros to assist in developing its ideas.
226
Space Security 2008
75 Space Foundation, The Space Report (2006), at 29; Space Foundation, The Space Report 2007
Update, at 9.
76 Scaled Composites, Press Release, “SpaceShipOne Makes History: First Private Manned Mission to
Space” (21 June 2004), online: http://www.scaled.com/projects/tierone/062104-2.htm.
77 Federal Aviation Administration, “Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicles and Emerging Markets”
(February 2005), at 6.
78 Leonard David, “Bigelow Aerospace to Take Inflatable Space Habitats,” Space.com (24 May 2004),
online: http://www.space.com/news/businessmonday_040524.html.
79 US Government Accountability Office, “Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued
Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry”
(20 October 2006), online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0716.pdf.
80 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “New Regulations Govern Private Human Spaceflight
Requirements for Crew and Spaceflight Participants” (15 December 2006), online:
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/human_space_flight_reqs/; see also
Human Spaceflight Requirements for Crew and Spaceflight Participants, Final Rule, 71 Fed.
Reg. 75616 (2006).
81 Safety Approvals; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 46847 (2006).
82 Andy Pasztor, “Satellite Insurers See Flat Rates Ahead,” Wall Street Journal (15 January 2008).
83 Futron Corporation, “Satellite Insurance Rates on the Rise: Market Correction or Overreaction?”
(10 July 2002), online: http://www.futron.com/pdf/Futron-SatInsurance.pdf; Lisa Daniel, “Satellite
Insurance: Operators Returning To Outside Providers,” Satellite Today (1 November 2007), online:
www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/19461.html.
84 Michael A. Taverna, “Worsening Insurance Crunch Worries Space Industry,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology (20 May 2002), at 47.
85 J. Bates, “Satellite Insurance: Market Stabilizes After Tough Stretch,” Via Satellite (1 June 2006),
online: http://www.satellitetoday.com/cgi/pub/via/via06010606.html.
86 “Quarterly Launch Report: 2nd Quarter 2006,” FAA Commercial Space Transportation, 2006, at
SR-7; Michael A. Taverna, “Worsening Insurance Crunch Worries Space Industry,” at 47; US Federal
Aviation Administration, “Commercial Space Transportation Quarterly Launch Report, 4th Quarter”
(2002), at 10, online: http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/FourthQuarterFinal.pdf.
87 Lisa Daniel, “Satellite Insurance: Operators Returning To Outside Providers.”
88 “Satellite Insurance,” Satellite Standard Blog (26 March 2006), online:
satellitestandard.blogspot.com/2006/03/satellite-insurance.html.
89 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “Quarterly Launch Report: 2nd Quarter 2006” (2006),
at SR-8.
90 Michael A. Taverna, “Back and Better?” Aviation Week & Space Technology (2 April 2007), at 6.
91 “Sea Launch Concludes Investigation of Launch Failure” (11 June 2007), online: Boeing
http://www.boeing.com/special/sea-launch/news_releases/nr_070611.html.
92 Brian Berger, “Falcon 1 Failure Traced to Busted Nut,” Space News (19 July 2006); Tariq Malek,
“SpaceX’s Second Falcon 1 Rocket Fails to Reach Orbit,” Space Flight (20 March 2007), online:
Space.com http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/070320_spacex_falc1_test2.html.
93 Robert Wall and Michael Taverna, “Ups and Downs: Launch providers enjoy strengthening market,
but a return to reality may be in the offing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (10 September 2007),
at 30.
94 Futron Corporation, “Launch Report” (January 2008).
95 Michael A. Taverna, “Back in Business: As private equity influence wanes, satellite operators turn
again to space insurance market,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (23 April 2007), at 26-27.
96 Andy Pasztor, “Satellite Insurers See Flat Rates Ahead,” Wall Street Journal (15 January 2008). Rates
for telecommunications satellites were roughly 14 percent of the total cost of the vehicle. Peter B. de
Selding, “Insurance Unit Adds $15 Million To Launch, Satellite Coverage,” Space News (9 July 2007).
227
Endnotes
97 Lisa Daniel, “Satellite Insurance: Operators Returning To Outside Providers,” Satellite Today
(1 November 2007), online: www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/19461.html.
98 “GeoEye Obtains 2008 Insurance for its IKONOS Satellite,” Press Release (14 December 2007),
online: GeoEye geoeye.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=284.
99 “Space Activities and Relevant Insurance Implications,” 14th Annual International Space Insurance
Conference, Milan Italy (22-23 March 2007), online: http://space14.pagnanellirs.com/.
100 Andy Pasztor, “Satellite-Launch Insurers May Temper Rate Increases,” The Wall Street Journal
(16 January 2008), online: http://online.wsj.com/article_email/
SB120043725314792563-lMyQjAxMDI4MDEwNzQxMzc3Wj.html.
101 “Arianespace Is Ready To Support The Mobile Satellite Services Industry’s Future Development”
(22 March 2008), online: Space Travel Exploration and Tourism http://www.space-travel.com/
reports/Arianespace_Is_Ready_To_Support_The_Mobile_Satellite_Services_Industry_Future_
Development_999.html.
102 “Arianespace And Astrium Sign Agreement On Ariane 5 Production Increase” (16 February 2007),
online: Space Travel Exploration and Tourism http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Arianespace_
And_Astrium_Sign_Agreement_On_Ariane_5_Production_Increase_999.html.
103 “Arianespace Is Ready To Support The Mobile Satellite Services Industry’s Future Development.”
104 SpaceX, Press Release, “SpaceX Signs Deal For First Geostationary Commercial Launch” (13
September 2007), online: SpaceRef.com http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.nl.html?pid=23521.
105 FAA Commercial Space Transportation, “2007 Year in Review,” at 15.
106 “Brazil, Argentina successfully complete joint space launch” (17 December 2007), online: The Earth
Times http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/159845.html.
107 “Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy aims to reduce launch costs – company,” Space Travel (7 January 2008),
online: http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Japans_Mitsubishi_Heavy_aims_
to_cut_rocket_launch_costs_company_999.html.
108 Jeff Foust, “When Bad Launches Happen to Good Companies,” The Space Review (9 April 2007),
online: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/847/1.
109 Frank Morring, Jr., ed., “In Orbit: Commercial Flight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (16 April
2007), at 22.
110 “News Breaks: Americas,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (23 July 2007), at 19.
111 “Space tourism tickets to skyrocket,” MSNBC (18 July 2007) online:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19834995/print/1/displaymode/1098/.
112 “Survey of European Privately-Funded Vehicles for Commercial Human Spaceflight,” ESA General
Studies Programme, online: http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/GSP/SEMR2Q8ATME_0.html (date
accessed: 13 March 2008).
113 David Shiga, “Space hotel competition heats up,” Space – New Scientist Blogs (13 August 2007),
online: http://www.newscientist.com/blog/space/2007/08/space-hotel-competition-heats-up.html;
Peter B. de Selding, “Europe Unveils Space Plane for Tourist Market,” Space.com (13 June 2007),
online: http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/AstriumEadsweb_061307.html.
114 Blue Origin, “Development Flight, and We are Hiring,” Media Release, online:
http://public.blueorigin.com/index.html (date accessed: 13 March 2008).
115 “Bigelow Aerospace Fast-tracks Manned Spacecraft,” Space.com (14 August 2007), online:
http://www.space.com/news/070814_bigelow_sundancer.html.
116 Leonard David, “Bigelow Aerospace Sets a Business Trajectory,” Space News (26 March 2007).
117 Craig Covault, “Bigelow Aims High: Entrepreneur reveals near-term plan for commercial manned
space infrastructure,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (9 April 2007), at 24-25.
118 Frank Morring, Jr., “Setting Prices,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (16 April 2007), at 36; David
Shiga, “Commercial space station to launch before 2010,” New Scientist – Space (14 August 2007),
online: http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn12485&print=true; Bigelow Aerospace,
“Bigelow and Lockheed Martin Converging on Terms for Launch Services,” News (5 February 2008),
online: http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/news/?BA_And_Lckheed_Martin.
228
Space Security 2008
119 X PRIZE Foundation, “About the Google Lunar X PRIZE,” online: http://www.googlelunarxprize.
org/lunar/about-the-prize (date accessed: 13 March 2008); Brian Berger, “Carnegie Mellon Sets Sights
on Google’s Lunar X Prize,” Space.com (1 October 2007), online: http://www.space.com/spacenews/
071001_businessmonday_lunarprize.html.
120 Guy Norris, “Google Moon: X Prize Foundation and Google offer $30 million to land robots on the
Moon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 September 2007), at 67.
121 “News Breaks: First Entry for Lunar X Prize,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (10 December 2007),
at 25.
122 Wg Cdr Ajey Lele, “Space Programme: Adding to India’s brand image,” India Strategic (July 2007),
online: http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories23.htm.
123 Spot Image, “Google delivers higher resolution on Google Earth through agreement with French Spot
Image” (22 January 2007), online: http://www.spotimage.fr/web/en/1270-google-delivers-
higher-resolution-on-google-earth-through-agreement-with-french-spot-image.php.
124 Matthew O’Connell, “An International Perspective on Policy and the State of the Industry:
A Dialogue with CEOs,” Remarks presented during Panel 7 of the CRS Symposium, Washington DC
(13-15 September 2006), at 22, online: http://www.crssymposium.com/program/
index.aspx?pg=pr&sub=pa.
125 Elise Labott, “Google Earth maps out Darfur atrocities,” CNN (15 April 2007), online:
http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/04/10/google.genocide/index.html.
126 BCC Research, “Remote Sensing Technologies and Global Markets” (February 2007), online:
Electronics.ca http://www.electronics.ca/reports/instruments-sensors/
remote_sensing_technologies.html.
127 D. Dowd Muska, “Houston, We Have no Purpose,” Nevada Journal (November 1998), online:
http://nj.npri.org/nj98/11/cover_story.htm.
128 Mark Wade, “USAF to subsidize EELVs,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, online:
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/atlasv.htm (date accessed: 25 April 2007).
129 US Space Transportation Policy Fact Sheet (6 January 2005).
130 Brian Berger, “SpaceX Fighting for USAF Launches,” Space News (31 October 2005).
131 The Aerospace Corporation, “Study of the Liability Risk-Sharing Regime in the United States for
Commercial Space Transportation” (1 August 2006), online: FAA/AST http://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarter_offices/ast/report_studies/media/Risk_Study(final).pdf.
132 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy” (13 May
2003), online: The White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/05/20030513-8.html.
133 Jeff Foust, “A Year-end Reality Check,” Space Review (29 December 2003), online:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/78/1.
134 “Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the
European Space Policy,” White Paper, European Commission (2003), online: The European Union
http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/whitepaper/pdf/spwhpap_en.pdf.
135 Russian Space Web, “Rockets: Angara Family,” online: http://www.russianspaceweb.com/angara.html
(date accessed: 10 July 2008); “On Measures to Fulfill the Russian Federal Space Program and
International Space Agreements, Decree No. 42, Selected Examples of National Laws Governing
Space Activities: Russian Federation,” Government of the Russian Federation (12 April 1996), online:
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/national/russian_federation/decree_422_1996E.html.
136 “Cash-Strapped Russia Says ISS May Have to Be Mothballed,” Center for Defense Information Russia
Weekly, No. 224 (27 September 2002), online: CDI http://www.cdi.org/russia/224-7.cfm.
137 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Space Activities in
2006,” (October 2006), online: People’s Daily Online (12 October 2006), online:
http://english.people.com.cn/200610/12/eng20061012_311157.html.
138 Scott Pace et al., “Appendix B: GPS History, Chronology, and Budgets,” in The Global Positioning
System: Assessing National Policies (RAND 1995), at 248.
229
Endnotes
139 “Russia to Lift GLONASS Restrictions for Accurate Civilian Use,” GPS Daily (14 November 2006),
online: http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_To_Lift_Glonass_Restrictions_For_
Accurate_Civilian_Use_999.html.
140 “China to Launch 2 Satellites for Compass Navigation System,” Xinhua (13 November 2006), online:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/13/content_5322002.htm.
141 Scott Pace et al., “Appendix B: GPS History, Chronology, and Budgets,” at 248-249; Missy Frederick,
“Commercial Use of GPS Expanding into More Markets.”
142 Daniel J. Marcus, “Commerce Predicts Big ’92 Growth for US Space Business,” Space News
(6 January 1992).
143 Kim Thomas, “Mobile Telephones Offer A New Sense of Direction,” Financial Times (London)
(17 November 2006), at 7.
144 K. Kaisti, GPS Receivers and LBS Applications (7 November 2005), slide 11, online: MobileMonday
Global http://media.mobilemonday.net/presentations/2005-11-07_kaisti.pdf.pdf.
145 Missile Technology Control Regime, online: http://www.mtcr.info/english/ (date accessed:
10 July 2008).
146 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China’s Export Controls,” online: http://www.nti.org/db/china/excon.htm
(date accessed: 10 July 2008).
147 Steven Pifer, “The US and Russia: Space Cooperation and Export Controls,” Testimony before the
House Science Committee, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics (11 June 2003), online: US
Department of State http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21487.htm.
148 Council Regulation (EC) No 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001 amending and updating Regulation (EC)
No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology,
Official Journal of the European Communities (20 December 2001); Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade Canada, “Definitions for Terms in Groups 1 and 2,” online:
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/gr1-2-en.asp?#spac (date accessed: 10 July 2008);
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and
Technologies (August 2002), online: Center for Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/research/
china/chiexp/misreg.htm; Seema Galut and Anupam Srivastava, “Nonproliferation Export Controls in
India” (June 2005), online: Center for International Trade and Security www.uga.edu/cits/
documents/pdf/EXEC%20SUMMARY%2020050616.pdf.
149 Satellite Industry Association, “Background: Satellite Export Controls.”
150 “Satellite Task Force Report, Factsheet,” at 5.
151 Satellite Industry Association, “Effects of Export Controls on the U.S. Satellite Industry: Anecdotal
Evidence,” at 2.
152 Peter B. de Selding, “European Satellite Component Maker Says It is Dropping U.S. Components
Because of ITAR,” Space News (9 June 2005).
153 The White House, Fact Sheet, “US Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy” (13 May 2003),
online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html; “Business Report,”
Space News (27 May 2003).
154 Peter B. de Selding, “France Reviews Spot Imagery Policy,” Space News (19 October 2001).
155 K.S. Jayaraman, “Russia Wants Access to Indian Satellite Imagery Market,” Space News
(27 January 2003).
156 John C. Baker, Ray A. Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell, Commercial Observation Satellites –
At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), at 431;
“Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Issue 21 – Evidence – November
22 meeting” (22 November 2005), online: Parliament of Canada
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/fore-e/21eva-e.htm?Languag. Bill C-25
fulfills Canada’s international and bilateral obligations to regulate the remote sensing space activities of
its nationals as required pursuant to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 2000 Canada-US
Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the operation of commercial remote sensing satellite
systems.
157 Jason Bates, “The Brave New World of Commercial Imagery,” Space News (21 January 2003).
Governments refer to “shutter-control” as “buy-outs” of sensitive imagery to prevent dissemination.
230
Space Security 2008
158 Philip McAlister, “Follow the Money: Satellite Opportunities with the US Government”
(17 November 2003), online: Futron Corporation http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource_center/
conference_presentations/sat_oppor_with_us_govt.pdf.
159 Patrick Chisholm, “Buying Time: Disconnects in Satcom Procurement” (29 November 2003),
online: Military Information Technology http://www.military-information-technology.com/
article.cfm?DocID=285.
160 Bob Brewin, “Satellite Development Delays Cost DOD $1B,” FCW.com (26 January 2007),
online: http://www.fcw.com/article97492-01-26-07-Web.
161 David Cavossa, Satellite Industries Association Executive, cited in Jerome Bernard, “US Using Space
Supremacy to Wage Combat in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Defense News (23 June 2006), online:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1890797&C=airwar.
162 US Government Accountability Office, “Congressional Requesters, Subject: Department of Defense
Actions to Modify its Commercial Communications Satellite Services Procurement Process” (17 April
2006), online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06480r.pdf.
163 US General Accounting Office, Satellite Communications – Strategic Approach Needed for DOD’s
Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth, GAO-04-206 (December 2003); David Helfgott,
“Satellite Communications Poised for Rebound,” SIGNAL (April 2004), online: AFCEA International
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=90&print=yes.
164 “Satellite Task Force Report, Factsheet,” at 10.
165 Craig Covault, “Resolution Revolution,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 September 2007),
at 30.
166 “Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne RS 27A Powers New Generation Imaging Satellite to Orbit,” Space
Travel (20 September 2007), online: http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Pratt_And_
Whitney_Rocketdyne_RS_27A_Powers_New_Gen_Imaging_Satellite_To_Orbit_999.html; Ball
Aerospace and Technology, “Digital global announces launch of World View” (13 August 2007),
online: http://www.ballaerospace.com/page.jsp?page=30&id=265.
167 “RadarSat2,” Media Kit, online: http://www.radarsat2.info/about/mediakit/backgrounder_R2.pdf
(date accessed: 13 March 2008); “Polar Epsilon to assert Canada’s Arctic sovereignty,” National Defense
and Canadian Forces (10 January 2008), online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/
view_news_e.asp?id=2547.
168 German Aerospace Center, “TerraSAR-X goes into operation” (9 January 2008), online:
http://www.dlr.de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4219/6774_read-11191; “News Breaks: Russia,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (16 April 2007), at 24; J. Herrmann, N. Faller, M. Weber and A.
Kern, “Infoterra GmbH Initiates Commercial Exploitation of TerraSar-X,” Inforterra GmbH, online:
GISDevelopment.net http://www.gisdevelopment.net/technology/sar/me05_062pf.htm (date accessed:
12 March 2007).
169 Infoterra website, “TerraSar-X services,” online: http://www.infoterra.de/tsx/index.php (date accessed:
13 March 2008).
170 “Commercial Satellite Imagery Companies Partner with the U.S. Geological Survey in Support
of the International Charter ‘Space and Major Disasters,’” EO (12 April 2007), online:
http://news.eoportal.org/policy/070417_pol1.html.
171 Andrew Chuter, “New UK Milsat Follows Pattern of Private Ownership Defense Services,” Defense
News (21 May 2007), at 16.
172 Andy Pasztor, “Pentagon, Private Firms Set Satellite Partnership,” Wall Street Journal (9 April 2007),
at 9.
173 “Final Day of ISCe Stress Importance of Commercial Satellite Industry and Government Partnership,”
SatNews Daily (8 June 2007), online: http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4573/.
174 Rebecca Cowen-Hirsch, head of DISA SATCOM Teleport and Services, quoted in Mark A. Kellner,
“Satellite Firms Could Sell Directly to DoD,” DefenseNews (15 January 2007), at 6.
175 Bob Brewin, “Satellite Development Delays Cost DOD $1B,” FCW.com (26 January 2007), online:
http://www.fcw.com/article97492-01-26-07-Web.
176 Caitlin Harrington, “Space office plans long-term view for commercial satellite usage,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly (28 November 2007), at 8.
231
Endnotes
177 Frank Morring, Jr., ed., “In Orbit: Tourist Destination,” at 22.
178 NASA, “NASA Signs Commercial Space Transportation Agreements,” News Release (18 June 2007),
online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/jun/HQ_07138_COTS_3_Unfunded_SAAs.html.
179 NASA, “NASA to Open New Competition for Space Transportation Seed Money,” News Release
(18 October 2007), online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/oct/
HQ_07228_COTS_competition.html.
180 David Bond, ed., “Washington Outlook: Seeding the Station,” Aviation Week & Space Technology
(22 October 2007), at 25; NASA, “NASA Signs Commercial Space Transportation Agreements”;
“Also Working Toward COTS Award is t/Space,” SatNews Daily, online: http://www.satnews.com/
cgi-bin/display_story.cgi?number=212728659 (date accessed: 13 March 2008).
181 David Bond, ed., “Washington Outlook: Seeding the Station,” at 25.
182 James R. Asker, ed., “Washington Outlook: Ride Sharing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (16 April
2007), at 27.
183 Peter B. de Selding, “Galileo Funding Solution Remains Elusive,” Space News (17 September 2007).
184 Kelly Hearn, “Terrorist Use of Google Earth Raises Security Fears,” National Geographic (12 March
2007), online: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/03/070312-google-censor.html.
185 “India says no to Google Earth’s peering,” PhysOrg.com (10 March 2006), online:
http://www.physorg.com/news11634.html.
186 Katherine Shrader, “Curbs on Satellite Photos May Be Needed,” San Francisco Chronicle (8 May
2007), online: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/05/08/national/
w140605D01.DTL&type=politics.
187 Dr. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Director of the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space
Law at the University of Mississippi, quoted in “India says no to Google Earth’s peering,”
PhysOrg.com (10 March 2006), online: http://www.physorg.com/news11634.html.
188 Aria Pearson, “China’s new submarine spotted on Google Earth,” New Scientist (6 July 2007), online:
http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn12204.
189 P.J. Blount, “Second Int’l Conference on the State of Remote Sensing Law,” Res Communis - Blog
(17 January 2008), online: http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2008/01/17/second-international-
conference-on-the-state-of-remote-sensing-law-germany/.
190 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Government of Canada issues operating
license for Radarsat-2,” News (16 November 2007), online:
http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?aritcleid+361969.
191 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel Accused of Blocking Commercial Satellite Imaging Deal with
Venezuela,” Space News (19 July 2007).
192 “Chavez Chomping At Russian Jets and Chinese Satellite,” SatNews Daily, online: http://www.
satnews.com/cgi-bin/display_story.cgi?number=1694226386 (date accessed: 13 March 2008).
193 Barbara Opall-Rome, “U.S. OKs Israel-China Spy Sat Deal,” Defense News (15 October 2007),
at 1, 6.
194 David McGlade, “Commentary: Preserving the Orbital Environment,” Space News (19 February
2007), at 27; Henry L. Stimson Center, “Space Security Program,” online:
http://www.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS200702131213 (date accessed: 13 March 2008).
195 Joseph Rouge, “The State of Space Security: Space Situational Awareness,” Presentation at workshop
on The State of Space Security, George Washington University, Washington, DC (24 January 2008),
online: http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/Joseph%20Rouge.pdf.
196 Richard DalBello and Joseph Chan, “Linking Government and Industry Efforts to Increase Space
Situational Awareness,” Presentation at workshop on The State of Space Security, George Washington
University, Washington, DC (24 January 2008), online: http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/
Richard%20DalBello.pdf.
197 “Election 2008 Issues: Keeping America Strong: Advance U.S. Leadership in Aerospace and Defense,”
Aerospace Industries Association, online: http://www.aia-aerospace.org/issues/election2008/issues2008.cfm
(date accessed: 14 March 2008); “Election 2008 Issues: Keeping America Strong: Export Control
Modernization,” Aerospace Industries Association, online: http://www.aia-aerospace.org/pdf/08issues_
1-exportcontrol.pdf (date accessed: 14 March 2008).
232
Space Security 2008
198 Caitlin Harrington, “US lobby group seeks export control reforms,” Jane’s Defence Industry
(14 March 2007), at 31.
199 Howard Chambers, “Trends in the Commercial Satellite Industry,” Keynote speech presented to
Euroconsult 2007, Paris, France (5 September 2007), online: http://www.boeing.com/
news/speeches/2007/chambers_070905.html; Michael Mecham, “Commercial Payoff : Boeing’s
satellite mix favors government but leans on private sector technology,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology (9 April 2007), at 57.
200 “Paris Air Show 2007, Briefly,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (25 June 2007), at 24; Michael
Bruno, “Special Deal: Officials promote unique U.S.-U.K. treaty while still laboring over details,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (23 July 2007), at 35.
201 “News Breaks: Asia Pacific,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (10 September 2007), at 20; David
Bond, ed., “Washington Outlook: Stars in Alignment,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (10
September 2007), at 23.
202 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Canada and the United States Sign
Arrangement Regarding Application of International Trade in Arms Regulations,” News Release
(17 May 2007), online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2289. The
agreement was initially between the US DOD, State Department, and Canadian Department
of National Defence, but was extended in June 2007 to include the Canadian Space Agency and
Natural Resources Canada.
203 Brooks Tigner, “Space Policy Rises on EU Radar,” Defense News (7 May 2007), at 22.
204 Antonella Bini, “Export control of space items: Preserving Europe’s advantage,” 23(2) Space Policy
(May 2007), at 70-72.
205 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Export Case Threatens U.S.-India Ties,” Defense News (30 April 2007), at 1.
206 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Space Company Chief Convicted of Spying,” ABC News (3 December 2007),
online: http://abcnews.go.com/International/comments?type=story&id=3945959.
207 Wendell Minnick, “U.S. Streamlining Curbs on Exports To China’s Military,” Defense News (25 June
2007), at 19.
208 Peter B. de Selding, “China Launches Communications Satellite,” Space.com (6 July 2007), online:
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/070706_chinasat6b_lnch.html.
209 Robert Wall and Michael Taverna, “Ups and Downs: Launch providers enjoy strengthening market,
but a return to reality may be in the offing,” at 30.
210 “Arianespace warns US over Chinese space ‘dumping,’” Agence-France Presse (30 November 2007),
online: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gRSPI2HxWsPwjfICbGanIw4VN0SQ.
Chapter Five Endnotes
1 Such statistics should acknowledge that purchasing power will vary among states and affect how much
can be purchased within a specific budget. Paul Shawcross, OMB, “The U.S. Government Space
Budget,” prepared for short course on the US Government Space Sector, George Mason University,
Center for Aerospace Policy Research (17 October 2006), online: http://www.gmupolicy.net/space/
shortcourse/2.%20Shawcross%20-%20U.S.%20Government%20Space%20Budget.pdf.
2 Jonathan McDowell, “Satellite Database,” updated January 2008, unpublished.
3 Jonathan McDowell, “Satellite Database.” It is difficult to assess the lifetime of Russian military
spacecraft, and thus to have a reliable count of the number of active Russian satellites.
4 Peter L. Hays, “National Security Space Actors and Issues,” to be published in Eligar Sadeh, ed.,
The Politics of Space: A Survey (Routledge, 2009).
5 Peter L. Hays, “National Security Space Actors and Issues.”
6 Tamar A. Mehuron, “2004 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine (August 2004), at 43; Peter L. Hays,
“National Security Space Actors and Issues.”
7 Tamar A. Mehuron, “2004 Space Almanac,” at 44.
233
Endnotes
8 “T-SAT Budget Designed to Win Back Congress,” Space News (20 February 2006); “Special Report:
The USA’s Transformational Communications Satellite System (TSAT-Updated),” Defense Industry
Daily (18 May 2007), online: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/05/special-report-the-usas-
transformational-communications-satellite-system-tsat-updated/index.php.
9 Glen Elfers and Stephen B. Miller, “Future US Military Satellite Communications Systems,” Crosslink
(Winter 2002).
10 “America’s Wideband Gapfiller Satellite Program,” Defense Industry Daily (26 April 2007), online:
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/04/americas-wideband-gapfiller-satellite-program/index.php.
11 Tamara A. Mehuron, at 43-46.
12 Missy Frederick, “Growing Use of UAVs Strains Bandwidth,” Space News (17 July 2006).
13 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 344.
14 Tamara A. Mehuron, at 44.
15 Sam Black, “Fact Sheet on Space Based Infrared System,” Center for Defense Information (16
October 2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4122;
Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, May
2003), at 6; US Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major
Weapon Programs,” Report to Congressional Committees (March 2008), at 101-2. To date the SBIRS
program has triggered four reports to Congress under the Nunn-McCurdy Act; the program breached
its cost estimates by 25 percent in 2001, by 15 percent in 2004, and by 25 percent twice during
2005.
16 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 336.
17 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 337.
18 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 337, 339.
19 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 338.
20 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008),
at 29.
21 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database” (January 2007). There are at least two NROL
classified satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office, which are believed to be either
radar reconnaissance or SIGINT.
22 Philip Taubman, “Failure to Launch; Death of a Spy Satellite Program,” New York Times
(11 November 2007).
23 “Defense Policy Changes Could be Advantageous to Lockheed Martin,” CDI Space Security Update
#7 (8 June 2006), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=
3499&from_page=../index.cfm#contents.
24 Tamara A. Mehuron, at 44.
25 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database” (January 2007).
26 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Statement
before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate
(25 March 2004), at 3, online: http://www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/ors/Cebrowski%20Testimony.doc.
27 James Canan, “Renaissance for Military Space,” Aerospace America (June 2003), online
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=364&ArchiveIssueID=39.
28 Robert K. Ackerman, “Small Satellite Offers Glimpse of the Future,” Signal Magazine (January 2004);
Gunter Dirk Krebs, “TacSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page (1 January 2005), online:
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tacsat-1.htm.
29 M. Hurley, “Tactical Microsatellite Experiment (TacSat 1),” Navy Research Laboratory Review (2004),
online: US Naval Research Laboratory http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=04REVIEW207.
234
Space Security 2008
30 US Air Force, Fact Sheet, “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” (April 2003), online:
http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3643; Anthony Young, “Heavy Lifting
for the New Millennium,” The Space Review (26 April 2004).
31 Anthony Young, “Heavy Lifting for the New Millennium”; Tariq Malik, “Delta 4 Heavy rocket lifts
off for first time,” MSNBC (21 December 2004), online: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6743383/.
32 US Air Force, “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” (January 2005).
33 Peter L. Hays, “National Security Space Actors.”
34 “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization” (11 January 2001) at 8-9, online: Federation of American Scientists www.fas.org/spp/
military/commission/report.htm. While established by the US Government, the Commission does
not formally set new US policy in this area. See also “Rumsfeld Asks if Pentagon is Over-Reliant on
Space Systems” Space News (13 May 2002) at 4.
35 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 70-72; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Chronology,” Gunter’s Space Page, online: http://www.skyrocket.de/
space/index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/home.htm (date accessed: 9 February 2007);
NASA, “Worldwide Space Launches 2004,” online: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/osf/2004/launch04.html
(date accessed: 9 February 2007). Johnathan McDowell, “Satellite Database,” (January 2008),
unpublished.
36 “Weapons in Space and Global Security,” Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, 156 STCMT 03 E (2003) at 5.
There is still only one satellite in orbit as of the January 2007, Union of Concerned Scientists,
“Satellite Database.”
37 “Russia’s Space Defenses Stage a Revival,” RIA Novosti (4 October 2006), online:
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20061004/54509604-print.html.
38 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space,” Working paper, The American Academy of Arts
and Sciences Project, “Reconsidering the Rules of Space” (June 2004), online: Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/space/20040700aaas.shtml.
39 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space.”
40 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space.”
41 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space”; see also Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger,
and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, at 349.
42 “Russian Space Conference Looks at Problems and Challenges” (25 November 2005), online:
RedOrbit.com http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/302983/russian_space_conference_looks_
at_problems_challenges/index.html.
43 Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System,” 10 Science
and Global Security (2002), at 21-60.
44 Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System.”
45 Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System.”
46 Pavel Podvig, “Russia is working on new early-warning satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces —
Blog, 22 August 2007, online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/russia_is_working_
on_new_early.shtml.
47 “Russia to Restore Space Missile Warning System,” Johnson’s Russia List (6 April 2006), online:
Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9112-27.cfm.
48 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 341.
49 The Lavochkin Science and Production Association agreed to build the Arkon-2 multirole radar
satellite for the Federal Space Agency. It is designed to take high-resolution and medium-resolution
photos for federal clients, and to use the information for national defense programs. Yuri Zatitsev,
“Russia Developing New Space Radars,” RIA Novosti (3 March 2005).
50 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space.”
51 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 319-323.
235
Endnotes
52 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space.”
53 Figures differ by source. Mission Control Centre, “GLONASS Constellation Status for 18.01.2008
based on both the almanac analysis and navigation messages received at 00:00 18.01.08 (UTC) in
IAC PNT TsNIIImash,” online: Russian Space Agency http://www.glonass-ianc.rsa.ru/pls/htmldb/
f?p=202:20:4969607893141445194::NO (date accessed: 17 January 2008); “Second Glonass launch
of 2007,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (25 December 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/
blog/2006/12/three_glonassm_navigation_sate.shtml. “Russia to launch 6 GLONASS satellites
by end of 2007,” A-Z of Russian Telecom (27 October 2007), online: Gidabyte
http://www.gidabyte.com/telecom/172/.
54 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space”; Center for Defense Information, “Russian General
Comments on Russian Space Forces Initiatives… Stands Firm on No Nuclear Weapons in Space,”
CDI Space Security Update 14 (21 July 2004), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.
cfm?DocumentID=2322&IssueID=140&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=Date
LastUpdated&ProgramID=68&issueID=140#3; “Russia Does Not Plan Launching Nuclear Weapons
in Space,” ITAR-TASS (14 July 2004).
55 “No More Reductions of Russian Satellite Fleet Planned,” Interfax (14 July 2004).
56 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 70-72; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Chronology”; NASA, “Worldwide Space Launches 2004.”
57 John T Bennett, “USAF wants 100 billion but not for top 5 priority list,” Defense News
(1 October 2007).
58 “USAF Launches First Of Next Generation Communications Satellites,” Space War (12 October
2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/USAF_Launches_First_Of_Next_
Gen_Communications_Satellites_999.html.
59 “Boeing To Build A Sixth Wideband Global SATCOM Satellite,” Space War (3 January 2008),
online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_To_Build_A_Sixth_Wideband_
Global_SATCOM_Satellite_999.html.
60 “Australia To Join With United States In Defense Global Satellite Communications Capability,” Space
War (9 October 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Australia_To_Join_With_
United_States_In_Defence_Global_Satellite_Communications_Capability_999.html.
61 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 1585 (6 December 2007), at 720.
62 “First Launch of Advanced Communications Satellite Slips,” Intellibriefs (9 January 2005), online:
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2005/01/first-launch-of-advanced.html; “Lockheed Martin built
Satellite Constellation Repositioned to Enhance Global Coverage,” Space War (17 July 2007),
online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Lockheed_Martin_Built_Milstar_Satellite_Constellation_
Repositioned_To_Enhance_Global_Coverage_999.html.
63 “Milstar constellation reconfigured,” Satellite News (17 July 2007), online:
http://satelit.web.id/2007/07/17/milstar-constellation-reconfigured.
64 Gayle Putrich, “How much punch remains in the US Defense Sales Boom — World Aerospace
Forecast,” Defense News (18 June 2007); Andy Pasztor, “Prospects Fade for Pentagon Satellite Plan,”
Wall Street Journal (26 December 2007).
65 “TSAT program faces cuts,” Wall Street Journal (5 February 2007).
66 “FY2008 Presidential Budget Request for National Security Space Activities,” Policy Outlook (March
2007), online: http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=507; Josh Rogin, “DOD space programs get
budget boosts,” Federal Computer Week (5 February 2007), online: http://www.fcw.com/online/
news/97556-1.html; US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008,” at 799.
67 Stephen Clark, “Last of its kind surveillance satellite reaches orbit,” Spaceflight Now (11 November
2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/d329/dsp23.html.
68 US Government Accountability Office, “Space Based Infrared System High Program and its
Alternative,” Report to Congress (12 September 2007).
69 “Just when you thought it was safe for milspace procurement,” Space Politics – Blog (2 October 2007),
online: http://www.spacepolitics.com/2007/10/02/just-when-you-thought-it
-was-safe-for-milspace-procurement/. The failure was with the safe holds mode.
236
Space Security 2008
70 Christopher Hellman and Travis Sharp, “Fiscal Year 2009 Pentagon Spending Request Briefing Book,”
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (February 2008), online: http://www.armscontrol
center.org/policy/securityspending/articles/fy09_dod_request/; Timothy Barnes, “Fact Sheet on
SBRIS,” Center for Defense Information (16 October 2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/
friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4122.
71 US Air Force, Press Release, “NPOESS Restructured” (30 July 2007).
72 US Government Accountability Office, “Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,” Status Report (7 June
2007), online: SpaceRef http://www.earthtoday.net/news/viewsr.html?pid=24436.
73 “Key Sensor For Northrop Grumman NPOESS Program Passes Critical Structural Test,” Space Mart
(7 September 2007) online: http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Key_Sensor_For_Northrop_
Grumman_NPOESS_Program_Passes_Critical_Structural_Test_999.html. A key sensor for the
program passed a critical test and the Cross-Track Infrared Sounder, a next generation atmospheric
sounding instrument for improved weather forecasting, successfully passed a frame proof test.
74 “Lockheed Delivers GPS Satellites,” Defense News (2 April 2007), at 50.
75 “Modernized GPS Satellite Built by Lockheed Martin Declared Operational for Users Worldwide,”
GPS Daily (6 November 2007), online: http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Modernized_GPS_
Satellite_Built_By_Lockheed_Martin_Declared_Operational_For_Users_Worldwide_999.html.
76 “Boeing Demonstrates Key GPS 3 Features In Critical Program Review,” GPS Daily (27 April 2007),
online: http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Boeing_Demonstrates_Key_GPS_3_
Features_In_Critical_Program_Review_999.html.
77 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” at 799.
78 The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (18 September 2007).
79 Section 913(c) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public
Law 109-364); “DoD stands up joint space office,” US Air Force (22 May 2007), online:
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123054214.
80 “Micro-satellites Gain Attention from ORS, DARPA,” Defense Daily (9 August 2007).
81 US Air Force, “TacSat-2’s milestone mission advanced responsive space concept,” Press Release
(18 January 2008), online: SpaceRef http://www.spaceref.ca/news/viewpr.html?pid=24531.
82 “ATK Delivers TacSat 3 Spacecraft Bus For Integration And Test By The USAF Research Lab,” Space
War (20 September 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/ATK_Delivers_TacSat_3_
Spacecraft_Bus_For_Integration_And_Test_By_The_USAF_Research_Lab_999.html.
83 Philip Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids,” New York
Times (11 November 2007).
84 Mark Mazzetti, “Spy Director Ends Program on Satellites,” New York Times (22 June 2007).
85 “US pursuing new satellite program,” CBS News (30 November 2007), online:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/30/tech/main3561086.shtml.
86 Colin Clark, “Railed Satellite Combined Optical, Radar-Like Imaging Capabilities,” Space News
(4 February 2008), at 1.
87 “US Spy Satellite declared loss, to drop from orbit,” Reuters (2 August 2007), online:
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0225519020070803?feedType=RSS.
88 Jonathan McDowell, “Jonathan’s Space Report No. 589,” Jonathan’s Space Page (21 December 2007),
online: SpaceRef http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=26433.
89 Alden V. Munson, Jr., deputy director of national intelligence for acquisition, cited in Philip
Taubman, “Death of Spy Satellite Program.”
90 US Government Accountability Office, “DoD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges,”
Report to Congress (2 August 2007), online: http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/
abstract.php?rptno=GAO-07-1029R.
91 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” at 800.
92 “Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne RS 27A Powers New Generation Imaging Satellite to Orbit,” Space
Travel (20 September 2007), online:
237
Endnotes
http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Pratt_And_Whitney_Rocketdyne_RS_27A_Powers_New_Gen_
Imaging_Satellite_To_Orbit_999.html; “Digital global announces launch of World View,” Ball
Aerospace and Technology (13 August 2007), online: http://www.ballaerospace.com/
page.jsp?page=30&id=265.
93 “Russia developing satellites with longer mission lives,” Satnews Daily (16 July 2007).
94 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Reviving The Army, Revising Military Doctrine,” Radio Free Europe
(12 March 2007), online: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/63173250-A8B3-40D0-
A26D-219ED25D91B2.html; “Russia approves a 10 year space budget,” Physorg.com (14 July 2005),
online: http://www.physorg.com/news5191.html.
95 “Putin Makes Glonass Navigation System Free for Customers,” GPS Daily (21 May 2007), online:
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Putin_Makes_Glonass_Navigation_System_Free_For_Customers_
999.html.
96 Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early Warning
Capabilities,” WMD Insights (December 2007/January 2008); “3 GLONASS Satellites Launched with
Proton-K from Baikonur,” State Scientific Centre of Russia, Central R&D Institute for Robotics and
Technical Cybernetics news line (26 October 2007), online: http://www.rtc.ru/news/2/4200_1.html
(in Russian).
97 “Russia prepares to launch 3 GLONASS satellites on December 25th,” RIA Novosti (25 December
2007), online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071225/94088531.html.
98 Y. Zaitsev, “GLONASS Potential Still To Be Realised,” GPS Daily (1 May 2007), online:
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/GLONASS_Potential_Still_To_Be_Realised_999.html.
99 “GLONASS Faces Crucial Juncture,” RIA Novosti (30 April 2007).
100 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Did GLONASS Failure Sink Ivanov’s Chance at the Presidency?”
Eurasia Daily Monitor (6 February 2008), online: Jamestown News
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id+2372780.
101 “Russian carrier rocket puts military satellite into orbit,” Global Security (9 December 2007),
online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2007/space-071209-rianovosti02.htm;
“Kosmos-2434 launch,” Jonathan’s Space Report 589 (21 December 2007); Pavel Podvig, “Launch
of the Raduga/Globus military communication satellite,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (9
December 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/12/launch_of_the_a_radugaglobus_m.shtml.
102 Pavel Podvig, “Cosmos-2427 – new Kobalt-M reconnaissance satellite,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
– Blog (7 June 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/06/cosmos2427_new_
kobaltm_optical.shtml.
103 Pavel Podvig, “Cosmos 2427 completed its mission,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (23
August 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/cosmos2427_completed_its_missi.shtml.
104 Pavel Podvig, “Persona launch postponed,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (14 December
2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/12/persona_launch_postponed.shtml.
105 Pavel Podvig, “Launch of Cosmos 2430 early warning satellite,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog
(23 October 2007), http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/10/launch_of_cosmos2430_earlywarn.shtml.
106 Pavel Podvig, “Early warning constellation is down to two satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (3 April 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/04/earlywarning_
constellation_is.shtml.
107 Pavel Podvig, “Russia is working on early-warning satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (22
August 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/russia_is_working_on_new_early.shtml.
108 “Armavir Radar To Be On Combat Duty Late In 2007,” Space War (4 October 2007), online: http://
www.spacewar.com/reports/Armavir_Radar_To_Be_On_Combat_Duty_Late_In_2007_999.html.
109 Pavel Podvig, “The early-warning radar in Lekhtusi entered service,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (22 December 2006), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/12/the_earlywarning_
radar_in_lekh.shtml.
110 “Russia to build new space port,” CNN.com Bloomberg (22 November 2007), online:
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/11/21/russia.space.ap/index.html.
238
Space Security 2008
111 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 70-72; Ted Molczan and John Pike, “Tables of operational military satellites,” Global Security (31
December 2004), online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/
2005/satellitetables2004.htm.
112 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 70-72.
113 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 72.
114 Yahya A. Dehqanzada and Ann M. Florini, Secrets for Sale: How Commercial Satellite Imagery will
Change the World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), cited in
Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Whole World is Watching,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January/February
2006), at 33.
115 Theresa Hitchens and Tomas Valasek, “National Programs,” European Military Space Capabilities,
A Primer (Center for Defense Information, 2006), at 24.
116 “Europe begins debate on next-generation spy satellites,” Defense News (6 February 2006).
117 French Imagery Intelligence, “The First European Military Observation Satellite,” Federation of
American Scientists, online: http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/france/military/imint/helios1a.htm.
118 “German Radar Spy Satellite Launches into Space,” Spaceflight Now (19 December 2006), online:
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0612/19sarlupe/; Tom Kington, “Crunch Time for Europe,”
Defense News (6 February 2006), at 11; Alenia Spazio, “COSMO-Skymed,” online:
http://www.aleniaspazio.it/earth_observation_page.aspx?IdProg=23 (date accessed: 9 February 2007).
119 “European Rocket Sends French Military Satellite Aloft,” Space News (28 November 2005).
120 For a discussion see online: Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/france/military/imint/ (date accessed: 9 February 2007).
121 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: Routledge
2004), at 230.
122 “German Forces Will Receive Secure Network with Two Satellites,” Space War (9 July 2006), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/German_Armed_Forces_Will_Receive_Secure_Network_With_
Two_Satellites_999.html.
123 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004, at 230.
124 David Long et al., “The Evolution and Shape of European Space Policy: Preliminary Report for
DFAIT” (Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
International Security Research and Outreach Programme, 2004), at 25.
125 Andrew B. Godefroy, “Europe in a Changing Global Context: Space Policy, Security, and
Non-Weaponization” (Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, International Security Research and Outreach Programme, 2004), at 14.
126 George Parker, “Call to consider EU Galileo for Military Use,” Financial Times (14 October 2006).
127 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Positioning itself on Europe’s Security and Defense Issues,” Space News
(27 March 2006).
128 Luca del Monte, cited in Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Positioning itself on Europe’s Security and
Defense Issues.”
129 GlobalSecurity.org, “China Military Space Projects,” online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/
world/china/military.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
130 Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Strategic Studies
Institute, September 1999), at 6, 173, online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pubs/display.cfm?pubID=74.
131 GlobalSecurity.org, “China and Imagery Intelligence,” online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/
world/china/imint.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
132 “Government and Non Government Space Programs: China,” Jane’s Space Directory (14 October
2004).
239
Endnotes
133 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004 at 230, 304. Union of
Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database” (updated January 2008), online: http://www.ucsusa.org/
global_security/space_weapons/satellite_database.html.
134 Surrey Satellite Technologies Ltd., SSTL Space Missions, “Disaster Monitoring and High-Resolution
Imaging” (2005), online: http://www.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=121. It has been reported that
“Government departments will also use the satellite during emergencies to aid decision-making of the
central government.” From “Beijing-1 Satellite Starts Remote Sensing Service,” People’s Daily Online
(8 June 2006), online: http://english.people.com.cn/200606/08/eng20060608_272262.html.
135 “Remote Sensing Satellite Successfully Launched,” Xinhua (27 April 2006), online:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/27/content_4480989.htm.
136 “JianBing-5/Remote Sensing Satellite-1 Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellite,” Chinese Defence Today
(17 May 2006), online: SinoDefence.com http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/
jianbing5.asp; Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database” (January 2008).
137 John Pike, “The Military Uses of Outer Space,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press: 2002), at 635-6; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China: Military Programs,” online:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/china/mil.htm (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
138 “Fenghuo-1 Military Communications Satellite,” Chinese Defence Today (14 September 2006),
online: SinoDefence.com http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/fenghuo1.asp.
139 John Pike, “The Military Uses of Outer Space,” at 635-6.
140 Geoffrey Forden, “Strategic Uses for China’s Bei Dou Satellite System,” Jane’s Intelligence Review
(16 September 2003); Geoffrey Forden, “The Military Capabilities and Implications of China’s
Indigenous Satellite-Based Navigation System,” 12 Science and Global Security (2004), at 232.
141 “China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” GPS Daily (3 November 2006), online:
http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/China_Starts_To_Build_Own_Satellite_Navigation_System_999.html.
142 “CZ 4B Chronology,” Astronautix (2007), online: http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/cz4b.htm; James
Lewis, “China as a Military Space Competitor,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(January 2004), at 12, online: Space Policy Institute http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/China.pdf.
143 Indian Space Research Organization [ISRO], “Indian Space Research Organization Annual Report
2005-2006” (2007), online: http://www.isro.org/rep2007/Earth%20Observation.htm; “Army’s
satellite based surveillance and intelligence program near completion,” India Defence (18 September
2006), online: http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2519.
144 “India to Set Up Military SBS System by 2007,” Space News (9 August 2005).
145 National Remote Sensing Agency, Department of Space, Government of India, “Risat,” online:
http://www.nrsa.gov.in/satellites/risat.html (date accessed: 9 February 2007); “RISAT,” EO
(19 January 2008), online: http://directory.eoportal.org/pres_RISATRadarImagingSatellite.html.
146 “Army’s satellite based surveillance and intelligence program near completion.”
147 ISRO, “Indian Space Research Organization Annual Report 2005-2006”; “Army’s satellite based
surveillance and intelligence program near completion.”
148 ISRO, “Indian Space Research Organization Annual Report 2005-2006.”
149 Dr. Kasturirangan, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Keynote Address at the International
Space Security Conference: Scope and Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, New Delhi (13-14
November 2007).
150 “India Begins Work on Space Weapons Command,” Space Daily (12 April 2006), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/India_Begins_Work_On_Space_Weapons_Command.html. While
some reports claim that it will be a space weapons command, others maintain that it will be used to
protect India’s space assets and for military purposes during conflict.
151 Rear Admiral Raja Menon, “Space and National Strategies,” Presentation at the International Space
Security Conference: Scope and Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, New Delhi (13-14 November
2007).
152 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004, at 292.
240
Space Security 2008
153 “Pakistan to Launch Remote Sensing Satellite System,” Dawn (22 August 2005).
154 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “IGS-Optical 1, 2” (4 January 2005), online:
http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/igs-optical-1.htm.
155 Mark Wade, “IGS,” Astronautix, online: http://www.astronautix.com/craft/igs.htm (date accessed:
20 Janaury 2008).
156 “Japanese Spy Satellite Rockets into Orbit,” Space Flight (11 September 2006), online:
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0609/11h2aigs/.
157 “Japan to Deploy Intelligence System,” Space News (11 January 2005).
158 Kim Yong-ho, “Air Force Begins Establishment of the Space Command Center in Full-Scale,”
Seoul Kukpang Journal (1 December 2003).
159 John Pike, “The Military Uses of Outer Space,” at 641.
160 The order was placed in 1996. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance
2003-2004, at 306.
161 “Koreasat 5 Launched,” Asia Satellite News (29 August 2006), online: TelecomsEurope
http://www.telecomseurope.net/article.php?id_article=2979.
162 “Russian Rocket Launches South Korea’s Kompsat 2,” RIA Novosti (28 July 2006), online: GIS
Developmenthttp://www.gisdevelopment.net/news/print.asp?id=GIS:N_sawjfmqrvz&cat=New+
Products&subc=Satellite+Imagery.
163 Spot Image, “Kompsat 2: The Alternative Metric Solution,” online:
http://www.spotimage.fr/html/_167_171_1155_.php (date accessed: 9 February 2007).
164 “Thailand Signs Deal with French Company for Spy Satellite,” Agence-France Presse (19 July 2004).
165 “Taiwan Planning Spy Satellite: Report,” Agence France-Presse (10 October 2005); “Taiwan Plans
Launch of Spy Satellite,” Mail and Guardian (10 October 2005). In 2006 Taiwan’s military released
reconnaissance photos that it claimed depicted China’s military buildup. “Taiwanese Military Shows
Satellite Images of China’s Military Build-up,” Yahoo! Asia News (20 January 2006), online:
http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060119/kyodo/d8f7mj280.html.
166 “Israel Launches New Satellite,” Defense Update (updated 9 July 2002), online:
http://www.defense-update.com/news/ofeq5.htm; The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Military Balance 2003-2004, at 230. The launch of Ofek-4 in 1999 failed. The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004, at 281.
167 “Israel’s Eros B imaging satellite reaches orbit,” Space News (1 May 2006).
168 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel Eyes UAVs, Comsat for Future Military Communications,”
Space News (7 December 2006).
169 Arieh O’Sullivan, “Successful Test of New Rocket Launcher,” Jerusalem Post (14 July 2005).
170 Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Whole World Is Watching,” at 35.
171 Yitaf S. Shapir, “The Spirit is Willing: Iran’s Effort to conquer Space,” 152 Tel Aviv Notes
(6 November 2005); Ali Akbar, “Iran Now Says Satellite Can Spy on Israel,” Associated Press
(16 November 2005).
172 Robin Hughes, “Long Range Ambitions” Jane’s Defence Weekly (13 September 2006), at 26.
173 GlobalSecurity.org, “Australia and Satellite Communication Systems,” online:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/australia/comm.htm (date accessed: 9 February 2007).
174 Stephen Butler, “DSTO Plans Unique Test Phase to Model New Era Defence C1 Communications
Satellite,” Australian Defence Science and Technology Organization (23 June 2003), online:
http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/news/3775/.
175 David Pugliese, “Canada Nears Access To Dedicated Milsats,” Defense News (25 September 2006),
at 16.
176 DND/CF News Release, “Project Polar Epsilon Will Enhance Canada’s Surveillance and Security
Capability” (2 June 2005), online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1674.
177 Stephen Thorne, “Feds Look to Satellite to Assert Arctic Sovereignty,” Canadian Press (28 August
2005).
241
Endnotes
178 David Pugliese, “Canada Nears Access to Dedicated Milsats.”
179 David Pugliese, “Canada to Use Commercial Sats for Mission Imagery,” Defense News (6 February
2006), at 19.
180 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space,
at 72; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Spacecraft: Military,” Gunter’s Space Page, online: http://www.skyrocket.de/
space/space.html (date accessed: 9 February 2007); Small Satellites Home Page, “Modern Military
Small Satellites,” online: Surrey Satellite Company http://centaur.sstl.co.uk/SSHP/list/list_mil.html;
Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Database,” (January 2008).
181 Greece and Belgium also use the Helios satellites through their participation in the Besoin
Operationnel Commune framework agreement, but they do not have independent dedicated military
satellites.
182 EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space
Policy, COM (2007) 212 final (26 April 2007), at para. 3.4, online: http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/space/doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf.
183 “Humanspace will launch Skynet 5 A and B military satscoms,” Comspacewatch (4 January 2005),
online: http://www.comspacewatch.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=15805.
184 Andrew Chuter, “New UK Milsat Follows Pattern of Private Ownership Defense Services,”
Defense News (21 May 2007).
185 “Germany forms public-private partnership for military sitcom,” Space.com (17 July 2006),
online: http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/Sat_071006.html.
186 “Successful Launch Second German Sar Lupe Observation Satellite,” Space War (3 July 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Successful_Launch_Second_German_Sar_Lupe_Observation_
Satellite_999.html.
187 “Europe begins debate on next-generation spy satellites,” Defense News (6 February 2006).
188 Robert Wall and Michael A. Taverna, “France Steps Up European Milspace Push,” Aviation Week
and Space Technology (24 September 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/
story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw092407p2.xml.
189 “European Space-Based Reconnaissance Takes Off,” Space.com (13 June 2007), online:
http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive07/cosmoskymed_0611.html.
190 “Skymed 2 satellite successfully launched from Vandenberg US base,” Thales Press Release (10
December 2007), online: http://www.thalesonline.com/space/Press-Room/Press-Release-
search-all/Press-Release-search-result/Press-Release-Article.html?link=18053f51-0242-0a0a-5850-
39205f005026:central&locale=EN-gb&Title=COSMO-SkyMed+2+satellite+successfully+launched+
from+Vandenberg+US+base&dis=1.
191 “United launch alliance launches 2nd Cosmos Satellite,” Space Travel (10 December 2007), online:
http://www.space-travel.com/reports/United_Launch_Alliance_Launches_2nd_COSMO_Satellite_
999.html.
192 “Humanspace to Launch ELISA Satellites,” Space Travel (14 September 2007), online: http://www.
space-travel.com/reports/Humanspace_To_Launch_ELISA_Satellites_999.html; CNES, “Elisa –
Mapping radar stations from space” (December 2007), online: http://www.cnes.fr/web/5940-elisa.php.
193 “EU Nations ‘Close’ to Political Agreement on Satnav Project,” EU Business (29 November 2007),
online: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1196335922.02/.
194 “Galileo Funding Solution Elusive,” Space News (17 September 2007).
195 “China aiming to replace foreign satellites report,” Space Daily (19 November 2007), online:
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_aiming_to_replace_foreign_satellites_report_999.html.
196 “CHINA: Defence in the 21st century,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (25 April 2007), at 26.
197 “China puts new navigation satellite into orbit,” Xinhua (3 February 2007), online: http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/03/content_5689019.htm; “China launches ‘Compass’ navigation
satellites,” Xinhua (14 April 2007), online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/
14/content_5974414.htm.
242
Space Security 2008
198 Dr. Jing Guifei, National Remote Sensing Center of China and the Ministry of Science and
Technology, quoted in “China Discusses Beidou with the GNSS Community,” GPS Word (21
February 2008), online: http://sidt.gpsworld.com/gpssidt/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=493496;
Glen Gibbons, “China’s Compass/Beidou: Back-Track or Dual Track?” Inside GNSS (March/April
2008).
199 Glen Gibbons, “China’s Compass/Beidou: Back-Track or Dual Track?”; John Walko, “China set to
launch rival to GPS, Galileo,” EE Times (5 February 2007), online: www.eetimes.com/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197003167.
200 Jonathan Weng, “China satellite launch indicates rapid progress,” Jane’s Defence Review (13 June
2007), at. 25; Jonathan McDowell, “NROL,” Jonathan’s Space Report No. 581, online:
http://www.planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/news.581.
201 Stephen Clark, “Chinese put up hush-hush observation satellite,” Spaceflight Now (14 November
2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0711/14yaogan3/.
202 Stephen Clark, “China and Brazil team up to launch remote sensing craft,” Spaceflight Now
(19 September 2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0709/19cbers/.
203 “Brazil boosts military spending more than 50 percent,” Space War (28 October 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Brazil_boosts_military_spending_more_than_50_percent_999.html.
204 “Ofeq-7, Other Spy Satellites Give Israel Persistent Eyes on the Middle East,” SatNews Daily (13 June
2007), online: http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4599/. Some reports indicate that the Ofeq-7 has
an imaging capability of up to 70 centimeters, while others indicate 50 centimeters.
205 “Israeli Newly Launched Spy Satellite Begins Sending Photos Back,” Space War (18 June 2007),
online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israeli_Newly_Launched_Spy_Satellite_
Begins_Sending_Photos_Back_999.html.
206 “Israeli Spy Satellite Launch By ISRO Runs Into Technical Difficulties,” Press Trust of India (4
December 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israeli_Spy_Satellite_Launch_By_ISRO_
Runs_Into_Technical_Difficulties_999.html.
207 Craig Covault, “Israeli space based radar set for Indian launch,” Aviation Week and Space Technology
(16 September 2007), online: http://aviationnow.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=
awst&id=news/aw091707p2.xml&headline=Israeli%20Space-Based%20Radar%20Set%20for%
20Indian%20Launch.
208 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel to greatly expand space capabilities,” Defense News (30 January 2008).
209 “Egyptsat-1 placed into orbit,” GIS Development (18 April 2007), online:
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/news/viewn.asp?id=GIS:N_hkzlwgbfpr.
210 “Egypt to launch first spy satellite,” Jerusalem Post (15 January 2007), online:
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1167467733037&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%
2FShowFull.
211 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Plans first Recon Satellite, Worldwide Aerospace Forecast,”
Defense News (18 June 2007).
212 “Japan Moves to End Ban on Military Use of Space,” Defense News (6 June 2006), online:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1843677&C=airwar.
213 Hisane Masaki, “Japan: when a spy satellite isn’t a spy satellite,” Asia Times (24 February 2007),
online: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IB24Dh01.html. The launch also included an
experimental optical satellite.
214 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Electrical Glitch Knocks Out Japanese Spy Satellite,” Space Flight (28 March
2007), online: http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/ap_070328_japan_spysat_glitch.html.
215 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Cartosat-2, 2A,” Gunter’s Space Page (27 September 2007), online:
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/cartosat-2.htm.
216 G. Madhavan Nair, Secretary in the Department of Space and Chairman of Indian Space Research
Organisation, quoted in “India ready for launch of satellite with military applications” (21 September
2007), online: Fresh News http://www.freshnews.in/india-ready-for-launch-of-satellite-
with-military-applications-15639.
243
Endnotes
217 “India to Set Up Military SBS System by 2007,” Space News (9 August 2005); Jacob Chriqui,
“Military Applications of India’s Space Program: The Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance
System,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (20 June 2006), online: http://ipcs.org/
newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2057&subCatID=null&mod=null.
218 Craig Covault, “Israeli space based radar set for Indian launch,” Aviation Week and Space Technology
(16 September 2007), online: http://aviationnow.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=
news/aw091707p2.xml&headline=Israeli%20Space-Based%20Radar%20Set%20for%20Indian%20L
aunch; “India ready for launch of satellite with military applications” (21 September 2007), online:
Fresh News http://www.freshnews.in/india-ready-for-launch-of-satellite-with-military-applications-15639.
219 “India in aerospace defence plan,” BBC News (28 January 2007), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/6307875.stm.
220 “Process On For Establishing Aerospace Command,” Terra Daily (November 20 2007), online:
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Process_On_For_Establishing_Aerospace_Command_999.html.
221 “Glonass Navigation System Available to India – Russia,” RIA Novosti (21 January 2007), online:
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070122/59520011.html.
222 Mac William Bishop, “Taiwan halts funding for replacement satellite,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (14
February 2007), at 19. In 2006 Taiwan’s military released reconnaissance photos that it claimed
depicted China’s military buildup. “Taiwanese Military Shows Satellite Images of China’s Military
Build-up.”
223 Jonathan McDowell, “Radarsat 2 launched,” Jonathan’s Space Report No. 589 (21 December 2007).
224 MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates, “Radarsat-2 backgrounder,” online: http://www.radarsat2.info/
about/mediakit/backgrounder_R2.pdf (date accessed: 23 February 2008); Defence Research and
Development Canada, “Radarsat-2 Moving Object Detection Experiment (MODEX),” (30 August
2007), online: http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/RS-336-radarsat_e.html.
225 “Polar epsilon to assert Canada’s arctic sovereignty,” National Defence and the Canadian Forces
(10 January 2008).
226 DND/CF, News Release, “Project Polar Epsilon Will Enhance Canada’s Surveillance and Security
Capability” (2 June 2005), online: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1674.
227 Stephen Thorne, “Feds Look to Satellite to Assert Arctic Sovereignty,” Canadian Press
(28 August 2005).
228 Donald Bedard, “Microsatellites for Northern Surveillance – Abstract,” Defence Research and
Development Canada (1 October 2007), online: http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/
abstract_microsatellites_norther_e.html.
229 Babagida Kakaki, “Nigeria: Armed forces urged to utilize space for efficiency,” Allafrica.com
(1 October 2007).
230 “Nigerian Space Program isn’t a 419 scam,” Wired (19 October 2007), online:
http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2007/10/nigerian_space.
Chapter Six Endnotes
1 Bruce deBlois, Richard Garwin, Scott Kemp, and Jeremy Marwell, “Space Weapons Crossing the US
Rubicon,” 29 International Security (Fall 2004), at 50-84.
2 Bruce deBlois et al., “Space Weapons Crossing the US Rubicon.”
3 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “SPIRALE 1, 2,” Gunter’s Space Page, online:
http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/spirale-1.htm (date accessed: 26 April 2007).
4 Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System,” 10 Science
and Global Security (2002), at 21-60.
5 Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the risk of an accidental launch,” 14 Science and Global Security (2006),
at 35.
6 V.G. Morozov, “Vsevidashcheye oko Rossii (The all-seeing eyes of Russia),” Nezavisimoye voyennoye
obozreniye (14 April 2000).
244
Space Security 2008
7 Pavel Podvig, “Russia is working on new early-warning satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (22 August 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/russia_is_working_
on_new_early.shtml.
8 “Russia to Restore Space Missile Warning System,” Johnson’s Russia List (6 April 2006), online:
Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9112-27.cfm.
9 “Russia Puts New Early Warning Radar Station on Combat Duty,” RIA Novosti (22 December 2006),
online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061222/57586624.html; Pavel Podvig, “Early Warning,” Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces – Current Status (30 December 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/sprn/.
10 Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond (1 October 2003), online: Center
for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/news/space-security/
afspc-strategic-master-plan-06-beyond.pdf.
11 Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the risk of an accidental launch,” at 30.
12 Theresa Hitchens, “Ante Up On Space Situational Awareness,” Space News (12 March 2007);
“$126.2M Paid Out as STSS SBIRS-Low is Rebaselined and Stretched Out,” Defense Industry Daily
(9 November 2006), online: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/mt/
mt-search.cgi?IncludeBlogs=2&search=SBIRS.
13 Marcia S. Smith, “Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Program,”
Congressional Research Service (30 January 2006), at 3-4. Marcia Smith’s cost estimates are based on
2005 dollars.
14 Amy Butler, “Pentagon Turns on First SBIRS Sensor,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (20
November 2006), online: http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id
=news/aw112006p2b.xml; Jeremy Singer, “New Technology Offers Low-Risk Approach to SBIRS
Replacement,” Space News (17 April 2006).
15 Jefferson Morris, “First SBSS Satellite Launch to Slip Several Months,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report (4 October 2004); Gary Payton, “SBIRS Alternative Will Keep Missile Warning on Track,”
Space News (15 May 2006).
16 Marcia S. Smith, “Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Program,” at
5. “Cost estimates are problematic because there is no final system architecture and the schedule is in
flux.” In 2001 it was reported that the program life cycle had grown from $10-billion to $23-billion.
17 Jeremy Singer, “MDA Delays Launch of Missile Tracking Satellites to 2008,” Space News
(18 June 2007).
18 Globalsecurity.org, “Yuan Wang Tracking Ships” (last updated: 23 July 2005), online:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuan-wang.htm; Globalsecurity.org,
“Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR)” (last updated: 28 April 2005), online:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/lpar.htm.
19 Heiner Klinkrad, “Monitoring Space – Efforts Made by European Countries,” paper presented at the
International Colloquium on Europe and Space Debris, sponsored by the Académie National de l’Air
et de l’Espace, Toulouse, France (27-28 November 2002), online: Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/klinkrad.pdf.
20 Globalsecurity.org, “RAF Fylingdales,” (last updated: 27 April 2005), online:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/facility/fylingdales.htm.
21 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and
Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(31 October 2007), at 66, online: http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens/R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens.pdf.
22 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,” 117 Stat. 1565 Public Law 108–136—
(24 November 2003).
23 Air Force Research Laboratory, Fact Sheet, “Radio Frequency Threat Warning and Attack Reporting
Factsheet.” This program was still underdevelopment as of 2006.
24 “A – Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and Reporting System Spiral 2 Studies,” FBO Daily,
Issue #1033 (24 September 2004), online: http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/
2004/09-September/24-Sep-2004/FBO-00679518.htm.
25 Corey Dahl, “New squadron activates at Peterson,” Air Force Print News (21 May 2007).
245
Endnotes
26 Jeremy Singer, “Air Force ANGELS: Satellite Escorts to Take Flight,” Space News (30 November
2005). Aeroastro put out a fact sheet indicating that their Escort microsatellite does pretty much what
Angels does. There is no reference to Escort on their website so one may assume that they did this
work for the Angels contract but lost out to Lockheed Martin. A similar situation can be seen with
Spacedev; Space Daily reported that they received a $1.24-million contract to develop Angels but
there the story ended.
27 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Vela,” Gunter’s Space Page, online: http://space.skyrocket.de/ (date accessed:
26 April 2007).
28 Pavel Podvig, “Launch of Cosmos 2430 early warning satellite,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (23 October 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/10/
launch_of_cosmos2430_earlywarn.shtml.
29 Pavel Podvig, “Early warning constellation is down to two satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (3 April 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/04/
earlywarning_constellation_is.shtml.
30 Pavel Podvig, “Russia is working on early-warning satellites,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces – Blog (22
August 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/08/russia_is_working_on_new_early.shtml.
31 Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early Warning
Capabilities,” WMD Insights (December 2007–January 2008).
32 Pavel Podvig, “Russia pulls out of an early-warning arrangement with Ukraine,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces – Blog (25 January 2008), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2008/01/
russia_pulls_out_of_an_earlywa.shtml; “Russia terminates early-warning radar agreement with
Ukraine,” RAI Novosti (25 January 2008), online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080125/97746840.html.
33 Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early Warning
Capabilities.
34 Pavel Podvig, “Delay with the early warning radar at Armavir,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (29 December 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/12/
delay_with_the_earlywarning_ra.shtml.
35 Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early
Warning Capabilities.”
36 Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Military is Working to Enhance Precision Targeting and Early
Warning Capabilities.”
37 Pavel Podvig, “Russia is modernizing the Don-2N radar,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces –
Blog (29 December 2007), online: http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/12/
russia_is_modernizing_the_don2.shtml.
38 Stephen Clark, “Last-of-its-kind surveillance satellite reaches orbit,” Spaceflight Now (11 November
2007), online: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/d329/dsp23.html.
39 US Government Accountability Office, “Space Based Infrared System High Program and its
Alternative,” Report to Congress, GAO-07-1088R (12 September 2007).
40 Timothy Barnes, “Factsheet on Space Based Infrared System,” Center for Defense Information
(18 October 2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4123.
The Interim Mission Control Station Backup in Boulder, Colorado, the Lockheed Martin SBIRS
Auxiliary Support Center in Sunnyvale, the Northrop Grumman Satellite Payload Operational Test
Station, and the SBIRS Functional Test Assembly all worked together to simulate the command and
control of the SBIRS GEO spacecraft. “Lockheed Martin Completes Environmental Testing Of
Missile Warning Satellite Payload,” Space War (25 July 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/
reports/Lockheed_Martin_Completes_Environmental_Testing_Of_Missile_Warning_Satellite_Payloa
d_999.html; Timothy Barnes, “Factsheet on Space Based Infrared System.”; “Lockheed Team Delivers
Software For Ground Component Of Space-Based Missile Warning System,” Space War (8 June
2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Lockheed_Team_Delivers_Software_For_
Ground_Component_Of_Space_Based_Missile_Warning_System_999.html; “Lockheed Martin
Completes Key End-To-End Test Of Space Based Infrared System,” Space Mart (2 August 2007),
online: http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Lockheed_Martin_Completes_Key_End_
To_End_Test_Of_Space_Based_Infrared_System_999.html.
246
Space Security 2008
41 “Just when you thought it was safe for milspace procurement,” Space Politics (2 October 2007),
online: http://www.spacepolitics.com/2007/10/02/just-when-you-thought-it-was-
safe-for-milspace-procurement/. The failure was with the safe holds mode.
42 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “SBIRS-GEO,” Gunter’s Space Page (16 December 2007), online:
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/sbirs-high.htm.
43 Timothy Barnes, “Factsheet on Space Based Infrared System.”
44 “The View From Above,” Airforce-Magazine (8 February 2008), online:
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Features/modernization/Pages/box020808infrared.aspx.
45 Northrop Grumman, News Release, “Northrop Grumman To Develop System Definition
Requirements For U.S. Air Force’s Alternate Infrared Satellite System” (3 January 2007), online:
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=111123; “General Dynamics
Wins Deal To Study Alternative Infrared Satellite Systems,” Space War (21 June 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/General_Dynamics_Wins_Deal_To_Study_Alternative_Infrared_
Satellite_Systems_999.html. Northrop Grumman was awarded a $24.8-million contract to provide
systems definition requirements for the US Air Force, and General Dynamics was awarded a
$6.4-million contract to continue work on the system, in addition to the $23.3-million it received in
December 2006.
46 “Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative”; Jeremy Singer, “Air Force Plans
August Awards for AIRSS Flight Demo,” Space News (7 March 2007).
47 “The View From Above.”
48 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 1585 (6 December 2007).
49 Amy Butler, “Bush Memo Orders Space Situation Awareness,” Aviation Week and Space Technology
(12 October 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp
?channel=defense&id=news/MEMO10127.xml.
50 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.”
51 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.”
52 Marcus Weisgerber, “In the wake of PDM IV… Funding cuts delay ‘space fence’ upgrade acquisition
schedule,” Inside the Air Force (19 January 2007), online: http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2007/
January/01252007/01252007-16.htm.
53 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” at 972.
54 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Eyes European Space Surveillance Network,” Defense News
(8 October 2007).
55 Stanislav Konyukhov, Ukraine’s Pivdenne design bureau head, interviewed in “Ukraine Launches
System for Monitoring Outer Space” (28 November 2007), online: Red Orbit
http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/1161248/ukraine_launches_system_for_monitoring_
outer_space/?source=r_space.
56 MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates, News, “MDA Awarded Contract To Build Canadian
Information Solution For Surveillance of Space Objects” (4 October 2007), online:
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/October2007/04/c8747.html.
57 David Pugliese, “Canada Focuses Military Space On Continental, Homeland Defense,” Space.com
(4 April 2005), online: http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive05/Milcan_040405.html.
58 President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), Fact Sheet,
“Satellite Taskforce Report, Factsheet” (March 2004), online: National Communications Systems
http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/reports/2004/Satellite%20Task%20Force%20Fact%20Sheet%20
(March%202004).pdf; Theresa Hitchens, e-mail communication with author, 17 March 2005.
59 EADS-Astrium UK, e-mail communication with author, December 2004.
60 Scott A. Henderson, Lt. Col, USAF, former commander, 2nd Space Operations Squadron – GPS,
telephone conversation with author, 2 May 2005.
61 US General Accounting Office, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security
Should Be More Fully Addressed,” Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, GAO-02-781
(August 2002), online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02781.pdf.
247
Endnotes
62 M.R. Frater and M. Ryan, Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield (Boston: Artech House,
2001). The electronic warfare treatment of this chapter was largely drawn from the approach provided
in this book. “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities, Engineering and
Design,” Pamphlet EP 1110-3-2, US Army Corps of Engineers (December 1990); W.E. Burrows,
Deep Black Space Espionage and National Security (Random House: New York, 1986), at 182; Roohi
Banu, Tanya Vladimirova, and Martin Sweeting, “On-Board Encryption in Satellites,” Paper presented
at 2005 MAPLD International Conference, Washington, DC, 7-9 September 2005, abstract online:
NASA Office of Logic Design http://klabs.org/mapld05/abstracts/184_banu_a.html; Eric Swankoski
and Vijaykrishnan Narayanan, “Dynamic High-Performance Multi-Mode Architectures for AES
Encryption,” paper presented at 2005 MAPLD International Conference, Washington, DC, 7-9
September 2005, abstract online: NASA Office of Logic Design http://klabs.org/mapld05/abstracts/
103_swankoski_a.html.
63 M.R. Frater and M. Ryan, Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield.
64 Don J. Hinshilwood and Robert B. Dybdal, “Adaptive Nulling Antennas for Military
Communications,” 3 Crosslink, The Aerospace Corporation (Winter 2001/2002), at 30-37. Adaptive
antenna systems contain five major components: a means of detecting interference, a means of
distinguishing desired signals from interference, a control processor for determining how to combine
the antenna elements, antenna elements and circuitry to respond to commands from the control
processor, and a performance monitor to identify changes in the interference environment and
respond accordingly.
65 Don J. Hinshilwood and Robert B. Dybdal, “Adaptive Nulling Antennas for Military
Communications”; Mark Wade, “Milstar,” Encyclopedia Astonautica, online:
http://www.astronautix.com/craft/milstar.htm.
66 US Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2006/2007 Budget Estimates. Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) Descriptive Summaries, Volume I: Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency” (February 2005), at 423, online: Defense Technical Information Center http://www.dtic.mil/
descriptivesum/Y2006/DARPA/0603768E.pdf; Maj. Earl Odom, “Future Missions for Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles: Exploring Outside the Box,” Aerospace Power Journal (Summer 2002); Lt. Col.
Gregory Vansuch, “Navigation & Guidance,” DARPA Special Projects Office, Presentation at
DARPATECH 2002; David C. Hardesty, “Space-based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications
and Alternatives,” Naval War College Review (Spring 2005), at 8.
67 Michael Fabey, “Air Force Approach Raises Questions about TSAT Capability and Cost,” Aerospace
Daily and Defense Report (18 December 2006), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/
generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/TSAT12186.xml.
68 John T. Bennett, “Air Force to Establish New Cyberspace Operations Command,” Inside the Air Force
(4 October 2006), online: World Politics Watch http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=233.
69 “China to Launch its First Anti-Jamming Satellite Next Year,” China Daily (4 March 2004).
70 “China Enhances Spacecraft Monitoring Network,” Xinhua (12 December 2006), online:
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/12/content_5473204.htm; Zhour Honghsun and Liu
Wubing, “Status Quo and Assumption of China’s Space Satellite Monitoring,” China Communications
(June 2006), at 123.
71 Michael Fabey, “Air Force Approach Raises Questions about TSAT Capability and Cost.”
72 “NFIRE testing laser comms,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (5 November 2007)
73 “Boeing TSAT Laser Communications System Demonstrates Mission-Level Capabilities and
Performance,” Space War (21 March 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_TSAT_Laser_Communications_System_Demonstrates_
Mission_Level_Capabilities_And_Performance_999.html; Northrop Grumman, News Release,
“Lockheed Martin/Northrop Grumman TSAT Team Demonstrates Technology Maturity Of Laser
Communications Subsystem” (25 June 2007), online:
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=121807.
74 Peter B. de Selding, “European Firms Launched Dual-Use Sat Laser Project,” Defense News
(8 October 2007).
75 Oerlikon, News Release, “Laser Communication Terminals (LCT) for the European GMES
Programme” (19 June 2007), online: http://www.oerlikon.com/ecomaXL/index.php?site=SPACE_
EN_press_releases_detail&udtx_id=4520.
248
Space Security 2008
76 Oerlikon, News Release, “Oerlikon Space demonstrates laser datalink across a distance of 1.5 million
kilometres” (7 November 2007), online: http://www.oerlikon.com/ecomaXL/index.php?site=
SPACE_EN_press_releases_detail&udtx_id=5060.
77 Jefferson Morris, “Government Should Protect Commercial Sats,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report
(5 March 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/
SATS03057.xml&headline=Government%20Should%20Protect%20Commercial%20Sats
%20&channel=space.
78 K.C. Jones, “Anti-Jamming Technology Offered To Commercial Satellite Firms,” Information Week (9
April 2007), online: http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198900255.
79 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2005).
80 Lt. Col. Richard E. Fitts, ed., The Strategy of Electromagnetic Conflict (Los Altos: Peninsula Publishing,
1980).
81 “‘Misty’ Stealth Spy Satellite Program Cancelled?” SatNews (26 June 2007), online:
http://www.satnews.com/stories2007/4677/.
82 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 95.
83 Dana Priest, “New Spy Satellite Debated On Hill,” Washington Post (11 December 2004); Dana
Priest, “Lawmakers Balk at Cost of Satellite Few Admit Exists,” Washington Post (12 December 2004).
84 European Commission, Press Release, “Loyola de Palacio Welcomes the Outcome of EU/US
Discussions on GALILEO” (26 February 2004), online: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/04/264&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en;
European Commission, Press Release, “GALILEO and GPS will Navigate Side by Side: EU and US
Sign Final Agreement” (26 June 2004), online: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/04/805&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
85 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture”
(8 August 2006), online: http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/oe.htm.
86 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 91.
87 Dennis Papadapolous, “Satellite Threat Due to High Altitude Nuclear Detonations,” online:
Lightwatcher http://www.lightwatcher.com/chemtrails/Papadopoulos-chemtrails.pdf (date accessed:
26 April 2007).
88 Dennis Papadapolous, “Satellite Threat Due to High Altitude Nuclear Detonations.”
89 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against
Weaponizing Space (Washington DC: The Stimson Center, 2003).
90 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against
Weaponizing Space.
91 John Foster et al., “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” US Arms Services Committee (22 July 2004), online:
Globalsecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2004_r/04-07-22emp.pdf.
92 Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible,” 10 International Security
(Spring 1986), at 46-98; Federation of American Scientists, “Laser ASAT Test Verification”; David
Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual.
93 Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible,” at 79.
94 CDI Space Security Update #11 (5 December 2007). Originally sourced: Jane’s Defence Weekly
(28 November 2007).
95 Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Samson and Sam Black, “CDI Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2008
Defense Budget,” Center for Defense Information (21 February 2007).
96 Quotation found in Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Sampson, and Sam Black, “CDI Space Weapons
Spending in FY 2008 Defense Budget.”
97 Brian Berger, “Pentagon Pulls Plug on Satellite Refueling Prototypes,” Space.com (25 July 2007),
online: http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/070725_darpa_orbitalexpress_end.html.
249
Endnotes
98 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture”
(8 August 2006), online: http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/oe.htm.
99 Brian Berger, “Pentagon Pulls Plug on Satellite Refueling Prototypes,” Space.com (25 July 2007),
online: http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/070725_darpa_orbitalexpress_end.html.
100 Michael Sirak, “DARPA Eyes Mini Satellites for Rapid Launch to Protect Other Spacecraft,” Defense
Daily (10 August 2007); Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Budget: Programs of
Interest,” Center for Defense Information (19 December 2008), online:
http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=4131&IssueID=80&StartRow=
1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&issueID=80.
101 Tamar H. Mehuron, “2004 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine (August 2003), online:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug2003/0803spacealmanac.pdf.
102 “Military Planning Nuclear Exercises,” Moscow Times (2 February 2004).
103 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space” (June 2004), online: Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/space/20040700aaas.shtml.
104 Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond, at 5.
105 Formerly called US Force Application from the Continental US (FALCON) but the acronym was
dropped when the program ended its strike component.
106 DARPA, “FALCON Broad Agency Announcement, Phase I Proposer Information Pamphlet” (29 July
2003); Frank Colucci, “FALCON Aims at Global Striking Power,” 6 (1) Military Aerospace Technology
(February 2007).
107 Brian Berger and Jeremy Singer, “Field Narrows for DARPA’s Falcon Program; Decision Expected
Soon,” Space News (29 August 2005); Jefferson Morris, “Falcon SLV Program Nearing Next Phase,”
Aerospace Daily and Defense Report (8 December 2006), online: Aviation Week
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_space_story.jsp?id=news/FALC12086.xml.
108 Robert K. Ackerman, “Small Satellite Offers Glimpse of the Future,” Signal Magazine (January 2004);
Gunter Dirk Krebs, “TacSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page (1 January 2005), online:
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tacsat-1.htm.
109 James Canan, “Renaissance for Military Space,” Aerospace America (June 2003), online:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=364&ArchiveIssueID=39.
110 Air Force Research Laboratories, Fact Sheet, “Space Maneuver Vehicle” (September 2002).
111 Andreas Parsch, “X-37/X-40” (2006), online: Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/x-37.html.
112 V. Brinda et al., “Mission Analysis of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstrator,”
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 13th International Space Planes and Hypersonics
Systems and Technologies (2005).
113 “Clearing Skies,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (29 April 1998).
114 Alexander Zhelezniakov, “New Space Carrier Rocket ‘Mikron,’” Russian Pereplet (15 February 2002),
online: http://www.pereplet.ru/cgi/science.cgi?id=61.
115 Aviation Week and Space Technology (3 March 2006).
116 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual,
at 83.
117 Robert Hewson, “China Plans New Space Launchers,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (22 November 2006).
118 Ben Iannotta, “$408 Million ORS Budget To Have Broad-Based Focus,” Space News (17 August
2007).
119 “TacSat-2’s Milestone Mission Advanced Responsive Space Concept,” Space Daily (22 January 2008),
online: http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/TacSat_2_Milestone_Mission_Advanced_
Responsive_Space_Concept_999.html; Jeremy Singer, “Two Instruments on TacSat-2 Not Being
Used,” Space News (14 March 2007).
120 See SpaceX, online: www.spacex.com (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
121 Brian Berger and Jeremy Singer, “Field Narrows for DARPA’s Falcon Program; Decision
Expected Soon.”
250
Space Security 2008
122 Ben Iannotta, “$408 Million ORS Budget To Have Broad-Based Focus.”
123 “NASA dips into bargain basement with new satellite,” Networkworld.com (21 November 2008),
online: http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/22160.
124 “Boeing Pico-Satellite Mission To Advance Miniature Satellite Technology,” Space Daily (20 April
2007), online: http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Boeing_Pico_Satellite_Mission_To_Advance_
Miniature_Satellite_Technology_999.html.
125 “ATK wins USAF space propulsion contract,” Space Travel (14 September 2007), online:
http://www.space-travel.com/reports/ATK_wins_USAF_space_propulsion_contract_999.html.
126 Noah Shachtman, “‘Autonomous’ Mini-Spacecraft Team up to Replace Big Sats,” Wired – Blog
(31 July 2007), online: http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/07/the-objective-o.html.
Chapter Seven Endnotes
1 Negation of space systems is called ‘offensive counterspace’ in current US Air Force terminology, and
includes the ‘Five Ds’ mission. US Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document
2-2.1 (2 August 2004), at 3. The Counterspace Operations document represents the views of the USAF
and not necessarily those of the US Government.
2 The Van Allen belts are two rings consisting of highly energetic protons trapped by the Earth’s
magnetic field. The lower belt is situated between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometers about the equator.
The second belt is situated between 15,000 and 25,000 kilometers above the equator. David Stern,
“Radiation Belts” (25 November 2001), online: NASA http://www-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/
Education/Iradbelt.html. See also “Van Allen Belts” in Alan Isaacs, ed., A Dictionary of Physics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3 Robert Butterworth, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,” George C. Marshall Institute Policy
Outlook (January 2008), at 1.
4 Bruce DeBlois et al., “Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon,” 20 International Security
(Fall 2004), at 66.
5 “Counterspace Systems,” Unclassified RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet, Exhibit R-2, Project
Element 0604421F (February 2003), at 1, online: Defense Technical Information Center
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2004/AirForce/0604421F.pdf.
6 Capt. Angie Blair, Air Force Spokesperson quoted in Jim Wolf, “US Deploys Satellite Jamming
System,” Reuters (29 October 2004).
7 “Space Control Technology,” Unclassified RDT&E Budget Item Justification, Exhibit R-2, Project
Element 0603438F (February 2004), at 3, online: Defense Technical Information Center
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/AirForce/0603438F.pdf.
8 “Space Control Technology,” at 1.
9 Office of Science and Technology Policy, Fact Sheet, “US Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Policy” (15 December 2004), online: http://www.ostp.gov/html/FactSheetSPACE-BASED
POSITIONINGNAVIGATIONTIMING.pdf.
10 In July 2003, broadcasts of Persian-language Voice of America and other Iranian broadcasts emerging
from the US were blocked by a signal believed to originate in Cuba. “US Broadcasts ‘Jammed by
Cuba,’” BBC News (18 July 2003), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3077303.stm.
11 Broadcasting from the UK and Belgium, Med-TV was a satellite network operated by Kurdish exiles.
Beginning in 1995 it experienced several interruptions in service blamed on a jamming signal
originating in Turkey, before its closure in 1999. “World: Middle East Kurds Retaliate in Turkish Jam
War,” BBC News (16 October 1998), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/193529.stm.
12 The Falun Gong has been accused of jamming SINOSAT signals to block broadcasts and overriding
transmission with pirate broadcasts in several incidents in 2002 and 2003. “Jamming Harms World
Trade,” China Daily (30 September 2002).
13 Frank Vizard, “Safeguarding GPS,” Scientific American (14 April 2003).
251
Endnotes
14 Steven Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and
Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (31
October 2007), at 83, online: http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20071031.
Arming_the_Heavens/R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens.pdf.
15 Walter Jayawardhana, “Intelsat to turn off LTTE beam,” Daily News (Sri Lanka) (13 April 2007),
online: http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/04/13/news01.asp.
16 “Satellite Operator Shuts Down Tiger Broadcasts In Sri Lanka,” Space Mart (26 April 2007), online:
http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Satellite_Operator_Shuts_Down_Tiger_Broadcasts_In_
Sri_Lanka_999.html.
17 “Hit by Intelstat closure Tamil Tigers plans a new TV satellite channel in France,” Asian Tribune
(13 April 2007), online: http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5305.
18 “Hit by Intelstat closure Tamil Tigers plans a new TV satellite channel in France.”
19 Sam Ghattas and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Mysterious satellite transmissions assaulting Israeli satellite
TV broadcasts,” International Herald Tribune (10 October 2007), online: http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2007/10/10/africa/ME-GEN-Whos-Jamming-Israel.php.
20 Kristin Roberts, “US Officials confirm Israel strike on Syria,” Reuters (12 September 2007), online:
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN1228366420070912.
21 “UN ships may be disrupting Israeli satellite television,” Shortwave Central – Blog (10 October
2007), online: http://mt-shortwave.blogspot.com/2007/10/un-ships-may-be-disrupting-israeli.html.
22 Lewis Page, “Mystery Israeli satellite telly disruption blamed on UN,” The Register (11 October 2007),
online: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/11/israeli_satellite_telly_banjaxed_by_
germans_n_cloggies/page2.html.
23 Sam Ghattas and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Mysterious satellite transmissions assaulting Israeli satellite
TV broadcasts.”
24 David Shiga and AFP, “Mysterious source jams satellite communications,” New Scientist (26 January
2007), online: http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn11033.
25 Michael Evans, “China ‘tops list’ of cyber-hackers seeking UK government secrets,” Times (London)
(6 September 2007), online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2393979.ece;
“France government falls prey to cyber-attacks ‘involving China,’” France24.com (9 September 2007),
online: http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/news/france/20070909-Internet-piracy-
france-secuirty-china-hacker.html; Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chinese hacked into Pentagon,” Financial
Times (3 September 2007), online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dba9ba2-5a3b-11dc
-9bcd-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1
26 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chinese hacked into Pentagon.”
27 Jeremy Reimer, “Chinese government at center of five cyber attack claims,” Ars Technica (14
September 2007), online: http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070914-chinese-government-at-the-
center-of-five-cyber-attack-claims.html?rel.
28 “France government falls prey to cyber-attacks ‘involving China.’
29 “China says suffers ‘massive’ Internet spy damage,” Reuters (UK) (12 September 2007), online:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKPEK7050420070912.
30 Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force To Upgrade Satcom Jamming System,” Space News (22 February
2007).
31 Center for Defense Information, “Air Force Deploying Two Satellite Jamming Squadrons,” Space
Security Updates (2 April 2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?
DocumentID=3909&IssueID=140&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLast
Updated&ProgramID=68&issueID=140#2, originally sourced from Defense Daily (9 March 2007);
Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force To Upgrade Satcom Jamming System.”
32 Caitlin Harrington, “USAF to speed up cyber attack,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (17 October 2007).
33 Lt. Gen. Kevin Campbell, commander of Army Space and Missile Defense Command, quoted in
Jeremy Singer, “Army Official Says U.S. Is Blocking Terrorist Signals,” Space News (30 August 2007).
252
Space Security 2008
34 Alan Cameron, “Perspectives – June 2008,” GPS World (24 June 2008), online:
http://sidt.gpsworld.com/gpssidt/Latest+News/National-Space-Symposium-Day-3-OCX-and-GPS-III/
ArticleStandard/Article/detail/525875.
35 “China Enhances Spacecraft Monitoring Network,” Xinhua (12 December 2006), online:
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/12/content_5473204.htm; Zhour Honghsun and Liu
Wubing, “Status Quo and Assumption of China’s Space Satellite Monitoring,” China Communications
(June 2006), at 123.
36 Craig Covault, “China’s ASAT Test Will Intensify U.S.-Chinese Faceoff in Space,” Aviation Week
(21 January 2007), online: http://www.aviationnow.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?
channel=awst&id=news/aw012207p2.xml.
37 US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (30 September 2001), at 45,
online: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
38 USAF, Counterspace Operations, at vii.
39 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,” 117 Stat. 1565 Public Law 108-136-24
(November 2003).
40 USAF, Fact Sheet, “Space Situational Awareness Integration Office” (April 2004), online: Peterson Air
Force Base http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/Library/FactSheets/FactsSheets.asp?FactChoice=23.
41 Launched in 1996, the MSX satellite has expended its intended lifespan. For system details see Grant
H. Stokes et al., “The Space-Based Visible Program,” 11 Lincoln Laboratory Journal (1998), online:
http://www.ll.mit.edu/ST/sbv/sbv.pdf.
42 USAF, US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, “Appendix D: Brief Descriptions of Programs,
ACTDs and Future System Concepts” (November 2003), at D-10, online:
http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf.
43 Boeing, News Release, “Boeing Completes Key Risk Reduction Milestone for Space Surveillance
System” (29 September 2006), online: http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2006/q3/060929b_
nr.html; John A. Tirpak, “Space and Counterspace,” 89(6) Air Force Magazine (June 2006).
44 USAF, US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, “Appendix D: Brief Descriptions of Programs,
ACTDs and Future System Concepts,” at D-9; Jeremy Singer, “Briefs – Pentagon Cancels Funds For
Deep Space Imager,” Space News (20 February 2006).
45 “Improving Our Vision: Approaches for Shared Space Situational Awareness,” Report of the 15-16
September 2006 Conference, The Antlers Hotel, Colorado Springs, CO, The World Security
Institute’s Center for Defense Information and The U.S. Air Force Academy’s Center for Space and
Defense Studies (2007).
46 Peter B. de Selding, “French Say ‘Non’ to U.S. Disclosure of Secret Satellites,” Space News
(8 June 2007).
47 Allen Thomson, “A GRAVES Sourcebook, Version 2007-12-01.”
48 Peter B. de Selding, “French Say “Non” to U.S. Disclosure of Secret Satellites.”
49 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 1585 (6 December 2007).
50 Amy Butler, “Bush Memo Orders Space Situation Awareness,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report
(12 October 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?
channel=defense&id=news/MEMO10127.xml.
51 Stanislav Konyukhov, Ukraine’s Pivdenne design bureau head, interviewed in “Ukraine Launches
System for Monitoring Outer Space” (28 November 2007), online: Red Orbit http://www.redorbit.
com/news/space/1161248/ukraine_launches_system_for_monitoring_outer_space/?source=r_space.
52 DARPA, “Orbital Express On-Orbit Mission Updates” (22 July 2007), online:
http://www.darpa.mil/orbitalexpress/mission_updates.html.
53 System details taken from Clayton K.S. Chun, “Shooting down a ‘Star’ Program 437, the US nuclear
ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers,” Cadre Paper No. 6 (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama, Air Force University Press, April 2000), at 4; Laura Grego, “A History of US and Soviet
ASAT Programs,” Union of Concerned Scientists (9 April 2003), online: http://www.ucsusa.org/
global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1151; David Baker, “Soviet ASAT Series,” Jane’s
253
Endnotes
Space Directory (17 September 2003); David Baker, “United States ASAT Series,” Jane’s Space Directory
(3 March 2004).
54 DeBlois et al. estimate that the North Korean Nodong missile or a GPS-guided bomb could achieve
the altitude and accuracy for this kind of attack. Bruce DeBlois et al., “Space Weapons: Crossing the
US Rubicon,” at 61.
55 Steven Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens.”
56 Counterspace Operations, at 3.
57 Funding appropriated by Congress for the system included $30-million in FY1996, $50-million in
FY1997, $37.5-million in FY1998, $7.5-million in FY2000, $3-million in FY2001, and $7.5-million
in FY2004. Marcia Smith, “US Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” CRS Issue Brief
for Congress (21 October 2004), online: Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/spp/
civil/crs/IB92011.pdf. Funding in FY2005 was $14.0-million. Theresa Hitchens, Michael
Katz-Hymen, and Jeffrey Lewis, “US Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus” (March 2006)
13(1) Nonproliferation Review, at 43, Table 4.
58 Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hymen, and Jeffrey Lewis, “US Space Weapons: Big Intentions,
Little Focus,” at 43, Table 4.
59 David C. Isby, “US Army continues with KE-ASAT,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (March 2005); Keith
J. Costa, “ASAT Technology Test Bed in the Works at Redstone Arsenal,” Inside Missile Defense (22
December 2004); Sandra I. Erwin, “US Space Command Chief Warns About Technological
Complacency,” National Defense (May 2001), online: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/
2001/May/US_Space.htm; United States Department of Defense, Press Release No. 503-04,
“Contracts: Army” (25 May 2004), online: http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/2004/ct20040525.html.
60 “Raytheon Delivers Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Payloads for Fort Greely,” Space Daily (18 August
2004), online: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04y.html.
61 Raytheon, Fact Sheet, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBM) Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV),” online: http://raytheonmissiledefense.com/matrix/pdfs/fs/fs_ekv.pdf.
62 David Wright and Laura Grego, “ASAT Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defense System,” 68
Disarmament Diplomacy (December 2002-January 2003), at 7-10.
63 “Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4),” Missile Threat, online:
http://www.missilethreat.com/systems/gorgon.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
64 Pavel Podvig, “Russian Military Space Capabilities,” in Phillip E. Coyle, ed., Ensuring America’s Space
Security (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004), at 127.
65 These dates are provided in Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “US Knew of China’s Missile
Test, But Kept Silent,” New York Times (23 April 2007), at 1.
66 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel, U.S., Test Compatibility of Arrow-Patriot Interceptors,” Space News
(14 March 2005); Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Plans 2nd ABM Test in June,” Defense News
(29 January 2007).
67 Approximately 80 percent of all the energy from a nuclear weapon detonated in outer space appears in
the form of X-rays, in addition to small amounts of gamma radiation and neutrons, small fractions in
residual radio activity, and in the kinetic energy of bomb debris. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is
also generated by a HAND when X-rays and gamma rays create an electron flux in the upper
atmosphere of the Earth that re-radiates its energy in the radio frequency portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum. When this radio frequency hits space systems it induces currents and
voltages that may damage or destroy electronic systems not hardened against these effects. Satellites in
GEO would experience an EMP of smaller magnitude than either LEO satellites or ground facilities
located within a line of sight of the HAND. Long after the initial detonation of a nuclear device,
electrons liberated by the device would join the naturally occurring radiation in the Van Allen belts.
Satellites not specifically designed for operations after detonation of a nuclear weapon may fail quickly
in this enhanced radiation environment due to a rapid accumulation of total ionizing doses on the
critical electronic parts of a satellite. Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, eds., Space Mission Design
and Analysis, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), at 215-228.
68 Union of Concerned Scientists, “History of Russia’s ABM System” (27 October 2002), online:
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cfm?pageID=609.
254
Space Security 2008
69 The International Atomic Energy Agency has never been able to fully verify the status of the North
Korea nuclear safeguards agreement and reports that it is non-compliant with its obligations.
Although claims have been made that North Korea reprocessed nuclear fuel for weapons, they remain
unsubstantiated as inspectors have been denied access to nuclear facilities since 2002. International
Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, “Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between
the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pursuant to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” GC(48)/17 (16 August 2004), online: http://www.iaea.org/
About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48-17.pdf; “Outcry at N Korea ‘Nuclear Test,’” BBC News
(9 October 2006), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6033457.stm.
70 Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work,” New York Times (3 December 2007);
James Blitz and Roula Khalaf, “ElBaradei warns on ‘work plan,’” Financial Times (2 October 2007),
online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ed44230-711e-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
71 S. Karamow, “Army Scores a Hit on Satellite in Test of Laser” USA Today (21 October 1997), at A6.
72 Laura Grego, “A History of US and Soviet ASAT Programs.”
73 Prior to the MIRACL laser test in 1997, “that a commercially available laser and a 1.5 m mirror could
be an effective ASAT highlighted a US vulnerability that had not been fully appreciated.” The 30-watt
laser used in the test was capable of temporarily blinding the target satellite. Grego, “A History of US
and Soviet ASAT Programs.”
74 Theresa Hitchens, “US Air Force Plans a Laser Test Against a Satellite in FY 07,” Center for Defense
Information (3 May 2006), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=
3411&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&typeID=
(8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm.
75 “Counterspace Systems,” at 875.
76 Missile Defense Agency, Fact Sheet, “The Airborne Laser” (last updated May 2006), online:
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/laser.pdf.
77 Tariq Malik, “The Power of Light: An Airborne Laser for Missile Defense,” Space.com (17 November
2004), online: http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/airborne_laser_techwed_041117.html.
78 “Airborne Laser fact sheet,” Missile Threat, online: http://www.missilethreat.com/
missiledefensesystems/id.8/system_detail.asp; Jeremy Singer, “MDA Officials Lay Out Milestones
for Airborne Laser,” Space News (13 March 2006).
79 Northrop Grumman, Press Release, “Northrop Grumman Chosen to Proceed with Developing
Solid-State Laser Technology for Military Applications” (5 January 2006), online: http://www.
irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.mhtml?d=91947; Textron Systems, Press Release,
“Textron Systems Receives Award to Develop Joint High Powered Solid State Laser (JHPSSL) for the
US Army” (16 February 2006), online: http://www.textrondefense.com/news/2006/02_16_06.htm.
80 China has developed significant capacity in gas, chemical, dye, excimer, solid-state, semi-conductor,
and free electron lasers, both for pulse and continuous wave functions. Subtypes developed by China
include krypton-fluoride, helium-argon-xenon, neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet
(Nd:YAG), oxygen-iodine, carbon-dioxide, neodymium glass (Nd:Glass), titanium-sapphire, quantum
cascade, xenon-fluoride, both infrared and X-ray free electron lasers, and others. See the Chinese
journals Chinese Journal of Lasers, Infrared and Laser Engineering, High Powered Laser and Particle
Beams, Chinese Optics Letters, and Laser and Infrared. Sun Chengwei, Zhang Ning and Du Xiangwan,
“Recent developments of Chinese activities in lasers and laser beam interactions with materials,”
AIAA-1995-1920, 26th Plasmadynamics and Lasers Conference, San Diego, CA (19-22 June 1995),
online: http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406&gTable=mtgpaper&gID=82509; Huang He,
“A Dust-Laden Secret: Review and Prospects for China’s Optical Instruments and Laser Weapons,”
Defense International (1 April 1998), at 100-115; “LD-Pumped Nd: YAG Microchip Laser with
62.5MW CW Output Power,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (3 May 1994); “Ti-Sapphire Laser Attains
CW Output Power of 650MW,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (December 1994); Hui Zhongxi, “Sg-1 FEL
Amplifier Output Reaches 140MW,” High Power Laser and Particle Beams (December 1994); “A GW
Power Level High Power CO2 Laser System,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (June 1990); IAEA, “World
Survey of Activities in Controlled Fusion Research, Special Supplement” ( 2001), online:
http://epub.iaea.org/fusion/public/ws01/ws_toc.html; “Directed Energy Weapons and Sensors,” in China’s
Aerospace and Defence Industry, Jane’s Chem-Bio Web (1 December 2000); Mark A. Stokes, “China’s
Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College (September 1999), online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB74.pdf.
255
Endnotes
81 Yang Wen-shi, Wang Wei-li, Sun Wei-na, Bi Guo-jiang, Zhu Chen and Wang Xiao-han, “Beam
Quality of the High Power DPL,” 5 Infrared and Laser Engineering (2005), at 511-516. Shi
Xiang-chun, Chen Wei-biao and Hou Xia, “Application of All Solid State Laser in Space,”
2 Infrared and Laser Engineering (2005), at 127-131.
82 “China Jamming Test Sparks US Satellite Concerns,” USA Today (5 October 2006), online:
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-05-satellite-laser_x.htm?POE=TECISVA.
83 During a test in 1997 a 30-W ground-based tracking laser reportedly dazzled an imaging satellite at
500-km altitude, although few details are available. John Donnelly, “Laser of 30 Watts Blinded
Satellite 300 Miles High,” Defense Week (8 December 1997), at 1, cited in David Wright, Laura
Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge:
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), at 128. Gen. James Cartwright, Commander of US
Strategic Command, denied that there is clear evidence of Chinese intentions to interfere with US
space assets and no official Chinese statements have been released. See Elaine M. Grossman, “Is China
Disrupting US Satellites?” InsideDefense.com (13 October 2006), online:
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,116694,00.html.
84 US General Cartwright claims that China made two previous attempts prior to the successful test on
11 January 2007. Amy Butler, “Chinese Anti-sat hit was Third Attempt,” Aviation Week (16 April
2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=
space&id=news/saty041607.xml&headline=Chinese%20Anti-sat%20Hit%20Was%20Third
%20Attempt. Dates are provided in Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s
Missile Test, But Kept Silent,” New York Times (23 April 2007), at 1.
85 Craig Covault, “China’s ASAT Test Will Intensify U.S.-Chinese Faceoff in Space,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology (21 January 2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_
generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw012207p2.xml.
86 GlobalSecurity.org, “Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] Capabilities” (last updated 18 January 2007),
online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm.
87 Shirley Kan, “China’s Anti-satellite Weapon Test,” Congressional Research Center (23 April 2007),
at 3.
88 Martin Staff, “China Officially Announces Anti-Satellite Test Successful,” Space War (24 January
2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Officialy_Announces_Anti_
Satellite_Test_Successful_999.htm.
89 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.”
90 Walter Pincus, “Space Defense Program Gets Extra Funding,” Washington Post (12 November 2007),
91 Rajat Pandit, “India years away from setting up aerospace command,” Times of India (6 February
2007), online: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1565014.cms; “India in aerospace
defence plan,” BBC (28 January 2007), online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6307875.stm.
92 Missile Defense Agency, Press Release, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments in 2007”
(14 January 2008), online: http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/08news0002.pdf.
93 US Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile
Defense, but Program Is Short of Meeting Goals,” Report to Congressional Committees
(GAO-08-448) (March 2008).
94 Raytheon, Fact Sheet, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBM) Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV),” online: http://raytheonmissiledefense.com/matrix/pdfs/fs/fs_ekv.pdf.
95 David Wright and Laura Grego, “ASAT Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defense System,”
68 Disarmament Diplomacy (December 2002-January 2003), at 7-10.
96 Lt. General Obering, Director, Missile Defense Agency, speaking at “Ballistic Missile Defense
Conference,” Lexington Institute (23 June 2008).
97 Sam Black, “The Kinetic Energy Interceptor: Missile Without a Cause,” Center for Defense
Information – Missile Defense (16 August 2007),
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4068.
98 Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, quoted in Sam Black, “The Kinetic Energy Interceptor: Missile
Without a Cause.”
99 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments in 2007.”
256
Space Security 2008
100 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments in 2007.”
101 “Raytheon Illuminator Succeeds In Airborne Laser Flight Tests,” Space War (12 October 2007),
online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Raytheon_Illuminator_Succeeds_In_Airborne_
Laser_Flight_Tests_999.html; “Northrop Grumman Begins Integrating Megawatt-Class Laser Onto
MDA’s Airborne Laser Aircraft,” Space War (11 October 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/
reports/Northrop_Grumman_Begins_Integrating_Megawatt_Class_Laser_Onto_MDA_
Airborne_Laser_Aircraft_999.html.
102 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments in 2007.”
103 Missile Defense Agency, “Fiscal Year 2009 (FY 2009) Budget Estimates Overview,” 08-MDA-3199
(23 January 2008), at Table 11, online: http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/budgetfy09.pdf; US House
of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” at 817.
104 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” at 817.
105 Missile Defense Agency, News Release, “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense Flight Test Successful,”
07-NEWS-0053 (17December 2007), online: http://www.mda.mil/mdaLink/pdf/07news0053.pdf.
106 “India tests hypersonic interceptor missile,” RIA Novosti (6 December 2008), online:
http://en.rian.ru/world/20071206/91234260.html.
107 G. Bharath and Harsh V. Pant, “A step closer to missile defense,” The Tribune (India) (23 December
2007), online: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20071223/edit.htm#5.
108 Joshua Williams, “World Missile Chart,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (November
2005), online: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/ballisticmissilechart.cfm. The chart includes
only missiles in operation as of 2007. The range used in Figure 7.4 is for the missile carrying its
nominal payload. The cutoff point of 1,000 km+ is used because, as a rule of thumb, a rocket can
deliver its nominal payload mass to an altitude roughly half of its maximum range and smaller
payloads to a greater altitude; see David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of
Space Security. The missiles on the chart can potentially lift a payload with a mass equal to that of
their nominal warhead to an altitude of at least 500 km. This is high enough to reach most Earth
observation and imaging satellites in LEO, such as the US Lacross radar satellites, but not to reach
communication satellites in GEO. Direct ascent ASAT systems based on ballistic missiles are possible,
as the Chinese ASAT interceptor used in the 11 January 2007 test was boosted into space by a
modified DF-21 missile. Actors without a hit-to-kill capability could choose to intentionally scatter
debris and pollute an orbit or conduct a HAND attack. All commercial launch vehicles also
inherently have ASAT capabilities.
109 Adaptiveoptics.org, “Adaptive Optics Establishments,” online:
http://www.adaptiveoptics.org/Establishments.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
110 Theresa Hitchens, “US Air Force Plans a Laser Test Against a Satellite in FY 07,” Center for Defense
Information (3 May 2006), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=
3411&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&typeID=
(8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm.
111 Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Budget: Programs of Interest,” Center for Defense
Information (19 December 2008), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm
?DocumentID=4131&IssueID=80&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=
DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&issueID=80.
112 Zhu Jianqiang, “Solid-State Laser Development Activities in China,” Conference on Lasers and
Electro-Optics (2007), online: http://ultralaser.iphy.ac.cn/cleo/data/papers/CThE6.pdf.
113 “SKorea develops laser weapons: report,” Space War (10 November 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/SKorea_develops_laser_weapons_report_999.html.
114 “Japan Develop Laser Weapons Amid North Korea Threat,” Space War (13 May 2007), online:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_Develop_Laser_Weapons_Amid_North_Korea_Threat_
999.html.
115 Rajat Pandit, “Space Command must to check China,” Times of India (17 June 2008), online:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Space_command_must_to_check_China/articleshow/
3135817.cms.
257
Endnotes
116 The Surrey Space Centre’s partnership with China to develop microsatellite technology has been the
source of much speculation about Chinese ASAT intentions, although there is no evidence of an
official Chinese ASAT program. Surrey Satellites’ CEO posted a statement on its website that “there
have been a number of reports in the press that have portrayed SSTL’s commercial satellite business
with PR China in a very misleading light. … SSTL has carried out two micro-satellite projects for PR
China. Both projects are entirely civil in nature and both have been executed strictly within export
controls specifically approved for each project by the UK government. … No propulsion technologies
or know-how has been provided by SSTL to China and therefore the satellites supplied by SSTL are
not able to be used either as ‘ASAT’ anti-satellite devices nor as a basis to develop such devices as
claimed by some press reports.” Surrey Satellite Technology, “News” (23 March 2005), online:
http://www.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=6. For an analysis of China’s interest in ASAT weapons,
including the Chinese academic debate about this subject, see Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan,
Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters, “China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of
Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies (22 July 2003), online:
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm. A full description of the Tsinghua-1/SNAP mission is
online: Surrey Space Centre http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/SSC/ (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
117 Jeffrey Lewis, “NFIRE Kill Vehicle Finally Dead. Really,” Armscontrolwonk – Blog (23 August 2005),
online: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/741/nfire-kill-vehicle-finally-dead-really.
118 Justin Ray, “Delta 2 Rocket Puts Military Experiment into Space,” Spaceflight Now (21 June 2006),
online: http://spaceflightnow.com/delta/d316/.
119 “Ballistic Missile Defense System Interceptors,” Unclassified RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet,
Exhibit R-2, Program Element 0603886C (February 2004), online: Defense Technical Information
Center http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/MDA/0603886C.pdf.
120 Mark Wade, “Rockets,” Encyclopedia Astronautica (May 2005), online: http://www.astronautix.com.
121 See for example the mobile land- and sea-based ballistic missiles identified in Hajime Ozu, Missile
2000 Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000).
122 “Overview of the Taurus Rocket,” Space Flight Now (19 September 2001), online:
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/taurus/t6/010919taurus.html.
123 See Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000 Reference Guide to World Missile Systems. .
124 Sea Launch Web Site, online: http://www.sea-launch.com/ (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
125 See for example the SHTIL SLBM launch identified in Brian Harvey, Russia in Space the Failed
Frontier? (Chichester, UK: Springer-Praxis Books, 2001) at 236.
126 Sea Launch Web Site.
127 Sea Launch Web Site.
128 Muhammad Shamsui Kamal Adnan and Md. Azlin Md. Said, “Aircraft-Based Satellite Launching
(ABSL) System - Future Space Transportation System,” German Aerospace Center, online:
http://www.dlr.de/iaa.symp/Portaldata/49/Resources/dokumente/archiv5/0810P_Kama_Adnan.pdf
(date accessed: 10 July 2008).
129 Orbital Sciences Corporation, “Space Launch Systems,” (May 2005), online: http://www.orbital.com/.
130 “China Tracks Space Debris,” Space.com, (18 March 2005), online:
http://www.space.com/astronotes/astronotes_mar1_mar31_2005.html .
131 The TAROT and ROSACE space debris monitoring programs are surveyed in Fernand Alby et al,
“Status of CNES Optical Observations of Space Debris in Geostationary Orbit,” 34(5) Advances in
Space Research (2002) at 1143-1149.
132 Fernand Alby et al, “Status of CNES Optical Observations,” at 1143-1149.
133 National Space Development Agency of Japan, “Space Debris Optical Observation and Orbit
Determination Experiment Initiated,” (September 2000), online:
http://www.nasda.go.jp/lib/nasda-news/2000/09/head_e.html.
134 Harvey, Russia in Space the Failed Frontier?
135 US Air Force, “Space Surveillance,” (May 2005), online: Air University
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usspc-fs/space.htm.
258
Space Security 2008
136 Wei Long, “Chinese Space Workers Celebrate Their Labour to Launch Shenzhou,” Space Daily
(9 January 2002).
137 Heiner Klinkrad, “Monitoring Space – Efforts Made by European Countries,” paper presented at the
International Colloquium on Europe and Space Debris, sponsored by the Académie National de l’Air
et de l’Espace, Toulouse, France, ( 27-28 November 2002), online: Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/klinkrad.pdf.
138 Klinkrad, “Monitoring Space.”
139 Radio Atmospheric Science Center, Kyoto University, “Introduction to MU Radar,” online:
http://www-lab26.kuee.kyoto-u.ac.jp/study/mu/mu_e.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
140 Harvey, Russia in Space the Failed Frontier? at 209.
141 US Air Force, “Space Surveillance.”
142 Department of Earth Observation and Space Systems, Delft University, “Satellite Laser Ranging for
ERS-1,” (8 August 1998), online: http://www.deos.tudelft.nl/ers/tracking1/global.html.
143 European Space Agency, “ConeXpress Orbital Life Extension Vehicle (CX-OLEV),” (May 2005),
online: http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=17870.
144 “Soyuz Launches Progress Cargo Flight to ISS/Automated Rendezvous Tests,” Space and Tech (26 June
2002), online: http://www.spaceandtech.com/digest/flash2002/flash2002-060.shtml.
145 NASA, “DART Mission,” (May 2005), online: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/dart/main/.
146 “ConeXpress Orbital Life Extension Vehicle.”
147 Mark Wade, “Polyot 11A59,” Encyclopedia Astronautica (May 2005), online:
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/pol11a59.htm.
148 “ConeXpress Orbital Life Extension Vehicle.”
149 “Autonomous Proximity Microsatellites,” Air Force Research Laboratory Horizons (December 2003).
150 “ConeXpress Orbital Life Extension Vehicle.”
151 “Autonomous Proximity Microsatellites.”
152 The Advanced Video Guidance Sensor was first demonstrated in the 1990s with the space shuttle in
NASA’s Automated Rendezvous and Capture project. NASA, Fact Sheet, “DART Demonstrator to
Test Future Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies in Orbit,” (September 2004).
153 Michael Braukus and Kim Newton, “On Orbit Anomaly Ends DART Mission Early,” NASA,
(16 April 2005), online: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/dart/media/05-051.html.
154 Lt. Col. James Shoemaker, “Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture,” DARPA (19 October
2004).
155 Gerd Hirzinger et al., “DLR’s Robotics Technologies for On-Orbit Servicing” 2 Advanced Robotics
(2003) at 139-174.
156 Wang Chaoqun, “Semi Physical Simulation Technique about the RF/IR Dual-mode Integrated
Homing Guidance System,” 1 Aerospace Control (2005), at 76-78.
157 “US Air Force FY 2007 Exhibit R-2A RDT&E Project Justification” (February 2006), online:
Defense Technical Information Center www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2007/AirForce/0605306F.pdf.
158 Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Budget: Programs of Interest.”
159 Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Sampson, and Sam Black, “Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2008
Defense Budget,” Center for Defense Information (21 February 2008), online: http://www.cdi.org/
PDFs/Space%20Weapons%20Spending%20in%20the%20FY%202008%20Defense%20Budget.pdf.
160 Justin Ray, “Delta 2 Rocket Puts Military Experiment into Space”; Defense Technical Information
Center, “DARPA FY 2007 Exhibit R-2 RDT&E Project Justification” (February 2006), online:
DTIC www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2007/AirForce/0604855F.pdf.
161 Ryan Caron, “CDI Factsheet: MiTEx (Micro-satellite Technology Experiment),” Center for Defense
Information (14 July 2006), online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/
printversion.cfm?documentID=3591.
162 Jeremy Singer, “Critics Worry There May Be More to MiTEx than Meets the Eye,” Space News
(5 July 2006).
259
Endnotes
163 Ryan Caron, “CDI Factsheet: MiTEx.”
164 Jeremy Singer, “Air Force ANGELS: Satellite Escorts to Take Flight,” Space News (30 November
2005).
165 US Tactical Technology Office, “Front-End Robotic Enabling Near-Term Demonstrations”
(18 February 2008), online: http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/frend.htm.
166 Alliance Space System, Press Release, “DARPA’s ‘FREND’ Technology Demo” (20 October 2007),
online: http://www.alliancespacesystems.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=206&Itemid=290.
167 NRL, Press Release, “NRL Developing Space “Tow Truck” Technology For Satellite Operations,”
(27 August 2007), online: http://www.nrl.navy.mil/pressRelease.php?Y=2007&R=47-07r.
168 Michael Sirak, “DARPA Eyes Mini Satellites for Rapid Launch to Protect Other Spacecraft,” Defense
Daily (10 August 2007); Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Budget: Programs of
Interest.”
169 Michael Sirak, “DARPA Eyes Mini Satellites for Rapid Launch to Protect Other Spacecraft.”
170 PRISMA website, online: http://www.prismasatellites.se/?sid=9028/ (date accessed: 10 July 2008)
171 Staffan Persson, Bjorn Jakobsson, Eberhard Gill, “PRISMA—Demonstration Mission for Advanced
Rendezvous and Formation Flying Technologies and Sensors,” Paper IAC-05-B5.6.B072005 at the
International Astronautical Congress (2005), online: http://www.prismasatellites.se/?id=9308.
172 PRISMA website.
Chapter Eight Endnotes
1 Jeffrey Lewis, “Space-Based Laser in the Black Budget?” Armscontrolwong.com – Blog (1 June 2004),
online: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/161/space-based-laser-in-the-black-budget.
2 Elizabeth Waldrop, “Weaponization of Outer Space: US Policy,” 29 Annals of Air and Space Law
(2004), at 1-28.
3 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security (Cambridge:
American Academy of Arts and Science, 2005), at 97.
4 US Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1 (2 August 2004), at 2
(the Counterspace Operations document represents the views of the USAF and not necessarily those of
the US Government); Marc J. Berkowitz, “National Space Policy and National Defense,” in Peter
Hayes, ed., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2000); Everett Dolman, Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass,
2002); Tom Wilson, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities,” Prepared for the Commission to
Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (2003), online:
Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#33.
5 Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael D. Miller, and Calvin Shipbaugh,
Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002).
6 J.C. McDowell, personal communication with author (3 April 2005).
7 J.C. McDowell, “The Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, A Short History,” publication
in preparation; personal communication with author (3 April 2005).
8 Robert Scheer, “Pssst. Want to Know a Secret? Just Ask Teller,” Los Angeles Times (25 May 1999);
Joseph Nilsen, “Legacy of the X-ray Laser Program” (November 1994), online: Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory http://www.llnl.gov/etr/pdfs/11_94.2.pdf; Ball Aerospace, “Relay Mirror
Experiment,” online: http://www.ball.com/aerospace/rme.html; Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J.
A. Edwards, Michael D. Miller, and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons, Earth Wars; Michael Krepon
and Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003); Ball Aerospace, “Brilliant Pebbles: Fact
Sheet,” online: http://www.ball.com/aerospace/bpebbles.html.
9 Mark Wade, “Chronology 2004,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, online: http://www.astronautix.com/;
Jonathan McDowell, “Satellite Catalogue and Launch Catalogue,” Jonathan’s Space Report, online:
http://planet4589.org/space/log/satcat.txt.
260
Space Security 2008
10 “Space Based Laser Put on Hold,” Arms Control Today (December 2002).
11 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, at 89.
12 “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007,” Report of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives on H.R. 5122 (109-452) (5 May 2006), online:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/hr109-452/preliminary.pdf.
13 David Pugliese, “US Wants to Build Space Laser in Total Secrecy: Weapon Could Be in Use Before it’s
Made Public, Canadian Military Fears,” Ottawa Citizen (1 July 2004).
14 US Naval Research Laboratory, “Clementine – DSPSC” (2002), online: http://www.cmf.nrl.navy.mil/
clementine/; NASA-GSFC, “Clementine Project Information,” online: http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/
planetary/clementine.html.
15 Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Exhibit R-2 RDT&E Budget Item Justification” (February 2004),
online: Defense Technical Informational Center http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/
Y2005/MDA/0603886C.pdf.
16 David Ruppe, “House Committee Cuts Space Interceptor Test Program,” Global Security Newswire
(15 June 2004), online: Nuclear Threat Initiative http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/6/15/
ed3ecef6-efb6-4740-a39c-b49388ec20a9.html; Jeremy Singer, “MDA to remove “kill vehicle” sensor
from NFIRE,” Space News (23 August 2004).
17 Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman, and Victoria Samson, “Space Weapons Spending in the FY
2007 Defense Budget,” Center for Defense Information (6 March 2006), online:
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FY07SpaceWeapons.pdf.
18 Air Force Material Command, “Microsatellite Propulsion Experiment Industry Day” (30 August
2004), online: SpaceRef.com http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=13807.
19 Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Exhibit R-2 RDT&E Budget Item Justification.”
20 Rick Lehner, “Missile Defense Research Satellite Launched,” Missile Defense Agency Press Release
(24 April 2007).
21 Sam Black, “Evolution of the Space Test Bed,” Center for Defense Information (21 March 2007),
online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3884.
22 “House, Senate Authorizers Block Space-Based Interceptor Funding,” Inside Missile Defense
(25 October 2006).
23 David Barton, Roger W. Falcone, Daniel Kleppner, Frederick K. Lamb, Ming K. Lau, Harvey L.
Lynch, David E. Moncton, L. David Montague, David E. Mosher, William C. Priedhorsky, Maury
Tigner, and David R. Vaughan, Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-phase
Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues (American Physical Society,
15 July 2003), online: http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm.
24 David Barton, Roger W. Falcone, Daniel Kleppner, Frederick K. Lamb, Ming K. Lau, Harvey L.
Lynch, David E. Moncton, L. David Montague, David E. Mosher, William C. Priedhorsky, Maury
Tigner, and David R. Vaughan, Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-phase
Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues.
25 Congressional Budget Office, “Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense” (July 2004), online:
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5679&type=1.
26 Missile Defense Agency, Press Release, “Missile Defense Research Satellite Launched” (24 April 2007),
online: NASA Wallops Flight Facility http://www.nasa.gov/centers/wallops/pdf/
175157main_07news00312.pdf.
27 General Dynamics, Fact Sheet, “Near Field Infrared Experiment Fact Sheet” (1 December 2005),
online: NASA Wallops Flight Facility http://www.nasa.gov/centers/wallops/pdf/
175158main_NFIREdatasheet.pdf.
28 Phillip Coyle, “Status of US Missile Defense Programs,” presented at the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in South Asia: A Global Perspective, Berlin, Germany (8 October 2007), online:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/BerlinPPT/MondaySessionOne/
CoyleBerlin5.pdf; Jeremy Singer, “NFIRE Goes to Work; Second Test Scheduled for October,” Space
News (6 September 2007).
29 Jeremy Singer, “NFIRE Goes to Work; Second Test Scheduled for October.”
261
Endnotes
Space Security 2008
30 Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget: Programs of Interest,” Center for
Defense Information (19 December 2007), online: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?
documentid=4131&programID=68&from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm.
31 Jeremy Singer, “Tests Ease Overheating Concerns with MKV Technology,” Space News (18 October
2005); Jeffrey Lewis, “Multiple Kill Vehicles,” Arms Control Wonk — Blog (12 September 2005),
online: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/781/multiple-kill-vehicles-mkv.
32 Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Missile Defense Space Test Bed” (May 2007), online:
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/space-test-bed.html.
33 US House of Representatives, “House and Senate Conference Report on H.R. 3222” (6 November
2007), at 316, online: http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_hr3222crtxt.pdf.
34 Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael D. Miller, and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space
Weapons, Earth Wars; Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against
Weaponizing Space; Bruce deBlois, Richard Garwin, Scott Kemp, and Jeremy Marwell, “Space
Weapons Crossing the US Rubicon,” 29 International Security (Fall 2004), at 50-84.
35 Marcia S. Smith, “Chinese Space Program: An Overview,” CRS Report for Congress RS21641
(18 October 2005), online: Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/RS21641.pdf.
36 John Pike and Peter Voth, “Current Plans for Missile Defence,” Disarmament Forum, No. 1 (2001),
at 7.
37 Victoria Samson, “A Contender for SBIRS High,” Space News Business Report (13 March 2006),
online: Space.com http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/SamsonOpEd_031306.html.
38 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Spirale 1, 2,” Gunter’s Space Page, online: http://www.skyrocket.de/space/
index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/spirale-1.htm.
39 Formerly called Force Application and Launch from Continental US program (FALCON) but the
acronym was dropped when the program ended its strike component.
40 Space Exploration Technologies, “Company Description,” online: http://www.spacex.com/(date
accessed: 10 July 2008).
41 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, at 104.
42 China has developed significant capacity in gas, chemical, dye, excimer, solid-state, semi-conductor,
and free electron lasers, both for pulse and continuous wave functions. Subtypes developed by China
include krypton-fluoride, helium-argon-xenon, neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet
(Nd:YAG), oxygen-iodine, carbon-dioxide, neodymium glass (Nd:Glass), titanium-sapphire, quantum
cascade, xenon-fluoride, both infrared and X-ray free electron lasers, and others. See the Chinese
journals Chinese Journal of Lasers, Infrared and Laser Engineering, High Powered Laser and Particle
Beams, Chinese Optics Letters, and Laser and Infrared. Sun Chengwei, Zhang Ning and Du Xiangwan,
“Recent developments of Chinese activities in lasers and laser beam interactions with materials,”
AIAA-1995-1920, 26th Plasmadynamics and Lasers Conference, San Diego, CA (19-22 June 1995),
online: http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406&gTable=mtgpaper&gID=82509; Huang He,
“A Dust-Laden Secret: Review and Prospects for China’s Optical Instruments and Laser Weapons,”
Defense International (1 April 1998), at 100-115; “LD-Pumped Nd: YAG Microchip Laser with
62.5MW CW Output Power,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (3 May 1994); “Ti-Sapphire Laser Attains
CW Output Power of 650MW,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (December 1994); Hui Zhongxi, “Sg-1 FEL
Amplifier Output Reaches 140MW,” High Power Laser and Particle Beams (December 1994); “A GW
Power Level High Power CO2 Laser System,” Chinese Journal of Lasers (June 1990); IAEA, “World
Survey of Activities in Controlled Fusion Research, Special Supplement” ( 2001), online:
http://epub.iaea.org/fusion/public/ws01/ws_toc.html; “Directed Energy Weapons and Sensors,” in
China’s Aerospace and Defence Industry, Jane’s Chem-Bio Web (1 December 2000); Mark A. Stokes,
“China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States,” Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College (September 1999), online:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB74.pdf.
43 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, at 134.
44 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, at 74.
45 Uranium Information Centre, Briefing Paper 8, “Nuclear Reactors in Space” (January 2004), online:
http://www.uic.com.au/nip82.htm.
262
Endnotes
263
46 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Military Satellites,” Gunter’s Space Page, online:
http://www.skyrocket.de/space/sat.htm.
47 “China to launch first space solar telescope in 2008,” Press Trust of India (24 October 2004).
48 European Space Agency, “Crew Return Vehicle for the International Space Station,” online:
http://www.esa.int/esaHS/ESARZS0VMOC_iss_0.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
49 CNES, “CNES and Aquitaine Regional Council join forces for atmospheric re-entry programmes”
(8 November 2004), online: http://www.cnes.fr/html/_455_463_1545_2863_.php.
50 Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), “Research on Flight Demonstrations,” online:
http://www.ista.jaxa.jp/res/b01/0b02.html (date accessed: 10 July 2008).
51 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, at 59.
52 The SBSW section of the table does not imply the existence of a program for integrating these into an
actual SBSW system, nor the capability to deploy that SBSW, just the existence of some capability for
each of the necessary prerequisite technologies for that particular SBSW system. This clarification is
important since integration of these technologies into a working system, including testing, can take
many years. Nevertheless, with the prerequisite technologies in hand, the SBSW systems are
considerably closer to the reach of that actor. It is clear that only the US and Russia currently have all
the prerequisite technologies for SBSW systems.
53 The Galileo navigation system is an initiative of the European Commission of the EU in partnership
with the European Space Agency, which is responsible for the technical aspects of the project. All EU
members will have access to it, as well as Norway and Switzerland, who are ESA member states.
Additional international partners include Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
the US, and Russia. China will not have access to the encrypted service. See Civil Space and Global
Utilities Trend 3.4.
54 The capabilities in each prerequisite technology can vary a great deal. The filled square only indicates
that there is some capability.
55 Jeffrey Lewis, “ASATs and Crisis Instability,” Arms Control Wonk — Blog (15 April 2007), online:
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1455/asats-and-crisis-instability.
56 US House of Representatives, “House and Senate Conference Report on H.R. 3222,” at 210-211.
57 US House of Representatives, “House and Senate Conference Report on H.R. 3222,” at 820.
58 See technologies described in Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the
Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (31 October 2007), online: http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens/R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens.pdf.
59 Sharon Weinberger, “Blackswift: Return of the Space Plane,” Danger Room – Blog (13 August 2007),
online: Wired http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/blackswift-retu.html.
60 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Blackswift Program Solicitation,” 08-02, online:
http://www.arpa.mil/TTO/solicit/PS08-02/PS08-02.pdf.
61 Sharon Weinberger, “Blackswift Aircraft is Born; But Will it Survive?” Wired – Blog (18 September
2007), online: Wired http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/09/blackswift-is-b.html.
62 Sharon Weinberger, “Blackswift Aircraft is Born; But Will it Survive?”
63 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens.”
64 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 105.
65 David Arthur and Robie Samanta Roy, “Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,” Congressional
Budget Office (July 2004), at 43, online:
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/56xx/doc5679/07-22-MissileDefense.pdf.
66 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 26.
67 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 37.
68 Stephen Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens,” at 39.
69 Amy Butler, “STSS to Launch Next Summer,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report (29 November
2007), online: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/
stss112907.xml; Jeremy Singer, “MDA Delays Launch of Missile Tracking Satellites to 2008,” Space
News (18 June 2007).
Space Security 2008
70 “‘Focus On: Space Tracking and Surveillance System,’ – excerpted from Department of Defense’s
Missile Defense Agency’s STSS Fact Sheet and BMDS Booklet entitled ‘Missile Defense—Worldwide,’”
MilSat Magazine (May 2008), online: http://www.milsatmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?
number=2110085368.
71 “STSS’s Second Satellite Completes Thermal Vacuum Testing At Northrop Grumman,” Space War
(30 November 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/STSS_Second_Satellite_Completes_
Thermal_Vacuum_Testing_At_Northrop_Grumman_999.html; Northrop Grumman, News Release,
“Space Tracking and Surveillance System’s Second Satellite Completes Successful Thermal Vacuum
Testing at Northrop Grumman” (29 November 2007), online: http://www.irconnect.com/noc/
press/pages/news_releases.html?d=132265.
72 “STSS’s Second Satellite Completes Thermal Vacuum Testing At Northrop Grumman.”
73 “Space Tracking and Surveillance System Passes Two Critical Ground System Tests,” Space War
(14 August 2007), online: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Space_Tracking_And_Surveillance_
System_Passes_Two_Critical_Ground_System_Tests_999.html.
74 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 1585 (6 December 2007).
75 Embassy of the United States to the Czech Republic, “Missile Defense Cooperation” (1 February
2008), online: http://prague.usembassy.gov/md705_chronology.html.
76 Phillip Coyle, “Status of US Missile Defense Programs.”
77 “Compass Navigation Satellite System (BeiDou-2),” SinoDefence (3 February 2007), online:
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/beidou2.asp.
78 Wendy Grossman, “Will Galileo ever achieve orbit?” The Guardian (21 June 2007), online:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jun/21/guardianweeklytechnologysection.freeourdata.
79 Peter B. de Selding, “Galileo Constellation Opened to Competitive Bids,” Defense News (10
December 2007), online: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3230609&C=europe.
80 “Russia launches new generation of GLONASS satellites into orbit,” Pravda Online (26 December
2007), online: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/26-12-2007/103163-glonass-0.
81 “India joins Russian GPS system,” The Times of India (29 January 2007), online:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India_joins_Russian_GPS_system/articleshow/1502481.cms.
82 Missile Defense Agency, Press Release, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments Throughout 2007”
(14 January 2008), online: www.mda.mil/mdaLink/pdf/08news0002.pdf.
83 US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 1585,” Report 110-447 (6 December 2007), at 817.
264
SS
PP
AA
CC
EE
  SS
EE
CC
UU
RR
IITT
YY
22
00
00
88
S
P
A
C
E
S
E
C
U
R
IT
Y
.O
R
G
2008
SPACESECURITY.ORG
SPACE SECURITY
2008
SPACE SECURITY
“The Space Security Index is one of 
the finest examples of a comprehensive
approach to space security, and a most
positive contribution by civil society on
a topic of such momentous importance.”
Johannes C. Landman
Netherlands Ambassador for Multilateral
Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation, Permanent Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
“The Space Security Index is a unique
and exceptional annual endeavor to
provide the global community with
significant information concerning
security in outer space. By addressing
all of the relevant sectors that influence
space security, the Index is an
invaluable reference document for 
all space professionals.” 
Colonel Philip A. Meek 
Judge Advocate, United States Air Force,
(Ret.), and former Associate General 
Counsel (International Affairs), Department 
of the Air Force
“No one source is more valuable than
the Space Security Index to learn about
the present state of space activities.
Space is critical to protect the Earth’s
environment and to improve life for 
all of humanity. For the present and
future generations, we must preserve
outer space as the source of security
and wealth. The first step is to read
Space Security 2008.”
Dr. Setsuko Aoki 
Professor, of International Law, Faculty 
of Policy Management, Keio University
SPACESECURITY.ORG
“The Space Security Index remains an
extremely valuable source of both an
overview of what is going on overall in
space and of the state of play on the
most pressing space issue of our time –
making space secure for all users.”
Dr. John M. Logsdon
Charles A. Lindbergh Chair in Aerospace
History, National Air and Space Museum
“The Space Security Index continues to
provide an objective ‘one stop shopping’
resource for information related to
international space activities and their
potential consequences. It’s a must for
every space research bookshelf.”
Theresa Hitchens
Director, Center for Defense Information
“This well-researched and comprehensive
text has been fully updated once again
through the end of last year. For those
interested in the evolution of space
policy and its interrelationship with
security, the Space Security Index
remains the indispensable volume.”
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
Former Special Assistant to the President 
for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament
